


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
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I. T.

(G) [Nor can Direct Apprehension be defined as 'that in which there is absolutely the absence of the character of Remembrance.' For the mere addition of the word 'absolutely' does not free the definition from the objections put forward in paras. 222 *et. seq.*]

(248). The Opponent now states his definition of Direct Apprehension (*anubhava*, in a somewhat changed form :—'Direct Apprehension is that in which there is absolutely (*eva*) the absence of the character of Remembrance.' But this does not improve matters. For what is the further point expressed by '*eva*'? It cannot be said to preclude the presence of the character of Remembrance, for this is already effected by the word 'absence'; *negation of presence* and *absence* meaning exactly the same thing. Should it be said that the word *eva* serves to preclude the co-abidance (in *anubhava*) of the presence of *smṛiṭṭva*,—we rejoin that this also is sufficiently expressed by the simple definition (without the addition of *eva*). Moreover the negation of Identity (of the co-abidance of the presence of *smṛiṭṭva*) would reside in Remembrance also; for surely Remembrance is not 'the co-abidance of the said presence' (and thus the definition would not exclude Remembrance.) Consider also that as you admit, in Remembrance, the presence (of the character of Remembrance) as well as the absence (i.e., the negation of Identity of the character of Remembrance), you thereby also admit the negation of the said co-abidance [and hence your definition fails to exclude Remembrance]. And further also consider that two negations are mutually destructive [and that hence the expression 'the negation of the co-abidance, etc.,' means in simple language that where there is the character of Remembrance, there the negation of that character is not; and this is tantamount to the, manifestly futile, assertion 'where the character of Remembrance exists, there it exists']. From the circumstance that in one substratum, *e. g.*, fire, colour and taste do not co-exist, it does not follow that they cannot co-exist anywhere [and in the same manner, the fact that the character of Remembrance and the negation of that character do not co-exist in Direct Apprehension furnishes no reason why they should not co-exist in another substratum, *e. g.*, Remembrance; and hence there would be

**Indian Thought*, Vol. II, Khāṇḍana continued from Vol. I, p. 354.

nothing incongruous in applying the definition to Remembrance also.]

(249). [Page 220.] But, our Opponent rejoins, when we actually find that the negation and non-negation (*i. e.* the 'negation of Identity' and its counter-entity, can co-abide in the same substrate, it cannot be proved that they are mutually destructive [and hence the said 'negation of co-abidance' cannot reside in Remembrance]. But in that case your own wish will be the only authority for giving the names 'negation' and 'non-negation' to such co-existent things, and not to Colour and Taste, which also are co-existent in some cases. * But, the Opponent explains, in the case of Colour and Taste we observe that they are not mutually destructive, and hence—in as much as in certain substrates, *e. g.*, Fire, one of them does not exist, we can regard them as *non-co-existent*; such however is not the case with the Negation and its counter-entity, (*i. e.*, 'the character of Remembrance' and the 'negation of Identity of that character' which being mutually destructive are yet found to co-exist in Remembrance and so cannot be regarded as *not-co-existent*).

In that case then, we rejoin, all that would be necessary for the *non-co-existence* of two things would be their not being mutually destructive; and this would mean that the absence of this fact, (*viz.*, of the two things being mutually destructive) is the condition necessary for their being regarded as co-existent; and this would lead to the conclusion that Colour and Taste (which are not mutually sublatory) can never co-exist (in any substrate)! and that negation and its counter-entity can never be co-existent!

(250). [Page 222]. 'What I mean,' the Opponent here may possibly say, 'is that Direct Apprehension is that wherein there is *always and necessarily* the non-co-existence of the character of Remembrance [and this does not apply to Remembrance which is not always such].' But this also, we reply, will not serve your purpose; because in this case also it will be as

* According to you 'negation of Identity' and its 'counter-entity' are found to co-exist in some cases, not in all. Similarly Colour and Taste co-exist in some substrates, not in all. Why then should the terms 'Negation' and 'Non-negation,' which you apply to the former, not be applied to the latter also?

difficult for you to give a satisfactory explanation of *eva* (*always* and *necessarily*) as on the previous occasion (para. 248). In the same manner we have also to reject the view that—"the negation meant is a peculiar kind of negation, (*viz.*, absolute negation) which can never abide in the same substrate as its counter-entity (and the *absolute negation* of the character of Remembrance can never co-exist with Remembrance; although the 'negation of the Identity' of that character can)." This position is untenable because the peculiar character of this Negation also is to be inferred only from the fact that it does not co-exist with its counter-entity—even though it be similar to other kinds of negation in being the denial of something capable of existence; and we have already shown that the *absence of co-existence* is equally present in the other kind of negation also [and thus no distinction has yet been established between the two kinds of negation—absolute Negation and Negation of Identity.]

The Opponent may here put forward the explanation that the peculiar character of absolute Negation is established by the fact that it is only with regard to this Negation that we have the actual *cognition* of the impossibility of co-existence. But even admitting this, the *fact of being co-existent*—to which the cognition relates—is found to reside in *Remembrance* also (which has been shown to be non-co-existent with the *character of Remembrance*). Should the Opponent explain that 'Direct Apprehension is that wherein we have that Negation of the character of Remembrance which is other than the *Negation of Identity*'—he lays himself open to all the objections which we have already brought forward against the definition of Direct Apprehension being 'that which is different from Remembrance.' Further discussion of this topic is needless.

(251). The first of the alternatives set forth (in para. 223) having thus been disposed of, we shall now show that the second and third alternatives also cannot be accepted, *viz.*, (b) that 'being devoid of the character of Remembrance' means 'having the character of a substrate which has the character of Remembrance for its counter-entity'; or (c) that means 'the Cognition of the character of this substrate.*' The fact is that the objections which we have put forward against the first alternative

* Both these views are held by the Prābhākaras.

apply to these views also, with equal force; in as much as according to you the conditions of the 'Negation of Identity' would be exactly the same as those of the ordinary (absolute) Negation. [And hence, as according to you Absolute Negation is nothing more than the particular substrate in which the counter-entity is not present; so the 'Negation of Identity' also would be nothing more than one of the counter-entities, or else the Cognition of it; and hence as the 'Negation of Identity' of the character of Remembrance would reside in 'Remembrance' also, the definition given in accordance with those alternatives also would apply to 'Remembrance.']

(252). The Opponent now proceeds to give a different interpretation of *saṃsargābhāva* (absolute negation). We have the absolute Negation of the character of Remembrance in a thing to which that character is denied as having any relation. Where, on the other hand, that character is only denied to be identical with the thing, we have not absolute Negation, but Negation of Identity. And it is not this latter negation which we mean by the negation appearing in our definition of Direct Apprehension; it is the former, i. e., Negation absolute, which is meant. But this explanation also will not stand scrutiny. For what, we ask, do you mean by the instrumental termination in the word *saṃsargītyā* : 'as having relationship' ? (1) Does that termination express a *characteristic feature* (*lakṣaṇa*) ? (2) Or does it mean *accompaniment* only ? Or is it used as one of the *kāraṇas* only, e. g., the instrument ?* The first of these alternatives is not possible; for the definition then might mean the 'Negation of Identity' of the *character of Remembrance* qualified by the *character of being related*; and (as this would apply to Remembrance also) the main objection thus would remain in force. Nor can the second alternative be accepted: You cannot deny that in Remembrance there is the *negation of*

* According to (1) the definition would mean 'there is negation of that character of Remembrance which is qualified by the character of being related'; according to 2) 'there is negation of the character of Remembrance *together* with the character of being related'; according to (3) 'there is negation which is brought about by the instrumentality of the character of being related.'

identity of the character of Remembrance along with the character of being related [and thus the objection remains]. Nor lastly, can the third alternative be maintained; for *absolute Negation* is not something that can be produced,* and it is absolute Negation that you are concerned with. [And hence the character of being related cannot be spoken of as instrumental towards bringing about that negation.]

(253). Should the Opponent rejoin that the instrumental ending (in *saṃsargitayā*) denotes *manner* or *method* (*prakāra*), we call on him to explain what he means by *method*. He may reply that method is just method; but this will not do; for unless, to a person who does not understand a thing, you give a *real* definition, (not merely an explanation of the thing by itself), you cannot prove to him that it excludes anything (which you maintain the instrumental ending to do). Were your proceeding allowed, the consequence would be that no enquirer would ever receive a real definition; if somebody asked you 'what is a jar'?—you might simply reply 'a jar is neither more nor less than a jar'! And if then an Opponent of yours should assert that your view of the Instrumental termination denoting *method* is not right and you should ask him 'what is the objection'?—he would do all that could be expected of him by replying 'the objection is neither more nor less than an objection.'

(H) [It has been shown that Direct Apprehension cannot be defined in a general way as that which has not the character of Remembrance. In the same manner it can be shown that we cannot define it as being without this or that particular characteristic of Remembrance; for the simple reason that it is not possible to mention any characteristic feature of Remembrance; that is, it is not possible to define Remembrance.]

(254). The same arguments set forth so far to prove that Direct Apprehension cannot be defined as that which is devoid of the character of Remembrance, prove also that it cannot be defined as that which is devoid of any other characteristic

* It is only *dhvamsa* that can be produced.

feature of Remembrance. One may define Remembrance as 'the cognition of that which has been previously cognized'; but this definition will extend to all so-called 'stream-cognitions,' (*i.e.*, series of closely successive cognitions in which each member is exactly like the preceding one). Or again, Remembrance may be defined as that recognition which is *dependent or relative*—the dependence or relation consisting therein that for the specification of its object (the thing remembered), it depends on, or refers to, a previous cognition of that object. But this definition also does not stand the test; for on it the character of Remembrance will have to be allowed to the idea of the *that* which enters into all *recognition* ('*this* thing is *that* thing which I cognized on a previous occasion'). You will say that there is no harm if it be so. But then we meet you by pointing out that in that case all Recognition would consist of two independent factors—one of Direct Apprehension referring to *this*, and one of Remembrance, referring to *that*; and as thus the two objects would be apprehended by two distinct acts of cognition, by what cognition would the identity of the two objects be apprehended? (and it is just this identity of the *this* and the *that* which constitutes the object of Recognition). And thus you would lay yourself open to the objection set forth by us before. A third definition of Remembrance may be given:—'Remembrance is cognition produced by impressions alone.' But this we reject on the ground that the characteristic mentioned is a quite impossible one, in as much as all kinds of cognition (including Remembrance) are due to certain aggregates of causes (the Self, the internal organ, the contact of the two, etc.) [And thus there can be no cognition due to impressions *only*]. A fourth definition may be given:—'Remembrance is that cognition in the bringing about of which impressions are the special distinctive cause.' But this definition would apply also to the recognition of one's self (the judgment of personal identity) which expresses itself in the form 'I am that (person I was before)' (which has no other peculiar cause but an impression); and as regards the contact of the Self and the internal organ this is common to all cognitions. [Hence impressions alone might be regarded as the peculiar cause, but this is found in the case of Recognition of the Self also]. And further, we could speak of *one* cause of

Remembrance, (*viz.*, impressions) only if we could form the comprehensive conception of one generic entity 'Remembrance' which would be the effect of that cause; but so far you have not been able to establish the existence of such a generic entity and hence you cannot ascertain its cause. And further, if you were to succeed in explaining the character of that generic entity, that explanation itself would at once supply the definition of Remembrance, and there would be no further occasion for that definition of yours which we are at present criticizing. The Bhāttas finally make the following distinction:—'Direct Apprehension (*anubhāra*) is that cognition through which the *object* is rendered *cognized*; Remembrance is that cognition through which *that which was cognized* before is rendered *cognized*.' But on these definitions the character of Remembrance will have to be allowed to such inferential cognitions as 'the thing is already known,' or 'the thing will be known, etc.,' (where that which is *cognized* already is cognized through the Inference.)

(255.) [Page 228.] Thus then we conclude that it is not possible to distinguish Remembrance (from Direct Apprehension)—(1) either on the ground of the different character of its object; for the same object would belong also to the Direct Apprehension arising from the verbal assertion of that definition of Remembrance;—* (2) or on the ground of their respective causes and effects; since of such causes and effects no previous comprehensive conception can be formed;—(3) or on the ground of the idea that the two constitute distinct generic entities or classes; since we have shown that the two classes would overlap.

(256). Nor can we accept the fourth alternative definition of 'Direct Apprehension' given in para 179, *viz.*, that it is 'that kind of cognition the specific cause of which is such as to come into existence just before the cognition.' For unless we know the distinctive character of the effect (Remembrance), how can we ascertain the cause? and wherein are we to cognize the specific character 'of the effect'?

* On the distinction referred to Remembrance will be defined as 'that which apprehends an object already apprehended.' But this verbal assertion also causes the apprehension of such an object, and hence would also have to be regarded as 'Remembrance.'

I [Having proved the inadequacy of the definition 'tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā' by showing that neither *tattva* nor *anubhūti* can be satisfactorily defined, the author now proceeds to consider the said definition of *pramā* as a whole.]

(257.) [Page 229.] And, further, the Logician is not only incapable to give an account of the meaning and the distinctive function of each of the terms of the definition ('tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā'); we shall show, in addition, that there are objections to the definition as a whole. The definition 'Right cognition is the direct apprehension of the real nature of things' would include, under the category of valid knowledge, those cognitions also which happen to be right by mere chance, as the cognition referring to the 'crow and the palm tree.'* Such cognitions take place not unfrequently. A man may, *e. g.*, close his hand over five shells and ask 'how many shells are in my hand?'—the person asked, by the merest fluke, gives the right reply 'there are five'; this being due to mere fortuitous coincidence as in 'the case of the goat and the sword.† But as the (true) cognition of *five* is in the mind of the questioner and the person questioned, this also might be classed as a case of *pramā*. It would not be excluded by the term 'true nature' or 'true condition' of things (*tattva*) in the definition; for as the number is *really* five the cognition cannot be called (*unreal* or *false*.) Nor would it be excluded by the word *anubhūti* (*direct apprehension*); for it is a cognition, a something not previously cognized, and hence destitute of the characteristic feature of *Remembrance*. Nor can it be argued that there being nothing to corroborate the cognition in question, it must be held to be a mere 'doubt' in the speaker's mind; the statement of one

* A crow alights on a palm tree just at the moment when one of the fruits of the tree, being thoroughly ripe, is about to detach itself from the tree and fall. A spectator concludes that the falling of the fruit is caused by the contact of tree and bird. This happens to be true in the given particular case, and the cognition though not generally valid thus might be classed as *pramā* as defined above.

† A goat rubs itself against a pillar from which a sword is loosely suspended; the sword falls and cuts the goat's throat. That the rubbing of its body against the pillar causes the death of the goat is a mere chance coincidence.

alternative only being like the case of the cultivator.* For the two cases are not parallel; in as much as the thought in the cultivator's mind must be viewed as a case of undoubting certainty as to one alternative; when all the requisite conditions are present he really feels certain with regard to the goodness of the harvest. Otherwise (*i. e.*, if we allowed that certainty as to one of several possible alternatives has to be classed as *doubt*; in other words if *certainty* were classed as *doubt*), real *doubts* might, on their part, be viewed as the combination of certainties with regard to several alternatives! Nor finally can the cognitions under discussion (*i. e.*, those cognitions which happen to be right by mere chance) be declared to be truly valid cognition (*pramā*), since they cannot be included in perception or any other kind of valid cognition.

(258.) [Page 231] The Opponent now may suggest that the definition should be amplified by the specification that cognitions to be valid (*pramā*) must be produced by instruments of cognition which never go astray (are unfailingly correct). But then, we point out, the word *tattva* (reality) becomes quite useless. Moreover, you are not able to contend that those cognitions discussed above, which turn out to be right by chance, are produced by faulty instrumentality (and hence the definition now proposed does not exclude them from *pramā*). If you were to maintain this, you would thereby admit the possibility of correct cognitions being brought about by faulty instruments; for the correctness of the cognition would not come about without some instrumentality; since, if this were so, the absence of a determining agency would give rise to a most confusing extension of the principle (for, if no specific cause were required for such chance cognition, they might arise at any time and any place). And as these cognitions are as a matter of fact correct, you are bound by an instrumentality which is definitely and

* The cultivator at bottom doubts whether the harvest will be good or not; but all the same he confidently asserts that it will be good. So in the case under discussion it might be said that although a person may say, with apparent confidence, that the questioner's hand holds five shells, he in reality doubts whether there be five or some other number, so that his cognition would have to be classed not as *pramā* but as *saṃshaya*.

exclusively connected with correct cognition. 'What is that instrumentality?'—the Opponent asks. It is your business, we reply, to give the answer to this question! And the answer must be such that the cognitions under discussion may be included in the well-known group of valid cognitions. Or else, you should try to exclude it from that group by a general definition of right cognition. [And this is not possible, in the case of those chance cognitions which happen to turn out right.]

(259). [Page 232.] Similar cases of cognitions being right by chance are to be met with in the sphere of Inference. The cognition of a certain subject of a conclusion (as *e. g.*, 'fire on a mountain) which is founded on a false reason (*e. g.*, fog which is mistaken for smoke), may be correct, in as much as, by chance, the mountain may have fire as well as smoke (in addition to the fog) or fire alone. This cognition would indeed not be right in so far as relating to the *probans* (*i. e.*, the fog which is mistaken for smoke); nor would it be right with regard to the 'subject' of the conclusion as possessing that 'mark'; yet as far as the *fire-factor* of the subject is concerned—viewed either by itself or as possessing a 'mark' other than the one perceived—the cognition relating to the fire must, under the aforesaid conditions, be held to be right or valid. Hence on the basis of this cognition also (which will have to be included in the category of *right cognition*), there is no escape for you from the aforesaid objection.

It might possibly be argued that as the inferential cognition in question is brought about by a wrong instrumentality, the object of the cognition must be something other than the real fire on the mountain (and that hence the cognition is not one of the *realitū* of things). But, we rejoin, although the individual object of cognition may be other (in as much as it is *really* not fire inferred from smoke), there is true cognition as far as the *generic character* of the object is concerned*; and consequently the objection remains in force. The

Opponent may reply that since the special case, *i. e.*, the subject and the reason of the special case of inference, (which is under discussion) falls under the category of the connexion of two generic entities, and since in the given instance the special

* The cognition of *fire* in general is true; for *fire* actually is present on the hill.

connexion which presents itself to consciousness is unfounded (false), the generic fire also (which you hold to be truly cognized) must be false ; and that hence the objection urged does not hold good. But this also we cannot concede. For it must be admitted that even in cases where there is no cognition of individual character the individual is cognized in so far as it possesses generic character ; in a case, *e.g.*, where we are in doubt whether something belongs to Devadaṭṭa or to Yajñadaṭṭa, we yet cognize definitely that, it belongs, to a man. In fact, if in all cases of cognition of relations any individual case were to come in its purely individual character, it would be quite impossible to have any comprehensive notions of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) and the like.* Then again, (although we might admit that you are right with regard to the cognition of individual things), in cases of wrong inferential cognition of generic entities (which although produced by a wrong instrumentality, may happen to be right by chance),† there clearly is no room for assuming the cognition of any other individual (since a generic entity is *one* only, and cannot be looked upon as being itself an individual included in a higher genus : there is no *goṭvaṭva* of *goṭva*). Should our Opponent maintain that in this case also what is cognised is a generic character and its inherence in an individual ; both of which, (*i. e.*, character and inherence) are other than what really exists (so that the cognition is not, as we maintain, substantially right, but false);—then he, abandoning the *anyathākhyāti*-view, lapses into *asaṭkhyāti*.‡ It might possibly be argued that what takes place in the case of the inferential cognition in question is that some special attribute of the generic entity is, erroneously identified with the generic character itself, (*goṭva*,

* We could never arrive at the *vyāpti* 'wherever there is smoke there is fire,' unless we dropped all individual characteristics of particular fires and smokes and formed pure general notions of the two.

† As when a man mistaking some cloth tied round the neck of a cow for a dewlap, would infer therefrom the 'goṭva' of the animal ; the cognition of *goṭva* would be right although brought about by a wrong instrumentality.

‡ Compare, on these two philosophical views, *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 176 et. seq.

The *anyathākhyāti* theory is the one held by the Logician ; but, as the text remarks, his argumentation in the present case, as to the nature of inferences which are true by accident only, lands him in the *asaṭkhyāti*-theory.

e. g., being erroneously inferred, while all that really should be inferred is the form and colour of a cow.) But this also does not establish your case ; for even thus (the conception would be wrong only in so far as that *identity* is concerned and) as far as the generic entity possessing that attribute is concerned, the cognition would remain as right and valid as before. Moreover, it has to be considered that in the case under discussion the causal conditions are such only as to produce the notion of connexion (between the generic entity and the attribute), and hence cannot give rise to the (erroneous) notion of identity of the two : specially would this be so in the case of an inference that is put forth for convincing another person,—where the conditions present are such as only to bring about the notion of relation (not identity) of the things to which the inferential reasoning refers. And if, in the face of all this, we were to assume the notion of identity, there would be left no ground for any definite rule regarding the different causes giving rise to the different kinds of misconception, (for then, any misconception might arise from any cause.)

(260). [Page 235.] Then again, (even though we admit your contention in the above case) what would be your view with regard to the case where a person has the misconception in the form—‘I have inferred the *relation* of the generic character (*gotva*) in this individual—this is verily a cow’ [where the inference is of the *relation*, while the ultimate Cognition is of *identity*]? What, further, would be your view regarding that kind of ‘fallacious inference’ which is called ‘*siddha-sādhana*’ (‘proving what is already proved or known’)? [In which case the final cognition resulting from the inferential process, is of *ṭaṭṭva*, and hence valid ; although the instrumentality through which it is brought about may be found fault with]. Should you maintain that here also the thing cognised is *other* than the real thing, you contradict what the very name of the fallacy expresses, *viz.*, that the thing inferred is *proved* (admitted to be real) already. If, on the other hand, the thing proved were held to be true (real), this would imply the admission that a fallacious inference brings about the cognition of what is real ; and as this would break through the

general principle ('that no fallacious argument can produce right cognition'), we should not be justified in assuming, even in the case of other fallacious inferences, that the thing cognised by their means is other than the real thing. In any case (even though you succeed in finding some explanation for the other fallacious reasonings) you will have no basis for distinguishing the '*siḍḍhasādhana* inference' (from a valid inference).

SECTION (15.)

[In the second place, *Pramā*, Right Cognition, cannot be defined as that 'anubhava,' *direct apprehension*, which is '*yathārtha*,' i.e. in keeping *with the thing as it is*; because no adequate explanation of what constitutes '*yathārtha*' can be given.]

(261.) [Page 236.] The definition of Right Cognition as *the direct apprehension of the thing as it really is* is also not tenable. Because, what is the meaning of the apprehension being 'in consonance with the thing as it is?' Does it mean that it has the *tattva* of the thing as its object? Or, that it is similar to the thing? It cannot be the former; as that has already been refuted (by our showing that it is impossible to define '*tattva*' or *this-ness*.) Nor is the second explanation possible; because the wrong cognition—also having this similarity to the thing that both are 'knowable' (a term that includes all conceivable cognitions and things), that also would have to be regarded as '*pramā*,' 'Right Cognition.' The logician will perhaps urge as follows:—"The similarity that is meant (to subsist between the right cognition and its object) is in that form of the thing which is objectified by the cognition (and in wrong cognition, the thing objectified by the cognition is entirely dissimilar to the thing as it exists); nor is this position vitiated by the argument that—even in wrong cognition the *knowability* of the thing cognised may be manifested [when, e.g., the *shell* is cognised as *silver*, this wrong cognition appears in the form *this silver is knowable*, in which case the cognition is quite similar to that form of the thing—viz., *knowability*—

which is objectified by that cognition]; and in such cases the wrong cognition would become included in the said definition of Right Cognition;—this argument cannot vitiate the logician's view; because, so far as the factor of 'knowability' is concerned, when this factor does become manifest in the cognition, the cognition is certainly to be regarded as *right*, even though it may be quite wrong as regards the other factors objectified by (entering into, the cognition." This, we reply, cannot be right; because as a matter of fact, the logician accepts as Right Cognition the cognition of things (the jar, for instance) as having colour and such other qualities inhering in them [as when we have the cognition—'the jar has colour inherent in it']; and yet in this case the cognition is not held to be similar to the object in that form of it which is manifested; as what is manifested in, or objectified by, the cognition, is *the character of having colour and inhering in it*, while the form of the object (the jar, for instance) is something totally different; [and thus with the qualifying explanation given by the Logician, the definition becomes too narrow, failing to include a cognition that he recognises as *right*.]

(262.) [Page 237.] The Logician explains—"What we meant by the apprehension being similar to the object is that it has for its qualification—it is qualified by—that form which is manifested in that apprehension; consequently in the case cited—that of the jar being cognised as having colour inhering in it—the colour is manifested in this cognition only as a qualification inhering in the object; and as such, it becomes a qualification of the cognition also (which thus comes to be similar to the object, in that both have the same qualification)."

This is not right, we reply; because in that case when the shell is cognised as *silver* 'before me,' the cognition will have to be accepted as *right*, because what is manifested is the character of *being before the cogniser*, as the qualification of the thing cognised, and this same would, *ex hypothesi*, be the qualification of the cognition also (which would, thus 'be similar to the cognised thing in the form that is manifested in the cognition.' The Logician retorts—"In so far, the cognition in question is certainly accepted as right, and as such

it is not reasonable to urge this as an incongruity.” This answer will not serve your purpose, we reply; because in that case, the epithet ‘in keeping with the thing’ in the definition, would be quite superfluous; because there would be no incongruity, according to you, even if Right Cognition were defined simply as ‘apprehension’; because all the so-called wrong cognitions, would ultimately have some object for themselves, according to the *Anyathākhyāti* view (by which in wrong cognition, though one thing is cognised as another thing, what is cognised is a *thing* all the same); whereby, in so far as the *character of being a thing* would be manifested in the cognitions,—which character is certainly present in the thing cognised,—it would become possible for all wrong cognitions, to be accepted as ‘right’; and thereby ‘Right Cognition’ would become synonymous with ‘cognition’ or ‘apprehension.’ If then, you seek to introduce the epithet ‘in keeping with the thing’ for the purpose of excluding all cognitions that might differ from the actual thing even in the slightest detail,—then in that case, the definition remains open to the objection urged against it at the very outset.

(263.) The Logician supplies another explanation of ‘similarity’:—“We regard that cognition as *right* which is similar to the thing cognised, in having for its qualification the entire form (of the thing) manifested in the cognition; nor is this explanation open to the objection that the thing, (in its entire form, though a qualification of the cognition) cannot be the qualification of itself (and therefore there would be no similarity between the thing and the cognition);—because the thing could be regarded as its own qualification in so far as it serves to exclude things other than itself.” This explanation also, we reply, cannot be accepted; because in that case, the wrong cognition would not be *right*, even so far as being the cognition of a *thing*; because in this case the cognition is not similar to the cognised thing in its entire form.* Then again, if you are prepared to take the bold step of casting the correct portion of the cognition into the realms of ‘wrong

* When the shell is cognised as *silver*, so far as the cognition is of a *thing*, it is right; it is only when it comes to the detailed character of the thing that the incompatibility and wrongness come in.

cognition,' not paying any regard to its inherent correctness,—then why do you not take the similar step of regarding the wrong portion of the misconception as right, in consideration of the correctness of the right portion of it? And in this manner you are quite free to define 'Right Cognition' as 'Direct Apprehension' (*Anubhūtiṭva*), or 'Apprehension' (*Jñānaṭva*), and so forth.

(264). Then again, if a certain cognition which is wrong in one part, be regarded as wrong even in that part of it which is right,—[this rightness or wrongness being determined by its being sublated or not sublated],—then we would have to regard as wrong that perception which we have of the jar on the house-top in a dark night; as in this case the thing being at a great distance from us, the light of the moon or the flash of lightning which allows us to have a vision of it, does not enable us to see that part of it which is on the other side (of the light); and hence on this account the perception that we have is not that of the complete actual size of the thing, but only of a smaller size (and this perception *as regards the size* being wrong, the whole perception will have to be regarded as wrong).

And further, whether a cognition is sublatale or not can be ascertained only on finding that, when we actually go to act up in accordance with the cognition, we find the real state of things conforming to it; and if the criterion of correctness be as you say, then where could we find the corroborative instance of an activity that would pertain to all the details (of qualification, etc.) of the thing cognised,—such for instance, as the particular place, time, supply of light,* water and so forth,—by which corroboration alone the *correctness* of the cognition could be ascertained?

(265). Then again, if because one part of the cognition is found to be sublated, we were to regard as wrong that portion of it which is not sublatale, then, to the Idealist who would argue that—"because a certain thing has been found to be sublated (and hence unreal) in one case, it must be regarded as unreal even in cases where it is not so sublatale (and hence all things are unreal under all circumstances)"—what answer

* This would imply that the author had in view the cognition of real water and that of the mirage.

could you give, except the renouncing or throwing away of all the well-known instances of right cognition ?

(266). The Opponent says:—"A cognition is *right* only with reference to that particular manifested qualification of the thing on which is based its similarity to that thing; and thus the *rightness* depends upon the particular phase of the thing; * and it is with a view to this that we have added to the definition the qualification '*yathārtha*.' " This also cannot be, we reply; because in this manner all the rightness of cognitions would pertain to qualifications, and no cognition would be right as regards any *qualified* thing. In answer to this it might be urged that—"what is meant by a *qualification* in this connection is only a *differentiating factor*; and as things also do differentiate, by their connection, the properties belonging to them, these also may be spoken of as *qualifications*; and hence the reply loses its force." But this is not right; because even thus the undesirable contingency remains that the cognition cannot be right as regards the *qualified* factor (though it may be so as regards the qualification).

And further in the case of the cognition of *shell-silver*, the *character of silver* does differentiate and qualify the shell, the cognition being in the form—"this is that particular shell which appeared *as silver*." † In answer to this it might be added that—"the qualification meant is the *direct* one, while the *character of silver* can qualify the *shell* only indirectly through the cognition; and so the definition of *rightness* cannot apply to this." This also is not right, we reply. As in that case when we have the cognition '*this man carries a long stick*,' where the man is cognised as *man*, the qualified factor is cognised as distinguished from men carrying *short* sticks, the cognition would not be right, in as much as the qualification '*long-ness*' (which is the only basis of distinction) qualifies the man, not *directly*, but *indirectly*, through the stick.

* The *character of silver* is not a qualification of the *shell*; hence with reference to *that*, the cognition cannot be called '*right*.'

† This would be the form of the sublating judgment, and in this cognition also the shell would be qualified by the *character of silver*; and to that extent the previous cognition would be right.

Nor can it be asserted that, "the qualification meant must be such as is independent of the form of the cognition." *

As in that case, we would have to regard as *wrong* the cognition that 'such and such a thing has been *directly cognised*,' (where the qualification depends upon the cognition). Then, as for the answer that, "the qualification is in the form that is manifested in that same cognition," †—this is extremely puerile; because the *colour* and such other qualities that we cognise do not *qualify* the cognition (in the form 'I perceive the colour of the flower') through the relation of *inherence* (by which it resides in the flower).

It might be said that—"the restriction that we mean by saying 'in the form that is manifested in that cognition' is with regard to the qualifications of *objects*, and not to those of *Cognitions*."

But this cannot be; because in that case your definition would contain the restrictive clause 'in the form manifested in that particular cognition;' and as the one particular cognition could not be present in any other cognition, the definition would apply specially to one cognition only; and as such could not include *all right cognitions*.

SECTION 16.

[The author proceeds to refute the definition of Right Cognition proposed by Uḍayanāchārya, as *samyak-parichchhīṭi*, *right discernment*,—the objection against this being that the words of the definition are not amenable to any reasonable explanation.]

(267.) Nor will it be right to define Right Cognition as "*samyak-parichchhīṭi*." ‡ Because on account of objections already pointed out above, the qualification '*samyak*' cannot be explained either as *that which has the tattva (the real form of the thing) for its object*, or as *that which is in accord with the object*.

* This while excluding the qualification of *shell* by '*silver-ness*' will include the cognition of the long-sticked man.

† The character of *silver* is cognised as residing in the *shell* by the relation of *inherence*, while it resides in it only in the idea formed by the misconception.

‡ The sense of the objection is that the expression '*samyak-parichchhīṭi*' cannot be taken either as a non-compound, or a *karmadhāraya* compound; i.e., the word '*samyak*' cannot be taken as qualifying '*parichchhīṭi*'

(268)* “What we mean by ‘*samyak*’ is ‘entire’ or ‘whole’; in ordinary parlance we find it asserted—‘I perceived the thing only in a general way, and did not see it *entirely* (or well)’; hence the expression ‘*samyak-parchichhēṭi*’ is to be explained as the ‘*parichchheda*’ (discernment) of the ‘*samyak*’ (entire) thing.’ (A *Tatpuruṣa* compound);—or we may even take the word ‘*samyak*’ as coordinate (qualifying adjunct) to the *parichchheda*, taking the word ‘*samyak*’ to mean *that which has the ‘samyak’ thing for its object*. [A *Karmadhāraya* compound].”

(269.) [Page 243]. This cannot be, we reply. For, what do you mean by the ‘*sāmastya*,’ ‘entirety,’ of the thing? (1) Do you mean that the thing is present along with all its constituent parts? (2) Or that it is present, endowed with all its properties? It cannot mean the former; because in that case, the ‘*parichchheda*,’ or ‘discernment,’ of a thing devoid of constituent parts, as also the knowledge of those things with constituent parts which does not pertain (or take in) the intermediate parts (but views the thing as a whole),—will have to be regarded as *wrong*. Nor is the second meaning possible; as in that case all the cognitions of persons *not omniscient* will have to be regarded as *wrong*.

(270.) You will perhaps offer the following explanation:—“What is meant by the word ‘*samyak*’ is that the thing is cognised along with its distinguishing features; in ordinary parlance also, when they say ‘*na mayā samyak dṛiṣṭam*,’ what is meant is that ‘I have not seen the thing along with its distinguishing features (in detail, I have had only a cursory view of it).’ Hence what our definition means is that *Right Cognition is the discernment of the dharmin (thing with properties) along with its distinguishing features*. As regards wrong cognitions, &c., all these appear in a man who fails to notice the distinguishing features of the thing; and hence it is for the purpose of differentiating Right Cognition from all such cognitions that we have the qualification ‘*samyak*.’ As for the cognition of those ultimate specific qualities, which, by their very nature, cannot have any

* The questioner takes the compound as *tatpuruṣa*.

further distinguishing features,—even though these have no properties or distinguishing features, according to us, yet for these their own specific form would be regarded as the ‘distinguishing feature’ (for purposes of our definition).”

(271.) But this is not right; because what you say is that the thing is cognised along with its distinguishing features (and you do not say anything as to whether these features are the right ones); and hence in the case of the mistaken cognition of shell-silver also, as we have the cognition of the shell before us with the distinguishing feature of *being silver* or ‘silveriness,’—the cognition should have to be regarded as *right*. If again, you were to introduce into your definition the mention of the specific distinguishing features of each and everything cognised (whose cognition alone would be defined by such a definition), then, in that case, it would be impossible to get at an all-comprehensive definition of *Right Cognition*; while on the other hand, if you mention only the ‘distinguishing features’ in general terms, then, as shown above, the definition becomes too wide (including wrong cognitions also). And thus in either case, the definition remains faulty. Then again, as regards the ultimate Specific Qualities spoken of above, it may be that their very *form* constitutes the necessary ‘distinguishing feature’; but in this case the distinguishing feature would be identical with the thing cognised; and hence this latter could not be spoken of as ‘*accompanied by* its distinguishing features;’ and thus there would be no answer to the charge that the definition fails to include the cognition of these qualities.

(272.) Some people offer the following explanation:—“By the word ‘*viśeṣa*,’ or ‘distinguishing features,’ are meant those characteristics without the perception whereof we are liable to doubts and misconceptions, and the perception whereof enables us to ascertain whether the cognition is to be rejected or not; and until we are able to ascertain this, it is not possible to make any distinction between *truth* and *untruth*; and such distinction is absolutely necessary; as without this

PRELIMINARY NOTE.

The oldest commentary on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* known to us is that by Shabara Svāmin, published in the *Biblio. Indica*. The same series also contains the English translation of the 'Elucidations' of Kumārila Bhatta on Shabara's *Bhāṣya*.

It has been found that the translation of many passages of Kumārila's work loses its interest without the translation of the original. We have therefore undertaken the translation of Shabara's *Bhāṣya*; and with a view to make this work of greater usefulness, we are adding explanatory notes from the commentaries of Kumārila. It is expected that when complete, this work will contain the most authoritative and exhaustive exposition of the tenets of the Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsā system.

THE BHĀṢYA OF SHABARA SVĀMIN ON THE
MIMĀMSĀ-SŪTRAS OF JAIMINI.

*With Notes from the Shlokaṽartika of Kumāṛila
Bhaṭṭa.*

Sūtra.

(1) Now therefore an enquiry into the nature of duty.

Bhāṣya [Page 1, line 2 to P. 3, L. 24.]

The words of the Sūtras are, wherever possible, to be taken in those senses only which are given to them in ordinary usage and speech: no special sense is to be attributed to them by means of the assumption of ellipses or of special technical significations. In this way Vedic passages only are explained by the Sūtras; while otherwise (*i. e.*, if meanings other than the generally accepted ones were to be sought for the words of the Sūtras) the task would become a doubly onerous one, as comprising in the first place the explanation of Vedic texts and, in the second place, the explanation of the meaning of the Sūtras.

Now, in ordinary speech, the word *aṭha* ('now,' 'then') is observed to signify sequence to something that has happened. In the present case (*i. e.*, the use of the word *aṭha* as connected with *dharmajijñāṣā*) we do not indeed directly observe any such happening: all the same, we necessarily must assume the existence of some such event in immediate sequence to which the desire to investigate the nature of duty naturally arises. And further, that event must be something well-known. We hence naturally assume that the 'happening' (with which the *aṭha* connects itself) is the reading or study, (*adhyayana*) of the text of the Veda; for, after such study, the said desire of investigation is possible and natural. An objection is raised here—'The above reasoning is inconclusive; for nothing prevents the assumption that, even previous to the study of the Veda, the desire to investigate the nature of duty should arise,

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consequent upon some other event.' To this we reply as follows:—The Teacher (Jaimini) clearly uses the word *atha* with reference to such a desire to investigate Duty as is not possible without the study of the Veda ; for, as we shall see, the aphorisms are engaged in manifold discussions of Vedic texts (which clearly presuppose a knowledge of those texts). We do not indeed mean to teach that, previous to the study of the Veda, there can be no desire to know Duty, and, at the same time, that the enquiry into Duty follows upon such study. For this one sentence could not, on the one hand, preclude the enquiry into Duty previous to the study of the Veda, and on the other hand, also serve to announce that such enquiry is consequent upon the study. If this were so, the one sentence would be split up into two ; for, inasmuch as precluding enquiry into duty previous to study, the verbal construction of the sentence would be one totally different from that whereby it could teach that the enquiry follows upon study. As a matter of fact, we find that the sequence of the enquiry upon the study is enjoined in one sentence 'having studied the Vedas, etc.'; while an entirely opposite matter (preclusion, etc.) is mentioned in another sentence ; and it will be declared later on (Mīm. Sū. II-i-46) that two sentences can be construed as one only when they express a single meaning or purport.

When the study (or learning) of the Veda is completed, two courses of action are open to the student—returning home from the place of the teacher and pondering on the meaning of Vedic texts. What the aforesaid injunction advises the student to do then, is not to return home from the teacher's place ; for if he did that, how could he ponder on the Vedic texts ?

But, it is objected, if this were so, the advice could not imply previous study of the Veda. For what the text directly declares is that 'after having studied the Veda one should bathe' (the bath marking the termination of the student's stay at the teacher's place) ; and this direct injunction would be violated, if the disciple, having learned the Veda, and being about to bathe, were first to ponder on the Vedic texts. And, of course, direct declarations should not be violated !

We shall, our reply is, transgress direct injunctions even, if by not violating it we should render the Veda, which *Shabara 2.*

has a meaning or purport, destitute of such meaning or purport. We actually find that the Veda *has* a purport, *viz.*, the laying down and enjoining of certain actions. And the reverend teachers of sacrificial lore do not maintain that any result follows from the mere learning of the text of the Veda : the little good they do admit on that ground, is connected with so-called *arthavāda* passages only, as we shall see later on. Nor does the injunction referred to by you enjoin the immediate sequence of the bath to the study ; for there is no word that denotes *immediate* sequence. The past participle termination of *adhiṭya*, 'having read,' denotes only the precedence of the study, not the *immediate* sequence of the bathing. If there were such sequence, the study would lose its character of perceptible (*i. e.*, immediately evident) usefulness [for the mere learning of texts without the apprehension of their purport has no immediately evident use]. The best way, therefore, is to assign to those injunctive passages an immediately evident purport by attending to their implied meaning. The bath is not enjoined as having an 'unseen purport' (*i. e.*, a purport, not naturally evident, but of a mystic or transcendental character.) The text merely states by implication that the end of such special observances as abstinence from bathing, on the disciple's part, is contemporaneous with the end of Vedic study. In this way we avoid the assumption of unseen results for the injunctions 'having learned the Veda he is to bathe,' and 'do not return home from the place of the teacher.' We thus finally decide that the word *aṭha* intimates that the disciple, having previously completed the study of the Veda, should thereupon apply himself to the enquiry into Duty. We do not mean to say that there should be no enquiry into Duty after any other action ; we only declare that the disciple, after having done with the learning of the texts, should not hastily perform the bath, but should apply himself to an enquiry into Duty.

The word *aṭah* ('therefore') points to some antecedent event or state of things and has causal significance ; as when somebody says 'Food is easily procured in this country, I, *therefore*, live here.'—The learning of the Vedic texts is cognized as the cause of the wish to enquire into duty ; hence after such study Duty should be enquired into—such is the significance of the word *aṭah*. For somebody, who has not learned

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the Veda, would not be in a position to ponder on Vedic texts to the end of understanding *dharma*; 'therefore,' *i. e.*, for this reason, one should desire to investigate the nature of Duty—such is the signification of the word '*aṭah*.'

The compound word '*dharma-jijñāsā*' is to be taken to mean 'the desire to know. (in other words 'the investigation of' or 'enquiry into') duty.' "In what way then is Duty to be enquired into?" As follows:—It has to be enquired what Duty is; what its characteristic features are; what the means are to accomplish it; what *apparent* (but not real) means of accomplishment there are; and what the purport or aim of Duty is. An answer to the first and second of these questions is given in one aphorism, *viz.*, I. 1. 2. The other questions are dealt with in the *Sheṣa-lakṣaṇa* (III Aḍhyāya), where it is shown in what cases Duty refers to man, and in what other cases man holds a secondary position only. All these points are collectively referred to in the Sūtra under discussion (I. 1. 1.).

But,—another preliminary objection is raised—is Duty something *known ab initio*, or not so known? If it is known already, there can be no *desire* to know it. And if it is not known at all, it is all the less possible that there should be a desire to know it. Under these circumstances, we must ask—has this enquiry into the nature of Duty any sense or use, or not? The reply to this is, that with regard to the nature of Duty, there is great difference of opinion among learned men; some give one definition, others another. Hence, if a man were, in his course of action, to proceed upon some view of Duty without having previously duly enquired into the matter, he might fall into great trouble and sin. Therefore, there clearly must be a 'desire to know,' *i. e.*, an enquiry into, the nature of Duty. For we hold that Duty, if rightly understood and performed, leads the dutiful man to great happiness. The definition of Duty is next given.

[The purport of Shabara Svāmin's comment on the first aphorism is sufficiently clear, and the points he discusses are not, moreover, of general interest or importance; we, therefore, refrain from an analysis of the very lengthy elucidations which Kumārila Bhaṭṭa considers needful. What the two teachers are concerned to show is that the study of the *śāstra* is something

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indispensable, inasmuch as without it the disciple would be unable to derive from his previous, merely verbal and memorizing, study of the Veda, any guidance towards the due performance of practical religious Duty upon which happiness, both in this world and the next, depends. A difficulty arises owing to the fact that certain scriptural passages appear to demand that the disciple, as soon as he has *studied*, *i. e.*, duly memorized the Veda, should leave the house of his teacher and himself enter on the 'householder' stage of life ; so that no time would appear to be left for that systematic enquiry into the purport of the Veda which constitutes the *Mīmāṃsā-shāstra*. But the decision is, that there is no reason why the return home from the teacher's abode should take place immediately on the termination of the verbal study of the Veda ; and that hence the natural and suitable time for the systematic pondering of Vedic texts is a period intervening between that verbal study and the final withdrawal from the teacher's abode.]

Sūtra (2).

Duty (Dharma) is that matter the characteristic mark of which is Injunction (*choḍanā*).

Bhāṣya (p. 3, l. 26 to p. 4, l. 5).

The term *choḍanā* is used to denote such utterances as urge men to action ; as is shown by forms of expression such as 'being urged (prompted, instigated ; *choḍita*) by my teacher I am doing this.' And *lakṣaṇa* means that by means of which something is pointed out ; smoke, *e. g.*, is the characteristic indication of fire, it points to the existence of fire. And we hold that that which is pointed out by *choḍanā* serves to bring happiness to man. For Injunction (*i. e.*, Vedic Injunction) is capable to make us apprehend things past and future as well as present, things minute and subtle, things hidden, things far removed and the like ; all of which can not be effected by the senses and the other means of knowledge.

Vārtika 1-20.

[The first *Sūtra* having introduced Dharma as a suitable, indeed necessary, subject of enquiry, the second *Sūtra* proceeds
Shabara 5.

to define *ḍharma* as that *matter* or *purpose* (*artha*) of which injunction (*choḍanā*)—*i. e.*, those Vedic texts which are injunctive in form,—are the characteristic mark or indication (*lakṣaṇa*). The *Vārtika*, directly explains *lakṣaṇa* to mean either cause in general (*nimitta*), or the instrumental cause, of valid knowledge. This, though no doubt rightly indicating the implied meaning, is a somewhat too liberal rendering of the term : in agreement with the received meaning of *lakṣaṇa* we may very well say that *Ḍharma* is that of which Injunction is the characteristic mark, *viz.*, inasmuch as *Ḍharma* is to be known through Vedic Injunction only. The *Mīmāṃsaka*, at the outset of his exposition, is concerned to establish a rational basis for his theory of the direct and absolute authoritativeness of the *Veda*. All the generally recognised means of knowledge (Perception, Inference, etc.) are, he maintains, intrinsically authoritative inasmuch as they give rise to cognition (knowledge; *jñāna*). This view will be fully discussed later on ; at the present stage one main result of it is anticipated, *viz.*, that one of the generally recognized means of knowledge *śabdā* (*i. e.*, the *word*, or *words*, or *verbal statements*) also possesses that intrinsic authority ; and that hence that which is 'word' in the highest and truest sense, *viz.*, the body of verbal utterances (or *sentences* or *texts*) which is comprised under the term *Veda*, possesses intrinsic authority. 'Even with regard to absolute non-entities (such as the *horn* of a hare or a *man*) the word brings about some cognition or notion ; hence, as this (*viz.*, giving rise to ideas or cognitions) is its very nature, the word constitutes a valid means of knowledge, owing to (*i. e.*, on condition of there being) absence of special imperfections or defects (which in any given case may invalidate the authoritative character of the word),' (*Vā*, I. 2. 6). That certain lines of action result in the agent's happiness, while others have a contrary effect, would generally be recognised as a matter of common experience : this, however, is an aspect of conduct, on which the *Mīmāṃsaka*, and more generally the Hindu theorizer, does not dwell. To the *Mīmāṃsaka* at any rate, good action or conduct is such conduct as is prescribed by the *Veda* ; and that happiness, in some form or other, is the result of such conduct is something to be known only through express Vedic statement. It is express Vedic declaration only which tells us that he who

performs the Agniṣṭoma-Sacrifice will later on go to heaven (Svarga): neither Perception nor Inference have anything to say on this point. *Dharma* may, therefore, be defined as that matter the knowledge of which depends on the injunctive texts of the Veda. Perception indeed deals with the several factors which enter into duty, as *e. g.*, the material things offered in a sacrifice; but all these properly constitute *Duty*, or meritorious action, in so far only as they contribute towards the accomplishment of certain auspicious results; and that they have this power can be learned from the Veda only. 'It will be proved that substances, actions and accessories (of meritorious acts, such as sacrifices) have the character of *dharma*; but although these matters are objects of sense-perception, it is not in this aspect that the character of *dharma* belongs to them. That they are means to bring about happiness is learned from the Veda only, and it is in this aspect only that they have the character of *dharma*. *Dharma* therefore, does not fall within the sphere of Perception' (Vā. I. 2. 13-14.)]

Bhāṣya (p. 4, ll. 5-24).

But, it is objected, Vedic injunction (*choḍanā*) may also state what is untrue*; just as any ordinary non-Vedic statement; as when somebody says 'there are fruits on the bank of the river',—which statement may be true or may not be true.

It implies a self-contradiction, we reply, to assert that Injunction 'expresses' (speaks; *bravīti*), and at the same time to assert that it expresses what is not true. For to say that a statement *speaks* or *expresses* something, means that it brings about the idea or cognition of the thing, that it is the cause of its being cognized. Now if, owing to a Vedic statement, there arises in men's minds the cognition that heaven results from the performance of the Agnihoṭra sacrifice, how can it be asserted that this is *not* so (is untrue, unreal)? or, if it is *not* so, how can the idea (of its being so) arise? It is a contradiction to say that somebody has an idea of that which has no being (is unreal). Nor can it be maintained that injunctions such as '(let him, who is desirous of heaven, sacrifice)' give rise to a

* Read in text (Bibl. Ind.) p. 4, l. 5 'nanva/a/hābhū'am.'

(merely) doubtful cognition in the form 'does heaven result from the sacrifice, or does it not'? Nor can a thing which is cognized as certain be false (*mīṭhyā*). That cognition only is false which, after having originated, subsequently lapses (is set aside)—there arising a further cognition 'this is not so.' But the cognition brought about by a Vedic Injunction is not set aside at any time, or in the case of any person, under any conditions or at any place; hence it cannot but be true. As regards the ordinary assertions of daily life, they are accepted as true if they are made by a trustworthy person, or are vouched for by sense-perception; if, on the other hand, they come from untrustworthy persons, or do not rest on sense-perception, they must be held to be invalid, springing from the speaker's imagination only. For what is not ascertained by the senses cannot be cognized except through verbal statements. 'But, it may be said, the speaker may have learned the matter from the verbal assertion of another man (the latter then being the ultimate authority).' That other statement also, we reply, is no more authoritative than the first. In matters of this kind no assertions made by men can claim⁴ be authoritative; no more in fact than persons born blind are in a position to make authoritative assertions with regard to different colours.

[The portion of the Vārtika which deals with the above section of the Bhāṣya (and which extends from Vā. I. 2. 21 to 155) is of special interest inasmuch as undertaking to establish the fundamental Mīmāṃsā-tenet of the 'Self-authoritativeness' (intrinsic authoritativeness or validity; *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) of the Veda;—it having to be kept in view that the kernel of the Veda consists of those declarations in injunctive form which prompt men towards certain modes of action—of prevaillingly ceremonial or sacrificial character—by implicitly declaring that such action leads to beneficial results of various kinds.]

The *pūrvapakṣa* on this matter is set forth in Vā I. 1. 21-46.

"The Word always makes one apprehend a thing already apprehended by some other means of knowledge: like Remembrance it cannot possibly possess intrinsic authoritativeness" (22.)

Shabara 8.

[Remembrance (representation, *Smṛiti*) is not a means of original knowledge, and therefore not a *pramāṇa*. The argument of the text is that, like Remembrance, the 'Word' cannot by itself give rise to valid knowledge "*asya smṛitivan na svamahimnā prāmāṇyam*" *Nyā-ṛaṇ.*)]

"On the other hand, an idea of a thing not perceived by a man himself may quite properly be formed on the assertion of another man, provided it rest on the testimony of a trustworthy person, which implies that the thing was actually *perceived* by that person." (23).

"The fact is that no verbal assertion has ever been found true apart from perception and the like, either on the part of one's self or some other person. The same principle, applies to Vedic injunctions also" (24).

"Just as imagination (*pratibhā*) does not by itself constitute a source of valid knowledge, even though giving rise to distinct mental representations; so it is with Vedic statements also" (25).

"Vedic injunctions referring to Heaven, sacrifice, etc., are false, because the things with which they deal are not apprehended through Perception and the rest; they are as false as assertions made on such matters by Buddha and others." (26).

"Or else, we may argue—Vedic declarations are false because they are not made by trustworthy persons—like the talk of children or drunken men. Or else, we may disestablish the authoritativeness of the Veda on the ground that like Ether and the rest it is eternal." (27).

[The *Mīmāṃsaka* holds that the Veda is *not* the production of any man. This gives his opponent the opportunity of arguing that the Veda *not* being the work of a competent, trustworthy person cannot possess any authority. Or again, he may argue that the Veda being eternal, and uncreated, belongs to the class of eternal uncreated things such as Ether, none of which are sources of knowledge.]

“Or again, he may argue—Vedic injunctions depend for their authoritativeness on men, they can claim no intrinsic authority ; for they are verbal declarations, like the verbal declarations of ordinary people.” (28).

“Or else, he may argue—the authoritativeness of all words must be held to depend on (special good qualities of) men ; because it is something connected with words, just as want of authoritativeness (in words, which depends on certain defects of men, such as untrustworthiness).” (29).

“If good qualities of the speaker were not the cause of the authoritativeness of words, how could it be held that imperfections of the speakers are the cause of want of authoritativeness.” (30).

“This being thus, the authoritativeness of the Veda is difficult to acknowledge whether it has a human author or not ; and hence the Bhāṣya formulates the objection.” (31).

“What the Bhāṣya (in refutation of the objection), says as to the self-contradiction (implied in holding that a ‘statement’ ‘the expression of a sense’ can be *false*), would apply to the words of Buddha also, because no doubt these also give rise to ideas. The argument therefore is a futile one.” (32).

“With regard to all ideas (cognitions) the following question has to be considered ; is their authoritativeness (validity) or else non-authoritativeness, due to themselves or to something else ?” (33).

[With the above Kārikā there begins the final discussion of the question whether any means of knowledge (whether Perception, or Words, etc.) can claim intrinsic validity or not.]

“Some maintain that, since cognitions untrue by themselves cannot by any means be proved to be true, the validity as well as invalidity of cognitions is due to themselves (is intrinsic). Others hold that a cognition becomes valid or invalid from the ascertainment of either the excellences or the defects of the cause to which it is due.” (34).

Shabara 10.

“ But, as to the former view, both these qualities cannot possibly belong to cognition by itself since they are mutually contradictory ; and, as to the latter view, both cannot be due to something else, because this would leave cognition destitute of all essential character.” (35).

[It cannot belong to the essential nature of cognition to be valid as well as non-valid, for this would be self-contradictory. Nor can the validity as well as the non-validity of cognition, depend on the ascertainment of the excellences or defects of the source of cognition ; for this would imply that previous to such ascertainment, cognition is destitute of all essential character of its own.]

“ How indeed should it be possible that independently of all extraneous agency, a thing should have contradictory characters ? and, on the other hand, what should be the nature of cognition if intrinsically devoid of both these characteristics ? ” (36).

“ If, to remove the former difficulty, it were said that the contradiction vanishes if *some* cognitions are held to be naturally valid and *others* naturally non-valid,—yet without reference to something extraneous, it could not be determined which character (validity or non-validity) belongs to which particular cognitions.” (37).

[The meaning is that he who holds certain cognitions to be naturally valid and others non-valid cannot determine which are which, without reference to an external factor ; *i. e.* he abandons the theory of *intrinsic* validity or non-validity.]

“ Let, therefore, non-authoritativeness be considered as the natural character of cognitions, while their authoritativeness depends on something else.” (38).

“ The inference determining this conclusion may be formulated as follows : Since non-authoritativeness is something non-positive, (*i. e.*, a merely negative characteristic), it is not due to the imperfections of the cause of the cognition (but may be viewed as naturally belonging to it) ; authoritativeness, on the other hand, as being something real and positive, springs from the excellences or perfection of the source of cognition. If

Shabara 11.

validity belonged to all cognitions *naturally*, while absence of validity were due to an extrinsic cause, on what ground were one to deny validity to dream cognitions and the like?" (40).

"On my view, on the other hand, validity is not produced, in the case of dream cognitions, etc., because there is the absence of a cause of such validity; and hence there does not result the absurdity of an unreal thing (non-validity) being ascribed to a positive cause, (*i. e.*, the defects of the cause of cognition)." (41).

"The cause of the validity of cognitions are the excellences, or perfect condition, of the sources of cognition, *viz.*, the sense-organs and the rest. Such cause may ~~not~~ be absent in two different ways; the sense-organs, etc., may be defective (vitiated); or they may be non-existent at the time." (42).

[That a shell is mistaken for silver is due to the absence of the perfect state of the sense-organ—such perfect state being destroyed by certain defects; that unreal things are presented to the dreamer's mind is due to the non-existence or non-function of those organs at the time.]

"It is for this reason that you (the Mīmāṃsakas) adhere to the view that the cognition of falsity is due to defects. In reality, however, it is the absence of excellences which is inferred from the concomitance of defects; and it is to this absence of excellences that the non-validity of the cognition is due." (43).

[It is not the defects which are the true cause of the non-validity of a cognition. Each cognition is *naturally* non-authoritative; the defects pointed to only indicate as invariable concomitants of the absence of positive excellence of the source of cognition.]

"The conclusion, therefore, is that purity, *i. e.*, perfection, of the cause of cognition is the cause of the cognition's validity. *Naturally* non-validity belongs to all cognition, and such non-validity is only *indicated* by the absence of such purity. (44).

"Nor can the view of the non-validity of cognitions being due to defects be established by reference to positive and
Shabara 12.

negative instances, (*i. e.*, by arguing that wherever such defects are, there is non-validity, and that non-validity is absent where defects are absent); for this is not seen in the case of absence of knowledge 'non-cognition', which has for its cause the absence of a cause of cognition." (45).

[Non-authoritative cognitions have the form either of *doubt* or of *mistake* or of absence of cognition, (ignorance; *ajñāna*). The last of these is due not to *defects* of the cause of cognition, but to the *absence* of such a cause.—*Nyā-raṭn.*]

"The general conclusion against the Mīmāṃsaka, then is that Vedic injunctions cannot be considered authoritative, for if they are not due to men, (possessing such good qualities as trustworthiness and so on) they cannot claim any authority; and assuming they were due to men, it would be impossible to show that those men possess the required perfections (capacitating them to lay down the law on supersensuous matters). Vedic injunctions thus have no ground to stand on." (46).

[Against this view the Mīmāṃsaka now undertakes to prove the *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*, *i. e.*, the intrinsic authoritativeness, of all means of knowledge including *śabḍa* ('Words' or 'verbal declarations'), of which the *Word* of the Veda is one, and indeed the foremost species.]

'Intrinsic authoritativeness must be held to belong to all means (sources) of right (valid) knowledge; for a power (faculty) by itself non-existent cannot be brought into being by another agency.' (47).

[If cognition (*jñāna*) did not by itself possess the power to determine (ascertain) the true nature (*taṭhātva*) of its object, nothing else could bring about that power. *Nyā-raṭn.*]

'It is only for its origination that positive entities require a cause; when they have once originated, they by themselves energize with regard to their various effects.' (48).

[All positive entities depend on a cause only for entering into existence; a jar, *e. g.*, requires clay, water, etc., in order to originate, but not to perform its functions such as the drawing of water. Thus cognition also may require a cause, whether

endowed with excellences or otherwise, in order to exist at all ; but it does not depend on that cause for its function, i. e., the ascertainment of the true nature of things. Nyā-raṭṇ.]

‘ If even when a cognition has originated its object were not definitely (certainly) known until the purity (excellence) of its cause is cognized through some other means of knowledge, then (in order to cognize that purity) we should have to wait for the origination of another cognition due to another cause ; for as long as that purity is not fully ascertained it is equal to nothing (and hence cannot prove the validity of the first cognition). And this other cognition again would be authoritative only on the cognition of the purity of its cause and so on *ad infinitum*. The person proceeding in this way would never reach a final resting place.’ (49-51).

‘ When, on the other hand, the intrinsic authoritativeness of cognitions is acknowledged, nothing else has to be apprehended ; for the falsity of the cognition is precluded at once, without any further effort, through the absence of cognition of defects.’ (52).

[Where there is absence of cognition of defects of the source of cognition, the intrinsic validity of the cognition asserts itself at once ; the absence of cognition of defects is not something that requires a further cognition to prove it.]

‘ We, therefore, hold that the authoritativeness (validity) of a cognition which results from its very nature of cognition (intellection-*bodha*) is disproved (in individual cases) only by the cognition of the different nature of the object or of defects (in the cause of cognition).’ (53).

‘ The non-authoritativeness of cognitions is of three different kinds, according as the cognition is false, or non-cognition (*ajñāna*) or a doubt. Two of these, ‘ viz., doubtful and false cognition’, are due to defective causes, for they are positive entities. In the case of non-cognition on the other hand the action of such defects can not be assumed ; we rather in agreement with your (the opponent’s) view hold that non-cognition results simply from the absence of a cause of cognition.’ (54-55).

‘For us who hold the theory of the intrinsic authoritativeness of cognitions, the view of non-authoritativeness being due to defects of the cause does not lead to a regressus *in infinitum*, as takes place on the view of the authoritativeness of the cognition depending on the excellence of the cause. As shown before, those who hold the validity of a cognition to depend on the excellence of its cause have to assume a further valid cognition to vouch for the excellence of the cause, etc., etc.; by parity of reasoning they will have to assume that the non-validity of a cognition is due to the non-validity of a previous cognition, etc., etc. We, Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, account for the validity of a cognition straightway by its intrinsic nature; and for the invalidity of a cognition straightway by the cognition of defects in its cause. The non-authoritativeness of a cognition follows, with comparative ease, from a directly contrary cognition; for the origination of the subsequent cognition cannot, in cases of this kind, take place without the sublation of the former.’ (56-57).

[The recognition of the non-validity—the falsity,—of a cognition accomplishes itself with ease in those cases where a subsequent judgment at once sublates a previous judgment referring to the same object—as when the cognition ‘this is a (mere) shell’ sublates the previous cognition ‘this is silver.’ But why, the question may be asked, should not rather, or as well, the subsequent judgment be sublated by the previous one? The second half of the *kārikā* replies to this question. As the *Nyāraṭṇ.* puts it—‘The previous cognition had originated without sublating the subsequent one—which at the time did not exist. The subsequent one, on the other hand, could not arise at all unless it, at the same time, sublated the previous one to which it is essentially opposed.’ The insight that the thing before us is a shell immediately teaches that the previous judgment ‘this is silver’ was a mistaken one.]

‘In those cases again where the cognition of the defects of the cause establishes itself with reference to another object, sublation of the former cognition takes place on the ground that, implicitly, the two cognitions refer to the same object; as in the case of the *goḍohana* vessel.’ (58).

[The previous *kārikā* had dealt with the case of the erroneousness of a cognition being recognised through the rise of a contrary cognition. The present *kārikā* refers to the cases where such erroneousness is proved less directly, by the recognition of defects in the cause of the cognition; as when, *e. g.*, the idea that a shell is yellow is cognised to be false in consequence of the insight that the organ of sight of the person concerned is affected by jaundice. Here there are two judgments which have different objects, (*viz.*, the shell and the eye, respectively); but the second judgment 'the eye is jaundiced' implies that the appearance of yellowness is a mistaken one, and thus has the effect of sublating the former judgment ('the shell is yellow'). The reasoning here is analogous to that referring to the *goḍohana* vessel which in a certain rite is prescribed for 'him who is desirous of cattle' instead of the ordinary *chamasa* vessel. Here although the qualification 'for him who is desirous of cattle' introduces a new circumstance, yet the injunction that water is to be fetched with the *goḍohana* shows that it is meant to take the place of the *chamasa*: the general injunction of the use of the *chamasa* thus is *sublated* by the passage enjoining the *goḍohana*.]

'This is so, where there does not arise a further cognition of defects, (*viz.*, in the cause of the second cognition), or a subsequent sublating cognition, (*i. e.*, a third cognition, sublating the second one). Where on the other hand, such a further cognition arises, the second cognition is seen to be false, and then the first becomes valid.' (59).

'And in that case also, (the first cognition is not indebted for its *prāmāṇya* to the third one but) the validity of the first cognition is due to that cognition itself, there being no cognition of defects. As long as the cognition of defects does not arise, no thought of the (original cognition's) want of validity is to be entertained. Hence nothing more is demanded than the consideration of the origination of three or four cognitions.' (60-61).

[The Nyāya-raṭnākara comments as follows:—'The well-known causes of the falsity of cognition are certain defects connected with place, time, circumstances, the sense-organs, the *Shabara* 16.

object of cognition, and so on ; where the existence of such defects is excluded—as *e. g.*, when a man, fully awake and in full possession of his perceptive and thinking faculties, perceives, in bright daylight, a jar placed close to him—no suspicion of defects can arise, and hence no idea of the perception not being valid. In other cases there may be the possibility of a defect—the object, *e. g.*, may be at a distance, and hence the suspicion of the non-validity of the perception may arise ; but generally, by one further step, *e. g.*, walking up to the thing, one of the two alternatives—to the simultaneous presentation of which doubt is due—may be determined as true, and the question settled in this simple way. And if this third cognition has no opening for defects, it marks the end of the whole cognition process. If, on the other hand, the third cognition itself gives room for the suspicion of defect, a further mental effort has to be made, in the form of a fourth cognition—which will either confirm the third cognition or not, and accordingly confirm or not confirm the second one, and ultimately the first one. As soon as it appears that a suspected defect has no real existence, the cognition, the validity of which that defect appeared to threaten, asserts itself in its *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*, its intrinsic validity. A series of four cognitions will serve the purpose in all cases, and hence *anavasthā* will not take place.]

‘The rule in the case of *words* is that the origination of defects depends on the speaker. The absence of defects is in some cases due to the excellence of the speaker, since the defects being removed by his excellences cannot attach to his words. In other cases again there can be no substrate for such faults, owing to the fact of there being no speaker.’ (62-63).

[*Kārikās* 47—61 had been devoted to the establishment of the general doctrine that all cognitions, due to whichever of the recognised sources of right knowledge, are intrinsically valid, *i. e.*, present to us the truth of things ; and that a cognition has to be rejected as invalid only in special cases (which need not be restated). With the present *kārikā* the author returns to the question he is more immediately concerned in, *viz.*, the intrinsic validity of Vedic declarations—which are a special class of *Shabḍa*—‘Words’ ‘verbal declarations ;’ and the conditions on

which the validity of 'words' in general and Vedic words in particular depend are now being enquired into.]

'In (true) human speech we observe the presence of two things—the absence of defects (in the speaker), and positive excellences; and we have already explained that authoritative-ness cannot be due to those excellences. The process, therefore, is as follows:—from the excellences there results the absence of defects, and from the absence of defects there results the absence of the two kinds of non-authoritativeness (the one which depends on the rise of a contrary cognition and the one which depends on the cognition of defects); and thus the natural character of words remains untouched; i.e., their intrinsic authoritative-ness, due to the fact that (like the other *pramāṇas*) they give rise to distinct conceptions (ideas) is not impaired. (64-66).

'But, somebody may object, if the absence of defects is *due* to the excellences (as you admit), there arises the same *regressus ad infinitum* (that you urged against us)!' (66).

'Not so, we reply. At the time when we are conscious of the absence of defects (in a verbal statement), the excellences of the speaker do not actually function towards establishing the authoritative-ness of the cognition; they only help by their mere presence towards the absence of defects which is the proper object of cognition.' (67).

'(This is so in the case of human verbal declaration); in the case of the Veda, the fact that it is not liable to have its authoritative-ness sublated (by defects) follows, in an even easier manner, from the absence of a speaker; non-authoritativeness of the Veda, therefore, cannot be imagined even. As thus the Veda is independent of a 'speaker,' the adoration of such a speaker, in order to establish its authoritative-ness is altogether out of place: the need of such a speaker would arise only if you wanted to show that the Veda is devoid of authority.' (68-69.)

[The Veda being independent of an author, and authoritative on that very account, it is distinctly foolish to assume such an author (the Lord, Ishvara or the like) in order to establish its authority. An assumption of that kind could indeed only prove the non-authoritativeness of the Veda.]

THE *TARKABHĀṢA* OR 'EXPOSITION OF
REASONING.'

by *Keshava Mishra*.

PRELIMINARY NOTE.

The *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keshava Mishra is an elementary treatise on the *Nyāya System*. It explains, in brief, the main tenets peculiar to that system, along with certain other details that that system subsequently borrowed from the sister system of the *Vaiśeṣikas*. The work has been chosen for translation, because of its freedom from the intricate polemics that makes many *Nyāya* works repellent to the ordinary student. This translation will serve as an introduction to the study of the more abstruse works that are being translated:—*viz.*, the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana and the *Vārtika* of Uḍyotakara,—which constitute the chief and original 'authority' for the *Nyāya*.

The writer of this work is believed to have lived between 1344 and 1419 A. C. in Mithilā (North Bihar).

The Text used is the reprint from the *Pandit*, published by the Medical Hall Press, Benares.

TARKABHĀṢA OR 'EXPOSITION OF REASONING.'

Introduction.

I am writing this 'Exposition of Reasoning' consisting, as it does, of short and easy explanations of arguments, for the sake of the dull youth who wishes to have to learn as little as possible for the purpose of entering the portals of the 'Nyāya Philosophy.'

*The Highest Good is attained by the true comprehension of—(1) the Means or Instruments of Right Cognition, (2) the Objects of Right Cognition, (3) Doubt, (4) Motive, (5) Corroborative Instance, (6) Demonstrated Truth, (7) Factors or Members of Reasoning, (8) Confutation, (9) Definitive Cognition, (10) Discussion, (11) Controversy, (12) Wrangling, (13) Fallacious Reason, (14) Perversion or Casuistry, (15) Futile Rejoinder, (16) Grounds of confutation or 'Clinchers';—such is the first aphorism of the Nyāya (as propounded by Gauṭama). The meaning of this is that liberation is attained by the right discernment of the Means of Right Cognition and the other categories enumerated. This right discernment of the categories is not possible unless there is a regular 'statement,' 'definition' and 'examination' of each of these; as says the *Bhāṣya* (Vātsyāyana):—'In three ways does this science proceed,—through *statement*, *definition* and *examination*.' Of these 'statement' consists in the mere mention of the category; this has been done in the aphorism quoted above; the 'Definition' is the pointing out of the distinctive qualities;—e.g., the definition of the *cow* consists in the pointing out of the *presence of the dewlap*, and such other characteristics which differentiate the *cow* from all other things; and 'Examination' consists in the investigation as to whether or not the definition proposed is applicable to the thing defined. Thus then [the 'statement' having been made in the first aphorism] it now becomes necessary to proceed, in the present work, with the 'definition' and 'examination' of the categories.]*

Tarka-bhā. I.

SECTION (1)—Page 8.

Pramāṇas.

‘The Instruments of Right Cognition.’

We proceed to explain the ‘definition’ of *Pramāṇa* which is the first of the categories mentioned in the aphorism. It has been defined as the ‘*Karaṇa*,’ ‘instrument’ or ‘means’, of ‘*pramā*,’ ‘right cognition’; the definition being stated in the form ‘*Pramāṇa* is the instrument of right cognition,’ where the word ‘*Pramāṇa*’ states the object to be defined, and the phrase ‘the instrument of right cognition’ constitutes the *definition*.

“If *Pramāṇa* is the ‘instrument of right cognition,’ it becomes necessary to point out its result; as it is absolutely necessary for an ‘instrument’ to have a result [an ‘instrument’ is so called only because bringing about a definite result]”

True; Right Cognition itself is the *result*, i. e., that which is accomplished by the said *instrument*; just as of the *axe*, which is the *instrument* of cutting, the *cut* itself is the *result*.

“What is this ‘Right Cognition,’ the instrument whereof you regard as ‘*Pramāṇa*’?”

‘Right Cognition’ is that apprehension (*anubhava*) which is in due accord with the real character of the thing apprehended; when we apprehend the thing *as it really is*, this apprehension is called ‘Right Cognition.’ The qualifications ‘which is in due accord, &c.’ serves to exclude Doubt, Misconception and Guess,—in all of which the thing is not apprehended in its real form. The word ‘apprehension’ (*anubhava*) excludes Remembrance; as this latter is only the cognition of something already cognised; and it is not Apprehension; ‘Apprehension’ (*Anubhava*) being the name given to all cognitions apart from Remembrance.

“What do you mean by the word ‘*karaṇa*,’ in your definition of *Pramāṇa*?”

Kāraṇa is the name given to that particular *Sādhaka* or instrument which is the most effective (in bringing about a certain result); that is to say, it is the *most efficient cause*.

Tarka-bhā. 2.

“ But you here explain ‘instrument’ (*Sādhaka*) by means of its synonym, the word ‘cause’ (*Kāraṇa*) ; and we have still to learn what this ‘cause’ is.”

We proceed to explain this : That which must exist before the effect, and which is not taken up in the bringing about of something else, is to be regarded as the ‘cause’ of that effect ; *e. g.*, the *thread*, the *loom* and such other things are the ‘cause’ of cloth ; even though in some cases of the making of Cloth, an ass may by chance come to the place, immediately before the making,—yet this mere *antecedence* does not make the ass a ‘Cause’ of the Cloth ; because the previous presence of the ass is not *necessary* in the making of the Cloth. Then again, even though the presence of the *colour* of the thread is necessary, previous to the making of the Cloth, yet that colour cannot be regarded as the ‘Cause’ of the Cloth, because the colour of the thread is taken up in the bringing about an entirely different effect, in the shape of the *colour* of the cloth woven out of those threads. It may be possible to regard the colour of the thread as the Cause of the Cloth as also of its *colour* ; but this would involve an unnecessary multiplication of assumptions. Thus then the ‘Cause’ of an effect may be defined as *that necessary antecedent which is not taken up in the bringing about of something else*. Similarly the ‘effect’ of a Cause may be defined as *that necessary consequent which is not brought about by some other Cause*.

Some writers have defined the ‘Cause’ as “that whose presence and absence (or affirmation and denial) are imitated by the presence and absence of the effect [the ‘Effect’ being *present* only when the ‘Cause’ is *present*, and the ‘Effect’ being *absent* when the ‘Cause’ is *absent*.]” This however is not right ; because this definition of ‘Cause’ would fail to apply to such eternal and all-pervading substances as the *Ākāśa* and the like ; because (being eternal) there is no point of time at which their *absence* would be possible ; and (being all-pervading) there is no point in space where they would be absent ; [and thus, if ‘*absence*’ formed an integral factor of the definition, it could not apply to such substances as the above, in whose case *absence* of any kind is not possible.]

The Cause is of three kinds : (1) the *Samavāyi*, the *Material* or *Constituent* Cause ; (2) the *Asamavāyi*, the *Non-Constituent* Cause ; and (3) the *Nimitta*, the *Efficient*, cause, or *Cause in general*. Of these, the Constituent Cause is that which forms the material out of which, and inherent in which, the effect is produced ; *e. g.*, threads are the Constituent Cause of the Cloth ; because it is out of the *threads*, and never apart from these, that the Cloth is produced ; it is not produced out of any such other things as the shuttle and the like.

“It cannot be denied that the Cloth is as much related to the shuttle and the other things as to the threads ; under the circumstances, how can we accept your assertion that it is out of, and as inseparably related to, the *threads* only,—and not those other things :—that the Cloth is produced ?”

It is true that the Cloth is *related* to those other things also ; but *relation* is of two kinds : (1) *Samyoga*, Conjunction and (2) *Samavāya*, Inherence. Of these the relation subsisting between two inseparable or intimate things is called ‘Inherence ;’ while that which subsists between things that are separable or not intimate, is ‘Conjunction.’

“What do you mean by ‘*intimate*’ things ?”

Two things are said to be ‘intimate’ when between them, so long as one is not destroyed it subsists in the other ; as has been declared in the following verse :—

‘Those two things are to be regarded as *intimate*, of whom so long as one is not destroyed, it continues to subsist in the other.’

As for example, the Whole and its Parts, the Quality and the Substance, the Action and the Actor, the Individual and Class, the Specific Qualities and the Eternal Substance. The Whole, the Quality, the Action, the Individual and the Specific Quality,—so long as they do exist, and are not completely destroyed,—continue to subsist, respectively, in the Part, the Substance, the Action, the Class and the Eternal Substance ; when they are destroyed, then they have no substrate at all ; for instance, when the Cloth is destroyed on the destruction of the constituent threads [it does not subsist anywhere] ; or when the Quality is

Tarka-bhā. 4.

destroyed on the destruction of its substrate, [it does not subsist anywhere]; and the *destructibility* of things consists in the presence of all those circumstances that are conducive to its destruction. Thus then, it is the relation between such *intimate* things as the Cloth and the Thread, or the Whole and the Part,—that constitutes ‘Inherence.’ The relation between the Cloth and the Shuttle, on the other hand, is not ‘Inherence;’ because these are not *intimate* or *inseparable*; the Shuttle does not subsist in the Cloth alone; nor does the Cloth subsist in the Shuttle alone; hence the relation between these two must be regarded as ‘Conjunction.’ Thus then, as it is in the Thread that the Cloth inheres;—and the Constituent Cause is that out of which, and *inhering* in which, the effect is produced;—it is the *Thread*, and not the *Shuttle*, that is the Constituent Cause of the Cloth; the Cloth again is the Constituent Cause of the Colour and such other qualities inhering in it. Similarly the lump of clay is the Constituent Cause of the Jar; and the Jar is the Constituent Cause of the Colour and other qualities inhering in itself.

“As a matter of fact, the colour of the jar is brought into existence at the same time that the jar itself is produced; thus the two, the jar and its colour, coming into existence as simultaneously as the right and left horns of the cow, there can be no sequence between the two; and as such one cannot be regarded as the *cause* of the other [*antecedence* being a necessary condition in all causes]; and as the Constituent Cause is only a particular form of Cause, the jar cannot be the Constituent Cause of its own Colour.”

It is not true that the Substance and its Quality are brought into existence at the same time; as a matter of fact, in the first instance, when the substance is brought into existence, it is entirely devoid of all qualities; and it is only later that the qualities inhering in it are produced. If the two were brought into existence at one and the same time, then the causal conditions for both would be precisely the same; and in that case there would be no difference between the two (and the substance and its quality would have to be regarded as identical)! Because two things can be held to be distinct only when they are brought into existence by distinct causal conditions. Thus then,

Tarka-bhā. 5.

in as much as the jar, at the first moment, is produced totally devoid of all qualities,—these latter being produced subsequently,—the jar is without doubt an ‘antecedent;’ and thus there is no incongruity in regarding the jar as the Constituent Cause of its qualities. In this manner the causal conditions of the two—the jar and its qualities—also become distinct (which precludes the absurdity of the two being regarded as identical); because the jar cannot be its own cause,—no *antecedence* and *sequence* being possible in regard to one and the same thing; the thing cannot form its own *antecedent* and *consequent*. As regards its qualities however, the jar is the Constituent Cause, being, as shown above, antecedent to them in point of time.

“ If the jar, at the first moment, is brought into existence, “entirely devoid of all qualities, then, it would be *invisible* at “the time, being devoid of colour; it is only a substance that “is large and is possessed of colour that can be *visible*. In “fact being devoid of qualities, the jar would not be a “‘substance’ at all; as Substance has been defined as that in “*which qualities ‘subsist.’* ”

True; but what harm does it do us if the jar is not visible *at the first moment of its existence*? Even for one who holds that the jar is produced along with its qualities, the jar is *not visible* at the time that he winks his eyes. Hence we conclude that *at the first moment* the jar is brought into existence, totally devoid of qualities; and it is only at the *second succeeding moment* that it become *visible*. Being devoid of qualities at the moment, the jar does not cease to be a ‘substance;’ because ‘substance’ can also be defined as *that which forms the ‘Constituent Cause of things,’* which condition is fulfilled by the jar (even though devoid of qualities; and in reality the character of *being the substrate of qualities* also may be said to belong to the jar, even though at one particular moment it be devoid of qualities; because it has, even at that time, the *capability of being the substrate of qualities*,—such *capability* consisting in the fact that it is not *absolutely* and *always* devoid of qualities. [And when the ‘substance’ is defined as the ‘substate of qualities,’ all that is meant is that it is *what is capable* of being the substate of qualities.]

Tarka-bhā. 6.

That which is in close proximity to—i. e., inherent in—the Constituent Cause, and which has its causal efficiency towards a certain effect duly ascertained,—is called the ‘Non-Constituent Cause’ of that effect; e.g., the *Conjunction or Combination of the yarns* is the ‘Non-Constituent Cause’ of the Cloth. The *Conjunction* being a quality of the yarns inheres in those latter, which are the ‘Constituent Cause’ of the Cloth; and thus the *Conjunction* is regarded as ‘inhering in the Constituent Cause of the Cloth;’ then again, that it has ‘causal efficiency’ towards the production of the Cloth is shown by the fact that it is a ‘necessary antecedent’ of the Cloth, and ‘is not taken up in the bringing about of any other effect.’

Similarly the *colour* of the yarns is the ‘Non-Constituent Cause’ of the Colour of the Cloth.

“It has been said above that of the *Colour of the Cloth*, the ‘Constituent Cause’ is the *Cloth*; under the circumstances, it must be some quality of the *cloth* that should be the ‘Non-Constituent Cause’ of the *colour of the cloth*; as it is only a quality of the *cloth* that can ‘inhere in the Constituent Cause of the colour of the cloth;’ this condition is not fulfilled by the *colour of the yarns*, as this does not inhere in the *Cloth*, which is the ‘Constituent Cause’ of the *colour of the cloth*.”

This is not right. Because the *colour of the yarn*, though not inhering in the Cloth *directly*, does so *indirectly*; because it inheres in the *yarn* which is the ‘Constituent Cause’ of the *cloth*; and that which inheres in the ‘Constituent Cause’ of the ‘Constituent Cause’ of a thing may be regarded (indirectly) as ‘inhering in the Constituent Cause’ of that thing.

The ‘Efficient Cause,’ or ‘Cause in general,’ is that which, while being neither the ‘Constituent’ nor the ‘Non-Constituent’ Cause, is yet a ‘Cause;’ e.g., the *loom* and such other things are the ‘Efficient Cause’ of the Cloth.

It is only things positive that have all the above three kinds of cause; of negation, on the other hand, there is only one kind of cause—the ‘efficient’—that is possible; and the reason for this lies in the fact that negation or negative entity, cannot

‘inhere’ in anything; and yet ‘inherence’ forms a necessary element in the other two kinds of Cause.*

From among these three kinds of Causes, that which happens to be endowed with some sort of an especial aptitude or efficiency is called the ‘instrument’ (*‘Karaṇa’*). And thus we get at the definition that *Pramāṇa* is the ‘instrument of right cognition.’

Some people have defined ‘*Pramāṇa*,’ ‘Instrument of right cognition,’ as that which makes known something not already known. This however is not right; because if such were the definition of the ‘Instrument of right cognition,’ then there would be no validity in the serial (or continuous) cognitions that we have of one and the same object,—e. g., the jar;—as, for instance, the cognitions, ‘this is a jar,’ ‘this is a jar’ and so forth;† [because except the first cognition of this series, every one of the rest would have its object such as has already been known by the preceding cognitions.]

Nor will it be right to argue that, inasmuch each of these momentary cognitions would have for its object the jar of *that particular moment*, each could be regarded as making known what is not already known. Because in the sensuous preception that we have of any object, we are not cognisant of any such subtle differentiation of time (as would be necessary in the above case); specially as, if such subtle differentiation of time were perceptible, there could not be any such idea of simultaneity with regard to the perception that we have (in many cases) of four such things as *action* (of moving), the *disjunction* or *separation* of particles (caused by that action), ‘the *destruction of the previous conjunction* and the *appearance of the next conjunction*.‡

* The reading ‘*bhāvaḍvaya*’ appears to be a misprint for ‘*kāraṇa-ḍvaya*.’

† These ‘serial cognitions’ are postulated in view of those cases where the cognition of the jar is present in the mind for a certain length of time; because no single cognition can subsist beyond a single moment.

‡ When we pierce the lotus-flower with a needle, the idea that we have is that all the several petals have been pierced *simultaneously*; though as a matter of fact, even in the piercing of only two petals, there are no less than four factors occurring at four distinct points of time: *viz.*, (1) the

“As a matter of fact, a right cognition has many causes, in the shape of the *cognising person*, the *cognised object*, and so forth; may not these also be regarded as the ‘instrument’ (*karaṇa*) of cognition (in the same manner as the *Pramāṇa*)?”

It is only the *sense-contact* (and such other factors) that can be regarded as the ‘instrument of cognition’; because we find that no sooner these factors present themselves than the resulting cognition appears; while, as regards the *cognising person* and the *cognised object*, on the other hand, even while these are present (if the *sense-contact*, &c., happen to be absent), the cognition does not appear. And this shows that even though all the three are the *cause* of the cognition, there is a peculiarity in the causal potency of the *sense-contact*, &c., in virtue of which peculiar potency it is these latter that are regarded as the *specialty efficient cause*; and it is the *specialty efficient cause* that is held to be the *Instrument*; and thus it is the *sense-contact*, &c., alone that can be regarded as the ‘instruments of cognition’,—and not the *cognising person* or the *cognised object*, &c.

Of these ‘Instruments of Cognition’ there are four; says the *Nyāyā-sūtra* (I-i-3):—‘Sense-perception, Inference, Analogy and Word are the four Instruments of Cognition.’

Page 27. “What then is *Sense-perception*?”

Sense-perception is the instrument of *direct* right cognition; that right cognition being called ‘direct’ which is brought about by the agency of sense-organs. This sense-perception is of two kinds—(a) *Savikalpaka*, Determinate or Concrete, and (b) *Nirvikalpaka*, Non-determinate or Abstract.*

action of striking the first petal with the needle; (2) the separation of the needle from that petal; (3) the destruction of the contact of the needle with that petal, and (4) the appearance of its contact with the second petal. In this manner in the piercing of all the petals, there are innumerable moments of time involved; and yet the perception is as if the whole process occurred at a single moment. This shows that subtle differences of time are not perceptible; and hence the objects of the various cognitions in a series can never be perceived as *different*.

*In popular language, these may be rendered as ‘definite’ and ‘vague,’ respectively.

The *instrument* of Sense-perception is of three kinds—(a) in some cases it is the sense-organ ; (b) in others it is the **contact** of the sense-organ with the object perceived ; and (c) in others again, it is Cognition.

“ In what cases is the sense-organ the instrument of Sense-perception ? ”

In cases where the resultant perception is of the non-determinate or abstract kind,—the sense-organ itself is the instrument. The process involved in these cases is as follows :—The Soul comes into contact with the mind ;—the mind with the sense-organ ;—the sense-organ with the object perceived ; this last factor being necessary in view of the fact that the sense-organ can manifest, or render perceptible, one object only when it gets at (is in contact with) this latter ; thus then by the instrumentality of the Sense-organ as being in contact with the object perceived, there comes about the non-determinate perception ; by which is meant that perception which is free from all notions of *name*, *genus* and such other details, which manifests (or objectifies) the mere thing in itself as ‘ something ’ (in a vague form). Of this perception, the Sense-organ is the *instrument*, in the same manner as the axe is the instrument of the *cutting* ; and the contact of the Sense-organ with the object enters into this perceptual process only as an intermediary secondary factor ; just as the contact of the axe with the piece of wood does in the process of cutting ; and the non-determinate perception is the *result* ; like the *cutting* by the axe.

“ In what case is the contact of the Sense-organ with the object the instrument of Perception ? ”

The sense-organ-and-object contact is the instrument in those cases where the above-mentioned *vague* perception [of the thing as ‘ something ’] is followed by the corresponding *definite* perception, in which the ‘ something ’ is cognised as having a certain name,—‘ *Diṭṭha* ’ for instance,—as belonging to a particular genus or class—‘ *Brāhmaṇa*, ’ *e. g.*,—and as having a certain quality—‘ darkness ’ for instance ; this perception being in the form ‘ this is a dark-complexioned Brāhmaṇa named *Diṭṭha*, ’ wherein are present the notions of the *qualification*

and the qualified; in this process the corresponding *vague perception* constitutes the intermediary factor; and the *definite perception* is the ultimate result.

“ In what cases, lastly, is the Cognition the instrument of Perception ? ”

The Definite Cognition is followed by the notion of *rejectability*, *acceptibility* or *indifference*, with regard to the object perceived [*i. e.*, when we perceive a thing, we feel either that it is worthy only of being abandoned; or that it is worthy of being accepted; or that it is worthy of neither the one nor the other]; and in these notions (which also form a factor in the Perception), the *instrument* is the corresponding *Vague Perception*; and in this process, the *Definite Perception* enters as the intermediary factor; and the notion of rejectability, &c., form the ultimate result. That which is itself brought about by one and brings about another, which again is the product of the former, is called the intermediary factor;* as for example, the contact of the axe with the piece of wood, brought about by the axe, brings about in its turn the *cutting*, which is the product of the axe. According to some people, however, in all cases of Perception, the *Determinate*, &c., also, it is the Sense-organ that is the actual *instrument*; all other factors, that come in, in the shape of contact and the rest, are only *intermediary factors*.

The contact of the Sense-organ and the object, which is the cause of *direct* right cognition, is of six kinds:—(1) Direct Conjunction, (2) Inherence in that which is in direct conjunction, (3) Inherence in that which inheres in that which is in direct conjunction, (4) Direct Inherence, (5) Inherence in that which is inherent, and (6) the relation of qualification and qualified. (1) When the perception of the jar is brought about by the eye,—in which case the eye is the ‘Sense-organ’ and the jar the ‘object,’—the ‘contact’ that there is between these two is in the form of Direct Conjunction;

* Thus in this last instance, the Definite Perception is brought about by the *Vague Perception*, and brings about, in its turn, the notion of rejectability, &c. In the previous cases the *Vague Perception*, brought about by the Sense-organ, brings about the Definite Cognition.

because the connection between them is not inseparable. Similarly, when the perception of the soul—in the form ‘I’—is brought about by the inner organ of the mind,—in which case the mind is the ‘organ’ and the Soul the ‘object,’—the ‘contact’ between these is of the nature of Direct Conjunction.

(2) When the colour of the jar is perceived by the eye, in the form ‘the colour of this jar is dark,’—in which case the eye is the ‘organ’ and the colour of the jar the ‘object,’—the ‘contact’ between these is of the nature of Inherence in that which is in direct conjunction : because the colour inheres in the jar, which latter is in direct conjunction with the eye. The same kind of ‘contact’ is present in the case of the perception, by means of the mind, of the pleasure, pain, etc., inhering in the soul.

In the perception of the Dimension of the jar, we have to admit of a further four-fold contact, over and above that in the shape of ‘inherence in the conjoined ;’ as without such four-fold contact, there could be no perception of Dimension from a distance. This four-fold contact is as follows :—(a) Contact of the *constituent particles* of the Sense-organ with the *whole* of the object ; (b) of the *constituent particles* of the object with the *whole* of the Sense-organ ; (c) of the *constituent particles* of the Sense-organ with the *constituent particles* of the object ; and (d) of the *whole* of the object with the *whole* of the Sense-organ.

(3) In cases where the *generality* of ‘colour,’ as inhering in the *colour* that inheres in the jar, is perceived,—in which case the eye is the *Sense-organ*, the generality of ‘colour’ is the *object*,—the ‘contact’ between these is of the nature of ‘inherence in that which inheres in that which is in direct Conjunction.’

(4) The ‘contact’ is of the nature of ‘inherence’ in the case when sound is perceived by the ear ; in which case the ear is the *organ*, and sound the *object* ; ‘contact’ of these two is of the nature of ‘inherence’ because the ear-organ is only a form of *ākāśha* (as enclosed in the tympanum),—and sound is the *quality* of *ākāśha* ;—and the relation subsisting between a substance (*e. g.* *ākāśha*) and its quality (*i. e.*, sound) is of the nature of ‘Inherence.’

Tarka-bhā. 12.

(5) In cases where the generality of 'sound' as inhering in sound, is perceived by the ear,—where the ear is the *organ*, and the generality of 'sound' the *object*,—the 'contact' between these is of the nature of 'inherence in that which is inherent;' inasmuch as the generality of 'sound' inheres in the 'sound' which, in its turn, inheres in *ākāsha*.

(6) In a case where the *absence of the jar* in a place which is in conjunction with the eye, is perceived by the eye, in the form 'the jar does not exist in this place,'—the 'contact' is of the nature of 'the qualification and the qualified;' in as much as the *place* is the '*qualified*,' being qualified by 'the absence of the jar' which is the 'qualification.' Similarly when the *absence of pleasure*, in the Soul which is in conjunction with organ of mind, is perceived (by the mind),—in the form 'I am devoid of pleasure,'—the 'absence of pleasure' is the *qualification* of the 'Soul in conjunction with the mind.' And so also, when the *absence of the generality of 'gha'* in the '*ga*,' which inheres in ear-organ, is perceived,—the *absence of the generality 'gha'* is the qualification of the '*ga*' inhering in the ear. Thus then, in brief, *negation*, or *absence*, is found to be perceived by the Sense-organs, through that *organ-object* contact which consists of the relation of 'the qualification and the qualified,'—this relation being based upon anyone of the five kinds of relation described above (Direct Conjunction and the rest).

Inherence also is perceived in the same manner; for example, the *inherence of the cloth* in its constituent yarns is perceived by the eye, only though the relation that it is the 'qualification' of the *yarns* which are in conjunction with the eye. Thus have been explained the six kinds of 'Contact.' On this point we have the following comprehensive verses :—

'Right cognition born of the Senses is of two kinds—*Determinate* and *Non-determinate*; the cause of such cognition is of three kinds—[*Constituent*, *Non-constituent* and *Efficient*]; and 'contact' is of six kinds; through each of which respectively the following objects are perceived—(1) the jar; (2) the blue colour of the jar; (3) the generality of 'blue'; (4) sound; (5) the generality of 'sound'; and (6) Negation and Inherence.'

Tarka-bhā. 13.

[Page 34.] [The Bauddha-Idealist objects to the postulating of *determinate* Sense-perception.]

“The non-determinate cognition, actually having for its object the *svalakṣaṇa* or ‘specific individuality’ of the thing perceived, may be regarded as ‘Sense-perception’; as for the Determinate Cognition, on the other hand, in as much as it pertains to inclusive or comprehensive generic forms,—just like *words* and *inferential indicatives*—its object is always in the form of the *universal* or generic entity, [which can never be in contact with any Sense-organ],—how can this cognition be regarded as ‘Sense-perception’? because it is only the cognition proceeding from the individual object direct that can be so regarded; specially as it is only such an object as really exists that can give rise to any cognition; and it is the ‘specific individuality’ only, and not the ‘generic entity,’ that has real existence;—the ‘generic entity’ being entirely insignificant (a non-entity); in as much as its positive character is rejected by all proofs, and the only form that it has is the negative one, *viz.*, that of being the *negation of things other than those included in the generic entity.*”

The above is not right; because the ‘generic entity’ also is as good a real entity as the ‘specific individuality.’

Thus has Sense-perception been explained.

[Page 36.] *Inference* consists in the *parāmarsha* or ‘deduction’ of the *līṅga* or ‘Probans’ (indicative or Middle Term). The name ‘Anumāna’ or ‘Inference’ is given to that by means of which a certain thing is *inferred*; and as a matter of fact, it is by means of the ‘deduction of the Probans’ that things are inferred; and hence it is to this deduction that we give the name ‘Inference.’ An example of this ‘deduction’ we have in the cognition that we have of the *presence of smoke* (which is the *probans* in the stock-example of Inference ‘there is fire in the mountain because we see smoke issuing therefrom’); this cognition of the presence of smoke is the required ‘deduction,’ inasmuch as it is this cognition that leads directly to the inferential cognition (*anumiti*); the *inferential cognition* in the case in question is in the shape of the cognition of *fire*; and

Tarka-bhā. 14.

the instrument that leads to this cognition is the cognition of the presence of smoke.

Question.—“ What is the ‘*probans*’? and what the ‘deduction of the *probans*’?”

Answer.—That which indicates the required object by the force of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is the *Probans*; as for instance, smoke is the *probans* of fire; because the necessary companionship between Fire and Smoke, that we recognise in the form of the proposition ‘wherever there is smoke there is fire,’ is what has been called ‘*vyāpti*’ or ‘invariable concomitance;’ and it is only when this concomitance has been duly recognised that the cognition of smoke leads to the cognition of fire; consequently, inasmuch as the smoke leads to the inference of fire, by the force of invariable concomitance, it is called the ‘*probans*’ (or ‘indicative’) of fire. And the third cognition that we have of this ‘*probans*’ is what has been called the ‘deduction of the *probans*.’ For instance, a man notices that over and over again, whenever he sees smoke in the kitchen, he finds fire there; and noticing this frequently, he comes to recognise a natural relationship between fire and smoke, in the form ‘wherever there is smoke there is fire.’*

[In the case where noticing the fact over and over again, that the children of Maitrī are dark-complexioned, we are led to conclude that ‘whoever is the child of Maitrī must be dark,’—this conclusion being exactly similar to the conclusion with regard to the relationship between fire and smoke; yet the relationship between ‘Maitrī’s child’ and ‘dark-complexion’ cannot be called ‘natural;’ as it is purely accidental; the ‘accident’ consisting in the fact of the dark-complexion of Maitrī’s children being due to the mother having fed upon vegetables; that is to say, what has made the children dark is not the fact of their being Maitrī’s children, but only the effects of the mother feeding upon vegetables; and it is this accidental circumstance that constitutes what has been technically called the

* After this the text makes a long digression extending up to p. 42, line 2, in order to prove that the relationship between Smoke and Fire is natural and constant, and not merely adventitious and accidental. We enclose this digression within square brackets.

‘*upāḍhi*’ or ‘accident.’ In the relationship of fire and smoke on the other hand, we do not notice any such ‘accident.’ If any such ‘accident’ were urged, we would ask—Is this *accident capable or incapable* (of vitiating the relationship)? If it were incapable, it could not be suspected; and as for any *capable* ‘accident,’ no such is actually noticed; as a matter of fact, whenever any ‘accident’ is present, it does not fail to be noticed; as for example, (1) in the relationship of the smoke with fire (in the form ‘wherever there is fire there is smoke’), we at once notice the presence of the ‘accident’ in the shape of the contact of wet fuel (to which alone is the presence of smoke, in *some* fires, due);—(2) in the relationship of ‘killing’ with ‘sinfulness’ (in the form of the proposition ‘all killing is sinful’), we notice the ‘accident’ in the shape of the fact of ‘being prohibited in the scriptures’ (which circumstance alone makes *some* killing sinful);—and (3) in the relationship between ‘the child of Maitrī’ and ‘darkness’ (in the form of the proposition ‘all children of Maitrī are dark’), we notice the ‘accident’ in the shape of the fact of ‘feeding on vegetables’ (which circumstance has made *some* of Maitrī’s children dark). In the case of the relationship of the fire with smoke (in the form of the proposition ‘wherever there is smoke there is fire’), we fail to notice any such ‘accident;’ and certainly, if any ‘accident’ really existed, it would certainly be noticed; and because we do not notice it, we naturally conclude that the ‘accident’ does not exist in this case; the absence of the ‘accident’ being thus actually cognised by *Sense-perception*, as aided by non-perception, which in its turn aids the reasoning first described. Thus then, it must be admitted that the relation of invariable concomitance between Fire and Smoke is cognised by means of Sense-perception, which makes cognisable the companionship of the two, and which is aided in this by the impression left on the mind by the frequent recognition (of the companionship), and also by the impression left on the mind by the recognition of the absence of all ‘accident.’ Hence the relationship of the fire with smoke must be regarded as *natural*, and not *accidental*; and it is this *natural relationship* that constitutes ‘Invariable Concomitance.’]

The Invariable Concomitance of the fire with smoke having been recognised in the manner described above, the cognition of smoke that one has in the kitchen is its *first* cognition ; the cognition of smoke again that one has in the mountain, and such other 'subjects,' is the *second* ; after this one recalls to his mind the previously recognised invariable concomitance between Fire and Smoke,—in the form 'where there is smoke there is fire ;'—and then he again notices or deduces the presence of smoke in the mountain,—in the form 'in this mountain there is smoke with which fire is invariably concomitant ;' and this last cognition of smoke is the '*third* cognition.' The presence of this cognition must be accepted ; as, in the absence of this cognition, we would have to rest at the proposition 'wherever smoke is there is fire ;' and how could this alone prove the presence of fire ? For the sake of this, it is absolutely necessary to have some such cognition as that 'there is smoke here' [which alone can lead to the conclusion 'there is fire here.'] This 'third cognition' is what has been called '*Parā-marsha*' or 'deduction ;' and in as much as this is the direct 'Instrument' of inferential cognition, it is called '*Anumāna*' or 'Inference ;'—the resultant inferential cognition being in the form 'therefore there is fire in this mountain.'

[Page 43]. Question. "How is it that the very *first* cognition of smoke that one has in the kitchen, does not bring about the inference of fire ?"

The reason for this lies in the fact that at that time the invariable concomitance (of fire and smoke) is not duly apprehended ; and inference appears only after the invariable concomitance has been apprehended.

"In that case, when once the invariable concomitance has been apprehended, the fire in the kitchen itself should become an object of inference."

By no means ; because in the kitchen the fire is actually *seen* ; and there is no doubt with regard to its presence ; while an object of inference is always one with regard to whose presence there is some doubt. This is what has been declared by the author of the *Bhāṣya* (on Su. 1. 1. 1, p. 37) in the following words :—'Reasoning operates neither towards the unknown

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or to that which is definitely known, but only towards the doubtful.'

"When a man has just reached the mountain, as soon as he has the cognition of smoke, why is he not, at once led to the inference of fire? At that moment, the doubt with regard to the presence of fire is certainly present; in as much as there are no distinct evidences available either for its presence or absence."

True; but, just as the man who has not apprehended the invariable concomitance has no inferential cognition; so also one who, after having apprehended the invariable concomitance, happens to forget it; because *the remembrance of invariable concomitance* also is a necessary factor in the accomplishing of inference. What happens in the case of actual inference is that on seeing the smoke (in the mountain), the memory being aroused, the man remembers the invariable concomitance (of fire and smoke)—in the form of the proposition 'wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen;' thus then, the cognition of smoke that follows after the perception of smoke and the remembrance of its invariable concomitance, is its *third* cognition,—in the form 'there is smoke here (in the mountain)'; and it is only this last 'third cognition', and no other cognition, that leads directly to the inferential cognition of fire; it is this again which is called '*anumāna*' and '*lingaparāmarsha*' or 'deduction of the *probans*.' For these reasons we conclude that Inference or *Anumāna* is the 'deduction of the *probans*.'

Inference is of two kinds—(1, '*Svārtha*,' 'for one's own conviction,' and (2) '*parārtha*,' 'for the purpose of carrying conviction to others.' The former is that which serves the purpose of bringing conviction to one's own self; *e. g.*, when a man has himself seen the smoke in the kitchen and has apprehended its invariable concomitance with fire;—if he happens to go near a mountain and sees an unbroken sky-kissing line of smoke issuing from it; this perception of smoke arouses his memory, whereby he remembers the invariable concomitance, in the form 'wherever there is smoke there is fire;' after this comes his cognition 'here in the mountain also there is smoke;'

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and this leads him to the conviction 'therefore there is fire also here in the mountain;' this inference thus having its sole end in the bringing of conviction to the man himself. When, on the other hand, a man having himself inferred, in the above manner, the presence of fire, wishes to carry conviction to another person; and for this purpose, puts forward the full syllogism with its five 'members' or propositions,—the resulting inference is called '*Parārtha*,' i.e., 'for the purpose of carrying conviction to another person.' This syllogism is in the following form:—'(1) This mountain contains fire;—(2) because it contains smoke;—(3) all that contains smoke contains fire, e.g., the kitchen;—(4) this mountain contains smoke;—(5) therefore this mountain contains fire.' By means of this syllogism, containing as it does the five propositions representing the 'statement of the desired conclusion' and the other four 'members' or 'factors' (of syllogism),—by means of which five propositions the *probans* comes to be represented in five forms,—the other person (to whom the syllogism is addressed) becomes convinced of the presence of fire; and it is for this reason that this inference is called '*parārtha*,' 'for the sake of another person.'

In the above syllogism, the presence of fire in the mountain is what is sought to be proved by the inference, and is called, on that account, the '*sādhya*,' the '*probandum*' 'that which is to be proved'; and the presence of smoke is the 'reason,' called '*hetu*,' the '*probans*.' The *probans*, in this case, is of the '*positive-negative*' kind, in as much between this (and the *probandum*) the invariable concomitance is both *positive* and *negative*; that is to say, we have the *positive* concomitance in the form 'wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen,'—in as much as in the kitchen we have the *presence* of both smoke and fire; similarly we have also a *negative* concomitance in the form 'where there is no fire there is no smoke, as in the lake,'—this being called '*negative* concomitance,' in as much as in the lake, we have the concomitance of the *absence* of both smoke and fire. The peculiar feature in the *negative* concomitance is that that which, in the *positive* concomitance, is the *perceived* (i.e., the less extensive),—the *negation* of that

becomes the *pervader* (the more extensive) in the *negative* concomitance; while that which is the *pervader* in the *positive* concomitance, the negation of that becomes the *pervaded* in the *negative* concomitance. This is what has been expressed in the following verses :—

‘The *pervaded* and *pervasive* character of two positive entities (taken as related) becomes subverted in the case of the negations of those entities.’ (Kumarila’s *Shloka-vārtika*, ‘Anumāna,’ 121).

‘In the case of a positive inference, the *probans* is the *pervaded* (less extensive) and the *probandum* the *pervader* (the more extensive); and the negation of the *probans* becomes the *pervader*, while the negation of the *probandum* becomes the *pervaded*.’

(In the statement of invariable concomitance) it is the *pervaded* that should be mentioned first; and then the *pervader*; and it is only when the invariable concomitance is thus stated that it becomes clearly discernible in its true form.’

[Page 48]. Thus then we have seen that in the case of ‘presence of smoke’ being the *probans*, we have the *positive* as well as the *negative* invariable concomitance: but in the actual presenting of the syllogism, it is only the concomitance in the *positive* form that is stated; and this is due to the fact that the purpose of the speaker is fulfilled by the statement of one only (which makes the statement of the other superfluous); and the one that is stated is in the *positive* form, because that is the straighter or simpler of the two; and that which can be accomplished by the simpler method, for the accomplishment of that it would not be right to have recourse to the more complicated method; and the non-statement of the negative concomitance is not due to the absence of such concomitance. Thus then, we conclude that the *probans*, in the shape of the *presence of smoke*, is of the ‘positive-negative’ kind. To the same class belong also such other *probans* as the *character of being a product* and so forth, which are brought forward to prove the *probandum* in the shape of ‘non-eternality’ and so on.

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There are some *probans* that are purely 'negative;' for instance, when the *presence of breathing* is put forward as the *probans* or reason to prove the *presence of soul*; the syllogism being presented in the following form:—'The living body has a soul, because it breathes—that which has no soul does not breathe, as for example the jar,—this living body is not so (i. e., it does not not-breathe),—therefore it must have a soul.' Here the presence of soul in the living body is the *probandum*, and the presence of breathing is the *probans*; and this *probans* is of the purely 'negative' kind; because there is no *positive* concomitance between the two; in as much as the positive concomitance could only be in the form 'that which breathes has a soul;' but in support of this we could cite no corroborative instance (the mention of which is a necessary factor in all invariable concomitance); and the reason for this absence of a corroborative instance lies in the fact that *all* living bodies are included in the 'subject' of the syllogism (and hence no 'living body' is left that could be cited as the instance). All definitions of things should be regarded as a *probans* of the 'negative' kind; for instance, when earth is defined as *that which possesses smell*, this may be stated in the form of the following syllogism:—'The thing in question must be regarded as *Earth*, because it possesses smell,—that which is not regarded as *Earth* does not possess smell, e. g., water.' Similarly, when we define *Pramāṇa* as the 'instrument of right cognition,' we may state this in the form of the syllogism—'Sense-perception and the rest must be regarded as *Pramāṇa*,—because they are instruments of right cognition,—that which is not regarded as *Pramāṇa* is not the instrument of right cognition,—e. g., wrong Sense-perception,—the real Sense-perception is not what is not the instrument of right cognition,—therefore it must be regarded as *Pramāṇa*.' If the concomitance in this case were to be stated in the positive form, it could only be in the form—'that which is the instrument of right cognition is always regarded as *Pramāṇa*;' but for this we could have no corroborative instance;—all *Pramāṇas* being included in the 'subject.' What is the *probandum* here is the *being regarded* as *Pramāṇa*, and not the *being Pramāṇa*; because

the *Pramāṇa* being synonymous with 'instrument of right cognition,' if it were the *probandum*, the *probans* and the *probandum* would become identical; and the *probans* would become open to the fallacy known as 'identity with the *probandum*.' We have thus described the *probans* of the 'negative' kind.

Some *probans* are of the purely 'positive' kind. For instance, in the syllogism—'Sound is predicable because it is knowable, whatever is knowable is predicable *e. g.*, the jar, —sound is knowable,—therefore it must be predicable,'—the *predicability* of sound is the *probandum*, and its *knowability* is the *probans*. This *probans* is purely 'positive' or universally affirmative; because the negative concomitance could be stated only in the form—'that which is not predicable is not knowable;' but in this case we could have no corroborative instance; in as much as there is no such thing as is not predicable; specially as in all cases it is only a well-known thing that can be cited as instance; and every one of such things is found to be both 'predicable' and 'knowable.'

Of these three kinds of *probans*,—*viz.*, the 'negative-positive,' the 'purely negative' and the 'purely positive,'—that which is of the 'negative-positive' kind can establish its *probandum*, only when it is endowed by all the five qualifications, and not when it is wanting in even one of these. These five qualifications are as follows:—(1) the *probans* must subsist in the 'subject'; (2) it must subsist in something in which the presence of the *probandum* is fully recognised; (3) it should be ever apart from all such things in which the *probandum* is known not to subsist; (4) its object should be one that is never liable to being sublated or contradicted and (5) it should not be liable to be met and counteracted by another *probans* to the contrary. All these five qualifications are found to be present in all such *probans* as 'the presence of smoke' and the like; for instance, (1) the smoke is present in the mountain, which is the subject; (2) it exists in the kitchen, where the presence of the *probandum* 'fire' is definitely recognised; (3) it is never present in any such place as the lake, where the *probandum*, fire, is known never to subsist; (4) its

object is never liable to being contradicted; because its object is the *probandum*, 'presence of fire;' and this presence of fire is not found to be sublated or contradicted by any valid means of knowledge; (5) similarly, the *probans*, 'presence of smoke' is not liable to be met and counteracted by another *probans* to the contrary; in as much as the 'probans to the contrary' is that which establishes a conclusion contrary to the original *probandum*; and as a matter of fact no such *probans* is found in the case of the 'presence of smoke' (establishing the presence of fire.) Thus then we find that all the five qualifications are present in the *probans*, 'presence of smoke,' which, for this reason, is accepted as that which proves or establishes 'the presence of fire.'

[Page 54.] That the fire (*probandum*) is present in the 'subject' (the mountain) is proved by the presence of the *probans* (smoke) in this latter; and thus in all Inferences, there are two factors—the *invariable concomitance* and the *character of subsisting in the 'subject'* [both belonging to the *Probans*.] From out of these two, what the *invariable concomitance* proves is the *probandum* in its general form; while what the *character of subsisting in the 'subject'* proves is a particular feature of the *probandum*, in the shape of its being related to the 'subject'; for instance, 'the presence of smoke' in the mountain proves that the fire also is related to (i. e., exists in) the mountain. If this particular feature of the *probandum* were not proved by the character of the *probans* subsisting in the 'subject,' then,—in as much as the mere *probandum* in its general form will have been already established by the 'invariable concomitance,' there would be no need for the other steps in the inferential process.

As was seen to be the case with the *presence of smoke*, so is the case with all negative-positive *probans*; all these can operate as true '*probans*' only if endowed with the above-mentioned five qualifications. Failing in this, they become mere semblances of the true '*probans*,' and not the true *probans*.

As for the 'purely positive' *probans*, this establishes its *probandum*, when endowed with four of the above five qualifications; as in this case it is not possible for the *probans* to be 'ever apart from that in which the *probandum* is known not

to subsist;’ for the simple reason that there is no such thing in which the probandum is known not to subsist.

As regards the purely-negative *probans*, this also is endowed with only four qualifications; because in this case it is not possible for the *probans* to subsist in something in which the presence of the *probandum* is fully recognised; for the simple reason that there is no such thing in which the *probandum* is known to subsist.

“What do you mean by the words *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*?”

That object in regard to which the presence of the probandum is doubtful, is called the *pakṣa* or ‘subject;’ e.g., in the inference of fire from smoke in the mountain, the mountain is the ‘*pakṣu*.’ The ‘*sapakṣa*’ is that object in which the presence of the *probandum* is fully and definitely recognised; e.g., in the above inference, the *kitchen*. The ‘*vipakṣa*’ is that object in which it is well known that the *probandum* does not subsist; e.g., the *lake*, in reference to the same inference.

Thus have been described all the three kinds of *Probans*, the ‘negative-positive,’ the ‘purely positive’ and the ‘purely negative.’ Those that are other than these are not true *probans*; they are mere ‘semblances of the *probans*’ or ‘Fallacious Reasons’ *Heṭvābhāsas*.)

[Page 57.] The ‘Fallacious Reasons’ are of the following five kinds:—(1) The ‘*asiḍḍha*,’ ‘unproven or uncertain;’ (2) the ‘*viruḍḍha*,’ ‘contradictory;’ (3) the ‘*anaikāntika*,’ ‘Inconclusive;’ (4) the ‘*prakaraṇasama*,’ ‘stultified or neutralised;’ and (5) the ‘*kālāṭyayāpaḍiṣṭa*,’ ‘nullified.’

(1) The ‘Unproven Probans’ is that with regard to which there is no certainty as to its being a true *probans*. This is of three kinds,—(a) *That which has an unknown subject* (*āśhrayāsiḍḍha*); e.g., in the syllogism ‘the sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus, like the lotus in the tank,’ the ‘sky-lotus’ is the subject of the ‘character of being lotus’ (which is the intended *probans*); and there being no such thing in existence, the *probans* is one whose receptacle is unknown. (b) *That whose very form is not known* (*svarūpāsiḍḍha*); e.g., in the syllogism, ‘sound is transitory, because it is visible by the eye, like the

jar,'—'visibility' is the intended *probans*; and in as much as sound is *audible*, and never *visible*, the *probans* is one whose very form is not known. (c) *That which has its invariable concomitance not known* or ascertained (*vyāpyatvāsiddha*); this is of two kinds—the first is that which is due to the absence of any evidence for the required invariable concomitance; and the other is due to the presence of 'accidents;' an example of the former we have in the syllogism.—'sound is momentary, because it is an entity,—every entity is momentary, *e.g.*, the mass of clouds;' as we have no proof for the invariable concomitance of *momentariness* and the *character of being an entity*, we do not include this fallacy under that '*vyāpyatvāsiddha*,' whose fallaciousness is due to the presence of 'vitiating accidents,' because, such including would imply (on our part) the acceptance of the view that Sound is momentary; as this regarding of the fallaciousness in this manner would only mean that the 'momentariness' in question is due to causes other than that of *being an entity*.

An example of this fallacy as due to the presence of 'accidents,' we have in the syllogism—'the killing of animals occurring in sacrifices is sinful, because it is killing, like any other killing apart from sacrifices;' in connection with this it has to be borne in mind that what makes the killing 'sinful' is not its character of *killing*, but its being prohibited in the scriptures; and this something else to which the character in question (the predicate of the conclusion) is due is called the 'accident.' The 'accident' (in regard to a syllogism) has been defined as 'that which, while pervading the *probandum* (*i.e.*, having the *probandum* invariably concomitant with itself), does not pervade the *probans*;' and this definition is applicable to the *character of being prohibited* (taken in relation to the aforesaid syllogism); inasmuch as *prohibitedness* pervades *sinfulness*; *i.e.*, whatever is *sinful* is always something that is *prohibited*; and yet the same character does not pervade the *probans*—'being *killing*' inasmuch as it is not true that *all killing is prohibited*; as the killing in connection with sacrificial performances is *not prohibited*. Thus then, inasmuch as the *character of being killing* is made (in the syllogism) dependent upon the invariable

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concomitance of something else (*i.e.*, *character of being prohibited*),—the syllogism becomes open to the fallacy of ‘having its invariable concomitance not duly known or ascertained.’

(II). The *Contradictory Probans* is that which is pervaded by the contrary of the *probandum*,—*i. e.*, with which the contrary of the *probandum* is invariably concomitant. For instance, in the syllogism—‘sound is eternal, because it is a product, like the soul,’—the *character of being a product*, which is the *probans* is pervaded by ‘non-eternality’ which is the contrary of ‘eternality,’ the *probandum*; inasmuch as it is a well-known fact that whatever is a *product* is *non-eternal*; and thus ‘being a product’ becomes, (in this syllogism) a *contradictory probans*.

(III). The *Inconclusive Probans* is that which is found to be fallible or anomalous. This is of two kinds:—(a) That anomalous *Probans* which is *too wide*, and (b) that which is *too narrow* (unique). The ‘Too Wide’ is that which subsists in that in which the *probandum* is known to be present, as well as in that in which the *probandum* is known to be absent; *e. g.*, in the syllogism—‘sound is eternal, because it is knowable, like the *ākāśa*,’—the *probans* is ‘knowability;’ and it is found to subsist in things *eternal* as well as *non-eternal* (*i. e.*, things in which eternality, the *probandum*, is present, and also the things in which it is absent). The ‘Too Narrow’ *probans* is that which subsists neither in that wherein the *probandum* is known to be present, nor in that wherein the *probandum* is known to be absent; *e. g.*, in the syllogism—‘the earth is eternal, because it is odorous,’—we have ‘odorousness’ as the *probans*; and this subsisting in the earth alone, cannot subsist in any other eternal or non-eternal things.

(IV). The ‘Neutralised Probans’ is that in whose case it is found that there is available another *probans* which proves the contrary of the *probandum* of the former; *e. g.*, in case of the syllogism—‘sound is non-eternal, because it is devoid of eternal properties;’—it is found that another syllogism is available, in the form—‘sound is eternal because it is devoid of non-eternal properties,’—which proves a conclusion directly contrary to the conclusion of the former syllogism. This fallacy has also been called ‘*Satpratipakṣa*.’

V. The 'Anulled or Nullified Probans' is that, the contradictory of whose *probandum* is known to be present in the 'subject,' by means of other (and more authoritative and trustworthy) means of knowledge; this fallacious probans also being called 'bādhita'; an example of this we have in the syllogism—'fire is not hot, because it is a product, like water;' here it is found that 'the character of being a product' is the *probans*; and this has been put forward to prove the *absence of heat* in fire; but the presence of heat in fire is known by means of Tactile Sense-perception (which is more trustworthy than Inference).

Thus has Inference been explained.

[Page 64.] *Upamāna*, 'Analogy', is the cognition of a certain body or thing as similar to another thing, the cow for instance,—such cognition being helped by the remembrance of an indicative declaration (bearing upon the subject). As for example, the man from the city, not knowing what the *gavaya* is, hears from a certain forester the declaration that 'the *gavaya* is similar to the cow;' subsequently, going to the forest, if he happens to remember that declaration, and at the same time sees an animal resembling the cow,—there appears in him the cognition of this animal as being similar to the cow, which cognition is helped by his remembrance of the aforesaid indicative declaration; and this cognition is called '*Upamāna*,' 'Analogy', inasmuch as it is the means or instrument of '*Upamiti*,' 'Analogical Cognition;' this 'analogical cognition' consists in the cognition of the relation of *name-and-named* between the word ('*gavaya*' for instance) and the thing named by it (the animal *gavaya* for instance); the cognition, in this particular case, appearing in the form 'this thing is named *gavaya*.' This same analogical cognition is the *result* of Analogy. This Analogy has been regarded as an independent *pramāṇa* or Instrument of Right Knowledge; because it brings about a right cognition that cannot be brought about by Sense-perception, or Inference.

Thus has Analogy been explained.

[Page 66.] ‘*Shabḍa*’ or ‘Word’ (as a *Pramāṇa*) consists in the assertion of a trustworthy person. A ‘trustworthy person’ is one who speaks of things as they really exist; and ‘assertion’ or ‘sentence’ is the collection of such words as are dependent upon (or in need of) one another, are endowed with the capability of being construed together, and are in close juxtaposition to one another. It is in view of this definition of ‘sentence’ that such words as ‘cow—horse—man—elephant’ are not regarded as a ‘sentence,’ in as much as there is no ‘mutual need,’ or ‘dependence,’ among the words; similarly the collection of such words ‘*agninā sin̄chet*’ (‘spray with fire’) is not regarded as a ‘sentence,’ because the two words are not capable of being construed together; that is to say, what the instrumental ending in the word ‘*agninā*’ denotes is the *instrumentality* of fire towards the ‘*spraying*’; but as a matter of fact, the fire is not possessed of the capability of acting as the instrument of *spraying* (which can be done with water only), and thus there being no capability, in the *fire* and in the *spraying*, of being related to each other in the relation of cause and effect, the words ‘spray with fire’ is not regarded as a ‘sentence.’ Similarly also the words ‘bring the cow,’ are not regarded as a ‘sentence,’ when each of them is pronounced at distant intervals of time, being separated by periods of three hours or more; and the reason for this is that, even though the words are ‘interdependent,’ and even though they are endowed with the capability of being construed together, yet they are not in close juxtaposition. Thus then a real ‘sentence’ is that which is made up of such words as are interdependent, capable of being construed together and in close juxtaposition; *e. g.*, the words—‘*Jyotiṣtomena scargakāmo yajeta*’ [‘one desirous of attaining heaven should perform the *Jyotiṣtoma* sacrifice,]—or, ‘*naḍītīre phalāni santi*’ [‘there are fruits on the river-bank’],—or, last by the aforesaid words ‘*gām ānaya*’ [‘bring the cow’] when pronounced in close succession.

An objection is raised:—“Even in such sentences (as ‘*naḍītīre phalāni santi*’, the ‘mutual need’ that we find is not among the *words*, but among the *things* denoted by them; that

is to say, the *fruit* (denoted by the word '*phalāni*') is something that needs a substratum, and the *river-bank* being such a substratum, we have the 'need' of the *fruit* for the *river-bank*. In reality, however, if we ponder over the matter we find that there is no mutual need among the *things* either; because 'need' (*ākāṅkṣā*) being a form of *desire* can subsist only in conscious or sensate beings."

True; but what occurs is that when a man hears certain words pronounced, and knows the things denoted by them, these things, being thus known, produce in the mind of the man a feeling of mutual need or interdependence among themselves; and being thus productive of the notion of 'mutual need,' the things are spoken of as 'interdependent;' and indirectly through the things, the *words* expressive of them also come to be spoken of as 'interdependent.' Or, it may be that the words themselves, having denoted the things, produce in the mind of the person, a feeling of the 'need' of other things; and thereby the words come to be spoken of as 'interdependent.'

The 'juxtaposition' of words consists of their being uttered by one and the same man, without much delay (in the utterance of the several words); and this is among the words themselves directly, and not through the things denoted by them.

Thus then the final definition of the 'sentence' may be thus stated:—The sentence is the collection of such words as are in close juxtaposition,—are expressive of things capable of being inter-related,—and produce, through the denotation of things, a feeling, in the mind of the person hearing them uttered, of either the words themselves standing in need of other words, or of the things denoted by the words standing in need of those denoted by other words.

A *Word* again is a collection or group of letters, and the 'collection' or 'group' is not *real*, but *ideal*,—i. e., the letters are regarded as forming a 'group' only because they are conceived of as such; the number of letters falling under one conception being regarded as one 'group.' When a word is pronounced, the letters appear one after the other; and as each is quickly destroyed, there is no possibility of the hearer perceiving, at any one moment, more than one letter; hence what happens is that having, in due succession, heard each of

the preceding letters, when he hears the last letter of the word, there is produced in his mind by the ear-organ, the idea of the whole word,—this idea objectifying both what actually exists at the time (the last letter) and what is no longer existent (the preceding letters); and the production of this idea by the ear-organ is due to the fact that the ear, aided by the impressions of each of the preceding letters, comes into direct contact with the last letter, and is further helped by the notion (that may be present in the mind) of what is expressed by the component factors of the word. The ear-organ is able to bring about such a cognition, by reason of the peculiar efficiency of its auxiliaries; just as we find to be the case with Recognition; in the perception whereof, the previous condition, even though *past*, yet appears in the perception of the *present* (by the force of impressions and such other auxiliaries). In the same manner, the idea of one whole sentence, objectifying more than one word, is brought about by the ear-organ, in contact with the last word, and aided by the impressions left by the perceptions of the preceding words, and also by the notion of what is expressed by the words.

When the above-defined 'Sentence' is uttered by a trustworthy person it becomes what we called the 'Word' regarded as an *instrument of right cognition*. The *result* of this instrument is the knowledge of what is meant by the sentence. And this 'instrument of right cognition' is available in ordinary parlance, as well as in the Veda; in regard to ordinary parlance, however, there is this peculiarity that only some, and not all, speakers are 'trustworthy'; and hence it is only a few of such sentences, only those uttered by trustworthy persons, that are 'instruments of right cognition.' In the Veda, on the other hand, every one of the sentences is the work of God, who is supremely trustworthy; and hence all Vedic sentences, being the 'utterances of a trustworthy person,' are 'instruments of right cognition.'*

* At this point there is a long digression in one of the manuscripts, dealing with the question of the existence of God. The commentary has not touched upon this passage; nor is this the right place for the discussion, which, if the author wished to include it in his work, would be more in place, under the treatment of 'Ātman' later on. We therefore omit this long passage in the translation.

The four Instruments of Right Cognition have been described. We do not admit of any other such Instruments; of those postulated by others, those that are valid and real, are included in these four.

[Page 79]. An objection is raised:—“Arthāpaṭṭi or Presumption also is a distinct Instrument of Right Cognition; when one perceives a certain fact which, on the face of it appears incongruous or inconsistent, the assumption of that which removes the incongruity, or explains the inconsistency, constitutes what has been called ‘Presumption.’ For instance, when it is either seen or heard that Devaḍaṭṭa is fat, and yet he does not eat during the day, (there is an inconsistency, for removing which) the fact of his eating at night is presumed; because for one who does not eat during the day, it is not possible to be fat, unless he eat at night; hence the only ‘instrument for the right knowing’ of the fact of his eating at night, consists in the ‘Presumption’ based upon the inconsistency of the fatness; and this must be regarded as distinct from Sense-perception and the other ‘instruments of right cognition,’ in as much as what is cognised by the said presumption cannot be cognised by any of those instruments of cognition.”

This is not right; because the fact of eating at night is cognised by means of Inference; the inference being in this form:—‘this Devaḍaṭṭa eats at night,—because he is fat, though he does not eat during the day,—one who does not eat at night is never fat if he does not eat during the day,—as for instance, the man whom we find to be not fat, if he does not eat either during the day or at night;—this person is fat and eats not during the day,—therefore he cannot be non-eating at night.’ Thus we find that the night-eating is cognised by means of a universal negative Inference; for what purpose then should we assume another ‘instrument of cognition’ in the shape of ‘Presumption’?

A further objection is raised:—“Negation must be a distinct ‘Instrument of Right Cognition’; its postulating being necessary for the purpose of the cognising of the absence of things. For instance, the absence of the jar is ascertained

by the non-perception of the jar; and 'non-perception' is only the negation of perception: hence it is by means of Negation that the absence of the jar is cognised."

This also is not right; because the absence of the jar is actually cognised by Sense-perception as aided by the non-perception (of the jar) and the reasoning embodied in the form, 'if the jar had existed here, it would have been perceived, in the same manner as the spot is perceived.'

"But, as matter of fact, the Sense-organs can apprehend only such things as are in contact with them; as in all cases of Perception what happens is that the Sense-organs illumine (or render cognisable) the object only after it reaches (comes into contact with) it;—and that this is so is proved by the fact that it is an instrument of cognition, like light; or the argument may be stated thus:—'the Ear and the Eye are illuminative of their objects only on reaching their objects,—because they are external organs,—like the organ of touch;' the fact that the organ of touch comes into actual contact with the object it apprehends is admitted by all parties. There is however no relation between *Absence* and the Sense-organs; Conjunction and Inherence are the only two relations, and neither of these is possible (between Absence and the Sense-organs); because in the first place, it is only between two substances that there is Conjunction, and Absence is not a substance; and as for Inherence, there being no inseparable relation between the two, no Inherence is possible. As for the relationship of the *qualification and the qualified*, this cannot be regarded as a 'relation'; because it is not *one* subsisting in two things distinct from itself; a 'relation' is always distinct from the two things related; and is one only, while subsisting in both of those things. As for example, the Conjunction of the drum and the stick; this Conjunction is something totally different from the drum and the stick, and is *one* while subsisting in both the drum and the stick. The relation between the Qualification and the Qualified is not of this character; because the relation between the man and the stick he carries is that of the Qualification and the Qualified; and this is not distinct from the man and the stick; in as

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much as the character of *Qualification* belonging to the stick is not something distinct from itself; nor is this *qualifiedness* of the man distinct from the man; both being identical with the forms of the two things (the stick and the man) respectively. Similarly in the case of Negation, or Absence, also, it must be the *qualification* as well as the *qualified*; as it is not possible for substance or any other category to subsist in Negation. Consequently the character of ‘*qualification*’ as belonging to the Negation must consist in its own form, which consists in its capability of bringing about a cognition tainted with itself; and this is not something distinct from the Negation (and thus the relationship is not different from the members related). Similar arguments may be urged against the postulating of such relationships as those of the *Pervader* and the *Pervaded*, the *cause* and *effect*, and so forth. For instance, the *pervasiveness* (character of pervading) as subsisting in the fire is nothing more than that particular form of the fire itself which consists in its capability of bringing about the idea of something concomitant with it; similarly the character of the Cause also, as subsisting in the Yarns, is only that form which is concomitant, both positively and negatively, with the effect (Cloth); and it is not something different from the Yarns themselves. In the same manner, while Negation also is both the *pervader* and the *Cause*, there is no possibility of such character being any such thing (other than Negation itself) as Generality and the like. Thus then we find that the relation of the Qualification and the Qualified is neither distinct from the things related; nor does it subsist in both the members related; because it is only the character of Qualification that subsists in the Qualification; and the character of the Qualified does not subsist in it; and similarly in the Qualified also, it is only the character of the Qualified that subsists, and not the character of the Qualification. Then again, in the compound ‘*viśheṣyaviśheṣanābhāva*’ (by which the relation is sought to be named), the word ‘*bhāva*’ (‘character’), appearing after the copulative compound ‘*viśheṣyaviśheṣana*’ could not be construed with each of the two members of that compound, if the ‘*bhāva*’ were only one; hence the word has to be repeated; whereby we have two characters—(1) that of the qualification, denoted by the

Tarka-bhā. 33.

word '*viśeṣayābhāva*' and (2) that of the qualified, denoted by the word '*viśeṣyābhāva*;' while the relation is *one* only; consequently there can be no such relation as *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyābhāva*.' Similarly there can be no such relations as '*vyāparyāpakābhāva*' (that of the Pervader and the Pervaded), and the like. Then as regards the actual application, in usage, of the name 'relation' to these (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyābhāva*, &c.),—this must be regarded as an indirect or figurative application, due to this similarity that, like the real relation, these so-called relations also are cognisable only through the cognition of the two members concerned. Thus then the upshot of all this is that Negation or Absence, cannot be perceived by the Sense-organs, being as it is, incapable of any relation (without which the Sense-organs cannot operate)."

(Reply).—True; but the law that 'the Sense-organs apprehend only such things as are related to them,' is true only with regard to the perception of positive things; by virtue of which, when the senses apprehend a positive object, they can do so only when the object is related to them; this law however does not apply to the apprehension of negative entities,—the apprehension whereof is brought about by the senses, only through the relation of qualification and qualified. As for the objection that,—'if the senses apprehended things not related to them (e.g., negation, then they would apprehend anything and everything,'—this is refuted by pointing out that what is held is that the senses apprehend only such negation or absence as qualify a definite object (and not any negation at random); and this is the case with the view of the opponent also [in as much even though, according to him the *absence* is cognisable by means of Negation as an instrument of knowledge, it can be cognised only as the qualification of something definite]. And if there are objections to this, they would be applicable to both views equally; and such objections, for that reason, should not be put forward by either of the two disputants.

[Page 88.] In connection with the Instruments of Right Cognition we proceed to consider the following matter—In *Tarka-bhā.* 34.

most cases, when the man has cognised the water, and has assured himself of the validity of his cognition, he proceeds to take up the water; but in some cases, the mere suspicion or doubtful knowledge of the presence of water leads the man to proceed to take up the water; and it is only after he has found the water to be actually present that he becomes assured of the validity of his original cognition. Such are the facts; and upon these some people opine as follows:—"In all cases, the man proceeds to activity after having previously ascertained the validity of his cognition; in as much the validity of cognitions is self-evident and self-assured. That is to say, whenever a man has a certain cognition, at that same time he also recognises the validity of that cognition; the apprehender of the validity of the cognition not being different from the apprehender of the cognition itself; and it is this *independence of any apprehender other than that of the cognition itself* that constitutes the 'self-sufficiency' of the validity of the cognition. There is no doubt that the cognition itself is apprehended before the activity; as if it were not so, wherefore could there arise any doubt as to its validity or otherwise? For certainly, until the object of doubt has been cognised, the doubt cannot arise. Thus then, the Cognition itself being already apprehended by the instrumentality of Presumption based upon the impossibility of its *apprehendedness* (except on such apprehension) the validity of that cognition comes to be apprehended by means of Presumption; and thereupon follows the action of the man. And it is not true that at first the cognition alone is apprehended; and its validity is apprehended only after the resultant activity of the man leads to his attaining the object of that cognition."

[Page 91]. In answer to the above we argue as follows:—We do not admit that the Cognition is apprehended by the instrumentality of the presumption based upon the impossibility of its *apprehendedness* (except on such apprehension), as has been declared above; we are all the further away from admitting that the validity is also apprehended by Presumption. To explain: what our opponent means may be stated thus:—"As soon as one has the cognition of the jar, there is

recognised the *apprehendedness* of the cognition, in the notion expressed in the words 'the jar is cognised by me;' and from this it is inferred that when the cognition is produced, there is produced in it a certain property in the shape of *apprehendedness*; and in as much as this *apprehendedness* had not been produced before the cognition,—and is produced upon the production or appearance of the cognition,—the natural conclusion pointed to by these positive and negative premises is that 'the *apprehendedness* is produced by the cognition.' And thus, this property named *apprehendedness*, produced by Cognition, is not possible without the Cognition,—the appearance of effect being not possible without the cause; and by means of the Presumption based upon this, the *apprehendedness* indicates its own cause or source, in the shape of the Cognition." This, we hold, is not right; because *Apprehendedness* is nothing apart from the character of being the object of Cognition.

The opponent retorts—"The jar is said to be the 'object of cognition' only in virtue of its being the substratum of the *apprehendedness* produced by the cognition. Because the said *objectivity* (of the jar) cannot be of the nature of identity; no identity being possible between the jar and the cognition, of which one is the object (*viṣaya*) and the other the subject (*viṣayin*). If the 'objectivity' consisted in the fact of the cognition being produced from (or proceeding from) it, then that objectivity would belong to the Sense-organs and such other sources from which cognition is produced. This leads us to the inference that by the cognition there has been produced in the jar something whereby that jar alone, and nothing else, becomes the *object* of that cognition,—and this something is what we call *apprehendedness*. It is in this manner that the *apprehendedness* is proved not only by direct sense-perception, but also by presumption based upon the impossibility of the said *objectivity*."

This is not right, we reply. Because, as a matter of fact, the *objective* and *subjective* character proceed from the very nature of things; that is to say, there is a natural peculiarity in the object and its cognition, by virtue of which one is the *object* and another the *subject* in relation to the other. If this were not so, then no objectivity could belong to past and

Ṭarka-bhā. 36.

future things; as it is not possible for any *apprehendedness* being produced in these by cognition; in as much as it is not possible for a property to be produced in an object that does not exist at the time (and *apprehendedness* is only a property). Then again, in as much as the *apprehendedness* also, in its turn, would be the object of its own cognition, that would necessitate the assumption of another *apprehendedness*, and thus there would be no end to the number of *apprehendednesses* thus assumed. If, in order to avoid this, the objectivity of the *apprehendedness* were held to be something inborn in itself, independent of any further *apprehendedness*,—then the same might be admitted with regard to the jar and such other things also; what then would be the necessity of assuming any *apprehendedness* at all? Even if (for the sake of argument) we admit of such a thing as *apprehendedness*; even in that case, the cognition would be indicated by mere *apprehendedness* in general; while its validity would be indicated by a particular form of *apprehendedness*,—that form which is in consonance with the cognition of the instrument of right cognition; and such being the case, how can the validity of the cognition be held to be apprehended by the apprehender of the cognition itself? If there were some such peculiar *apprehendedness*, in consonance with the cognition of the instrument of right cognition, by which the cognition and its validity were both apprehended simultaneously;—then the same might be said with regard to *invalidity* also; namely, that there is some such peculiar *apprehendedness* in consonance with the cognition of the instrument of invalid cognition, by virtue of which this cognition and *invalidity* are both apprehended simultaneously; and thus the invalidity of the cognition also might be regarded as self-evidenced. If, even in face of this, the *invalidity* of the cognition be held to be due to extraneous circumstances, then its *validity* also would be due to extraneous circumstances,—that is to say apprehended by means other than that which apprehends the cognition. It is for these reasons that we hold that the cognition is apprehended by sense-perception obtained through the agency of the mind, while its validity is apprehended by means of Inference; for instance, when the man seeking for water has the cognition (or perception) of water, the exertion

that he puts forth is either *fruitful* or not *fruitful*; of these the fruitful exertion is called '*samartha*' or 'fit,' 'capable'; and it is through the fruitfulness of the exertion that the validity of the cognition (exciting that exertion) is *inferred*; the inferential syllogism appearing in the following form:—'the cognition of water in question is valid, —because it gives rise to fruitful exertion,—that which is not valid never gives rise to fruitful exertion;—as for example the invalid cognition;' this is based on the universal negative premiss ('that which is not valid never gives rise to fruitful exertion'); the 'subject' of the syllogism is *that cognition of water which gives rise to fruitful exertion*; and the '*probandum*' is the *validity* of that cognition; what is meant by the 'validity' (*prāmāṇya*) of the cognition in this case is the fact of its being in due consonance with its real object,—and not the character of being the instrument of right cognition; as if it meant the latter, then the syllogism would become fallacious; in view of Remembrance, which, while giving rise to fruitful exertion (and thus fulfilling the conditions of the *probans*, is not the instrument of right cognition (and thus would fail in reference to the *probandum*). The *probans* of the syllogism is the 'character of giving rise to fruitful exertion.' The validity of the cognition, after it has become rightly effective (by giving rise to fruitful exertion), being thus ascertained by means of the above inference, we are led to infer, on the strength of the analogy of this cognition of water, the validity also of similar cognitions of water, even before they have given rise to any exertion, and thereby proved themselves to be rightly effective,—this inference being based upon the fact of these latter cognitions being similar on all points to the previous cognition; and this inference is based upon negative-positive premisses. Thus then, we conclude that the validity of cognitions is apprehended by means other than those whereby the cognitions themselves are apprehended.

'All the four Instruments of Right Cognition Keshava has explained, for the comprehension of youthful learners, in accordance with the Shāstras, indicating in brief the main arguments bearing upon the subject.'

Tarka-bhā. 38.

SECTION II.

Prameyas : Objects of Cognition.

[Page 97.] The *Instruments* of Right Cognition have been described; we now proceed to describe the *Objects* of cognition. On this point we have the aphorism (*Nyāya-sūtra*, I.1.9) -- '(1) the Soul, (2) the Body, (3) the Sense-organs, (4) the Objects or Categories, (5) Apprehension, (6) the Mind, (7) Activity, (8) Defects, (9) Rebirth, (10) Resultant Experience, (11) Pain and 12th Release,--are the *objects of cognition*.'

(1) Of these the Soul is that which belongs to the genus 'Soul'—*i.e.*, that which is possessed of the generic character of the 'Soul.' This Soul is something distinct from the body, the Sense-organs and other things; it is different with each body, it is eternal and omnipresent. It is perceptible by the mind. When there is any diversity of opinion as to the Soul being perceptible by the mind, it may be inferred through the presence of such peculiar qualities as the Intellect and the like. The whole inferential process involved may be explained as follows:—Intellect and the rest must be regarded as *qualities*,—because, like colour, they are transient and perceptible by a single Sense-organ; and as a matter of fact the Quality must subsist in some substance; now Intellect and the rest cannot be the qualities of material substances,—because they are perceptible by the mind,—and the qualities of material substances are never perceived by the mind, *e.g.*, colour and the rest; nor again could they be qualities of Space, Time or Mind, —because they are what have been called 'specific qualities,'—and Number and such other qualities of Space, Time and Mind are not 'specific qualities,' being, as they are *common* to all substances; that Intellect and the rest are 'specific qualities' is proved by the fact that while they are qualities, they are each perceived by a single sense-organ; like Colour, &c.; and for this reason they cannot be the qualities of Space, Time and Mind; for these reasons the substratum of Intellect, &c., must be a substance other than the aforesaid eight (the five material substances and Space, Time and Mind); and this ninth substance is none other than the Soul. This inferential process may be stated in the form of the following formal purely negative syllogism:—'Intellect, &c., must sub-

sist in a substance other than the eight substances, Earth, &c.—because while not subsisting in these, they are qualities,—that which does not subsist in a substance other than the eight substances is never found to be a quality that does not subsist in the eight substances,—*e. g.*, Colour and the rest ;' or it may be stated in the form of the following mixed, or positive-negative Syllogism :—' Intellect and the rest must subsist in a substance other than the eight substances, Earth and the rest,—because they are qualities, and do not subsist in these eight substances,—that which does not subsist in one thing subsists in things other than that thing,—*e. g.*, sound which does not subsist in Earth, Water, &c., subsists in *Ākāśhā* which is a substance other than the Earth, &c.,—in the same manner, Intellect and the rest subsist in a substance other than the eight substances, Earth and the rest.' It is in this manner that the Soul becomes established as the ninth substance, the substratum of the qualities of Intellect and the rest. And this Soul must be omnipresent, in as much its effects (*i.e.*, the effects of the merit and demerit acquired by the Soul) are found to be present everywhere ; by 'omnipresence' we mean the largest dimension. Being omnipresent, the Soul must be eternal ; like the *Ākāśha*. It must be regarded as different in each body ; because we find that the experiences of pleasure, pain, &c., vary in different bodies.

(2) That ultimate composite which forms the receptacle of the Soul's experiences is the *Body*. By 'experience' we mean the perception or feeling of pleasure or pain ; and these are produced in the Soul only when the Soul is possessed of (characterised by) a certain accessory ; and this accessory being the receptacle of the experiences, is the *Body*. Or we may define the *Body* as the substratum of activity : 'activity' consisting not in mere motions, but in action tending to the acquiring of the good or desirable and the abandoning of the evil or undesirable.

(3) That which is in contact with the body, is the instrument of cognition and is itself imperceptible by the senses,—is the *Sense-organ*. If the *Sense-organ* were defined only as that which is imperceptible by the senses,—this would include Time, &c., also,—hence we have added the qualification 'that which is the instrument of cognition.' Even with this qualification,

Tarka-bhā. 40.

the definition would be applicable to the contact of the Sense-organ with the perceived object ; hence we have added the further qualification that 'it is in contact with the body.' If we defined it simply as that which is in contact with the body and is the instrument of cognition,—even such things as Light and the like would have to be regarded as 'Sense-organs' ; hence we have added the qualification that it is imperceptible by the Sense-organs.

The number of these Sense-organs is *six* :—The Olfactory, the Gustatory, the Ocular, the Tactile, the Auditory and the Mental. Of these, the Olfactory Organ is that which brings about the apprehension of smell ; and is located in the tip of the nose ; this organ is of the Earth, because it is odorous, like the jar ; that it is odorous is proved by the fact that it apprehends odour ; because it is a well-recognised fact that from among the five qualities—Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch and Sound,—that quality which the Sense-organ apprehends belongs to that Sense-organ ; as we find in the case of the ocular organ, the eye, which, apprehending colour, is itself coloured.

The Gustatory Organ is that which brings about the apprehension of taste ; and is located at the tip of the tongue ; it is of the Water, because it has taste ; that it has taste is proved by the fact that from among Colour and the rest it manifests taste only, like the saliva.

The Ocular Organ is that which brings about the apprehension of colour ; it is located within the black pupil of the Eye ; it is of the Light, because from among Colour and the rest, it manifests colour only, like the lamp.

The Tactile Organ is that which brings about the apprehension of touch ; it exists all over the body ; it is of the Air, because from among Colour and the rest, it manifests touch only, like the wind proceeding from the fan, which manifests, or renders perceptible, the cool touch of the water attaching to the body.

The Auditory Organ is that which brings about the apprehension of sound ; it is nothing else but *ākāśa* as limited by the tympanum ; that it is *ākāśa* is proved by the fact that it is possessed of the quality of sound ; and that sound is a quality of this organ is proved by the fact that it apprehends sound ; it being a well-recognised law that from among Colour and the rest, that quality which is manifested by a certain organ belongs to that organ ; as we find in the case of the Ocular

Tarka-bhā. 41.

organ which apprehends colour, and is itself coloured ; hence being the apprehender of sound, the Auditory Organ, must have sound for its quality.

The Mental Organ is that which brings about the apprehension of pleasure, &c. ; it is atomic and located within the heart.

“ What is the proof for the existence of these Sense-organs ? ”

Inference alone affords the requisite proof,—viz., ‘ The apprehension of Colour, &c., must be brought about by some instrument,—because they are actions,—like the action of cutting.’ [And it is these ‘ instruments ’ that constitute the Sense-organs.]

(4) The six categories constitute the ‘ objects.’ The six categories are—Substance, Quality, Action, Generality, Specific Individuality and Inherence. Though the ‘ Instruments of Right Cognition ’ and the other ‘ *prameyas* ’ are all included under these six, yet they have been enunciated separately for a definite purpose. Of these six categories, the Substance is that which is the constituent or material cause of things,—or that which is the substratum of qualities. The substances are nine in number : Earth, Water, Light, Air, *Ākāśha*, Time, Space, Soul and Mind.

Of these, Earth is that which possesses the generic character of ‘ Earth ’ ; consisting of a peculiar conglomeration of particles, which constitute its *hardness, softness, &c.* It exists in the form of the olfactory organ, the bodies (of animals), lump of clay, stone, trees and so forth ; it is endowed with the qualities of colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, gravity, fluidity and faculty. It is of two kinds—eternal and transitory ; Earth in the form of atoms is eternal ; and that in the form of the various composite products is transitory. Of both these kinds of earth, the colour, taste, odour and touch are evanescent ; being brought about by the application of heat ; as a matter of fact, when heat is applied to earthy substances, their previous colours, &c., are destroyed, and fresh ones are produced.

Water is that which is possessed of the generic character of ‘ water ’ ; existing in the forms of the gustatory organ, the *Tarka-bhā. 42.*

bodies of aqueous beings, rivers, oceans, snow, hail and the like ; it is endowed with all the qualities belonging to Earth, with the exception of odour, and with the addition of viscosity. Water also is eternal and transitory ; the colour, &c., of the eternal watery substances are eternal ; and those in the transitory ones are evanescent.

Light is that which is possessed of the generic character of 'light' existing in the forms of the eye, the bodies of fiery beings), the sun, gold, fire, lightning and so forth ; it is possessed of the qualities of colour, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, nearness, remoteness, fluidity and faculty ; the eternality and non-eternality of this are as before (in the case of Earth, etc). It is of five kinds - 1) having colour and touch both manifested ; (2) having both colour and touch unmanifested ; (3) having colour unmanifested and colour manifested ; and (4) having its colour manifested and touch unmanifested. The light that has colour and touch manifested is in the form of the light of the sun, &c, and also in masses of fire ; the Gold is light with its colour and touch manifested but suppressed ; if its colour were not manifested, it could not be visible ; and if its touch were not manifested, it could not be perceived by touch ; the suppression of its colour and touch is done by the homogeneous colour and touch belonging to the earth-particles (mixed up in the gold). The light that has its colour and touch unmanifested is in the form of the ocular organ. That having its colour unmanifested but touch manifested is in the form of the light latent in heated water. Lastly, that having its colour manifested and touch unmanifested is in the form of the circle of light emanating from the lamp.

Air is that which is possessed of the general character of 'Air' ; it exists in the form of the Tactile Organ, the air breathed in, and so forth ; it is endowed with the qualities of touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, nearness, remoteness and velocity. It is inferred from the feelings of touch, &c. For instance, when the wind blows, we feel a touch which is neither hot nor cold, this touch being a quality which cannot subsist without a substance ; and hence

Tarka-bhā. 43.

the touch, when felt, leads to the inference of the substance to which that touch belongs; and this substance is none other than Air; because no earth is found to be present; and apart from Air and Earth the touch, which is neither hot nor cold, cannot subsist. Air also is of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal; the eternal air being in the form of atoms, and the non-eternal in the form of the various composite products.

We now proceed to describe the processes of the production and destruction of the composite substances or products of the four substances described above. When two atoms are active, they combine; and from this combination is the Diad formed; of this Diad the two atoms form the constituent cause; and the conjunction of the atoms forms the non-material cause; and such agencies as the 'Unseen Agency' (or Fate) and the life form the efficient or Instrumental cause. When there is an

activity among three diads, and they combine in consequence, there appears the Triad; of which the Diads form the constituent cause, and the other two as above. Similarly with four Triads the Quartette is formed; with four Quartettes another more gross substance, and so on and on to the grossest substance; upto the Great Earth, the Great Water, the Great Light, and the Great Air.

The colour and other qualities in the products are produced out of the qualities of their respective constituent particles, in virtue of the law that the qualities of the cause produce the qualities of the product.

After the product, the jar for instance, endowed with colour and such other properties, has been brought into existence, at some time or the other, there appears an activity among the component parts of the jar,—this activity being due either to a push or to a stroke; this activity brings about a disjunction among the particles; which disjunction brings about the destruction of the conjunction that keeps the composite substance intact and is its non-material cause; and it is thus that the composite jar comes to be destroyed. This shows how an object is destroyed on the destruction of that non-material cause which keeps the object intact. In some cases the object is destroyed by the destruction of its material cause; as for instance, when the time for the dissolution of the Earth, &c., arrives, there appears in the mind of God the desire to dissolve the world; where-

upon, there appears an activity among the atoms composing the Diad ; this activity brings about a disjunction or disruption which destroys this conjunction, from which results the destruction of the Diad ; and the Diad being destroyed, there follows the destruction of the Triad, due to the destruction of the Diad which forms its substratum ; and so on, it goes till ultimately the entire Earth is destroyed. Another instance of the destruction of an object by the destruction of its material cause we have in the destruction of the cloth brought about by the destruction of its component yarns.

The destruction of the colour and other qualities of the products is due to the destruction of the products themselves, which form the substratum of those qualities. In some cases however, while the substratum, the object, remains intact, one quality may be destroyed by the appearance of other contrary qualities ; *e.g.*, by baking, the dark colour of the jar is destroyed (by the appearance of the red colour).

[Page 117]. “What is the proof for the existence of the Atom ?”

We proceed to explain the evidence that we have for the existence of the Atom. In the rays of the sun seen through the network of the spider's web, we perceive extremely fine specks of dust ; this grain of dust, we argue, must be a product composed of finer particles,—because it is a product,—like the jar ;—those finer particles again must be regarded as products,—because of the law that the component particles of a gross composite must themselves be products ; carrying this same reasoning a few steps downwards, we come ultimately to the particles in the form of Diads ; this Diad in its turn, we argue, must be the product of still finer particles,—because it is a product,—like the jar ; and it is this particle composing the Diad that is called the ‘Atom’ ; and this is not a composite product.

“In view of the universal character of the law that the component of a composite product must itself be a composite product, how can the Atom (which is the component particle of the composite Diad) be regarded as *not* a composite product ?”

We accept the Atom as indivisible,—i. e., not a composite product,—because otherwise (if we did not stop at some point in the series) we would be landed on the absurdity of having to postulate an infinite series of products; and the inevitable result of this would be that, all things being equally composed of infinite component particles, the mountain Meru and the grain of rapeseed would come to be regarded as of equal dimension. For this reason the Atom must be regarded as indivisible,—and not a composite product. The Diad is composed of *two* atoms; because a single atom cannot be productive; and there is nothing to prove that the Diad contains three or more atoms. The Triad is composed of *three* diads; because a single diad cannot be productive; and if it were composed of only two Diads, then it could not become endowed with that *larger or grosser dimension* which is the distinctive feature of all products (as compared with their component particles); because this grosser dimension of the product is due either to the gross dimension of the component particle, or to the numerousness of the component particles; and in as much as no gross dimension belongs to the Diad (which is the component particle of the Diad, which is subtle in its dimension), the gross dimension of the Diad must be attributed to the latter cause.—i.e., to the numerousness of the component Diads; which proves that the number of Diads in a Triad must be three or more; and as there is nothing to show that the number is more than three, we conclude that the gross dimension of the Triad must be due to the presence of *three* diads.

The *ākāśha* is that which is the substratum of the distinctive quality of Sound; and it is endowed with the qualities of sound, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction. It is one only, all-pervading and eternal; its presence is indicated by Sound.

“In what way do you prove the fact that the presence of *ākāśha* is indicated by sound?”

We prove it by means of the reasoning *per 'pariśeṣa'*; the subsistence of a certain quality in a number of things being suspected, when the impossibility of such subsistence in some of those things is proved, the notion that we have of the *Tarka-bhā. 46.*

quality subsisting in the remaining things is what is called 'parisheṣa'; thus, in the case in question, we argue that Sound is a specific quality, because while possessing a generic character, it is perceptible by us by means of a single sense-organ;—e.g., colour and the rest;—being a quality it must subsist in a substance;—it cannot subsist in Earth, Water, Light, Air, or Soul,—because it is perceptible by the auditory organ;—those qualities that subsist in these latter substances are not perceptible by the auditory organ,—as we find in the case of the qualities of colour and the like;—and sound is perceived by the auditory organ [therefore it cannot subsist in Earth and the rest];—nor can sound be the quality of Space, Time and Mind,—because it is a *specific quality* [and none of those three are possessed of any specific qualities]; for these reasons the substance in which sound subsists as the quality must be one that is distinct from these eight; and this can be no other than *Ākāśha*. The *Ākāśha* is one only; there is no proof for its diversity; and all that is needed is explicable by a single *Ākāśha*. Because *Ākāśha* is one only, there subsists in it no such generality as 'ākashaṭra'; as a diversity of individuals is a necessary element in all generalities, all *generality* subsisting in more than one individual. The *Ākāśha* is *all-pervading*,—i.e., possessed of the largest dimension; this being shown by the fact that its effect is found everywhere. And finally, being all-pervading, it is *Eternal*.

[Page 121.] Time also is inferred from the notions of nearness and remoteness which are contrary to those pertaining to Space;* it is endowed with the qualities of number, dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction; it is one and all-pervading.

“In what way is time inferred from the nearness and remoteness contrary to that pertaining to Space?”

When an old man is near us,—though on account of his proximity to us he is capable of being spoken of as *near*, yet the notion that he actually gives rise to is that of *remoteness*

*The nearness and remoteness due to Space is not brought about by the movements of the sun; while those pertaining to Time are brought about by the sun's movements.

from us ; conversely, when a young man is at a distance from us,—even though this fact of his being at a distance renders him liable to be spoken of as *remote*, yet the notion that he actually gives rise to is that of *nearness*. [What happens in these cases is that the man who is near us in *space* is *remote* in point of time, and *vice versa*]. Now, these notions of *nearness* and *remoteness*, contrary to those pertaining to Space, being effects, must have a cause ; this cause cannot be Space or any other substance ; and hence what is the cause of this effect is Time, whose existence is inferred from the said effects.

Though Time is in reality one only, yet through certain conditions in the shape of *present*, *past* and *future* actions, it comes to bear the names of ‘present,’ ‘past’ and ‘future ;’ exactly in the same manner as one and the same man, through certain conditions in the shape of the actions of cooking, reading and the like ; comes to be known as a ‘cook,’ a ‘reader’ and the like. The eternality and all-pervadingness of Time are to be explained in the same manner as before (in the case of *ākāśa*).

[Page 124.] Space, whose existence is inferred from those notions of nearness and remoteness that are contrary to similar notions pertaining to Time, is one, eternal and all-pervading ; it is endowed with the qualities of number, dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction. It is inferred from such notions as those of ‘East’ and the like ; as these notions can have no other cause save Space ; in as much as in every other way the thing remains the same, whether it be located in the east or in the west. Though Space is one only, yet it comes to be named ‘East,’ ‘West’ and the rest, through certain circumstances in the form of the contact of the sun with various places.

[Page 125.] The Soul is that which possesses the generic character of ‘Soul ;’ it is different in each body, in as much as pleasure and pain, &c., in each body are entirely distinct from those in the other. The qualities that belong to it are, the five beginning with Number, as also the nine *specific qualities*, beginning with knowledge or intellection. This also is eternal and all-pervading as the substances before mentioned.

Tarka-bhā. 48.

[Page 126.] The Mind is that which is possessed of the generic character of 'mind;' it is atomic, is in contact with the Soul and is the internal organ, being the organ through which pleasure, pain, etc., are experienced; it is eternal; endowed with the eight qualities beginning with Number. It is through contact of this mind that the external sense-organs apprehend their respective objects; and it is on this account that the mind is regarded as the organ leading to all perception. The mind itself, however, is not perceptible; it can be only inferred; the inference being expressed in the following terms:—The apprehensions of pleasure, &c., must be due to an organ other than the Ocular and the rest,—because those apprehensions are found to appear also where the ocular and other organs are not present,—and it is a well recognised law that when a thing is produced in the absence of another thing, it must have for its cause something other than this latter thing; as we find in the case of the action of cooking, which, being produced in the absence of the axe, has for its cause, fire and such other things, which are different from the axe;—and this other organ (that brings about the apprehension of pleasure, &c.), is the Mind; and it is an organ totally different from the ocular and other organs; and it is atomic.

The Substances have been described; we proceed to describe the Qualities. Quality is defined as that which is endowed with generic character, is the non-material cause of things, and is not of the nature of motion; and it always subsists in substances. The qualities are twenty-four in number:—Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Nearness, Remoteness, Gravity, Fluidity, Viscidity, Sound, Knowledge, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Merit, Demerit and Faculty.

[Page 128.] Of these qualities, Colour is the *specific* quality, perceptible by the Ocular Organ only; it subsists in

Tarkabhā, 49.

Earth, Water and Light; it is of various kinds, white and the rest. In earthy substances, Colour is produced by the application of heat; and (hence) it is in these substances alone that colour is transient; in the atoms of Water and Light it is eternal; but in the composite aqueous and luminous products it is transient. The colour in luminous substances is bright-white, and is not due to the application of heat; and in aqueous substances also it is of the same kind, except that in these it is not bright.

Taste is the specific quality perceptible by the Gustatory Organ; it subsists in Earth and Water; in the earthy substances it is produced by the application of heat, and is of six kinds—sweet, acid, saltish, pungent, astringent and bitter; in aqueous substances, it is sweet only, not produced by the application of heat, and is both eternal and transient; eternal in the water-atoms, and transient in the composite aqueous products.

Odour is the specific quality perceived by the Olfactory Organ; it subsists in Earth alone; and is always transient. It is of two kinds—good and bad. The odour that is generally found in water and other substances is due to the presence of earth-particles mixed up with the water, in which earth-particles subsists the odour that is perceived.

Touch is the specific quality perceived by the Tactile Organ; it subsists in Earth, Water, Light and Air. It is of three kinds—cool, hot and neither-hot-nor-cool; it is *cool* in Water, *hot* in Light; and *neither hot nor cool* in Earth and Air. It is in the Earth alone that it is transient; it is eternal in the atoms of Water, Light and Air; but transient in the composite products of these latter. The above four qualities—Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch—become perceptible only when they are *manifested*, and that also in such substances as are endowed with sufficiently large dimensions.

Number is a *general* (or common) quality (as opposed to the *specific* qualities), and forms the basis of the ordinary

notions of 'unity,' 'duality,' &c. It extends from *one* to the *parārdha* (which is the highest conceivable number'. It is eternal in eternal substances, and transient in transient substances; in the latter case, it is produced by *unities* in the object in which it inheres. *Duality* is always transient; being produced as it is, by the distinctive unitary conceptions in the form of 'this is one unit' and 'that is another,' that we have with reference to two objects; for 'duality' thus there are two constituent causes, in the shape of the two objects; while its non-constituent cause are the two unities, while the distinctive unitary conception is the efficient cause. Duality is destroyed by the destruction of the distinctive unitary conceptions. As is the case with the notion of 'two,' so it is with those of 'three' and the other numbers.

[Page 132.] Dimension is the specific cause of all notions of measurement or size. It is of four kinds—small, large, long and short. The dimension of the product is due to number, dimension and aggregation; for instance, the dimension of the Diad, being produced by the distinctive unitary conceptions that God has with reference to the two atoms composing the Diad, is due to the number; that is to say, it is produced by the number of the component atoms; the Dimension of the Triad is produced by the *multiplicity* of numbers inhering in the Diads composing it; but the dimension of all products, from the Quartette downwards, is produced by the dimension of their component particles (their constituent causes); and lastly, the dimension of the bale of cotton is due to the aggregation, or loose conglomeration, of its component layers (which are its constituent cause). The *small* dimension of the atom, as well as the *large* dimension of *Ālūsha*, is eternal.

Separateness is the peculiar cause of the notion of one thing being separate from another. It is of two kinds—(1) single separateness and (2) double, triple separateness, &c.; the former when subsisting in eternal substances, is eternal;

and it is transient when subsisting in transient substances; and the double separateness, &c., are always transient.

Conjunction is the quality that serves as the peculiar cause of the notion of one object being in contact with another. It subsists in two substances, and never pervades over its entire substrates. It is of three kinds—(1) due to the action of any one of its two substrates; (2) due to the action of both its substrates; and (3) due to another conjunction. To the first class belongs the conjunction of the moving kite with the unmoving pillar,—of this conjunction the action (moving) of the kite is the non-constituent cause;—to the second class belongs the contact or collision of two wrestlers;—and to the third class belongs the contact between the effect and what is not an effect,—this contact being brought about by the conjunction of what is the cause with what is not the cause; as for example, the conjunction between the body and the tree brought about by the conjunction between the hand and the tree [where the hand is the constituent cause of the body, while the tree is not its own cause].

Disjunction also is the basis of the notion of one thing being disjoined from another. This also is of three kinds—(1) due to the action of one of the two members; (2) due to the action of both members; and (3) due to another disjunction. To the first class belongs the disjunction of the kite from the mountain on which it was resting,—this disjunction being due to the flying away of the bird; to the second class belongs the disjunction or separation of two wrestlers; and to the third class belongs the disjunction of the body from the tree following upon the disjunction of the hand from the tree.

Remoteness and Nearness (or Priority and Posteriority) are the peculiar causes of the notion of 'remote' and 'near.' They are of two kinds, pertaining to space and pertaining to time. We proceed first to explain the appearance of those pertaining to space:—When two objects are placed on the

same side of the observer, the quality of *Nearness* is produced in the object which is closer to him by the conjunction of the object with the particular point in space that it occupies,—this conjunction being aided in this by the notion in the mind of the man of that object being closer to him than the other one; and when a similar conjunction of the other object is aided by the notion of the other object being further removed from the man, it produces the quality of *Remoteness* in that object which is further removed. The *proximity* of the object to the observer consists in the comparatively smaller number of contact with space-points between that object and the body of the man; and conversely the *distance* of the other object consists in the comparatively larger number of such contacts.

We next describe the appearance of the qualities of *Nearness* and *Remoteness* as pertaining to Time. When two persons, one of whom is younger than the other, are located in uncertain places, the quality of *Nearness* is produced in the younger person, by the conjunction of the body of that person with the particular point in time,—this conjunction being aided by the notion that the body has had contact with fewer time-points; and similarly the quality of *Remoteness* is produced in the older person, by a similar conjunction of that person, when aided by the notion of his body having had contact with a larger number of time-points.

Gravity is the non-constituent cause of the first step in the falling of a substance; it subsists in Earth and Water only. In regard to this quality it has been declared that the falling of a substance is due to its gravity, when there is nothing in the shape of conjunction, velocity or effort (to prevent such falling).

[Page 136.] Fluidity is the non-constituent cause of the first step in the process of flowing; it subsists in Earth, Light and Water. In such earthy substances, as Butter, &c., and in such luminous substances as Gold and the rest,—the Fluidity

Tarkabhā, 53.

is *caused*, being brought about by the application of heat ; in water on the other hand, it is *natural*.

Viscosity is smoothness ; it subsists in Water only ; it is brought about in the product by reason of a like quality in the cause or component particles of that product ; and like gravity, &c., it is coeval with the substance in which it subsists.

Sound is the quality apprehended by the auditory organ ; it is the specific quality belonging to *Ākāśa*.

“In what manner can sound be said to be apprehended by the Auditory Organ, when as a matter of fact it is produced at the place occupied by the drum (for instance), while the organ is at the place occupied by the man?”

True ; but the sound produced at the place of the drum produces another sound in close proximity to it,—either in the form of water-ripples, where one ripple sets up another in close proximity to itself, or in the manner of the filaments of the Kadamba flower, where the central carpel shoots off the filaments in all directions,—and the ripples being thus set up one after the other, till one sound-ripple happens to be produced in the regions of the Auditory Organ ; and it is this last ripple and not either those in the middle or at the other extremity, that becomes apprehended by the organ. In the same manner, when a piece of bamboo is cleft in twain, the sound produced at the point of the cleaving sets up sound-ripples, till the last ripple produced in the regions of the Auditory Organ becomes apprehended by that organ ; then as regards the ordinary belief ‘I have heard the sound of the drum’ (in the sense of the sound being produced in the regions of the drum),—this must be regarded as a misconception.

In the production of the sound of the drum, the non-constituent cause is the contact of the drum and the stick with which it is struck ; similarly in the production

Tarkabhā, 54.

of the *chut-chut* sound accompanying the cleaving of the bamboo, the non-constituent cause is the disjunction between the cleft parts of the bamboo and the *Akasha*; and the efficient cause is the disjunction between the two cleft pieces of the bamboo. Thus then we find that, at the first step, sound is produced either by conjunction or by disjunction; while at the intermediate and at the last step, this has sound alone for its non-constituent cause, and favourable air-currents for its efficient cause; this is what has been declared in the *Vaisheshika-Sūtra* (2-2-31)—‘Sound is produced by conjunction, by disjunction and by sound.’ The *constituent cause* of all sounds however, is *Ālāsha* itself. Sound, like action and knowledge, continues to exist for three moments of time. The first and the intermediate sounds are destroyed by the sound-wave next to itself; while with regard to the last and the last but one it would seem that they are destroyed by each other, like the two-wrestlers of the story, named ‘Sunda’ and ‘Upasunda’; but this would be scarcely right; because by hypothesis, the last but one should continue to exist for three moments; and as such it would exist only till the second moment of the last sound; and so not existing at the third moment of the latter, it could not bring about its destruction; for this reason it has been held that the last sound is destroyed by the destruction of the last but one sound.

That sound is destructible is proved by inference; the inference being stated in the following form:—‘Sound is transient,—because while belonging to a generality (or genus), it is apprehended by our external sense-organ,—like the jar’; herein the *probandum*, or what is proved, is the fact of sound being transient; and what is meant by a thing being *transient* is that it has a form that is liable to destruction; it does not mean that it has a *being or existence* that is liable to destruction; because if it meant this latter, then there could be no transient character in Prior Negation, which has no *being* at all (and is yet regarded as *transient*);

Tarkabhā, 55.

and the *probans* that proves the conclusion is the fact of sound belonging to a generality and being apprehended by an external sense-organ ; if we had said simply 'apprehended by the sense-organ,' then the reasoning would apply to the soul also (which is apprehended by the organ of the mind) ; hence we have said 'apprehended by our *external* sense-organ ;' similarly if we had said simply 'apprehended by external sense-organ,' then it would apply to the *atom* and such other ordinarily imperceptible things that are 'apprehended by the external sense-organs' of the *Yogin* ; hence we have said apprehended by *our* external sense-organs.'

"What proof is there for the existence of such persons as the *Yogin* ?"

The proof, we reply, lies in the following reasoning :—The Atoms must be perceptible by some one, because they are knowable, like the jar.

Even with all these qualifications, the above reasoning (in proof of the destructibility of sound) would apply to Generalities ; hence with a view to exclude these, we have added the qualification 'while belonging to a generality' ; and it is well known that the three categories—Generality, Specific Individuality and Inherence—are entirely devoid of generality.

Knowledge consists in the manifestation of objects. It is eternal as well as transient ; the knowledge of God is eternal ; that of all others is transient.

Pleasure is gratification, and is recognised by all souls as something desirable.

Pain is suffering ; and is recognised by all souls as something undesirable.

Desire is attachment.

Aversion is anger or soreness.

Effort is energy or exertion.

The six qualities—Knowledge, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort—are perceptible by the mind.

Merit and Demerit are the specific causes of pleasure and pain respectively. Even though imperceptible, these two are known through Scriptures, and also by means of Inference, the Inference being in this form—The body and other things belonging to Devadatta are the effects of some *specific quality* belonging to Devadatta, because while being effects they are the means by which Devadatta's experiences are brought about, like any other object obtained by the man's efforts. And the specific quality by which these, body and other things are brought about is known under the names of *dharma* and *adharma* or 'merit and demerit;' because such other specific qualities as effort and the rest are not capable of bringing about such products as the Body and the like.

Faculty is of three kinds—Velocity, Impression and Elasticity. Of these, Velocity subsists in Earth, Water, Light and Air; and it is the cause of action (motion). The Faculty in the form of Impression subsists in the soul only; and being the product of cognition, becomes the cause of remembrance; it is only when the Impression is aroused that it becomes the cause of remembrance; and the arousing or excitement of the Impression consists in its obtaining the necessary auxilliary; the auxillaries of Impression appear in the form of the perception of similar things and so forth. This is what has been thus declared—What arouse the cause of remembrance are similarity, unseen agency and constant thought.' Elasticity subsists only in certain tangible substances; it is that quality which makes the bow and such other things revert to their original shape after their shape has been temporarily altered.

All the qualities from Knowledge down to Demerit, along with Impression, constitutes the *specific* qualities of the soul.

[Page 143.] We have described the Qualities, and proceed to describe Actions. Action consists of motion; like Qualities it subsists in Substances only; it co-exists with that limited dimension of substances which has been called 'corporeality';

Tarkabhāṣā, 57.

and through disjunction it becomes the cause of the destruction of the conjunction of its substrate with one point in space, and also of the appearance of its conjunction with another point. This is of five kinds—*throwing upward, throwing downward, contracting, expanding and going*; Revolving and such other actions are all included in *going*.

Sāmānya or Generality is the basis of all comprehensive notions; it subsists in Substances, Qualities and Actions; it is eternal, one only, but pervading over many things. This is of two kinds—*higher and lower*. The highest or *summum genus* is 'Being', which includes many things; it is a pure generality inasmuch as it forms the basis of comprehensive notion only. The *lower* generalities,—in the shape of 'substance' and the rest, are so called, because they include only a few things; and these are *generalities* as well as *individualities* inasmuch as they form the basis of *comprehensive* as well as *exclusive* notions. On this subject some people hold that there is no generality or genus apart from individuals. But against this view we urge the following considerations:—If there were no genus, what would be the basis for that comprehensive notion of *oneness* that we have with regard to many different individual substances, in the absence of some such entity as pervades over all these? It is that which forms the basis of this comprehensive notion what we call 'Generality.'

"The comprehensive notion of diverse individuals may be explained on the basis of the negation of things other than those cognised. [i. e. all individual cows are spoken of as *cow*, on the basis of all of them equally agreeing in being *the negation of the non-cows*, i. e., the negation of all animals—the horse and the rest—other than the cow; and thus the one comprehensive notion that we have of all cows would be based upon this *negation of the non-cow*, and not on any generality or genus." This is not right, we reply; because the comprehensive notion that we have is in the positive form, and not in the negative (as it would be if it were based upon negation).

The Specific Individuality is eternal, and subsists in eternal substances only ; it always forms the basis of exclusive notions only. The éternal substances (in which these subsist) are *Ākāśa*, Time, Space, Soul and Mind, as also the atoms of Earth, Water, Light and Air.

Inherence is the relation subsisting between things that are never found apart from one another,—those, that is, that are usually inseparable. This has already been explained (Text, p. 15 *et seq.*).

Against this the Bauddha raises an objection :— “ It has been asserted that the whole and its parts being inseparable, the relation subsisting between them is ‘ Inherence.’ This however is not right because the *whole* has no existence apart from the parts.—*i.e.*, the *whole* is nothing different from the parts ; for instance, the jar is nothing more than the component atoms themselves combining in that particular form. [And the jar being the same as the component atoms, we cannot speak of any relation between them ; as all relation subsists between *two* different things.] ”

To the above, we offer the following reply :—That the jar is *one* and *gross* is a judgment that is obtained directly by Sense-perception ; and this judgment cannot apply to the component atoms, which are *many*, and *not gross* and not perceptible by the senses (which latter circumstance makes them totally incapable of forming objects of any judgment based directly on sense-perception). It might be argued that the aforesaid judgment (in regard to the jar) is wrong. But there is no evidence for regarding it as such ; there being no sublation of it by means of any subsequent judgment.

We have described the six categories, Substance and the rest ; all these appear as objects of positive conceptions ; and as such are all in the form of *entities*. We now proceed to describe the seventh category of *Vegation*, which, being the object of negative conceptions only, is of the form of nonentity. In brief, Negation is of two kinds—‘ Relative ’ or ordinary

negation, and Mutual negation. Ordinary negation again is of three kinds—Prior Negation, Destructive Negation and Absolute Negation. Before the effect is produced, there is negation of that effect in its cause; it is this negation of the effect in its efficient cause that is called ‘Prior Negation’; *e.g.* the Negation of the cloth in the yarns; this negation is beginningless, not being brought into existence by anything; it has however an end; as the very production of the effect itself constitutes the end of the ‘prior negation’ of that effect. When the effect has been produced it is destroyed after a time being reduced to the form of its original cause; and this destruction of the effect is called its destructive negation; *e.g.* when the jar has been broken, there is negation of the jar in the number of pieces into which it has been reduced. This negation has a beginning, being (in the case of the jar) brought about by the stroke of the stick. Though having a beginning, it has no end; as the effect that has been once destroyed is never brought into existence again [and it is only by its reappearance that its negation could be destroyed.] When an object has had no existence in the past, nor has it an existence in the present, nor is there any likelihood of its coming into existence in the future, this negation of the object is called ‘absolute’; *e.g.*, the negation of colour in Air.

[Page 148.] Mutual negation is that which has for its counter-entity (*i.e.*, which denies) the identity of things; *e.g.* in the conception ‘the jar is not the cloth,’ we have the mutual negation of the jar and the cloth.

We have described the ‘objects’ (of cognition). [We proceed to describe Cognition; and with regard to the nature of cognitions, the Idealists, the Baud̥ha and the Ved̥antin, raise an objection]—“Objects have no existence apart from cognitions (according to the Baud̥ha), or from Brahman (according to the Ved̥antin).” This however is not right; because that *objects* exist is proved by sense-perception and other forms of valid cognition; so their existence cannot be denied.

(5) Buddhi or Knowledge is that which is spoken of by such synonymous words as “*upalabdhi*” (apprehension), ‘*jñāna*’ (cognition), ‘*pratyaya*’ (cognizance), and so forth; or we may define it as consisting in *the manifestation of things*. In brief, it is of two kinds—Direct Apprehension and Remembrance. Direct Apprehension again is of two kinds—true and false; the *true* apprehension is that which is in consonance with the real character of the thing apprehended; and it is brought about by the instruments of right Cognition, Sense-perception and the rest; for instance, by means of the undiseased eye we have the apprehension of the jar and such other things; by means of the smoke as the indicative mark (*probans*) we have the apprehension of fire; by the perception of the similarity of the cow we have the apprehension of the fact of a particular animal bearing the name of *gavaya*; and by means of such sentences as “one desiring heaven should perform the Jyotiṣtoma sacrifice” we get at the apprehension of the fact that the Jyotiṣtoma sacrifice is the means of attaining heaven. The *false* apprehension is that which is not in consonance with the real character of the thing cognised, and is obtained by means of invalid instruments of knowledge. It is of three kinds—*Doubt*, *Guess* and *Misapprehension*. Doubt and Guess will be described later on. Misapprehension consists in the knowing of a thing as what it is not;—*i.e.*, an Error; *e.g.* When the piece of shell before the eye, which is not silver, is apprehended as silver. Remembrance also is of two kinds according as it is, or is not, in consonance with the real character of the thing remembered; both these kinds of Remembrance appear during waking; in dreams all the cognition that there is is of the nature of such remembrance as is not in consonance with the real thing. That it is so is proved by the fact that while in reality the thing remembered during dreams should be known as ‘*that*’ (being not before the eyes), it is actually known as ‘*this*’ [thereby being the Cognition of a thing as what it is not].

[PAGE 151]. All Cognitions are formless; the object cognised cannot be regarded as imposing its own form on the Cognition; because the theory of Cognition being with form as has been rejected. It is for this same reason that we do not infer the presence of objects, from the form of Cognitions; specially as the existence of objects—jar and the like—is proved by Sense-perception itself. Every Cognition is however indicated or defined by its object, as it is only when related to its object that the Cognition becomes apprehended by the mind; as the judgment arising from every apprehension is in the form ‘I have the cognition of *the jar*,’ and not merely in the form ‘I have a cognition.’

(6) The Mind is the internal organ; and has already been described (along with the Sense-organs).

(7) *Activity*, partaking of Merit and Demerit, consists in such actions as sacrificing and the like; this forms the basis of all that goes on in the world.

(8) *Defects* consist of Attachment, Aversion and Stupefaction. Attachment consists in Desire; Aversion in Anger; and Stupefaction in wrong knowledge or misapprehension.

(9) *Re-birth* or Re-incarnation consists in the soul’s abandonment of one body and obtaining of another.

(10) *Resultant Experience* consists in the direct cognizance of pleasure or pain.

(11) *Pain* is trouble; and this has already been described.

(12) *Release* is final Emancipation; this consists in the absolute cessation of the twenty-one forms of pain. The twenty-one forms of pain, including the important as well as the unimportant ones, are—(1) the body, (2-7) the six sense organs, (8-13) the six objects of the six organs, (14—19) the six cognitions obtained through the organs, (20) pleasure,

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and (21) pain. Pleasure is regarded as 'pain', because of its being mixed up with pain; and pleasure (accompanied by pain) is called 'pain' in the same manner as honey mixed with poison is called 'poison.'

"In what manner does this Release come about?"

When the man seeking Release has duly learnt from the Scriptures the real nature of all things, he notices many deficiencies in the objects of experience, whereby he loses his attachment or desire for these; after this he gives himself up to meditation; on the due perfection of which he comes to perceive the real character of his soul; and being freed from all defects, he continues to perform only the acts laid down as *necessary*; and thus he does not acquire any further merit or demerit; as for his past merit and demerit, he knows them all by means of his Yogic powers; and knowing them he brings them together and passes through the experiences resulting from them; by this process all his past Karmic residuum becomes exhausted; and so when his present body falls off there is no new body to be taken up by him; which makes it impossible for him to come into contact with the twenty-one forms of pain beginning with the body; this being due to the absence of any cause for this (in the shape of past merit and demerit); and it is this cessation of the twenty-one forms of pain that constitutes what is called *Emancipation or Release*.

Section 3.

ON DOUBT.

When with reference to one and the same object there arise ideas of two mutually contradictory things, it is what is called 'Doubt.' It is of three kinds—(1) arising from the non-perception of the difference between two things, and the perception of only their similarities; (2) arising from the difference of opinions; and (3) arising from the perception of a property that is peculiar to the thing concerned. As an instance of Doubt arising from the perception of similarities,

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and non-perception of differences, we have the Doubt as to the object seen being 'a man or a post;' in this case with reference to the object seen, when the observer fails to perceive either the presence of crooked crevices which would lead to its being definitely recognised as the *post*—or the presence of head, hand, and the rest, which would indicate it definitely to be a *man*,—and he perceives only the *tallness*, and such other properties common to the post and the man,—he has the doubt in the form—'is this a post or a man?' (2) The second kind of Doubt is that which is due to there being difference of opinions, and the distinctive features not being perceived; *e.g.* the Doubt as to words being eternal or non-eternal. Some people hold that words are eternal, while others hold that they are non-eternal; and the impartial man who becomes apprised of this difference of opinion, and does not himself notice any features in words that would point definitively one way or the other—has the doubt,—'is word eternal or non-eternal?' (3) The third form of Doubt is that which is due to the perception of a property that is peculiar to the thing in question only; *e.g.* when one perceives the odour of earth,—which is a property peculiar to Earth only, and which does not indicate either eternality or non-eternality,—and he does not notice any other property either one way or the other,—there arises a doubt in his mind as to the eternality or non-eternality of Earth; the doubt being in the form—'Is the earth eternal, because possessed of the quality of odour which is not present in non-eternal substances? or is it non-eternal, because possessed of the quality of odour which is not present in any eternal substance?'

Section (4).

ON MOTIVE.

Motive is that, by which urged, man has recourse to activity; and it consists in the seeking of pleasure and avoidance of pain; as it is for the sake of these two ends that all men act.

Section (5).

ON CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE.

The Corroborative Instance is that with regard to which there is an agreement between the two parties of a disputation. It is of two kinds—(1) The Instance *per* similarity, *e.g.* the kitchen is the instance corroborating the reason ‘smoke’ as proving the presence of fire (the kitchen being similar to the thing in question, in that it contains smoke and fire); and (2) the instance, *per* dissimilarity; *e.g.* in corroboration of the same reason we have the dissimilar instance of the Lake (which is *dissimilar*, inasmuch as it presents a case where there being no fire there is no smoke).

Section (6).

ON DEMONSTRATED TRUTH.

Demonstrated Truth is a conclusion that is recognised as proved. It is of four kinds:—(1) That which is accepted as such by all systems of philosophy; (2) that which is admitted by any one system only; (3) consequential, that is a natural corollary to another established conclusion; and (4) that which is accepted as such only for the sake of argument. To the first class belong such propositions as that everything that has qualities exists; to the second class, the proposition accepted in the Nyāya system and in the allied system of the Vaisheshika, that the mind is a sense-organ; to the third class belongs the proposition that ‘God is omniscient’ following as a necessary corollary to the conclusion that ‘earth, &c., are created by God;’ to the fourth class belongs the proposition that ‘sound is a quality’ which is admitted by Jaimini for the purpose of discussing the question of its eternity or non-eternity.

Section (7).

MEMBERS (OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING).

The several factors of the inferential syllogism are called its ‘members.’ They are five in number, consisting of Final Conclusion and the rest. Says the *Sūtra* (1-1-32)—‘The mem-

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bers are—Statement of the Proposition, Statement of the Reason or Probans, Statement of Example, Application of the Reason to the subject in question, and Final Conclusion.’ The sentence that speaks of the ‘subject’ as qualified by the predicate—*probandum*—is called the ‘statement of the proposition, *e. g.* the sentence ‘this mountain contains fire.’ The sentence that puts forward the reason—*probans*—ending in words either with the Instrumental or the Ablative termination, is called the ‘Statement of the Reason,’—*e. g.* ‘*ḍhūmavaṭṭvena*’ or ‘*ḍhūmavaṭṭvāt*,’ ‘because it contains smoke.’ The sentence which points out the invariable concomitance (between the *probans* and the *probandum*), along with the corroborative instance, is called the ‘statement of example,’—*e. g.* ‘that which contains smoke contains fire, as for instance, the kitchen.’ That which points out the presence of the *probans* in the ‘subject,’ is called the ‘application of the Reason to the subject,’—*e. g.* ‘this mountain contains smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire’ or ‘this mountain contains smoke.’ That which sums up the presence of the *probandum* in the ‘subject’ is the ‘Final Conclusion,’—*e. g.* ‘therefore this mountain contains fire.’ These are the several ‘members’ of the syllogistic statement, and as such they resemble ‘parts’ of the whole ; and are not so many ‘parts’ in the sense of the ‘constituent cause’ ; because the constituent cause of all sounds (and words are only *sounds*) is the *Ākāśa*.

Section (8).

ON CONFUTATION.

Confutation consists in pointing out an undesirable contingency ; that is to say, when of two things that are invariably concomitant, we admit that which is concomitant, and thereby indicate that with which it is concomitant, this process is what is called ‘confutation’ ; for instance, (having recognised the fact that all jars are perceptible,) thereby accepting the concomitance between ‘jar’ and ‘perceptibility’)

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when we say 'if the jar had been here' (by which we admit the concomitant jar) 'it would have been perceptible' (thereby indicating the possibility of *perceptibility*, which is not desirable, the jar being not perceived at the place). This 'confutation' serves as an aid to the instruments of right cognition. For instance, when there arises a doubt as to whether or not the mountain contains fire, if some one were to assert that it did not contain fire, then against him we would urge—'if it did not contain fire, then, being without fire, it would be without smoke also'—whereby the undesirable contingency of 'smokelessness' (when the mountain is actually found to be smoking) is pointed out; and it is this urging of an undesirable contingency that constitutes 'Confutation'; this particular Confutation serves to clarify (or justify) the conclusion arrived at by means of Inference; for instance, it justifies or validates the notion of the presence of *fire* which forms the object of inference based upon *smoke* as the *probans*; inasmuch as it invalidates or rejects all possibility of the *absence of fire*. It is in this manner that Confutation aids Inferences. Some people seek to include Confutation under 'Doubt;' but this is not right: because Confutation pertains to one aspect of the case only (while Doubt pertains to both aspects).

Section (9).

ON DEFINITIVE COGNITION.

Definitive Cognition is assured conviction; it is the ultimate result of the Instruments of Cognition.

Section (10).

ON DISCUSSION.

Discussion consists in disquisition between two persons desirous of arriving at the true conclusion in regard to the subject at issue; it is in this that we find the use of the eight *nigrahas* or *clinchers*,—*Deficiency*, *Superfluity*, *Abandoning of position* and the five 'fallacious reasons' (to be described below.)

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Section (11).

ON CONTROVERSY.

Controversy consists in the discussion that is held between two persons desiring victory over each other, and which contains arguments in favour of both sides of the question at issue. In this form of discussion all the various *Clinchers* find their place, in accordance with the exigencies of argumentation. Its ultimate purpose lies in the establishing of one's own position, after the demolishing of the position of the adversary.

Section (12).

ON WRANGLING.

The above, when not leading to the establishing of one's own position, is what is called 'Wrangling;' its sole aim lies in the demolishing of the opponent's position. In fact, for the wrangler, there is no position to be established. The form of discussion called '*kathā*' or 'controversy,' consists in the statement by more than two persons, of the arguments in support of the two sides of the question at issue.

Section (13).

OF FALLACIOUS PROBANS OR REASON.

With regard to the *probans*, several necessary conditions have been laid down, such, for instance, as that it should subsist in the 'subject,' and so forth; in so far as it fails in any one of these points, it is regarded as 'fallacious.' Even so, however, it may be found to possess some of the characteristics of the real 'probans'; and as such *appearing* as 'probans' it has been called 'semblance of the probans.' There are five kinds of Fallacious Reason—(1) 'the unproved or unattested,' (2) 'the contradictory,' (3) 'the inconclusive,' (4) 'the neutralising,' and (5) 'the annulled.' (See above, *Text*, pp. 58, *et. seq.*)

Udayana has pointed out that the *probans* is said to be 'known' or 'proved' when it is actually recognised as *concomitant with the probandum and as subsisting in the 'subject'*; and it is the absence of this recognition that, according to him, constitutes the fallacy of the 'unknown or unproved probans.' Though this definition is found to be applicable to the 'contradictory probans' and other fallacies also, yet we shall proceed to show in what manner this may be regarded as applying distinctively to the 'unknown probans' only. In the case of all fallacious Reasons that condition is held to be the 'fallacy' vitiating the Reason which is the first to be detected and which is actually capable of indicating the Reason to be fallacious; and inasmuch as the fallaciousness of the Reason being clearly indicated by this one fact, that closes the discussion, there is no force in any other vitiating conditions that may happen to be subsequently detected; in view of this, that Reason alone can be called 'contradictory' in regard to which the vitiating condition that is detected first of all is that it involves *contradiction*, inasmuch as it is actually concomitant with the contrary of the *probandum* that is sought to be proved by its means; similarly, in cases where the vitiating condition detected is that it is not actually concomitant with the *probandum*, the fallacy attaching to the Reason is called 'inconclusiveness,' and so on. In the same manner in cases where there is no knowledge of the fact that the Reason is invariably concomitant with the *probandum*, or that it subsists in the 'subject' the reason is said to be 'Unknown or 'Unproved.'

This fallacy of the 'Unknown' or 'Unproved' is of three kinds:—(a) *that which has an unknown or uncertain subject*, (b) *that whose very form is not proved*, and (c) *that which has its invariable concomitance not established*. As an example of the *first* of these we have the following reasoning—'The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus, like the ordinary lotus in the water'; in this we find that the 'subject' of the Reason

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(*character of the lotus*) is the 'sky-lotus' which is a non-entity. Another example we have in the reasoning—'The jar is non-eternal, because it is a product, like the cloth.'

In regard to the latter example an objection is raised. "In this case the 'subject' of the Reason is the jar, and as this is not a non-entity, the Reason cannot be said to have its 'Subject' unknown; though it may be regarded as a superfluity, proving the *non-eternality of the jar* which is already proved." This is not right, we reply; any object does not, by its very nature, become the 'Subject' of an Inference; it is regarded as a 'Subject' only when the presence of the *probans* in it begins to be suspected; this is what is thus declared in the *Bhāṣya*—'Reasoning is operative neither with reference to what is not known at all, nor with reference to that which is definitely known; but only with reference to that whose presence is suspected'; in regard to the reasoning in question, we find that there is no *doubt*—or mere suspicion—with regard to the *non-eternality* of the jar; as it is definitely known for certain; consequently even though by itself the jar is an entity, yet, inasmuch as there is no *doubt* as to its *non-eternality*, it cannot be regarded as the 'Subject;' and hence the 'Subject' being not 'known' as such, the Reason becomes fallacious.

(b) The reason is said to be one that has its form not known which does not subsist in the 'Subject;' as an example, in the reasoning 'Generality is non-eternal, because it is an effect,'—where as a matter of fact, the Reason, 'Character of effect' is such that it does not subsist in the *generality* which is the 'Subject.' The 'partially unknown' also is only a form of that which has its form not known*. An example

* There is in one of the MSS. before the last section a long passage describing the 'partially unknown' Reason; this passage is not found in the other 3 MSS; nor is it in keeping with the sentence that follows—*bhāgāsiddho'pi svarūpasiddha eva*. Hence it has been omitted in the text; but we translate it here in the note.

'An example of the *partially unknown* we have in the reasoning—'Sound is non-

of this 'partially unknown' we have in the reasoning—'The four atoms of Earth, Water, &c. are eternal,—because they are odorous'—where *odorousness* is such that it is not present in all the four that go to make up the 'Subject,' subsisting as it does in the Earth-atom only; this is what makes the Reason 'partially unproved.' In the same manner, 'the unknown qualification,' 'the unknown qualified,' 'that form of the unknown in which the qualification is impotent or incapable,' 'that in which the qualified is impotent' and so forth are only forms of 'that which has its form unknown.' An example of the 'unknown qualification' we have in the reasoning—'sound is eternal, because being a substance' it is not tangible'; here the Reason is 'intangibility coupled with substantiality', and not merely 'intangibility'; and as sound is a quality, the qualification of 'substantiality' is not present in it; and this is what constitutes the 'unknown qualification,' as so long as 'substantiality' is not present the 'intangibility coupled with substantiality' cannot be present in it; as for example if either the man or the stick be absent, the 'man with the stick' cannot be present; consequently, even though *intangibility* is present, inasmuch the *qualified* intangibility is not present, the reason becomes one

eternal, because it is always accompanied by Effort'; here the non-eternality of sound is the *probandum*, its being accompanied by effort is the *Reason*; and as a matter of fact this last character is not found to be present in *all Sounds*; because though the first utterance of the Sound is certainly preceded by the effort of the speaker, yet the sound-waves following upon that first sound are brought about by the sound-waves preceding them; and hence are not *preceded by Effort*; this is what makes the Reason 'partially unknown.' *Question* :—What do you mean by *being accompanied or preceded* by Effort. *Answer* :—What happens is that first of all there is contact of the mind with the Soul; then Cognition, then the desire to speak, then the effort, then the disjunction of the wind in the body from its former position, and its contact with another position,—whereupon follows the first sound-wave. And thus it is this first sound-wave alone that is preceded immediately by Effort; which cannot be said of the further sound-waves that are produced by that wave; because the precedence of Effort is present in only a few sounds, the first sound-waves; but is not present in *all*.

that has its form not known. An example of the 'unknown qualified' we have in the reasoning—'sound is eternal, because being intangible it is a substance'; here also the reason is a qualified one (the *intangibility* qualifying *substantiality*); and when the *qualified* (substantiality) is absent, the qualified Reason cannot be present. An example of the 'impotent qualification' we have in the reasoning—'sound is eternal, because being a quality, it has no cause'; here the qualification 'being a quality' is 'impotent,' because it has absolutely no force (in the proving of eternity); *Eternality* being proved merely by the *absence of cause*; it is thus that the reason comes to be one of 'impotent qualification'; this becomes only a form of that which has its form unknown,' because when the qualification is absent, the Reason qualified by it is also absent. An objection is raised—"The *being a quality* constitutes the qualification, and this is certainly present in sound." True, the character of 'quality' is present in Sound; but it is not a 'qualification' of the Reason; because that alone can be regarded as the 'qualification of the Reason' which serves the useful purpose of distinguishing it from other things; and as this purpose is not served by the mention of 'being a quality,' it is for this reason that it is called an 'impotent qualification'. An example of the 'impotent qualified' we have in the same reasoning stated conversely,—*e.g.* 'sound is eternal because being without cause, it is a quality'; here the mere qualification—'being without cause' is sufficient to prove the required *eternity*; and the 'qualified' (*being quality*) is 'impotent' (without force to prove the conclusion). This also is a form of 'that which has its form unknown,' because in the absence of the object qualified, the 'qualified' is not present; and it is in the qualified form that the Reason is put forward: the rest is as before.

(c) The Reason 'that has its invariable concomitance not duly ascertained' is of two kinds—(1) That which is

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not concomitant with the *probandum*, and (2) that which is related to a *probandum* with an adventitious adjunct. An example of the former we have in the reasoning—‘All that exists is momentary like the clouds,—Sound and the other objects in question exist,—therefore these objects are momentary’; here ‘sound and other objects’ form the ‘subject,’ the ‘momentary character’ of these is the *probandum*, and their ‘existence’ is the *probans*; and as a matter of fact we find that there is no proof for asserting the invariable concomitance of ‘existence’ with ‘momentariness.’ The second kind—*i.e.*, that reason *whose invariable concomitance is not ascertained*, because of its being related to a *probandum* with an adventitious adjunct,—we have in the following reasoning:—‘He is dark, because he is Maitrī’s son,—like a number of Maitrī’s children whom we see’; here *darkness* is sought to be proved by the circumstance of being Maitrī’s son; but as a matter of fact we know that what makes the dark complexion is not the fact of being Maitrī’s child; what brings it about is the effect of her feeding upon vegetables, &c.; and it is this latter that is called ‘Upādhi’ (adventitious vitiating adjunct); hence in the relationship of *darkness* with *the character of being Maitrī’s child*, we find an adventitious adjunct in the shape of *being the effect of feeding on vegetables*; similarly, if we seek to prove the presence of smoke by the presence of fire, we meet with an adventitious adjunct in the shape of the *contact of wet fuel*; thus then, by reason of these adjuncts, we find that there is no real concomitance between the *reason* and that which is sought to be proved by it; and it is for this reason that such Reasons are held to be such as *have their invariable concomitance not ascertained*. Another example of this same fallacy we have in the reasoning—‘The killing of animals at sacrifices is sinful;—because it is *killing*,—like the killing apart from sacrifices’ in connection with this we know that what makes the killing *sinful*, is not its being *killing*, but the fact of its *being prohibited*

in the Scriptures; which latter therefore forms the adventitious adjunct in the case; and thus in this case also the desired invariable concomitance cannot be ascertained. An objection is raised:—"The *adventitious vitiating adjunct* has been defined as 'that which while being the invariable concomitant of the *probandum* is not the invariable concomitant of the *probans*'; and this is not found to be applicable to the *character of being prohibited by the Scriptures* (which has been put forward as the adventitious condition in the above reasoning); how then can this character be regarded as a *vitiating condition*?" This is not right, we reply; because as a matter of fact, the said definition of the *vitiating condition* is quite applicable to the *character of being prohibited*: for instance, this character is certainly the concomitant of the *probandum*, 'sinfulness'; because we know that whatever is *sinful* is always *prohibited*; on the other hand, it is not true that whatever is *killing* is always *prohibited*, because in the case of *sacrificial killing* we find that it is *not* prohibited. Thus have we explained the three kinds of the 'Unproven Reason.'

(2) We proceed to explain the 'Contradictory Reason'—That Reason which is concomitant with the contrary of the *probandum* is called 'Contradictory.' An example of this we have in the reasoning—"Sound is eternal, because it is a product"; here *eternality* is the *probandum* and 'being a product' the Reason; but as a matter of fact we know that what the 'product' has for its invariable concomitant is, not *eternality*, but its contrary 'non-eternality'; as all that is a *product* is always found to be *non-eternal*; consequently the Reason in this case, 'being a product,' becomes 'Contradictory.'

(3) That Reason which is of a character that makes the *probandum* doubtful is called 'Inconclusive' or 'Fallible.' It is of two kinds—that which is *inconclusive because too comprehensive or wide*, and that which is *inconclusive because too*

exclusive or narrow. To the former class belongs that Reason which subsists in the 'Subject' as well as in such things in which the *probandum* is known to exist and also in such things in which the *probandum* is known to be absent; *e.g.* in the reasoning 'Sound is eternal because it is knowable,' we find that the Reason 'knowability' is present in the 'subject,' *Sound*; as well as in such things as *Ākāsha* and the rest which are *eternal*, and in which as such, the *probandum* 'Eternality' is known to be present;—and also in such things as the jar and the rest, which are non-eternal, and in which, as such, the *probandum* 'Eternality, is known to be absent; thus the Reason, 'Knowability' is found to be 'inconclusive, because too comprehensive.' The Reason that is 'inconclusive because too exclusive' is one that is present in the 'subject' only, and not in either such things as are known to contain the *probandum*, or in things in which the *probandum* is known to be absent; an example of this we find in the reasoning—'The earth is eternal, because it is odorous'; here 'odorousness' is the Reason; and we know that it subsists only in the earth; and not either in such eternal things as *Ākāsha* and the rest in which the *probandum* 'eternality' is known to be present, nor in such non-eternal things as *Water* and the rest, in which the *probandum* is known to be absent. We proceed to describe that form of Inconclusive Reason which is known by the particular name of 'Fallible.' As a rule, all valid Reasons are such that while subsisting in all things known to contain the *probandum*, they do not subsist in any such thing as is known to contain the contrary or negation of the *probandum*; under the circumstances, the 'fallibility' or 'failure' of the Reason consists in its not fulfilling this aforesaid condition, by having the *contrary of the probandum* for its concomitant; and this 'fallibility' is twofold,—consisting (1) in subsistence in both, that in which the *probandum* is present and that in which the contrary of the

probandum is present, and (2) in not subsisting in either of these two.

(4) The 'Neutralised Reason' is that which is opposed by an equally strong reason to the contrary; another name of this kind of 'fallacious reason' is '*Satpratīpakṣa*'; an example of this we have in the reasoning—'Sound is non-eternal, because we do not find in it any eternal properties'; as opposed to this we have the counter-reasoning, 'Sound is eternal because we do not find in it any non-eternal properties'; this latter reasoning is called '*pratīpakṣa*' or 'opponent', because being equally strong it establishes a conclusion directly contrary to that of the former reasoning; that which is not equally strong is not a real 'opponent.' The reasoning proving the contrary of a conclusion is of three kinds—(a) that upon which the former reasoning is dependent, (b) that which is dependent upon the former reasoning, and (c) that which is neither of these two; the first of these being the more powerful of the two tends to the rejection of the former reasoning; *e. g.* when the reasoning—'the atom is non-eternal, because it is material or corporeal, like the jar'—is opposed by the reasoning proving the existence of the atom, this latter reasoning, even though proving the *eternity* of the atom, which is the contrary of the former conclusion, cannot be regarded as the 'opponent' or 'counter-reasoning' of the former, because it is such that the former depends upon it, and as such the latter reasoning tends to the former being entirely rejected; the dependence of the former reasoning upon the latter is based upon the fact that it is the latter that establishes the 'Subject' of the former; so long as the 'Subject' *Atom* has not been duly cognised by means of a valid instrument of knowledge, the reasoning as to its non-eternality cannot proceed; as if it did proceed, it would be open to the fallacy of the 'unproven or unknown subject'; consequently, the very putting forward of the reasoning

in support of the non-eternality of the atom presupposes the validity of the reasoning proving the existence of the atom; as in the absence of this latter, it could not itself appear; and thus being dependent upon it, it becomes rejected by it, being the weaker of the two. When, on the other hand, the second reasoning is one that is itself dependent upon the former reasoning, it happens to be the weaker of the two; and is therefore rejected by it; as in the case of the two reasonings just mentioned, if the order of the two were reversed. For these reasons it is only when the two reasonings are equal in their strength (apparent validity) that we have the fallacy of 'neutralisation.'

(5) That Reason is said to be 'annulled,' in whose 'subject' the absence of the *probandum* is known by a more authoritative instrument of cognition; another name for this 'fallacious reason' is '*Bādhiṭaviṣaya*,'—i. e. 'whose object is sublated.' An example of this we have in the reasoning 'Fire is not hot, because it is a product, like water; here the Reason is 'being a product,' and it is put forward to prove the 'absence of heat'; and as a matter of fact, the absence or negation of this 'absence of heat' in the 'subject' *fire* is known by means of Sense-perception; inasmuch as the *hotness* of fire is known by the Tactile organ. Another instance of the 'Annulled Reason' we have when 'being an entity' is brought forward as a reason to prove the momentary character of the jar; because here also the *negation of the probandum* '*momentariness*'—i. e., the non-momentary character of the jar is known by means of *Sense-perception* in the form of Recognition; inasmuch as when we see a jar that we have seen before, we at once have the recognition in the form 'this is the same jar that I had seen before,'—this recognition being brought about by the sense-organ as aided by the impression left by the previous perception, and apprehending within itself the two points of time

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(past and present); and this Recognition proves that the jar is lasting, not momentary.

All the aforesaid five 'fallacious reasons' are not 'Reasons' proper; because they fail to establish their *probandum*,—being wanting in one or more of the necessary conditions of the 'valid reason,'—such for instance as that *it should subsist in the 'subject'* and so forth.

All definitions are 'reasons' of the universal-negative kind (serving to preclude from a certain category things not fulfilling the specified conditions); consequently the three 'defects' pertaining to definitions,—*viz.* 'too narrow,' 'too wide' and 'impossible'—are to be included among the above five 'fallacious reasons,' and are nothing apart from these. For instance, the 'too wide' definition falls within the scope of the 'Reason whose concomitance with the *probandum* is not proven,' inasmuch as the definition does not exclude each and every such thing as is known to contain the negation of the *probandum*; and also because it is vitiated by an adventitious adjunct; as for instance, when the cow is defined as an animal'; where it is a well-known fact that what makes the cow a 'cow' is 'the presence of the dewlap and such other distinctive features.' Similarly the 'too narrow' definition falls within the 'partially unproven Reason,' as for instance, when the cow is defined as 'the variegated cow.' In the same manner the 'impossible' definition falls within the 'absolutely unproven Reason'; as when the cow is defined as 'the animal with undivided hoofs.'

Section (14).

ON PERVERSION OR CASUISTRY.

When a person puts forward an assertion by means of words conveying one sense, if the other person should take the words in another sense and then proceed to point out defects in the reasoning,—this procedure is what is called 'Perversion.' For example, one person says '*Navakambalo-*

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yam Devaḍaṭṭah', meaning thereby that Devaḍaṭṭa possesses a *new blanket*; but the other person takes the word '*nava*' in another sense (that of *nine*) and then proceeds to point out the mistake in it by showing that '*Devaḍaṭṭa* being a poor man does not possess *nine blankets*; he cannot afford even *two*, whence could he have *nine*?' The disputant who has recourse to this method is called '*perverse*' or a '*Casuist*.'

Section (15).

ON FUTILE REJOINDER.

The *Futile Rejoinder* consists in the incorrect answer; it is of many kinds—'*uṭkarṣasama*,' '*apkarṣasama*,' and so forth; we do not describe all these many varieties here. When the possibility of the presence of a property that is not concomitant with the Reason is put forward on the basis of the presence in the *probandum* of a certain property which, though present in the object cited as the corroborative instance, is not one that is invariably concomitant with the Reason,—we have a case of the *Utkarṣasama*; as for instance, when the reasoning '*sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like the jar*' has been put forward, if, in answer to it, someone were to say,—'*if by reason of its being a product, sound be regarded as non-eternal, like the jar, then, like the same jar, and for the same reason, it may be regarded as a composite substance also*;' [where though in fact, *non-eternality* is invariably concomitant with *being a product*, yet *compositeness* is not so concomitant with it; and merely on the ground of the compositeness being found, in the jar, along with the quality of *being a product*, the possibility of its presence in *Sound*, which is the '*subject*,' is put forward for the purpose of discrediting the aforesaid reasoning]. The *Apakarṣasama* is that where through that quality belonging to the corroborative instance, which is not invariably concomitant with the Reason, one puts forward the possibility of the *negation of a certain quality*, such negation not being one with which the

Reason is invariably concomitant; for instance, if, in answer to the aforesaid reasoning (proving the non-eternality of sound), some one were to say—‘if by reason of its being a product, sound be regarded as non-eternal like the jar, then, like the same jar, and for the same reason, it may also be regarded as *not audible*; as certainly the jar is *not audible*.’

Section (16).

ON CLINCHERS.

[PAGE 184]. A Clincher is that whereby the opponent is silenced or defeated. It is of many kinds—such as ‘deficiency,’ ‘superfluity,’ ‘renouncing of position,’ ‘incoherence,’ ‘fatuity,’ ‘admission of the opponent’s view,’ ‘contradiction,’ and so forth,—yet, for fear of becoming too prolix, we do not describe all of them. That which falls short of what is intended to be said, is called ‘deficient’; that which goes beyond what is intended is ‘superfluous’; when one falls off from the position he had taken up, he is said to ‘renounce his position’; when what is said does not bear upon the subject under consideration, we have ‘incoherence’; when the man is absolutely incapable of finding an answer, we have a case of ‘fatuity’; when the man is made to admit the view of his opponent, we have the ‘admission of the opposite view’; when the man demolishes what he originally wished to establish, we have a case of ‘contradiction.’

In this work we have again and again explained those things that are extremely useful; if we have omitted to explain things not of much use, this fact cannot be urged against us; as what we have explained is enough for the purposes of the young learner.

Thus ends the ‘Exposition of Reasoning’ by Keshava Mishra.

PREFACE.

In the course of my study of the *Bhātta* system of Pūrva-Mimāṃsā, I was, in many places, struck by the ingenuity and apparent simplicity of many *Prābhākara* explanations. This led me to the study of this much misrepresented system ;—a study which received fresh impetus from the institution by the University of Allahabad of the degree of ‘Doctor of Letters,’ in connection with which I elected for the subject of my dissertation, the *Prābhākara* School of Pūrva-Mimāṃsā. At the very outset however, I was faced by the difficulty of the extreme paucity of materials available : the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* of Shālikanāṭha was the sole book available from which we could learn anything directly, about the tenets of the *Prābhākara* School. By a strange coincidence, however, another work of the same writer, the ‘*Rijuvimalā*’ was brought to my notice by Col. G. A. Jacob, through my honoured tutor, Principal Venis ; and I at once applied for a loan of the manuscript from the India Office Library ; which was granted to me through the kindness of Principal Jennings. When I had sent my application to the India Office, my friend Mr. Govinda-dāsa very kindly obtained for me a copy of the same work from the Travancore State Library. The fact of the *Rijuvimalā* being a work dealing directly with the *Sūtras* recalled to my mind the name of ‘*Bṛihaṭī*,’ which I had come across, ten or twelve years ago, in a list of manuscripts belonging to the Asiatic Society of Bengal, wherein it was described as a work on ‘*Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsa*.’ I sent an application for the loan of this manuscript also, which was granted by the Society, through the kind courtesy of the President. This work turned out to be nothing less than a commentary upon Shabara’s *Bhāṣya* by *Prabhākara* himself. The temptation to bring out an edition of this unique work was so great that I at once set about preparing the press-copy. But after

having done the first eighteen *paṭras*, I was disappointed to find that the manuscript, though good enough to supply first-hand information with regard to Prabhākara's views, was far from perfect, for the purposes of an 'edition. Baffled in that quarter, I intended to bring out an edition of the *Rijuvimalā*; but the two manuscripts of this work, which I had obtained from the India Office and Travancore, turned out to be entirely different parts of the work; the India Office Ms. containing nearly the whole of Adh. I (the first leaf in the beginning, and the whole of the first *adḥikaraṇa* of *pāḍu* ii being wanting), while the Travancore Ms. contained *aḍhyāyas* III, IV and V complete.

Though unable to bring out a 'critical edition' of any of these works, I found the Mss. of great help; from these I derived much first-hand information on the views held by Prabhākara and by his direct pupil, Shālīkanāṭha; and I was also enabled to verify their views as put forward by Māḍhavāchārya in his *Nyāyamūlāviṣṭara*. This latter work notices Prabhākara's views—calling them '*Gurumaṭa*'—on the following *adḥikaraṇas*:—

- (a) I—i—2—'Veda is the sole authority on Dharma.'
- (b) I—i—3—'Necessity of enquiry into Dharma.'
- (c) I—ii—19 to 25—'Nature of those Arṭhavāḍas that have the form of Injunctions.'
- (d) I—iii—10—Dealing with words as used by the Mlechchhas.
- (e) I—iii—11—Authority of the Kalpasūtras.
- (f) I—iii—15—The '*Holākāḍhikaraṇa*.'
- (g) I—iii—25—Dealing with the Grammar-Smṛitis.
- (h) I—iii—30—'Words are expressive of class-character.'
- (i) I—iv—2—'Uḍbhid' is the name of a sacrifice.'
- (j) I—iv—9—'Āgneya' is not the name of a sacrifice, but indicates the Deity.'

(k) I—iv—10—The word ‘*varhi*’ denotes class-character.

(l) I—iv—13—‘*Vaishvaḍeva*’ is the name of a sacrifice.

(m) I—iv—17—The word ‘*Aṣṭa*’ with reference to the pans used at the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice is mere *arṭhavāda*.

It will be noticed that Mādhava ceases to notice the ‘*Gurumaṭa*’ after the first *Adhyāya*. Nor is there much of a difference, after this, between Bhatta and Prabhākara, directly bearing on the *adhikaraṇas*; the other differences being only as regards certain detailed principles involved in the *adhikaraṇas*. These we have tried to bring out in chapter III.

When the present work was undertaken, it was intended to deal only with the views of Prabhākara, as bearing upon subjects psychological and metaphysical; but later on, in view of the fact that the full details of what is contained in the *Mīmāṃsā-shāstra* have not yet been presented before the modern reader,* the writer was advised to present a consecutive account of all that is contained in that *Shāstra*. This task proved to be more stupendous than was expected. But with the constant encouragement accorded to me by Principal Venis, and the sage counsel of Dr. Thibaut, I was enabled to set to work and to make out a somewhat presentable account of the contents of the *Mīmāṃsā-Shāstra*. In the actual ‘research’—or ‘search’—involved in this work, I am indebted to my friend Mr. Govinda-ḍāsa, to whose help, most willingly accorded, I owe the unearthing of all those manuscripts which have enabled me to bring together information, which, in one sense, may be regarded as altogether new,—and also *unexpected*, in view of the fact that, in

* The excellent translation of the *Arṭhasangraha* with its lucid introduction, deals mainly with the subject of ‘*Viḍhi*’.

the first place, all interest in the *Shāstra* had ceased, and secondly, all hopes of ever getting at Prabhākara's works had been given up; and my friend had to hunt out, and indicate to me, manuscripts lying hidden in far-off corners of India;—one of these manuscripts being the long-lost portion wanting in the *Prakaranapañchikā*, which had to be printed in its incomplete form, by two such enterprising publishers as the Medical Hall Press, and the Chaukhambha Book Depôt.*

2. As regards the originality of the present work, inasmuch as nothing has been written upon the Prābhākara School, in any modern language, the whole may be regarded as 'original.' On the other hand, as it contains only what has been written by Prabhākara and his followers nothing can be truly 'original.' But what is claimed for the work is that it represents the first attempt in more than one direction, a few of which may be noted here:—

(1) In no work,—not even in the innumerable *prakaraṇa-granṭhas* in Sanskrit, is the whole *Mīmāṃsā-shāstra* found explained in the systematic and connected way in which it is presented here.

(2) No work known to exist is found to contrast the views of the two sister schools on *all points*.

(3) The bearing of *Mīmāṃsa* upon legal literature is not found brought out, in the manner in which it is done in this work.†

(4) This is the first attempt at a systematic account of the *Prābhākara* system. There is no work known to the modern world which affords a detailed account of what that system is; the *Prakaranapañchikā* confining itself only to a few philosophical points, and a very few of the purely *Mīmāṃsā* topics.

* The Ms. of this portion has been handed over to the publishers of the Chaukhambhā Sans. Series, who have now printed it.

† Since writing the above we have received the *Tagore Law Lectures on the Mīmāṃsā Rules of Interpretation*,—a book which deals with the legal aspect of the *adhikaraṇas* in a way that only a trained lawyer could deal.

CHAPTER I.

THE BEGINNINGS OF MĪMĀMSĀ.

1. In the far-off days of ancient Āryāvarta when, we are told, the gods moved among men, and received and gave gifts much in the same way as men give and receive among themselves,—matters went on smoothly; each giving as he chose, and receiving when and what he chose. There was no occasion for any rules or regulations on the matter. All that was needed was that the man should sing the praises of the superior being whom he wished to please. This may be regarded as having been the state of things during the period of the ‘Rigveda’, wherein,—at least in the ‘older’ portions—we do not find ‘sacrifices’ occupying any important position.

As times changed and the gods ceased their friendly visits, and became, by and by, more remote beings, doubts naturally began to arise in the minds of men, regarding the ways and methods by which the offerings should be made in order to be most acceptable. The wisest among men came together and laid down a set of rules as to these ways and methods. So long as these patriarchs lived, the affairs of men went on under their guidance; as whenever difficulties arose, the original framers of the rules were at hand to settle them, by means of explanations and illustrations. This state of things may be regarded as covering the period represented by the ‘Brāhmaṇas’, wherein we find all sacrificial details laid down, explained and illustrated. In regard to this period it is quite true, that—

‘although there is no reason to suppose that the sacrificial ceremonial was in early times so fully developed,.....the religious service would seem to have been already of a sufficiently advanced nature’ (*Shatapaṭha Br. Trans., Intro. xi*); and also that—

‘the idea of bringing together the different family collections would seem first to have suggested itself to the priests at a time when the hitherto divided Āryan tribes had moved from the Panjab to the eastern plains, and became consolidated into larger communities, and the want of a more uniform system of worship would naturally make itself felt;—to the same period we may refer the first attempts at a systematic arrangement of the entire ceremonial of worship, and the definitive distribution of the sacrificial duties among four classes of priests. (*Ibid*—XX.)

When a further degeneration set in, further doubts began to arise, for the removal of which no living authorities were available; and thus arose the necessity of collecting and digesting the old rules and regulations; and as each collector and digester had at hand a mass of material all of which could not be bodily adopted by him,—for the simple reason that the greater part of these appertained to the exigencies of particular times and places,—he had to exercise his judgment in the preparing of his compilation. This gave rise to the literature of the ‘*Smṛitis*,’ whose professed aim is to clarify what is already present in the Vedas (*Samhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas*). With the appearance of this literature there came about the necessity also of a regular study of these matters as bearing upon *Dharma* or Duty of each man. It was at this juncture that ‘*Mīmāṃsā*’ literature stepped in with its 1000 and odd ‘rules’ for the interpretation and right understanding of what is said in the Veda, in regard to *Dharma*.

These rules of interpretation were formulated for the first time by Jaimini, in a systematic manner, in the work that has come down to us under the name of ‘*Jaimini-sūtra*’ or ‘*Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*.’ This was commented upon by a number of writers, among whom we may mention—(1) *Bharṭṛimitra*

(mentioned by the *Nyūyaraṭnākara* and *Kāshikū* on verse 10, and believed by my honoured teacher, Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Chitrāḍhara Mishra to be the oldest commentator on the *Sūtras*)—(2) Bhavaḍāsa (mentioned by Kumārila in the *Shlokavārtika*, 1—63),—(3) Hari (referred to in the *Shāstrāḍipikā* X—ii—59,60),—and (4) Upavarṣa, referred to in the *Bhāṣya* as ‘*Bhagavān Upavarṣaḥ*’ (page 13, line 8); and then at a much later date by *Shabara*, whose work is known as the ‘*Bhāṣya*.’ He is believed by the Pandits to have lived about 57 B.C., being described as the father of King Vikramāḍitya, as also of Varāhamihira and Bharṭṛihari; this fact is believed upon the authority of the following verse current among Pandits; among whom he is also known as having for his real name, Āḍitya-ḍeva, the name ‘Shabara’ being only due to his having disguised himself as a forester for fear of Jaina persecution :—

ब्राह्मण्यामभवद् वराहमिहिरो ज्योतिर्विदामग्रणीः
राजा भर्तृहरिश्च विक्रमनृपः क्षत्रात्मजायामभूत् ।
वैश्यायां हरिचन्द्रवैद्यतिलको जातश्च शङ्कुः कृती
शूद्रायाममरः षडेव शबरस्वामिद्विजस्यात्मजाः ॥*

It was this *Bhāṣya* that formed the basis and starting point for all later Mīmāmsā works; it was at this stage also that there came about the well-known bifurcation of the system into two schools: One of these was headed by Kumārila Bhatta, believed to have been the senior contemporary of the Great Shāṅkara, also known as ‘*Bhatta*’ and ‘*Bhattapāḍa*’—who wrote an extensive commentary upon the *Bhāṣya*; this is a work in three parts :—the *first* called the *Shlokavārtika*, dealing with the first, or polemical, part of the

* But Viḍyāpaṭ Thakkura, a writer of the 15th—16th Century A. C., speaks of him, in the *Puruṣaparīkṣā* as the ‘Guru’ or ‘teacher’ of Vikrama.

first chapter ;—the *second* called the *Tantravārtika*, dealing with the rest of chapter I, and also with chapters II and III. [Both of these have been translated by the present writer, and are in course of publication by the Asiatic Society of Bengal ;] the third called the *Tuṭṭikā*, which contains only brief notes upon the remaining nine *adhyāyas*. Kumārila came to be known as the ‘Vārtīkakāra’ by a host of followers and commentators, chief among whom are Maṇḍana Mishra (the author of the *Vidhiviveka* and *Mīmāṃsūnukramanī* and also of a commentary on the *Tantravārtika*, mentioned in the *Shāstraḍīpikā* II—i—1), Pārthasārathi Mishra (the author of the *Shāstraḍīpikā*, the *Tantraratna*, the *Nyāyaraṭnākara*, and the *Nyāyaraṭnamālā*), Sucharita Mishra (author of the *Kāshikū*) and Somesvara (author of the *Nyāyasudhā*, also known as ‘*Rūṇaka*’). The other school had for its founder a writer whose work has not yet come to light, who is referred to by Prabhākara and his followers as ‘*Vārtīkakūrapādāḥ*.’ That this ‘*Vārtīkakāra*’ is different from Kumārila is shown by the fact that the quotations referred to him are not to be found in any of Kumārila’s works ; and that Kumārila is referred to by these writers only as ‘*Yathāhuḥ*,’ without any appellation of honour. Following upon this latter ‘*Vārtīkakāra*,’ Prabhākara Mishra wrote his *Bṛīhaṭī*,* a commentary upon Shabara’s *Bhāṣya* ; and this again has an extensive commentary, the *Rijuvimalā*, by Shālīkanātha Mishra, who also wrote a digest of the Prabhākara system, called ‘*Prakaranāpañchikā*.’†

In course of time as Vedic sacrifices began to fall into disuse, the study of Mīmāṃsā lost its hold upon the popular mind, and gave way to the study of the *Tantra* and other allied subjects. The principles however that had been evolved

* Mentioned on p. 375 of Aufrecht’s *Catalogus Catalogorum*.

† Of this work, the earliest Ms. hitherto discovered is one belonging to the sixteenth century.

by the *Mīmāṃsaka* continued to influence all literature, liturgical, philosophical and legal. In fact, whenever any question arose as to the interpretation of certain texts, the aid invariably called in was that of the principles enunciated by Jaimini and his followers. At the present day, apart from the intrinsic merits of the *Mīmāṃsāśāstra* itself, the chief interest of the *Shāstra* lies in its bearing upon the whole Hindu legal literature; and for this reason, towards the close of our present study, we shall devote a short chapter where we shall show in what manner *Mīmāṃsā* principles have been used to settle legal difficulties.

Prabhākara,—or Guru, as he is generally spoken of in later Sanskrit philosophical literature—is found to be referred to by later writers on *Mīmāṃsā* as ‘*Nibandhanakārah*,’ ‘the writer of a great work,’ apparently the ‘*Bṛīhaṭī*’ mentioned above. (See *Shāstradīpikā* II—i—1st adhik. where a passage from the *Bṛīhaṭī* is quoted.) From this it would seem that *Nibandhana* was another name for the *Bṛīhaṭī*. In the only manuscript of this work, that has been found in the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, we find the following at the end of the chapters:—

(a) इति प्रभाकरमिश्रकृतौ मीमांसाभाष्यविवरणे—at the end of pāda ii of *Adhyāya* II.

(b) इति बृहत्याम्—at the end of pāda vii of *Adhyāya* III.

(c) इति सर्वविद्यानिधानकवीन्द्राचार्यसरस्वतीनाम् प्रभाकरमीमांसायाम्—at the end of *Adhyāya* III.

The name ‘Guru’ is not found in any of the colophons; it would appear to have been a later title given to him, perhaps as deprecatory of his elaborate or complicated (*guru*) views; though tradition assigns a different reason for this title. That Prabhākara’s views were regarded as too elaborate or complicated—without much justification

however,—is also shown by the following *Shloka* current in South India:—

गाथा ताथागतानाङ्गलति गमनिका कापिली कापि लीना
 क्षीणा काणाद्वाणी द्रुहिणहरगिरः सौरभन्नारभन्ते ।
 क्षान्ना कौमारिलोक्तिर्जगति गुरुमतङ्गौरवाद् दूरवान्तम्
 का शङ्का शङ्करादेव्रजति यतिपतौ बहुवेदीन्त्रिवेदीम् ॥

As regards the time and place where Prabhākara rose we have not been able to obtain any information, except certain traditional stories current among Pandits. According to these, Prabhākara, along with Maṇḍana Mishra, was a pupil of Kumārila. From the very beginning of his studies, he evinced great independence of thought and opinion, and many a story is told in exemplification of his independent spirit. On a certain point connected with the after-death rites, Prabhākara happened to hold with characteristic tenacity to a certain opinion diametrically opposed to that held by his teacher. Having failed to win the pupil to his views, by reasonings, the teacher had recourse to a trick: one morning it was suddenly discovered that the teacher had died; and there arose among the pupils a discussion as to the exact manner in which his after-death rites were to be performed; when the question was referred to Prabhākara, as the exponent of one view, he declared that the view held by his teacher was the right one, and that he had put forward another view simply for purposes of exciting discussion. On hearing this the teacher, who had feigned illness only for obtaining this confession, sat up and expressed satisfaction at Prabhākara having at last been won over to his views; thereupon Prabhākara said—‘Yes, you won me to your views, but not while you were living.’ Another story tells us how he acquired the title of ‘Guru’ from his teacher:—In course of their

studies, they came across the sentence—‘*Atra tu nokṭantaṭra-pinokṭamitidvirukṭam*’; this apparently meant—‘this has not been mentioned there, nor has it been mentioned here, thus it has been mentioned twice,’ an apparent absurdity. The teacher could not find a satisfactory explanation, and ultimately gave it up and went to attend to his evening prayers. When the class assembled again, Prabhākara suggested that the sentence in question admitted of the construction—‘*atra tu nū ukṭam ṭatra apinā ukṭam, iti dvirukṭam*’,* the meaning being ‘what is mentioned there by means of the particle *tu* is again mentioned here by the particle *api*, and thus it has been mentioned twice.’ The teacher was so pleased at the ingenuity of his pupil that he thereupon conferred upon him the title of ‘Guru’ or ‘Teacher.’

That the tradition bearing upon the relation of Prabhākara to Kumārila is not a mere lip-story is proved by the following extract from an old Ms. of the *Survasiddhāntarahasya* by Sheṣa, commented upon by his son Govinda, a pupil of the great Maḍhusūdana† :—

‘अस्यां सूत्रञ्जैमिनीयम्, शाबरम्भाष्यमस्य तु
मीमांसावार्तिकम्भाट्टम्, भट्टाचार्यकृतं हि तत् ॥
तच्छिष्योऽप्यल्पभेदेने शाबरस्य मतान्तरम्
प्रभाकरगुरुश्चक्रे तद्धि प्राभाकरममतम् ॥’

तस्य भाष्यवार्तिककर्तुः भट्टाचार्यस्य शिष्यः प्रभाकरगुरुः भट्टमतात्
उपादानग्राहकग्रहणादिरूपप्रमाणान्तरनियोगशब्दबलवादार्थं
बलवादादिरूपषड्भेदस्वीकारेण शाबरस्य शबरस्वानिकृतस्य
भाष्यस्य मतान्तरसंप्राभाकरत्वान्नान्यभेदङ्कृतवानित्यर्थः ।

* The modern reader of well-edited texts has to bear in mind that in old MSS. we do not find the system of ‘*paḍachheḍa*’; and thus there would be no such difference in writing as—*तत्रापिनोक्तम्* (according to the interpretation of Prabhākara) and *तत्रापि नोक्तम्* (which gave the former absurd meaning).

† Now published at Madras, Edited by Prof. Rangachārya.

Prabhākara's philosophy had to pay a heavy price for its innovating spirit; it never gained a solid footing; and until the publication of Shālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañchikā* in the 'Pandit,' the philosophy was known only under the misrepresentations of its opponents. It is however interesting to note that the author of the *Mitākṣarā* (p. 181) quotes an entire passage out of the *Bṛīhaṭī* of Prabhākara. Even on the publication of the above-mentioned work, the system was not studied; it shared the fate of the whole *Mīmāṃsā Shāstra* which, by a strange irony of fate, has not found a place in the curriculum of modern *Pāthashālās*.

In regard to the relation between Prabhākara and Kumārila as indicated by the above tradition, it may be noted that this is not borne out by the internal evidence available in the writings of these authors.

(A) Prabhākara's *Bṛīhaṭī* is a 'comment,' in the strict sense of the word, upon Shabara's *Bhāṣya*; it does not, in any place, differ from the original, which it always tries to support; nor does it attack any opinions of the original; in fact as a rule, it attacks no opinions except those of the avowed *Pūrvapakṣa*. Kumārila on the other hand, in many places' in the *Tantravārtika*, rejects the interpretation of Shabara' and offers an entirely different interpretation of his own. We will note a few of these instances here :—

(a) I—ii—Aḍhi (1) (*Tantravārtika*, translation, page 32).

(b) I—iii—Aḍhi (1) (page 116.)

(c) I—iii—Aḍhi (4)—(p. 178.)

(d) I—iii—Aḍhi (5)—(p. 207.)

(e) I—iii...Aḍhi (7)—(p. 227—where more than two interpretations are given).

(f) I—iii—Aḍhi (10)—(p. 347).

(g) I—iv—Aḍhi (1)—(p. 373).

If Prabhākara had been an innovator, or reformer, or improver of the *Bhātta* system, he would naturally have taken up every one of these deviations from the *Bhāṣya* and tried to demolish it with his wonted verve and vigour. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the *Bṛihatī* takes no notice of any of the new interpretations proposed by Kumārila. This would perhaps indicate that it was Kumārila, and not Prabhākara, who was an innovator or reformer. This view is confirmed by the fact that while Prabhākara does not criticise any of the strikingly original interpretations of Kumārila, the latter in many places, takes great pains to demolish certain views, a few of which we find put forward by Prabhākara in the *Bṛihatī*. We append a few of these :—

(a) I—ii—Sū 31—(*Tanṭravārtika*, Translation, p. 54)
Kumārila objects to the question of the *Adhikaraṇa* being put in the form ‘are *mantras* meaningless or not?’—the form in which it has been stated in the *Bṛihatī* (Ms. p. 31a.)

(b) I—iii—2—(*Tanṭravārtika*, Trans. p. 112.)
According to Prabhākara (Ms. p. 31b) the Vedic texts in corroboration of injunctions found in the *Smṛiti* are to be *inferred*. This is objected to by Kumārila.

(c) I—iv—1—As regards the connection of *pāda* iv with the subject-matter of the whole *adhyāya* Prabhākara, in agreement with the *Bhāṣya*, puts forward the question in the form—‘Are the words (*udbhiḍ* and the like) expressive of materials or of names of sacrifices?’—this question

Prabhā. 13.

bearing upon the authority of *Dharma* (*Bṛihaṭi*, p. 38 a). This is objected to by Kumārila (*Tantravārtika*, Trans. 373).

- (d) I—iv—1—On the same *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Bhāṣya*, and the *Bṛihaṭi* with it, takes *sūtra* (i) as the ‘*Pūrvapakṣa*’ and *śū.* (2) as the ‘*Siddhānta*’; while Kumārila takes the two *sūtras* as embodying two distinct *Adhikaraṇas*; and objects to the other interpretation (*Tantravārtika*, Trans. p. 373).

The only point where we have found Prabhākara combating a view propounded by Kumārila is under IV—i—2 (*Bṛihaṭi*, Ms. p. 64b, line 9 *et. seq.*). But in this connection also, it is noteworthy that the words in which the view combatted is expressed—which are apparently a quotation—are very different from those employed by Kumārila (iv—i—2). The words of the latter are—‘*Kratvarthe dṛayārjane kratu-righātah syāt*’; while those used by Prabhākara are—‘*Kratvarthātve satṭvameva na bhavaṭīti yūga eva na samvartate*’; and this is combatted by Prabhākara in the words—‘*pralapita—midaiḥkēnapī arjanam satṭvannūpādayaṭīti praṭisiddham*.’ The difference in the words shows that ‘*kenapi*’ of Prabhākara must refer to some one entirely different from Kumārila. It is Prabhākara’s very words in this connection that have been quoted by the *Mitākṣarā* with approval. (see below, chap. V.)

(B) In point of style also, the *Bṛihaṭi* shows distinct signs of being older than the *Tantravārtika*. The style of the former is very similar to that of the *Bhāṣya* of Shabara, possessing the same natural grace, simplicity and directness; while that of Kumārila becomes rather involved and rich, very much like that of the *Shārīrakabhāṣya* of the Great Śaṅkara. The contrast is best shown by presenting here side by

side a few typical passages chosen at random from the two works :—

Bṛihaṭī.

Tantravārtika.

(a) नायं हेतुः । कस्मात् । (a) तथा यद्यप्यन्यदैवत्यः पशुराग्ने-
शूर्पहोमेति हेतुः प्रतीयते । एतेव मनोःता कार्येत्यूहप्राप्तिद-
र्शनमेवमुक्ताणाम्मेषाणामित्येवमा-
दीनां यथार्थमूहितानामपि विव-
क्षितार्थम्भविष्यति ।

(b) कथम्पुनरविनियुक्तमसम्ब- (b) स्यादेतत् । अर्थस्मरणेन कृतार्था-
दुमेवाक्षिप्यते । नैव विनियोग नान्निष्प्रयोजनम्भूलस्मरणमनाद-
आक्षेपे हेतुः । किन्तर्हि । रादुभ्रष्टमिति । तदयुक्तम् ।
कार्यम् ।

(c) अथादृष्टार्थमेवेदं सूत्रं वेदम- (c) अर्थवादानाञ्चान्यपरत्वेन गुण-
धीत्यानन्तरन्धर्मजिज्ञासेति । वादप्रायत्वात् आदित्यूपयजमा-
एवन्तर्ह्यर्थद्वयविधानमप्र-
प्नोति । वेदमधीत्य अनन्तरञ्चे-
ति । यदि च वेदमधीत्येत्यु-
च्यते, अन्यस्यापि कर्मणोऽन-
न्तरन्धर्मजिज्ञासाऽवकल्पते ।
अथानन्तर्यं विधीयते प्रागपि
वेदाध्ययनात् प्राप्नोति । न
चादृष्टार्थस्य वाक्यस्यार्थद्वय-
विधानन्दिदं सम्भवति ।

उच्यते । नैवेदमदृष्टार्थं सूत्रम्,
वेदार्थविचारायैवेदमारभ्यते ।
कुतः । तादृशीमित्यादि ।

- (d) कथमवच्छिन्नार्थोऽनवच्छिन्नो भवति । कथन्तर्हि प्रतिबुद्धो मिथ्येति जानाति । (d) तथा य आत्माऽपहतपाप्माविजरो विमृत्युर्विशोकी विचिकित्सो ऽ पिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसङ्कल्पः.....इति कामवादलोकवादवचनविशेषैर्जिज्ञासामननसहितात्मज्ञानकेबलावबोधपयन्तस्पष्टात्मतत्त्वज्ञानविधानापेलितवाक्यान्तरोपात्तद्विविधाभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसरूपफलसम्बन्धः स सर्वांश्च लोकानाप्नोति सर्वांश्च कामानाप्नोति तरति शोकमात्मवित् तथा स यदि पितृलोककामो भवति सङ्कल्पादेवास्य इत्यादिना योगजन्याणिमाद्यष्टगुणैश्वर्यफलानि वर्णितानि ।

The above extracts will suffice to show—(1) that while Kumārila employs compounds freely,—and these sometimes very long ones—Prabhākara's compounds seldom contain more than two words ;—(2) that while Kumārila joins together several reasonings and arguments in a single clause, Prabhākara always employs a distinct clause for each reason ;—(3) that while Kumārila almost invariably adopts the distinctive particles indicative of the objection and its answer,—*e. g.* 'ननु.....चेत्, न' 'स्यादेतत्.....तदयुक्तम्'—Prabhākara seldom makes use of any of these, except occasionally the *first*; and almost always puts the objection and its refutation in the form of question and answer; which makes it difficult at times to ascertain where the one ends and the other begins; this is the feature that marks all older works, as for instance the *Bhāṣyas* of Patañjali and Shabara.

Another feature of Prabhākara's style pointing to the same conclusion is that his work abounds in many of those flashy retorts which one meets with in the older works, and which become rather rare as we descend to the later artificial period of Sanskrit literary style. We shall quote a few of these, chosen from the *Bṛihaṭī* :—

- (a) अज्ञानकातर्यमायुष्मतः प्रदर्शितम् (30b l. 2).
- (b) अहो जनवस्थितनयनीतिज्ञो भवान् (32, l. 3).
- (c) अनभिज्ञो भवान् वैकल्पिकानाम्पदार्थानाम् (32b, l. 2).
- (d) सूर्याभिषिक्तम्प्रासायम् (b 32, l. 6).
- (e) इन्द्रजालोपममिदम् (32b, l. 8).
- (f) अग्रन्थज्ञो देवानाम्प्रियः (36b, l. 9).

CHAPTER II.

PSYCHOLOGY—METAPHYSICS.

BOOKS CONSULTED :—

1. Jaimini's *Sūtras* I—i } *Bibliothica Indica*.
2. *Bhāṣya* of Shabara I—i }
3. *Shlokavārtika* of Kumārila—Text (Chaukhambha S.S. Benares) English Translation (Biblio-Ind).
4. *Nyāyaraṭnākara* of Pārthasārathi—Commentary on (3) (Chaukh. S.S. Benares).
5. *Kashikū* of Sucharita Mishra—Commentary on (3) MS. with MM. P. Chitrādhara Mishra of Darbhanga.
6. *Bṛih.ṭī* of Prabhākara. (MS. with present writer and in the Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.) I—i.
7. *Rijuvimalū*—Commentary on (6) by Shāliknātha—I—i. (MS. with present writer).
8. *Prakaraṇapañchikā* by Shāliknātha (Chauk. S.S. Benares).
9. *Nyāyamālāviṣṭara* (Ānand. S.S. Poona).
10. *Shāstraḍīpikā* ('Pandit' Benares), I—i.
11. Prashastapāda's *Bhāṣya* on Vaishēṣika-Sūtras (*Viz*: S.S. Benares).
12. *Nyāyamuktāvalī* of Vishvanātha (Benares).

Section (1).

NATURE OF COGNITION.

1. 'Cognition' or 'Knowledge' has been divided by Prabhākara into the two broad classes of 'Valid' and 'Invalid' Cognitions. Under 'Valid Cognition' he includes all those cognitions that bear directly upon their object; and under 'Invalid Cognition' those that bear upon their object only indirectly. At the outset, this classification

corresponds to the two broad divisions of '*Anubhūti*' (Apprehension) and '*Smṛiti*' (Remembrance) put forward by the Logicians; Prabhākara regarding all Remembrance as 'invalid,'—agreeing in this with the Logician,—and all Apprehension as 'valid',—herein differing from the Logician who divides Apprehensions into *valid* and *invalid*, *pramā* and *apramā*, while Prabhākara identifies all 'Apprehension' with '*pramā*.' This view, that all Apprehensions are *valid*, appears, at first sight, to be too revolutionary; but Prabhākara and his followers have made their case strong by the reasons that they have put forward in support of it.

2. In accordance with the practice of all writers on Philosophy, the *Prābhākara* begins with an account of '*Pramāṇa*.' The starting point of the enquiry is—What is *Pramāṇa*? The word '*pramāṇa*' has been taken by Prabhākara in this connection to mean 'valid cognition,' and not the *means* of valid cognition. What then is this 'valid cognition' according to Prabhākara?" The answer is given in the following verse:—

प्रमाणमनुभूतिः, सा स्मृतेरन्या, न सा स्मृतिः ।

न प्रमाणं स्मृतिः पूर्वप्राप्तपत्तिव्यपेक्षणात् ।

[*Prakaranapañchikā*, p. 42.*]

That is to say, '*valid cognition*' is *Apprehension*; it is something totally different from *Remembrance* which is *not valid*, inasmuch as it stands in need of a previous cognition, being, as it is, a cognition produced only by the impressions left by a previous cognition.. This definition of Remembrance does not apply to Recognition or *Pratyabhijñā*, as this latter is not

* In this connection we find the *Pra-pañchi*, quoting a number of verses and basing its explanation upon them.—Whose verses these are, it is not clear; they appear to be by the '*Vārtikakāra*' of the *Prābhākara* School, whom Śhālikanāṭha frequently quotes.

produced *only* by impressions left by previous cognitions. Thus Remembrance cannot be regarded as *valid*, because it bears upon its object, not *directly*, but only indirectly, through the agency of previous cognitions of that object.

3. * Even though 'valid cognition' has been defined as Apprehension,' any wrong cognition,—*e.g.*, the cognition of silver in the shell—cannot be regarded as *valid*; not indeed because there is anything inherently *invalid* in it,—it would not be an 'apprehension' at all if it were so,—but because, as a matter of fact, the judgment or idea resulting from that cognition, 'this is silver', when referring to the shell, contains not one, but *two*, cognitions,—one pertaining to 'silver' and the other to 'this'; and of these two the idea of 'silver' is mere *Remembrance*; and as such not being 'apprehension,' it cannot be regarded as *valid*; the other factor in the idea—the idea of 'this'—is of the nature of 'apprehension,' and as such, must be regarded as *valid*. Thus we find that the *wrongness* of the judgment 'this is silver' lies in the idea of 'silver,' which is *remembrance*; and this also is regarded as *wrong*, simply because it is not found to agree with the real state of things, when the agent proceeds to act up to the judgment, and picks up the piece. Even those who regard the judgment 'this is silver' as containing a single idea, and as *wrong*, base the *wrongness* upon the fact of the judgment being one that is found to be subsequently sublated—and not upon anything in the nature of the cognition itself. But these people also cannot regard as *wrong* that factor of the judgment which pertains to 'this'; as the notion of 'this' is not found to be sublated, being retained in the sublating judgment also,—which latter is in the form '*this* is not silver, but shell.' The other typical instance of wrong cognition, 'the conch is yellow', differs

* For further discussion bearing on the nature of the so-called 'wrong' cognitions, see below, § 8.

from the judgment 'this is silver,' in that the former does not contain any element of Remembrance, both factors—*yellowness* and *conch*—being perceived by the eye; and as such it is regarded to be similar to the judgment 'water is hot,' where though the heat belongs to the fire-particles entering into the water, and not to the water itself, yet the judgment is not rejected as altogether *wrong*; inasmuch as in actual experience the judgment is found to be in agreement with the real state of things,—the water feeling really hot; in the same manner, when we have the idea 'the conch is yellow,'—if on picking up the conch it is actually found to be yellow,—it must be accepted as *valid*; even though the *yellowness* perceived belongs to the bile in our eyes, and not to the conch; just as the validity of the judgment 'the water is hot' is not denied, so also that of the judgment 'the conch is yellow' cannot be denied. Thus we find that all cognitions, *per se*, must be 'valid; this inherent validity can be denied only if the cognition is found to be not in agreement with the real state of things. This view is briefly put by Prabhākara thus*—'It is strange indeed how a cognition can be said to *apprehend* an object, and yet be *invalid*;'—

and is also supported by Kumārila who has declared† that—

'the validity of the cognition must consist in its being an *apprehension*; this validity can be set aside only by such discrepancies as the disagreement of the real state of things and so forth.'

Though this view of 'valid cognition' is supported by the above declaration of Kumārila, his followers,—Pārthasārathi Mishra among others,—have put forward‡ the definition of 'valid cognition' as *that which, being free from*

* *Bṛīhati*—MS. p. 3. Cf. also *Bhāṣya*—'vipratīṣiḍḍhamidaṃmuchyate bravīti viṭaṭhañcheti.'

† *Shlokavārtika*—Sū 2, Shl. 53.

‡ *Shāstraḍīpikā*—p. 28.

discrepancies, apprehends things not already apprehended; and they do not accept the definition given by Prabhākara. These later writers appear to have missed the very point of the dictum of the 'svataḥ-prāmānya' of cognitions; if the validity of cognitions depends, not upon its own nature, but upon such extraneous circumstances as the absence of discrepancies and the previous non-apprehension of the object,—then where would be its 'svataḥ prāmānya' or self-validity'?

4. The above definition of Pramāṇa presupposes the *svataḥ-prāmānya* of cognitions; 'Valid cognition' can be defined as *apprehension* only if each and every *apprehension* were intrinsically valid. This '*svataḥ-prāmānya*' of cognitions forms the very keystone of *Mīmāṃsā*: Both the *Bhātta* and the *Prābhākara* * are agreed on this point. If all cognitions were not valid, whence could we have any confidence in our own cognitions? As a matter of fact, even when the cognition may not be found to be in agreement with the real state of things, the cognition, *as cognition*, cannot but be accepted as *valid*; even though, the thing cognised may not be there, the cognition is there all right. If the character of *being in agreement with its object* or otherwise, belonged to the cognition, then the cognition would be something with a shape, each cognition having the shape of its object,—an absurdity! Nor again can there be any cause for the appearance of any such cognition as is not valid, *as cognition*; because what is regarded as the *cause* or origin of invalid cognitions is the presence of discrepancies in the cognitive agency; but upon examination we find that these discrepancies are totally devoid of creative energy, and as such, cannot produce any thing; all that they can do is merely to put obstacles in the way of the cognition of things as they are; and thus the *wrongness* would pertain to the *thing cognised*, and not to the *cognition*.

* *Prakaranapañchikā*, pp. 32-38; *Shlokarārtika*, Sū. 2. Shl. 33-61.

The objection generally raised against the self-evidential or self-illuminative character of the cognition is that,—inasmuch as no ‘manifestation’ or ‘illumination’ is possible, unless that which is manifested has some sort of ‘form’, the ‘self-illumination’ of cognition would presuppose some form for it; specially as unless each cognition has a distinctive form of its own, there could be no distinction among the cognitions themselves; and this ‘form’ cannot but be the same as that which belongs to the object of that cognition; as the only thing that differentiates one cognition from another is its object; and as no cognition is ever actually felt to be distinct from its object, there must be an absolute identity between the cognition and the thing cognised; and so the form of the *thing* must be the form of the cognition also. In answer to the above it is argued that if there were an absolute identity between the cognition and the thing it apprehends, then the latter could not be said to be *apprehended* by the former,—the one could not be called the ‘cognised’ and another the ‘cognition.’ Nor again, is it absolutely necessary to postulate a form for Cognitions, in order to serve as the basis for differentiating one cognition from another; because by the ‘*samvedāna*’ (cognition or knowledge) of a person we mean only *the manifestation of a special kind of his dharma or merit, which favours his active operation in connection with a certain object*; and even though this ‘manifestation’ or cognition is self-illuminated, that does not render its differentiation impossible; as it is called the cognition *of that object with regard to which it favours the activity of the cogniser*; and as each cognition tends to active operation in connection with a distinct object, this would afford all the basis that is necessary for its differentiation.

Then again, we must pause to consider what is meant by saying that, if the cognition were formless there could be no illumination of it. *Formlessness* certainly cannot mean

absence of character, as even apart from its object, the cognition is possessed of the *cognitional character*. Nor can any stress be laid on the fact that the cognition is devoid of such forms as the *blue* and the like. Because it is not necessary that it is only such things as are endowed with the *blue* and other forms that can be 'illuminated.' In regard to everything, it must be admitted that it is possessed of the *form* in which it is manifested ; no other criterion is possible ; and as all cognitions are manifested simply as 'cognition' 'cognition' can be the only form that can belong to, them. Another argument in favour of Cognitions having the same form as their object is based upon Dreams, wherein, it is argued, even though there is no real object concerned, yet the cognition that one has is in the form of some external object. Against this it is argued that, as a matter of fact, during dreams also what the cognition renders cognisable is some object of the external world ; which, even though not bodily present before the cogniser at that time, is yet one that has been cognised directly at some previous time, and presents itself to consciousness through impressions left upon the mind, which is aroused for the occasion. So during dreams also, it is the external thing that is cognised. Says Kumārila* :—

'In dream-cognition also, the basis of the external object cannot be denied ; in all cognitions the ultimate basis must lie in some external object,—only in certain cases, qualified by wrong connections of time and place (when alone the cognition is regarded as wrong).'

The explanation of the fact that during dreams we do not cognise the thing as something perceived before and remembered,—but as something actually cognised at the time,—lies in the fact that during dreams the cognition that

* *Shloka-vārtika*—'Nirālambanavāda,' Shl. 107—8.

we have must be accepted as being of the nature of Remembrance, for the simple reason that it is brought about by an arousing of existing impressions ; this arousing of the impression being due to the Unseen Agency conducive to the happiness or unhappiness of the agent. It is for this reason that only that much of the previously cognised thing is *remembered*, during dreams, as would cause that happiness or unhappiness to the agent for which the Unseen Agency of his *Karma* would be ripe for operation at that moment. This also explains the fact why dream-cognition is not always of the same precise kind as an ordinary waking remembrance.

5. The above explanation of Dreams serves to set aside the stock argument of the Idealist—‘All cognitions must be regarded as having no counterpart reality in the external world,—because they are cognitions,—like Dream-cognitions,’—because, as Prabhākara* points out,—

‘We are justified only in assuming, from a well-known effect, a cause that would make the effect possible,—and not one that would destroy it; what we find in a dream is that there is a cognition of an external object; this effect can justify us in assuming,—not indeed the absolute non-existence of the external object—but the real existence of such an object; as without this the cognition would be an impossibility; as a general law we know it to be true that that without which something else is not possible, is the *cause* of this latter; from this it follows that the cause of Dream-cognition is some object in the external world.’

The Idealistic argument is thus found to be untenable; because the corroborative instance of ‘Dream-cognition’ does not support the desired conclusion; as it has been shown above that Dream-cognitions are not entirely devoid of real counterparts in the external world.

**Bṛihaṭī*—MS. page 5 b.

6. We have seen that Cognitions are *self-illuminated*; the question now arises—what is that ‘illumination’ of cognitions? The explanation given by some people is that the cognition is itself cognised by another cognition, which latter is of the nature of Sensuous Perception, brought about by the agency of the organ of ‘Mind’, just in the same manner as the perceptions of pleasure and pain. This view of the perceptibility of Cognition has been put forward by the Idealists; and it is thus explained by the *Rijuvimalā* (pp. 54-55):—

‘The cognition is perceptible; no perception is possible without *form* or *colour*; hence the form of *blue*, &c. that are perceived must belong to the cognition, and not to any external object.’

This view has been repulsed by Prabhākara and his followers.* Cognitions, says Prabhākara, can never be perceptible; this is what the *Bhāṣya* means by the passage—‘*Arthaviṣayā hi pratyakṣabuddhiḥ, na buddhivīṣayā*’ (page 9, line 6); which means that it is the *object* that is *perceived*, and not the *cognition*;—it is not the Perception that is *perceived*, but the object. By this it is not meant that Cognition is not *cognised* or *known*; it is *cognised* certainly, but cognised only *as cognition*, not as *something cognised*—*samvittāyaiva hi samvit samvedyā na samvedyātayā*, says Prabhākara; if it were cognisable as *something cognised*, then with each individual cognition we would have to postulate Cognitions *ad infinitum*. That is to say, the Cognition, even though *cognised*, cannot itself form the *phala* (effect, object) of another act of cognition—*tasyām karmabhāvo na yuktaḥ*; because if it were an object of another act of cognition, it would not be ‘self-illuminated.’ We cannot regard the cognition as altogether *unknown*, as it is only when the cognition is *known*, that the cognition of *things* becomes possible. What

* *Bṛīhaṭī*—MS. pp. 7 *et seq*; *Rijuvimalā*, pp. 54-61; *Prakaraṇapāñchikā*, p. 63.

therefore, we must admit is that the Cognition is something that is *self-cognised*, and has its presence known *by means of Inference*; what we apprehend by means of Inference is not any *object*, but only the *presence* of an object,—e g., fire :—*nāpyanumānād rūpagrahaṇam, sanmātragrāhyānumānambhavaṭi*, says Prabhākara. So in the case in question, all the information provided by Inference is that the Cognition *is* there, and not that it is *cognised*; the inference being thus formally stated—‘the Cognition exists, because we have the apprehension of its object.’ In this manner, Cognition does come within the purview of Inference, which is one of the ‘means of right knowledge’; and thus it is that Cognition is held to be *prameya*; but this does not make it *samvedya*. Prabhākara draws a subtle distinction between ‘*prameya*’ and ‘*samvedya*’: the ‘*samvedya*’ is that where the form or shape of the object is manifested and apprehended; and this can occur only in the case of objects perceived by the senses; in the case of ‘*prameya*,’ on the other hand, it is not necessary for a form or shape to be present in consciousness; thus as having no form or shape, Cognition cannot be ‘*samvedya*’ (and hence also it cannot be *perceptible*); but as having its presence apprehended by means of Inference,—which is one of the ‘*pramāṇas*’;—it has to be regarded as ‘*prameya*.’

7. The above view has been accepted, to a certain extent, by Kumārila and his followers also. The *Shāstraḍīpikā* (p. 37) explains—(1) that the Perception of a certain thing ends not in a further cognition of that perception, but in the *āparokṣya* or *prakataṭā*, *direct apprehensibility*, of that thing; and (2) that every act of Perception involves a certain relationship between the *perceiver* and the *perceived*,—the former being the agent, and the latter the object of that act; this agent-and-object relationship is not possible without some activity on the part of the agent; hence

Prabhā. 27.

the presence of this relationship leads to the inference of its invariable concomitant,—viz., the action of the agent ; and it is this *action* that, in the case of knowledge, is known as ‘cognition’; and it has been shown to be *inferable* from the relationship between the cognising self and the cognised object,—‘*Mānasapratyaksagamyor ’ thena sahitmanah sambandho jñānāṅkalpayatīti ramanīyam,*’ says the *Shāstradīpikā* (pp. 37-38).

8. If all Apprehensions are valid, then there arises the question—How to account for *doubtful* and *wrong* cognitions? These certainly, it is argued, are not valid ; and yet they are *cognitions*. (1) In answer to the above, it is pointed out that the *object* of a cognition is that same thing which is presented to consciousness by it ; and thus in the stock example of the *wrong* cognition—‘this is silver’—what is presented to consciousness is the *silver*, and it is this that is the *object* of the cognition,—and not the *shell*, which does not enter into the cognition at all ; for this reason the judgment in question is not found to fulfil the conditions of the *wrong cognition*, which has been defined as ‘the cognition of a thing in something that is not that thing’—‘*atasmin tadbuddhiḥ*’ (*Prashastapāda* p. 177), ‘*tadabhāvavati tatprakāraḥ jñānam*’ (*Nyāyamuktāvalī*) ; because in the case in question we find that it is not the *shell that is cognised as silver* ; but as a matter of fact, the *shell is not cognised at all* ; what is cognised is the *silver*. This sounds rather subtle ; but its truth cannot be denied ; to say that it is the *shell that is cognised* would not be true to fact. What happens in the case is that, though the object present before the eye is the *shell*, yet, inasmuch as the perceiver fails to notice the distinctive features peculiar to the *shell*, and notices only those features that are common to the *shell* and the *silver*, he fails to apprehend the difference between these two things ; and this gives rise to his cognition of *silver*,—this

cognition thus being due to the non-apprehension of the difference between *silver* and the object before the eyes. The idea of silver also, comes to his mind by the force of memory, which is aroused by the perception of the properties common to the shell and silver; though the silver is *remembered*, it is not remembered as 'that'—something perceived in the past—which would have sufficed to differentiate the '*that silver*' of the past from the '*this thing*' before the eyes,—the non-perception of 'that' being due to a certain weakness of the mind; thus then the apprehension of silver in the judgment '*this is silver*' cannot but be regarded as an act of memory. The *silver* not being actually before the eyes, cannot be regarded as *perceived*; nor are there any factors available to bring about *inferential* or other kinds of cognition of it. Though the judgment in question is thus found to partake of the dual character of *remembrance* and *direct apprehension*, and as such, differs from the ordinary *valid cognition* of silver (which is wholly *apprehension*),—yet in actual experience, it is not cognised as so different; and this for the simple reason that, just as in the case of real silver, the *thing perceived* is not cognised as different from '*silver*,' so in the case in question also. Thus in actual experience, there is found to be no difference between the '*right*' and the '*wrong*' cognition of silver; specially as both equally give rise to the same kind of activity on the part of the agent,—in both cases he stoops to pick up the thing.

The *Bhātta* view* on this point is not different :—in so far as the judgment '*this is silver*' involves a cognition *per se*, it is valid,—it is quite valid for the cogniser at the time that he has the cognition; that it is sublated or rejected by subsequent experience is another matter; the subsequent experience must be regarded as destroying the validity that

* See *Shloka-vārtika*—Sūtra 2. Shl. 53 *et. seq.*

belonged to the cognition *as cognised*; says the *Shāstrādīpikā* (page 15, l. 16).—

*Tasmāt svataḥpramāṇyam prāptam arthānyaṭhātva-kāraṇa-
doṣajñānābhyāmapadyate ityavashyam aṅgīkartaṇyam*;—

And again on p. 31, l. 5.—

*Yatra prajañnenānvīṣyamāṇe kāraṇa-doṣo bādhakajñānam
vū nopalabhyate tuṭ pramāṇam itarachehāpramāṇam.*

(2) In the case of the cognition of conch as yellow, what occurs is this:—There is a real yellowness that is perceived,—that belonging to the bile affecting the eye; the whiteness of the conch fails to be noticed on account of the disease in the eye; so what is perceived is the *conch without any colour*, and also the *yellowness* without the object to which it belongs; and thus a colourless object and an objectless colour being perceived at the same time—both these perceptions being quite valid and correct so far,—what more natural than that the two perceptions should coalesce, and present to consciousness the *yellow conch*? And even when picked up the conch is found to be yellow; and thus in this cognition we find nothing that could make it a *wrong* cognition; in fact the man himself can regard the apprehension as *wrong* only when he knows of the disease in his eye (the ‘*kāraṇa-doṣa*’ of the *Shāstrādīpikā*).

(3) In the same manner, when a person suffering from bile feels sugar to be bitter, what happens is that he fails to feel the sweetness of the sugar, which he feels to be tasteless; but he feels the bitterness of the bile in his mouth; the two coalescing present to him the *sugar as bitter*.

(4) In the case of a person seeing ‘two moons,’ the rays of light issue from the two eyes, at different times, and of different kinds; and so it is only natural that two images

of the moon are imprinted on the retina, and hence presented to the man's consciousness. Thus in this case also, there are two distinct perceptions; but as the interval of time between the two is subtle, the two coalesce and give the idea of 'two moons'.

(5) Where we mistake one direction for the other, the real direction is not seen; and the other quarter is *remembered*; and here also the *wrongness* lies in this *remembrance*, and not in the *apprehension*; as there is no apprehension at all.

(6) In Dream-cognition also, even though things are only *remembered*, yet they appear as if they were actually *apprehended* at the time; and what occurs is that the factor of *having been apprehended at some previous time* is lost sight of; and it is this last factor only that differentiates what is *remembered* from what is *apprehended*; then as regards the agency that excites or energises the impression,—the energising of which is needed for all Remembrance,—this is supplied by some 'Unseen Agency' which guides the percipient or dreaming souls in their earthly sojourn. If the time during which the man sleeps is one at which he is destined to experience pleasure, the unseen agency of his destiny awakens the impressions that bring to his mind pleasant memories; and so for pain also. This accounts for the fact that dreams are sometimes pleasurable, and sometimes painful; this pleasure or pain, so far as the actual *feeling* is concerned, is as real as any that is experienced during waking consciousness.

This view of Dream-cognition is thus supported by the *Shāṣṭradīpikā* (p. 39, l. 10 *et seq.*):—

'In dreams also, what is cognised is the external object perceived elsewhere, and presented to consciousness during sleep by an Unseen Agency; the cognition is quite valid, so far as the object is concerned; the *wrongness* or *invalidity*

comes in only when it is regarded as something actually *apprehended* at the time, and not as only *remembered*; and the cause of this lies in such discrepancies as are due to sleep; thus the invalidity pertains only to the accessory details; and not to the cognition *per se*.'

Thus then, we find that wherever we have actual *apprehension* or *cognition*, there is nothing 'wrong,' and that the mistake comes in only when some factor of *Remembrance* creeps into the *Cognition*; consequently none of the so-called 'wrong' Cognitions militate against the self-validity of Cognitions.

9. As regards Doubtful Cognitions—*e. g.* 'Is this a pillar or a man?'—what is actually perceived is *some object endowed with the quality of tallness*; and this is quite valid so far; this perception of *tallness* then reminds the man of a number of tall things,—the pillar, the man, the tree, and so forth; then it is that there comes the *doubt* as to whether it is this or that particular thing; thus in all Doubtful Cognitions there are two *remembrances* involved; there is not only one act of *apprehension*; so this also leaves untouched the 'self-validity' of *Cognition*.

Section (2).

DIFFERENT KINDS OF VALID COGNITION.

Sub-section (1)—Perception.

1. 'Valid Cognitions' have been divided into five classes:—(1) '*Pratyakṣa*,' Sensuous, (2) '*Anumāna*' Inferential, (2) '*Śāstra*,' Scriptural, (4) '*Upamāna*,' Analogical, and (5) '*Arthāpatti*,' Presumptive. Prābhākara does not accept '*Abhāva*,' Non-apprehension, as a *prāmāṇa*, as Kumārila has done. (*See below, under sub-section 6*).

2. Prabhākara defines '*Pratyakṣa*' as *sākṣāt pratītiḥ*, direct apprehension,—pertaining to the *apprehended* object, to

the *apprehending person* and to the *apprehension* itself; that is to say, in each act of Perception the idea of each of these three enters as its constituent factor. This distinctive view of Prabhākara has been called the '*Tripūtīpratīyakṣavāda*.' We shall take up each of these three factors separately.

3. (a) Direct Apprehension pertaining to the *apprehended object* proceeds directly from sense-contact. Of *sense-organs*, these are *six*, according to Prabhākara,* and also according to Kumāriḷ†. These are:—the Nose for the scenting of smell, the Eye for seeing colour and form, the Tongue for perceiving tastes, the Skin for sensing touch, the Ear for apprehending sound, and the Internal Organ or Mind, for the perceiving of such purely mental states as those of pleasure, pain, and the like.

In connection with the Sense-organs the Prābhākara raises‡ some interesting questions—How do you prove the existence of these organs? What reasons are there for postulating the number as *six* only? In course of this enquiry, we have a highly interesting and closely reasoned analytical proof of the existence and number of Sense-organs. As a matter of ordinary experience, it is found that our cognitions of things are not everlasting,—but appear at only certain times; being ephemeral, they must have some cause; every effect has two kinds of causes,—the *material cause* to which it owes its material composition, and the *immaterial cause*, which, in most cases, takes the form of certain circumstances or qualities, which, in proximity with, and through, the material cause, help in the bringing about of the effect; for instance, the *material cause* of the *jar* consists of the earthenware particles that compose it; and the *conjunction* of these particles constitutes its *immaterial cause*. The

* *Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 52;

† *Shāstraḍ pīkā*, p. 21.

‡ *Prakaraṇapañchikā* p. 52 et seq.

immaterial causes of an effect may subsist either in its material cause, or in the material cause of that material cause; *e. g.*, in the case of a new form of smell being produced in a substance by fire-contact, this contact, which is the immaterial cause of the smell, subsists in that substance itself which is put in the fire, and in which the smell is produced; whereas in the case of the colouring of a white piece of cloth, the colour of the yarns, which is the cause of the colour in the cloth, subsists in the yarns which form the *material cause* of the cloth. Now then, in the case of Perceptions, we have the cognising soul as the *material cause*; and we have to find its *immaterial cause*; this latter cause cannot subsist in the cause of the soul; as the soul, being eternal has no cause; hence it must subsist in the soul itself; further, as it is only a quality that can subsist in substances, it follows that the immaterial cause of perception must be a *quality*. Then again, we know that Perception, which is a particular kind of Cognition, is a 'specific' quality of the soul, and also that, for such a quality belonging to eternal substances, the *immaterial cause* must be in the form of *contact* with some other substance, *e. g.*, the colour produced in the *earth-atom* has, for its immaterial cause, the contact with fire; from this it follows that Cognition must have for its immaterial cause, its contact with some other substance now; and inasmuch as we have nothing to show that this *other substance* is something inhering in yet another substance, we conclude that the substance whose contact would be the immaterial cause of Cognition must be one that has an existence independent of other substances. Of such independent substances, there are two kinds:—(1) those that are all-pervading in their character, *e. g.*, Time, Space, &c., and (2) atom. It is a well-known fact that no *contact* (which by its very nature must be ephemeral) with an all-pervading substance is possible; as these substances are in permanent

contact with all things; and hence they cannot be said to *come* into contact with anything; nor can their eternal contact be the cause of anything; as being *eternal* it could bring about only *eternal effects*, which is a contradiction in terms. From all this it follows that the contact which is the immaterial cause of Cognition must be one that subsists in something atomic; the contact of atomic substances is brought about by the action—motion—of the atoms themselves; they can move up to one or more substances, thereby creating so many *contacts* for themselves, one after the other. This *atomic substance* again must reside in the body ensouled by the cognising soul, as none other could contain the substratum of the immaterial cause of the cognition of which that soul is the *material* cause. The action of this atomic substance in the body—tending to bring about the contact—is due to its coming into contact with the soul which (in every act of cognition) puts forth an effort towards the cognition. The only *atomic* substance that fulfils all these conditions is the *manas* or mind. This *manas*, alone by itself, brings about such effects as cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, and so forth; it brings about remembrance when aided by impressions left by past cognitions. Thus then we have arrived at the conclusion that the *manas*, or *mind*, is an organ whereby the Soul obtains such cognitions as those of pleasure, pain, &c. The *mind* however by, itself, is found to be devoid of any such qualities as colour, smell, &c.; and as such it cannot lead the soul to experience or cognise these qualities; hence for this it stands in need of such other organs as may be characterised by these qualities; for the cognition of colour the mind will need the aid of an organ of which colour is the distinguishing quality; for the cognition of smell, the help of an odorous organ; and so on with the cognition of touch, sound and taste. Now then

we know that the organ which has colour for its distinctive quality must be one composed of *tejas* or *light*; as colour is a feature of light; and this proves the existence of the *luminous* organ—the Eye,—for the cognition of *colour*; similarly the organ with smell as its distinctive quality must be composed of earth; as it is to the earth that smell belongs; and this proves the existence of the *earthy* organ—the Nose—for the cognition of smell; the organ qualified by taste must be of the water, as it is to the water that taste belongs; this proves the existence of the *aqueous* organ—the Tongue—for the cognition of taste; the organ qualified by Sound must be composed of the *ākasha*, as it is to the *ākasha* that sound belongs; this proves the existence of the *ākāshic* organ—the Ear—for the cognition of sound; and lastly, the organ qualified by touch, must be of the air, to which *touch* belongs; and this proves the existence of the *airy* organ—the Skin—for the cognition of touch.

The contact of the Mind is regarded as a necessary factor in the perceptions by means of all these sense-organs; because of the fact that even when the object to be perceived is in close contact with the organ concerned, it fails to be perceived, if at the same time the organ also is not in contact with the mind,—*i.e.*, if we are absent-minded. Thus in the case of all these there are four contacts necessary—(1) that of the object with the sense-organ, (2) that of the distinctive qualities of the object with the sense-organ, (3) of the sense-organ with the mind, and (4) of the mind with the soul. In the perception of pleasure and such other purely mental states, on the other hand, only two contacts are necessary,—that of the pleasure with the mind, and that of the mind with the soul.

As regards the *object apprehended* by perception, it has been classed under three heads:—(1) *Substances*, (2) *Jāti* or *Class*, and (3) *Qualities*. To the first category belong only

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such substances as are tangible and of sufficiently large dimensions,—[substances other than these being imperceptible],—partaking of the nature of Earth, Fire, Water, and Air. To the third category of ‘Qualities’ belong such qualities as Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort,—all of which are *perceptible*. How the *Class* is perceptible we shall explain later on. (*Section 4, para. 7.*)

4. As regards the third factor entering into Perception,—that is the *Apprehension* itself,—it has been divided into two classes :—(1) *Savikalpaka*, determinate or concrete, which pertains to, and has for its object, *the thing along with its distinctive properties*; and (2) *Nirvikalpaka*, non-determinate or abstract, which pertains to, and has for its object, *the thing-in-itself*, in its pure unqualified form. As a matter of common experience, we find that when an object is first perceived,—be it a substance, a quality, or a class—it is perceived in its own pure form, free from all distinctive features that it may possess; our own experience is the sole criterion and authority for the view that whenever an object comes within the range of one of our sense-organs, and our mind is not absent, we perceive the *object itself* alone, entirely apart from all such characteristics as differentiate it from other objects. This view is supported by Kumārila also, who says*—

‘The cognition that appears first is a mere *ālochana* or simple perception, called *non-determinate*—pertaining to the object itself pure and simple, and resembling the cognitions that the new-born infant has of things around himself.’

But with regard to the exact nature of the object perceived by the non-determinate Perception, Prabhākara’s

* *Shlokavārtika*, Sū. 4, Shl. 112.

view is somewhat different. He does not accept the *Bauddha* view that it is the mere 'Svalakṣaṇa' or 'specific individuality' of the thing that is apprehended by it; and his reason for rejecting this view is that, as a matter of fact, into the Non-determinate Perception there does enter the factor that pertains to the 'genus' or 'class' to which the object belongs. Herein also lies the chief difference of the *Prābhākara* from the *Bhātta* view, according to which latter,—'in this Cognition neither the *genus* nor the *differentia* is presented to consciousness; all that is present there is the Individual wherein those two subsist.'* Nor does *Prabhākara* accept the view that it is only the *class-character* that is apprehended; because he finds that after all, the object is apprehended *as an individual*, and not merely *as belonging to a class*. Having rejected these two extremes, *Prabhākara* strikes the 'golden mean' and holds that what is apprehended in the *first*, or non-determinate, stage of perception is both the *class-character* and the *specific individuality*,—but with this difference that, inasmuch as no other object has as yet entered into the apprehension, the thing is not apprehended *as actually being an individual belonging to a definite class*; because a thing can be cognised as an 'individual' only *in comparison with other things* from which it differs in certain well-defined characters; and it can be apprehended as 'belonging to a class' only when found to possess certain characteristic features *in common with some other things*; and so it follows that so long as no other thing has presented itself to consciousness, even though what is apprehended is actually *an individual belonging to a class*, yet this mixed character of the thing cannot be fully comprehended until some other things have entered into the cognition; until when the apprehension remains 'non-determinate.'

* *Shloka-vārtika*, Sū. 4. Shl. 113.

As regards the other kind of Perception, the *Savikalpaka* or *Determinate*,—it follows in the wake of the above-described Non-determinate Perception, and apprehends the same object as actually being an individual possessed of certain well-defined specific features peculiar to itself, and also of certain class-characteristics in common with other things, and thus belonging to that 'Class.' The object in contact with the organ of perception is only one individual thing, and no *other things*; and as such it may be questionable how the perception can apprehend it *as an individual*, &c., &c.,—which presupposes the apprehension of things other than the one in contact with the perceptive organ; but the fact is that the real *apprehender* is neither the Perception, nor the Sense-organ, but the Soul, which, by its very nature, apprehends all that can be apprehended; and hence what happens is that, just after the Soul has had the non-determinate perception of the thing, there come to his mind those other things also—those from whom it differs and those with whom it has certain characters in common; and this accounts for the aforesaid *mixed* character of *Determinate Perception*. It would thus seem that according to Prabhākara, in every *Determinate Perception* there enters a factor of Remembrance,—as the *other things* are held to present themselves before the soul by reason of the *impression* that it has of those things. It may be due to this element of Remembrance entering into *Determinate Perception* that the Logician* has qualified his definition of the *valid Perception* by the word '*avyapadeshya*' which, for all intents and purposes, may be regarded as synonymous with '*Nirvikalpaka*' or 'non-determinate'; as Remembrance is not *valid cognition*, the *Determinate Perception* could not very well be regarded as *valid*. But this view of the *non-valid* character of *Determinate Perception* has not been accepted

*Nyāya-Sū. 4.

by Prabhākara; he asserts that the Determinate Perception, even though apprehending the same thing as that apprehended by the preceding Non-determinate Perception,—is yet a *valid* cognition; inasmuch as it also apprehends certain such factors as did not enter into the Non-determinate Perception; as for the element of Remembrance entering into Determinate Perception, it has to be noted that that element does not pertain to the thing perceived, but to those *other things* with which it has certain characters in common, &c., &c.; and this cannot vitiate the validity of any cognition of the thing itself.

The Bhāttas also accept both the Non-determinate and the Determinate Perception to be valid. (*Shāstrāḍīpikā*, pp. 22—23.)

5. (b) The second factor entering into Perception is the 'apprehender'. (see § 2,)—the third being the 'apprehension' itself (already described under § 4). In all cognitions,—be they either *Direct Apprehension* or *Remembrance*,—the 'apprehender' always appears as a constituent factor; so long as the apprehending soul does not become manifest, there is no *apprehension* at all; because all cognitions are in the form '*I know*.' It must be admitted, therefore, that whenever anything is cognised, it is cognised along with the cogniser himself; and the cognition of the Soul is always of the nature of direct Apprehension; even when the cognition of the object is *inferential* or *verbal*, that of the cognising Soul is in every act of cognition, purely *perceptual*, or direct, obtained through the agency and contact of the mind. The third factor—that of 'apprehension' itself—is always *self-cognised*, by direct apprehension (see above, sec. 1, § 6); even the *inferential cognition* is cognised by itself *directly*.

6. Though all these three factors enter into Perception, yet there is this difference that, so far as the *apprehender* and the *apprehended object* are concerned, these are something different from the *apprehension*; while the *apprehension* is non-different from itself. The reason for this lies in the very nature of things. The *apprehension* being of the very nature of *light, illumination* or *manifestation*, does not stand in need of any other thing to manifest it, or make it apprehended; it is therefore *self-apprehended*; the *apprehender* and the *object*, on the other hand, are not of the nature of light; hence for their manifestation, these two require something different from themselves, which is of the nature of light. That the *apprehending* soul and the *object* are not of the nature of light is proved in the following manner:—As a matter of fact we know that in the waking state both the *apprehender* and the *object* appear in the apprehension; but neither of these really appear during deep sleep (as a rule there is no apprehension); and yet it cannot be denied that they are there all the time; for if the apprehender were not there, how could we have any remembrance of dreams appearing during sleep? If then, the *apprehender* were of the nature of *light*, he would be manifested during sleep also; the mere fact therefore of his existing at the time, and yet not being manifest to consciousness proves that he is not of the nature of *light*, which is always self-manifest. The case of the *Apprehension* itself is totally different; whenever and wherever it exists, it is self-manifest and self-apprehended; and it is thus neither like the *apprehender* nor like the *object*,—both of which are never apprehended except by the *apprehension*.

7. As regards the question of the '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Phala*' as pertaining to Perception,—Prabhākara holds that if the word '*pramāṇa*' be taken to mean *that which is*

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validly cognised,—that is, the valid cognition itself,—then it is the valid cognition that is the ‘*pramāṇa*’; and in that case, the ‘*phala*’ would be either the *acceptance* or *rejection* by the agent of the object perceived, or his *indifference* towards it,—these three being the attitude taken up by the perceiver towards the things that he perceives. If, on the other hand, the word ‘*pramāṇa*’ is explained as ‘that *by which* something is validly cognised’, *i. e.* the *means* of valid cognition,—then the name ‘*pramāṇa*’ would apply to the contact of the soul with the mind (which is the element common to all cognitions); and in that case, the cognition itself would be the ‘*phala*’. So also, in the case of the name ‘*pramāṇa*’ being applied either to the perceiving *sense organ*, or to its contact with the mind,—in all these cases, the cognition itself would be the ‘*phala*’ or ‘*result*’; as all these agencies operated towards the accomplishment of that alone.

Section (2)—Sub-section (2).

INFERENTIAL COGNITION.

1. ‘When a certain fixed or permanent relation has been known to subsist between two things,—if we perceive any one of these things, we have an idea of the other thing; and this latter cognition is called *inferential*’ (*Shabara-Bhāṣya*, page 10). That is to say, the cognition of the permanent relation between two things helps in the Inferential Cognition by affording to the agent the idea of the other member when one member is cognised; when the observer perceives a certain thing, and remembers the permanent relation that it has been known to bear to another thing, the recalled idea of the relation presents to the mind the apprehension of the other member of the relation; and to this apprehension is given the name ‘Inferential Cognition’ (*Prakarāṇa-pañchikā*, p. 74).

2. There is a difference of opinion as to the character of the relation upon which the Inference is based. The *Prābhākara* view is that this relation must be one that is unfailing, ever true and permanent; as that which subsists between the cause and its effect, between the whole and its part, between the substance and its quality, between qualities inhering in the same substance, and so forth; for instance, between fire and smoke, between the class and the individuals forming that class, between earth and smell, between the taste and colour of a fruit. It may be noted that it is the *smoke* that bears the relation to the *fire*, and *not vice versa*; as there can be fire without smoke, though there can be no smoke without fire. This view of the relationship is also accepted by the *Bhātta* (*Shāstrāḍī-pikā*, p. 41).

3. The next question that presents itself is with regard to that means of knowledge by which we have obtained the valid cognition of the permanent or unfailing character of the relation in question:—This cannot be cognised by Perception, which is operative only with regard to things *in the present*, and in contact with the sense-organs. Nor could it be cognised by Inference or Presumption, as both of these also would, in their turn, depend upon like relationships; which would thus involve a *regressus ad infinitum*. Nor lastly could it be cognised by Perception obtained through the agency of the mind alone; as if the mind alone by itself were to bring about the cognition, then people would become omniscient, as there could be no limitations to the working of the mind, as there are in that of the other organs of perception. The question is thus met by *Prābhākara*:—As a matter of fact, between fire and smoke, all the relations,—of *contact* or of other kinds,—are perceived by the sense-organs; the relations being apprehended as qualifications pertaining

to the things (fire and smoke), which also are perceived by themselves ; the particular time and place also are perceived as mere qualifying adjuncts of the things ; thus the fire and the smoke are perceived as qualified by a certain qualifying relation and by specifications of time and place. The next step in the process is the recognition of the fact that, while in some cases, Fire is bound to be concomitant with smoke, there are instances where it is not so ; this gives rise to the conviction that the relation of fire with smoke is not *constant*, but qualified by specifications of time and place ; as for smoke, on the other hand, it is never found apart from fire ; and this gives rise to the conviction that smoke is always (invariably) concomitant with fire,—the relation of smoke with fire being thus recognised as *constant*. After this conviction has dawned on the mind, all that is needed for the forthcoming inferential cognition of fire is the apprehension of the mere existence of smoke ; for which apprehension alone there is need of the operation of a means of knowledge ; as when once its existence has been apprehended, the idea of the connection and presence of fire follows naturally from the preconceived notion of the relation between the two being of a permanent character. Thus then, all that is needed for the appearance of the inferential cognition is supplied by Sensuous Perception itself.

This view is open to the objection that, by the above explanation, the cognition of *smoke* would include within itself the cognition of *fire* also ; and thus there would be nothing left unknown to be cognised by the resultant inferential cognition ; and this last would therefore cease to be '*pramāṇa*' or '*valid*' cognition.

This objection would have had some force only if '*pramāṇa*' had been defined as that which affords cognition of *something not known* ; as a matter of fact however, the *Prābhākara*, does not make this a necessary character in '*pramāṇa*', as we have seen above, where

(Consciousness) which is without distinction be superimposed upon by Nescience? This argument does not affect our position, we reply. For all that is necessary for Consciousness being the substrate is that there should be an immediate perception of it; and it is of no consequence whether or not it be qualified by distinctions;—and that it is immediately perceived is to be inferred from the fact of its never being non-perceived. Nor can we allow the objection that the Self is something continuously inferred, and hence not something of which we have an immediate presentation. For this latter view is refuted by the fact that it is in conflict with the immediate consciousness which every one has of his 'I', as has been explained in the Section on the *Ahañkāra*. "But may it not be held that the I-consciousness also really rests on inference, but is erroneously considered as an immediate presentation for the reason that owing to the ease resulting from constant repetition the inference arises with extreme rapidity, without the constant concomitance (*vyāpti*) and the other constituents of the inferential process entering into consciousness." By no means, we reply, if this were so, Devadatta cognizing a jar would not be conscious of the relation which expresses itself in the form 'this jar is cognized by *me*.' He would apprehend that relation no more in the case of a jar cognised by himself than he apprehends it with regard to a jar cognized by another person. For as, on the view we oppose, both these relations would be objects of continuous inference, there would be no difference between them. "But there is a difference," our opponent rejoins, "inasmuch as at the time when a person himself cognizes something, his Self is the abode of the cognition!" This will not avail you, we reply. For if the Self is not immediately apprehended, we have no right to say that it is apprehended as the abode of the cognition. Nor also can it

be said that its being the substrate of cognition is inferred from the connection of the Self with the fruit of cognition (*i.e.*, the ultimate acceptance or rejection of the jar, as resulting from its cognition); for at the time of the cognition, there is no possibility of any such connection (the *fruit* appearing *after* the cognition). We hence must hold to the conclusion that the Self is not known through Inference, but is immediately presented, owing to its self-luminousness.

[Page 85]. There indeed are some to contest this 'self-illuminatedness' of the Self (which by us has been advanced as the cause of the Self's *āparokṣya*). But to them we address the following question:—What then, according to you, does constitute the cause of the immediately presentative character of the Self? Is it that the Self is the abode of Consciousness? or that there is a general connexion between Self and Consciousness? or that the Self is an adventitious concomitant (*Upādhi*) of Consciousness? or that the Self is the object (*Viśaya*) of Consciousness? The first alternative we dispose of by the following syllogistic argument—It is not on account of its being the abode of consciousness that the Self is immediately presented; for it is so presented without being the object (*karman*) of consciousness; just as states of consciousness are. Nor is the second alternative admissible; for it would be unduly wide (*viz.* to argue that whatever is in some way connected with consciousness is immediately presented). As to the third alternative, we ask what is meant by the Self being an adventitious concomitant (*Upādhi*) of consciousness? It cannot, in the first place, mean that the Self is the abode of Consciousness; for this would imply that an object (*viśaya*) which is not the abode of consciousness, is *not* immediately presented (while as a matter of fact it is so presented). Nor, in the second place, can it mean that the Self is

either the abode or the object (*viṣaya*) of consciousness; for so far we have no sufficient definition of *object*. Should you say that by *object* of consciousness you understand that which naturally enters into all those activities and conceptions (*vyavahāra*) which depend on Consciousness; we point out that on this definition the *Self* would itself be an *object*. If, next, you should say that to be an *Upādhi* of Consciousness means being that which defines (*vyāvartayati*) Consciousness, while not being its abode; we reply that this definition is too wide, inasmuch as it would comprise sight also (and the other sense organs). And if, next, you should say that to be the *Upādhi* of Consciousness means being that which naturally enters into all the activities and conceptions which depend on consciousness, while not being the abode of Consciousness; we point out that this definition would include also the connexion (*sambandha*) between Self and Consciousness. But a connexion according to you, can not be *viṣaya*; for this would imply that it is something immediately presented, in contradiction of your theory that the *Samavāya* relation (which, in the case under discussion, would be the *Sambandha*) is (not immediately presented, but) the object of a continuous inference.

Regarding the fourth alternative, finally, (which implies the Self's being a *viṣaya* of Consciousness) we make the following remarks:—That state of Consciousness of which the Self is the object, could not, in the first place, engross a time different from the time which is engrossed by that state of Consciousness of which the jar is the object; for if this were so, the connexion of the two objects of consciousness—which finds its expression in the thought 'this *jar* is recognized by *me*'—could not be realized. Nor, in the second place, can the two states of consciousness be assumed to engross the same time; for two Cognitions through which contrary objects are apprehended cannot originate at one

and the same time : no more than a person can at one and the same time engage in two opposite acts of motion bringing him up to one object placed in front of him and to another placed behind him. Nor may you contend that, while indeed it is not possible to make, at one and the same time, two muscular efforts tending in different directions, it *is* possible that two different changes (transformations ; *pariṇāma*) should take place at the same time. For (this could only mean that different changes may take place, at one and the same time, in different parts of a thing ; while) that which is not made up of parts (the Self *e. g.*) cannot undergo two *partial* changes. Nor, on the other hand, can a thing undergo at the same time two different changes affecting it in its entirety. For experience shows that changes which affect a thing in its entirety—as, *e. g.*, the bodily changes connected with childhood on the one, and old age on the other hand, which affect the whole body—are in no case contemporaneous.

There thus remains, as the only possible one, the view that the immediate presentation of the Self is due to its being ‘self-illuminated.’

Nor may it be objected (*viz.* to the conclusion that the Self may be the substrate of an *adhyāsa*, for the reason that owing to its self-illuminatedness, it is *aparokṣa*—immediately presented) that we in no case observe an *adhyāsa* due to the mere fact of the immediate presentation of the substrate, unless at the same time that which is superimposed on that substrate be apprehended by the same sense-organ as the thing superimposed. For, as a matter of fact, we have, by means of the eye, immediate presentative knowledge of dark blue colour as superimposed upon Ether, (which is not perceived either by the eye or (any other sense but) of which latter we have immediate knowledge either through witnessing consciousness *sākṣin*) or the internal organ by itself (without the help of

the eye or any sense-organ); so that, in this case the two are not apprehended *by the same sense-organ*). We of course decline to accept the view of the Bauddhas and the followers of the Bhatta, according to whom Ether is something perceived by the eye; for from this it would follow that it possesses colour and tangibility. The presence and absence of visual perception (as actually observed to be factors required for the cognition or non-cognition of Ether respectively), are accounted for thereby that the eye has for its object that absence of solid bodies which urges us to infer the existence of Ether (Space).*

There are some Vedāntins, however, who, in accordance with certain general principles of theirs, hold space to be something (not directly presented but) continuously inferred; and as against these, the citing of the instance of Ether, by our opponent, would be quite effective; inasmuch as, according to that view, there would be nothing to show that it is possible to have immediate presentative knowledge even without the superimposed being apprehended by the same sense-organ. And, to ward off a final objection, we point out that as the Self is not the material cause of the *adhyāsa*—which cause rather is constituted by Nescience and its effects,—and as the *adhyāsa* is put an end to by true knowledge, the Self though no doubt the substrate of the *adhyāsa*, is in no way affected by the good or evil qualities of the thing superimposed.

The final conclusion then is that, since all objections to the Vedānta theory admit of being refuted with ease, the superimposition on the Self of the Not-self must be acknowledged as something that *may* take place.

* Visual perception does not give us a direct presentation of Ether; but its operation is required to present to us that absence of solid space-filling objects which leads us to cognise Ether (empty space).

XLI.

[It having been shown so far that *Adhyāsa* can be satisfactorily defined and is something possible, it remains to show that it is *actual*. And this actual existence of *Adhyāsa* is proved by Perception, Inference, Presumption and Authoritative Tradition].

[Page 86.] “But,” our opponent resumes, “although so far you have shown that the superimposition on the Self of the Not-self, in the first place, is something of which a satisfactory definition may be given, and, in the second place, is not an impossibility, yet such superimposition cannot be established as something actual without a valid means of proof (*pramāṇa*); for in all cases things to be known depend for their proof upon means of proof.” Well, we reply, in the case under consideration, there is no lack of means of proof; in fact, Perception, Inference, Presumption and Authoritative Tradition combine to supply the proof required. *First* as to Perception (intuitive knowledge). It is a matter of immediate, intuitive, experience that all animated beings superimpose upon a material aggregate,—consisting of a body distinguished by certain generic characteristics, of sense-organs and the rest,—identity with their non-material, intellectual or spiritual, Selves,—which erroneous identification expresses itself in intuitive judgments such as ‘I am a man,’ ‘I am a God,’ ‘I am a beast,’ and on the basis of such erroneous identification carry on empirical life with its distinction of knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, and so on. Although in cases where the Sense-organ has suffered derangement it does not enter into the means of proof leading to such cognitions,—and hence there is no possibility of the ordinary causal apparatus for Perception being operative—, yet there is nothing at any time to prevent that kind of intuitive knowledge which depends purely upon the *Sākṣin*. For it is a recognised Vedānta principle that where there is intuitive cognition (immediate presentation), even in the absence of the

ordinary apparatus of perceptive cognition, such cognition is due to 'witnessing' consciousness. *Secondly* as to Inference—Inference in the present case operates in the following form: the waking and dreaming states of Devaḍaṭṭa imply all the distinctions—*viz.*, of knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, and so forth—on the basis of which practical life is carried on, and these in their turn presuppose the *adhyāsa* 'I am a man';—for they occupy times different from the times when the same Devaḍaṭṭa is in the state of dreamless sleep or swoon; what does not thus differ is not such (*i. e.* does not imply those distinctions, etc.); *e. g.* the state of deep sleep. *Arthāpatti*, Presumption, next, operates in the present case as follows:—'Ordinary thought and action, with their distinction of knowing subjects, etc., are not possible without the *adhyāsa* of identity of Self and body; for where, as in the state of dreamless sleep, such *adhyāsa* is absent, there is no consciousness of the empirical world.'* Authoritative Tradition, finally, (as proving *adhyāsa*) is represented by scriptural texts such as 'A Brāhmaṇa should offer sacrifices.'†

"But," an opponent objects, "empirical existence with all its distinctions presupposes no more than that there should be some kind of relation between Self and body, not that they should be identified through *adhyāsa*." What kind of relation then, we ask in reply, do you assume in the case?

*In reality the two proofs, Inference and Presumption, as put forward above are one and the same; there is however a difference in the form or verbal statement; and this justifies our putting them forward as distinct proofs. Some such sameness is to be found in the case of all Presumption, which, on that account, is regarded by the Naiyāyika as only a form of Inference.

†The text cited means that the Brāhmaṇa should perform sacrifices, which means that he should acquire the results of such offerings. These results come to the man only in future lives, when the body which equipped the man who offered the sacrifices has ceased to exist; and the names 'Brāhmaṇa' and the like refer to the body; hence the text cited implies the identification of the Self with the Body.

Do you mean that the Self is to be conceived as the master (Lord) of the body? In that case the empirical world with all its distinctions might as well be founded on the body of a servant.* “Let us then say that the connection of Self and body consists therein that the latter complies with, and acts according to, the wishes of the former. This definition will not be liable to the objection raised against the previous one; for the body of a servant complies with and carries out the Master’s *verbal* commands only.” Not so, we reply. Do you understand by such ‘compliance’ the potentiality of compliance only? If so, your definition breaks down; for such potentiality exists in the state of deep sleep also, and hence there should exist in that state also the distinction of knowing subject, objects of knowledge, etc. (while as a matter of fact the empirical world with all its distinctions does not exist for him who lies in dreamless sleep). Or do you, in the second place, mean ‘actual compliance’ with the wishes of the Self?—This also will not do; for when a man is in a state of intense mental perturbation, we observe that his body does *not* comply with his wishes, and then, according to you, no empirical world would exist for that man! (which, of course, is not the fact). “But”, our Opponent resumes, “it after all is a matter of immediate experience, that the body’s complying with the wishes of the Self is the basis of all practical life!” Do you mean to say, we ask in return, that this is so invariably, or only occasionally? You cannot uphold the former alternative; for we observe that in the case of evil smells and the like a man is a cognising agent, although the body does not at the time comply with his wishes (inasmuch as

* If the relation between Self and body on which empirical existence rests, is not that of (wrongly imagined) identity, but no more than the relation between a ruling Self and a subservient body, we might as well say that the world is due to the relation between the Self of one person and the body of another person who is his slave.

it conveys to him the bad smell, contrary to his wishes). Nor is the latter alternative tenable. For as all wishing itself has *adhyāsa* for its root, it is nothing else but *adhyāsa* that is the root of all empirical thought and action. Apart from the *adhyāsa* of its identity with the internal organ, the Self, which in itself is of an absolutely unchanging nature, is incapable of the change called *desire*.

Nor, in the next place, can either conjunction (*Saṁyoga*) or intimate relation (*Saṁavāya*) between the Self and the Not-self constitute the *relation* which is the cause of empirical existence; for these two relations would persist in deep sleep also, and hence the empirical world should continue to exist for the sleeper also (which as we know is not the case). Other definitions which might be given of the relation of Self and body are equally invalid. Should it, *e. g.*, be said that the relation is that between Enjoyer (experiencing subject) and object of enjoyment; or that the body is that which is originated through the actions of the Self; or that the body is the abode of the organs of the Self, and so forth;—we point out that none of these relations could constitute the ultimate cause of the *vyavahāra*; because enjoyment and the rest are themselves rooted in *adhyāsa*. Moreover all these relations exist not only between a person's Self and his own body, but likewise between that Self and the bodies of slaves or servants (which are objects of enjoyment and so on for the master, so that all these definitions evidently are too wide). “Let us then,” the Opponent resumes, “with a view to exclude servants and the like, say that the relation of Self and body consists therein that the latter is the immediate (non-mediated) object of enjoyment to the former.” This again, we rejoin, would mean either that the body is the potential object of enjoyment, and such it is in deep

sleep also (where the empirical world does *not* exist); or else it would mean that the body is the object of actual enjoyment on the part of the Self; and then, considering that the (omnipresent) Self is in immediate contact with all bodies, places and times equally, a further fundamental connexion would be required to determine which bodies and which times and places are to be the objects of actual enjoyment (experience). (But no such connexion can be assigned).

The conclusion from all this is that nothing else but the *adhyāsa* of identity of Self and Not-self can be accepted as the cause of all empirical existence, thought, and action.

And if with regard to this view it should be finally asked what is the cause determining the connexion of the *adhyāsa* with a special body (*i. e.*, the cause of the Self erroneously identifying itself with this or that body); we reply that this cause consists in a special subtle body. The connexion of the Self with special subtle bodies is without a beginning (exists from all eternity); hence the question as to a further connexion does not arise.

XLII.

[But if these means of proof are rooted in *Adhyāsa*, what validity can they claim?—They are perfectly valid, the Vedāntin replies, within the empirical sphere; not beyond it. The Vedānta texts on the other hand though at bottom also mere things of *Adhyāsa*—since they are other than Brahman—yet have the power of conveying a knowledge of Brahman, the Real; just as an unsubstantial dream-vision may portend something real as, *e. g.*, good luck for the dreamer].

Our opponent may here urge a new objection—“If, he says, “all empirical being and doing rests on the *adhyāsa* of identity of Self and body, Perception and the other means of knowledge lose their authoritative character, since their cause (*viz.* the *adhyāsa*) is a ‘defect.’” But this objection also has no force. That the means of

knowledge other than the Vedānta texts have no power to enlighten us with regard to the ultimate reality, is an admitted fact; but this does not deprive those other means of knowledge of their authoritative character within the empirical sphere. For within this latter sphere there is nothing to sublate them: that at bottom they are mere things of *adhyāsa* is admitted only an account of their being sublated in the sphere of final release. Nor may you say that there is a contradiction between their being on the one hand mere things of *adhyāsa*, and on the other hand, constituents of non-contested or correct empirical existence. For there are valid proofs for both these characteristics. The proofs of the former characteristic have been already set forth by us at length; the latter is proved by immediate experience. Should you rejoin that the incontestability or correctness of empirical existence cannot be ascertained,—we reply that ‘witnessing’ consciousness bears testimony to a *prima facie* incontestability of empirical existence as ascertained through Perception and the other means of knowledge; its *absolute* incontestability is not maintained by us. The Vedānta texts, on the other hand, have for their object that which is absolutely irrefutable, and hence are held to be authoritative means for cognizing fundamental truth. That what in itself is unreal (as the Vedānta texts are, being something distinct from Brahman, the only Reality) yet may serve to intimate what is not liable to refutation, is illustrated by the fact that certain dream-visions, *e. g.*, of a beautiful woman, although in themselves unreal, yet portend *real* good luck.

“ But, ” our opponent resumes, “ you reason as follows—‘ Perception and the other sources of knowledge are valid within the empirical sphere because they have for their objects things possessing causal efficiency within that sphere ’ ;

and this implies that the authoritativeness of those sources of knowledge rests on something outside themselves.” Well, we reply, you are in no better case: For you have to argue as follows—‘Perception and the rest are valid means of knowledge because they have real things for their objects.’ And, should you rejoin that the reality of the objects is established by that very cognition of which they are the objects and not by any further cognition, and that hence the authority of Perception and the rest requires no extrinsic proof;—we reply that we may make a perfectly analogous claim—*viz.*, that it is nothing else than just the cognition of objects which proves their capability to be causally effective within the empirical sphere.

XLIII.

[But, if, as the Vedāntin maintains, *Adhyāsa* is the substantial cause of the Cognition of Brahman, that Cognition cannot be but false!—I admit, the Vedāntin replies, that the Cognition *quā* Cognition is unreal; all the same its object, *i.e.*, Brahman, is real. Nescience is a defect only in so far as it gives rise to the appearance of a manifold world other than Brahman; but it is not a defect in so far as it leads through the Cognition of the phenomenal world to the Cognition of the under-lying reality.]

“But,”—our opponent raises a fresh objection—“if *adhyāsa* is the substantial cause of the cognition of Brahman (as of all other cognitions), it follows that this cognition is as false as the cognitions of the empirical world.” This objection has no force as against us, we reply. For we ourselves hold that the cognition in itself (*quā* cognition) is false.* It is the falsity of the object then that has to be proved; and the determining condition for this is, in the case of the cognition of the empirical world, that this cognition apprehends what is perishable. “But the cognition of Brahman also must be regarded as

* The cognition of Brahman lies within the sphere of the unreal, but the object of that cognition is real. This cognition thus essentially differs from the cognition of the empirical world, the object of which is false.

apprehending what is perishable: for it is produced by a defective cause, just as the cognition of the snake in the rope (in which case the cognition apprehends what is perishable).” Not so, we reply. The reason upon which your inference rests (*i.e.*, the defectiveness of the cause) is not established in the case under discussion; for the cognition of Brahman is *not* produced by a defect analogous to those imperfections of vision which give rise to the erroneous perception of a snake. “But,” the opponent replies, “the defect is there, *viz.*: that very Nescience which is the material cause of the cognition of Brahman.” The case is otherwise, we reply. Nescience no doubt constitutes a defect in Consciousness in so far as, impeding the presentation of Non-duality, it gives rise to the presentation of Duality; but on the other hand, it constitutes an ‘excellence’ (the contrary of a defect), in so far as constituting the material cause of, and thus rendering possible, the cognition of Brahman. “But it implies a contradiction to view one and the same thing as being a defect and an excellence at the same time.” You are mistaken, we reply. For those defects of vision also (which cause the erroneous cognition of a snake, etc.) indeed are defects in so far as they are antagonistic to the cognition of Truth (*e.g.*, the rope); but at the same time they are excellences in so far as enabling one to infer, on the basis of them, the mischief (in the shape of past misdeeds) to which they are due. The fact is that in the case of all instruments of right knowledge, that which causes want of validity in any case is some adventitious defect, such as a morbid affection of the eye, which counteracts the normal operation of the instrument of knowledge concerned. In ordinary experience we observe that affections such as hunger and thirst, although antagonistic as it were to the normal condition of the body, are not considered as defects; and that is simply because they are *natural*; Nescience on

the other hand is not only natural but also positively advantageous (in so far as it leads us to the cognition of the Real), and hence can all the less be viewed as a 'defect.' The conclusion then is that Perception and the rest, although things of *adhyāsa*, are not devoid of validity, and *adhyāsa* thus is rightly held to be the material cause of all *vyavahāra*.

XLIV.

[*Adhyāsa* is the substantial, not only the instrumental, cause of Cognition; for although cognition ultimately rests on a knowing subject which in itself is free from *Adhyāsa*, yet actual cognition does not come about without *Adhyāsa*].

Against this view the following counter-view will possibly be maintained—"The *adhyāsa* under discussion is the instrumental (not the material) cause of empirical existence with its distinction of knowing subjects and so forth; for it is an *adhyāsa*, just as the *adhyāsa* of silver on the shell." But this also is untenable; because the fact of this *adhyāsa* (of silver on the shell) not being the basis of empirical existence, vitiates your reasoning: as a matter of fact, we find that, even in the absence of the *adhyāsa* of silver, we find such empirical existence being carried on as implies the Self being regarded as the knowing subject, &c.; and this shows that the *adhyāsa* of silver is not the basis of empirical existence; what does form the basis of empirical existence is the *adhyāsa* of Body and Self; because we find that during deep sleep, when there is no such *adhyāsa*, there is no empirical existence.*

Another counter-view is set forth:—"Empirical existence rests on the knowing subject; and to be 'a knowing subject' results from the intelligent nature of the Self, without any *adhyāsa*." But this also cannot be upheld. For as the Self, which is essentially free from all relation and all

* The reading 'na ta śāstrayāḥ' gives no sense: that there is no *vyavahāra* when there is no *adhyāsa* should be a reason for regarding the one as the basis of the other; hence the correct reading appears to be 'hi śāstrayāḥ.'

activity, cannot without *adhyāsa* give rise to actual personal cognition, the condition of any one being a personal knowing subject,—which implies the character of being an instrument or agent,—is something not possible (without *adhyāsa*). We are thus again led back to the conclusion that empirical existence with its distinctions of knowing subjects and so on has *adhyāsa* for its material cause.

XLV.

[This holds good with regard to all cognition, even that part of that cognition of a man (not of the ordinary kind, but, possessing discriminative knowledge, which refers to actions, such as sacrifices, which are based on the Veda. For although the scriptural passages determining such action point to a Self other than the (gross) body, that Self is not the absolutely non-related Self of the Vēdānta texts, but a Self on which an internal organ is 'superimposed']

[PAGE 89.] "This may be true," our opponent resumes, "with regard to the empirical existence of those who do not possess discriminative knowledge; but not of those who do possess such knowledge!" But this also we decline to admit. The *ordinary* thoughts and activities of such men even as possess discriminative knowledge do not essentially differ from those of animals; and hence must be viewed as due to *adhyāsa*. Animals also are observed to act and intelligize in a way that points to their indentifying their 'I' with their body, and this proceeding is of the nature of *adhyāsa*; for it implies the cognition of the oneness of two things the difference of which fails to be apprehended; just as in the case of the cognition of the oneness of shell and silver. And even men possessing discriminative knowledge, as long as they keep within the sphere of everyday thought and action, do not apprehend the difference of Self and body, and thus do not essentially rise above the level of animals; like animals they form judgments with regard to things beneficial to the body, such as food and drink, and things harmful, such as blows—"This thing is beneficial to *me*," "That thing is harmful to *me*,"

thus identifying the body and the Self;—and frame their action and abstention from action accordingly; which would not be possible if they realized the difference of body and Self. Nor may this argument of ours be met by the counter-assertion that even common people do realize the distinction of Self and body,—this being proved by the fact that even ignorant women and Shūdras engage in acts, such as bathing in the Gangā, which are meant to benefit the Self in future forms of existence (while they in no way benefit the body). The insight into the distinction of body and Self is, in the case of those people, acquired only on the basis of traditional teaching current among cultivated men; were it otherwise, Scripture would not make it its aim to impart knowledge of the Self. We hence maintain that the everyday thoughts and actions of such persons even as do possess discriminative knowledge are founded on *adhyāsa*.

“But,” a further point is raised, “in the case of men possessing discriminative knowledge that part at any rate of their thought and action which is determined by Scripture does not rest on *adhyāsa*; for they apply themselves to the active duties enjoined by the Veda only after having gained from the instruction of competent persons the knowledge of a Self which is related to a future world also.”

As against this view, says the opponent of the Purvapakṣin, a preliminary question here requires to be settled:—What class of Scriptural injunctions is it that should induce us to assume a Self distinct from the body and related to a future world? (A) Is it those injunctions which intimate that special results are connected with special actions—as *e. g.* ‘A man desirous of increase of cattle should make the *Chitrā*-offering,’ or ‘He who is desirous of the heavenly world should offer the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice?’ (B) Or is it injunctions of permanent obligation, as

e. g. 'A man should offer the *Agnihoṭra* as long as he lives'? (C) Or is it that group of injunctions which refer to special occasions—as *e. g.* 'A man whose house has been destroyed by fire should offer a sacrifice'? (D) Or is it, finally, the injunctions of expiatory ceremonies?—(A) On the first alternative the further question arises—(a) whether it is results such as the acquisition of cattle that are impossible without the assumption of a Self distinct from the body; (b) or results such as obtaining the heavenly world. (a) Not certainly the former; for cattle and such things can clearly be gained in this life. Nor must it be thought that if the results of offerings of the *Chitrā* type are obtained within this life, there would be no difference between these offerings and those the results of which are found to be realized immediately, such as, *e. g.* the *Kārīrī*-oblation (which is performed for bringing rain); for the difference is that, as human life comprises different periods—youth, old age, etc.—the results of the *Chitrā* offering are not bound to any definite point or period of time; while in the case of the *Kārīrī*—which is an offering enjoined on the occasion of grain drying on the stalk owing to want of rain—the result must be obtained immediately. (b) Nor is the latter alternative admissible; for—

'They tell us, on the strength of valid means of knowledge, that heaven and hell are to be found nowhere but here on earth:—Heaven is whatever delights the mind; hell whatever is of a contrary nature';—

—and according to this view—which implies that such delight also as is due to the possession of cattle and the like may be denoted by the term 'heaven'—the results of the *Jyōtiṣhṭoma* may be realised here on earth; and the delights resulting from this latter sacrifice cannot be identical with that resulting from the *Chitrā*-offering; as this latter is laid down for those

Vir. 211.

people who desire cattle only [so that the above-quoted verse must refer to both kinds of delight]. And even if 'Heaven' were held to denote (not ordinary delights but) *Supreme* delight, such delight also may be realized on earth,—*viz.*, through the attainment of supreme rulership and the like. And should it be objected to this that the sacred books understand by 'Heaven' a definite locality on Mount Meru (not 'delightful' things in general), we reply that Heaven in this sense also may be reached by man in his present bodily existence; *viz.*, by those who by means of magical formulas and drugs, etc., have acquired extraordinary powers. If persons of that kind do not actually attain to 'Heaven,' we must assume that their magical practices were somehow defective; just as the eventual failure of rain compels us to conclude that the *Kūrīrī* offering was defective in some respect. (B) (C) The second and third of the above alternatives can likewise not be accepted. For in the opinion of the Guru (Prabhākara) acts of permanent obligation and acts meant to meet special occasions have no results whatever; [they are performed solely with a view to meeting the obligations imposed by the *Shāstra*]; while in the view of the Bhatta (Kumārila) their results can be realized in this life only. (D) Nor finally will the fourth alternative help us. For expiatory ceremonies have for their only result the warding off of evil. Should you object that crimes such as the murder of a Brāhmaṇa, unless atoned for by certain expiatory ceremonies, are punished by 'Hell,' and that hence there must be a Self, other than the body, which goes to Hell;—we point out that 'Hell' no less than 'Heaven' may mean something that is experienced in this life. And if to this you object that according to Scripture evil-doers have to undergo their punishment in new lives, in the bodies of dogs, pigs and the like; we reply that Scripture may mean nothing more than that evil men are

punished by having to undergo sufferings equal to those of vile brutes. The conclusion from all this, the Opponent of the Pūrvapakṣin sums up, is that there are no scriptural injunctions of any kind which justify the conclusion that there is a Self different from, and surviving, the body (upon which supposition the scriptural actions of the learned would be based).

“All this is not so,” the Pūrvapakṣin replies. “As fully explained in the section of the ‘Divinities’ (Ved. Sūtras I—iii—26-37), authoritative *mantras* and *arṥhavāda* passages alike intimate that there are certain results of actions, ‘Heaven’ among them, which must be experienced in special places, at special times and in special embodiments; and this proves that there is a Self other than the body. You may not object that this latter tenet, although proved in the ‘Divinity’ section of the Vedānta, is not held by Jaimini. For although Jaimini, in his *Sūtras*, does not explicitly set forth the theory of there being a Self distinct from the body,—and this for the reason that for the discussion of Vedic injunctions that theory is not required—; yet the *Sūtras* imply that theory; inasmuch as they set forth the authoritative character—consisting in independence of all extrinsic support—of the entire Veda, whether dealing with things to be accomplished (actions, such as sacrifices and the like), or with things accomplished (permanently existing things, facts, such as the Self). If such were not Jaimini’s view, how could the author of the Great Commentary on the Sūtras (Shabara) have discussed the existence of a Self other than the body, on the very basis of the authoritativeness of *mantras* and *arṥhavādas*? Nor may it be objected that in the ‘Divinity’ Section of the Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsā (IX—i—6-10), both the author of the *Sūtras* and the author of the Commentary disprove the authoritative character of the *Mantras* and *Arṥhavādas*.

For what they there aim at disproving is not the authoritative character of *Mantras*, in general, but only of what, in the *Mantras*, is contrary to reason. The argument is that if on the basis of *Mantras*, such as 'Indra is great, he carries the thunder-bolt in his hand,' divinities were held to have definite bodily shape, they would help the sacrifice by presenting themselves bodily at it; just as the priests do; and this is contrary to experience: the statement in the *Mantras* has therefore to be set aside. Such *Mantras* on the other hand as are not in conflict with reason are allowed to have authoritative force; and even such *Mantras* whose mere indications are contained in *Arṥhavāḍa* passages, are referred to in the many places of the *Mimāṃsā-Sūtras* as authoritative. The legitimate conclusion therefore is that intelligent men learn from *Mantras* and *Arṥhavāḍas* that there is a Self distinct from the body; and on the strength of this knowledge engage in actions prescribed by the Veda; and this proves that activity and thought of the latter kind does not rest upon *aḍhyāsa*."

[Page 91.] All this, we reply, does not shake our position. For we ask the following question:—men engaging in dutiful action as prescribed by the Veda learn from *Mantra* and *Arṥhavāḍa* that there is a Self other than the body;—but of what special nature is that Self? Is it a Self absolutely one and non-related? or a Self that, after death, moves into another world? Not the former indeed; for that there is a Self of *that* kind can be learned from the *Veḍāṇṭa* texts only. And as to the second alternative, we ask you whether the knowledge of a Self capable of moving into another world terminates all *aḍhyāsa*? or only the *aḍhyāsa* of the Self being identical with the gross body? The former is not possible; for as a Self free from all *aḍhyāsa* and hence infinite in extent (omnipresent) could not move into another world, it **must** be allowed that (even when the identification of Self

and gross body comes to an end), the *adhyāsa* owing to which the Self identifies itself with the internal organ, persists. And the second alternative also we cannot accept; since an *adhyāsa* of an immediately intuitive kind (and such is the *adhyāsa* owing to which Self and gross body are identified) cannot be terminated by any non-intuitive knowledge (such as the knowledge acquired from *Mantras*, etc., that the Self survives the body and goes to another world). We thus arrive at the conclusion that in the case of men with insight also even that part of their thought and action which refers to actions enjoined in the Veda, rests upon *Adhyāsa*.

XLVI.

[The theory of the 'superimposition' of the Not-Self on the Self is illustrated by the facts of ordinary experience—a man looks upon persons and objects near and dear to himself as identical or one with himself. Other things, not equally near and dear, he yet views as *his*. On these undoubted facts we base the generalization that, through *Adhyāsa*, the fundamentally non-related Self erroneously relates itself to the entire phenomenal world—the internal organ (mind), the sense-organ, the gross body, the external world. The primary and fundamental identification is that of the Self with the so-called internal organ or mind, owing to which the universal non-personal Self becomes a limited personal Self—the Self becomes an I : On this fundamental erroneous identification the entire series of further identifications builds itself up in succession. The internal organ is something of which the Self is immediately conscious; and we therefore reject the theories of the Naiyāyika and others who hold that our knowledge of the internal organ is acquired by indirect means. Nor, of course, do we admit the view that internal states such as desire, feeling, etc., belong to the Self; the absolutely changeless Self merely witnesses the changes going on in the internal organ. That it views them as its own, is the great error to free us from which is the task of philosophy]

"If, then, all thought and action rest on *adhyāsa*, we call on you to explain in detail which thing is superimposed on which, and how the whole *adhyāsa* of Self and Not-self has to be conceived!" Well, give your careful attention to the following account :—On witnessing Consciousness (*sākṣi-chaitanyam*) there are superimposed in succession,

the internal organ, the sense-organs, the body, and finally the things external to the body and their attributes—consciousness as qualified by each earlier *adhyāsa* constituting the substrate for each later *adhyāsa*. That the external things also are superimposed upon Consciousness there is no reason to doubt; for ordinary experience shows that a man thinks and speaks of himself as sound and entire or the reverse according as his wife, children relations etc. are sound and entire or the reverse. “But,” our opponent objects, “thought and speech of that kind are not to be understood in their primary (literal) sense, for they do not extend to all cases; when, *e.g.*, the wife of somebody’s son dies, the father does not consider himself to have lost his own wife.” Your reasoning is unsound, we reply. From the fact that the identification under discussion does not take place in some cases, it does not follow that where it does take place it is not to be taken in its full literal sense. It is quite true that in many cases shells are not treated—either in thought or in action—as being silver; but from this it does not follow that when a shell actually presents itself to somebody’s mind as silver, his thought and action connected with that silver are not fully serious (but of a merely secondary or metaphorical kind, as if the man were at the time conscious that the silver after all is not real). “Well,” our opponent rejoins, “let us admit that the identification of shell and silver is, for the time, an identification in the full sense of the word; but a man’s identifying himself with his body or with his son—where after all there is a clear consciousness of difference—can have a metaphorical meaning only; analogous to the meaning of the phrase, ‘*Devalatta* is a lion.’” The two cases, we reply, are not parallel: *Devalatta* is not affected by the pleasures and pains experienced by lions: he who thinks and speaks of him as a lion, therefore, can have nothing else in mind than a metaphorical identification of the two; the father, on the other

there would be a self-contradiction.” *

(273). But this is not right; as you cannot mention any ‘*viśeṣa*’ with regard to the cognition of which there may be a positive certainty that it is not wrong; specially as a dreamer cognises all sorts of *viśeṣas* (which proves that all *viśeṣas* are liable to misconception). Nor would it be right to accept such a ‘*viśeṣa*’,—even though its existence cannot be proved,—simply for fear of the pain of ‘self-contradiction’ (that you have urged). Because, simply because you cannot prove the existence of the ‘*viśeṣa*’, why cannot you accept the fact that there must be some other means of avoiding the ‘self-contradiction.’—† even though it be not possible to point out such means? ‡ As a matter of fact, there is not a single cognition, pertaining to things perceived in ordinary experience, which cannot be dreamt of, or be the subject of a false assertion (and be known by that means); consequently, you assume the existence of the *viśeṣa*, as something present in your consciousness,—even though you have no (necessarily true) cognition of it; and certainly, rather than court this apparent self-contradiction, it would be far better to assume the existence of some unperceived means § of avoiding the ‘self-contradiction’ (for avoiding which you are led to make the assumption of the *viśeṣa*). Then again, as for this threat of ‘self-contradiction,’ we shall have many occasions, off and on, to refute it entirely.

* If everything be untrue, then the cognition of this untruth would also be untrue,—this would be one ‘self-contradiction.’ (2) If we have no notion of the truth of a certain cognition, we cannot make any denial of such truth,—this would be another. (3) There would be a contradiction involved in regarding as *true* the sentence denying the truth of all things, etc., etc.

† Some means other than the postulating of the *viśeṣa*.

‡ If the *viśeṣa* is something apart from the things of ordinary experience, then it is what we call *Brahman*. If not, then it is liable to misconception; as all ordinary things are so liable.

§ The theory of ‘*anirvachanīyāṭī*’—the thing cannot be explained—is the means suggested.

(274). The opponent explains—"What we mean by the expression "*viśeṣasahitopalambha*" is, not that the *upalambha* or Cognition is to be accompanied by the *viśeṣa*,—but that the object that is cognised is cognised as along with its *viśeṣas* or distinguishing features ; and hence as the character of *being silver* is not the *distinguishing feature* of the shell, how can our definition be made to include the misconception of shell-silver ? (as urged by the *Siddhāntin* in para 271)."

(275). But the reasoning is already refuted by the objections shown above : That is to say, if you mention only '*viśeṣa*' in general (without specifying any particular distinguishing feature) then, inasmuch as some such *viśeṣas* as *being before the eyes* and the like are really present in the *shell*, the misconception would become included in the definition ; and if, in order to avoid this, you were to mention particular *viśeṣas*, then there being no end to this, no one comprehensive definition of Right Cognition would be possible.

(276). Then there remains the argument that the *viśeṣa* serves the purpose of enabling us to ascertain whether or not a certain cognition is to be rejected. To the extremely foolish person who sticks to this position, we say :—when one and the same thing is spoken of by the sentence "there are fruits on the river bank"—as uttered by the trustworthy and the untrustworthy person,—what *viśeṣa* or *special feature* is there which you perceive in the thing in one case and not in the other ? [and yet in one case it is true, not to be rejected, and in the other, untrue, to be rejected]—[and hence the mere postulating of the *viśeṣa* cannot serve your purpose].

If there be a still greater fool (who does not understand our meaning) he should be made to understand it in the following manner :—Being afraid of having to postulate an endless number of *viśeṣas*,—necessitated by your having to assume one *viśeṣa* after the other,—you have admitted

that some *viśeṣas* are *viśeṣas* by themselves (and not by reason of having other *viśeṣas*); but then, as all these self-specificatory entities would be distinct from one another, there would be no one form pervading over them all; and thus the definition could not be made to include all. Nor can it be argued that we have an all-comprehensive characteristic—in the shape of *being the means of ascertaining which cognition is to be rejected and which not*,—which would include all *viśeṣas*. Because even in the case of the misconception of shell-silver, there is the *viśeṣa* of *being silver*; and this *viśeṣa* is the true means of ascertaining whether the cognition is to be rejected or not, *in some cases* (*i.e.*, of real silver) [even though not in the particular case in question]. Nor would it be right to add the words ‘of that’ and ‘in such and such a case’ [*i.e.*, it will not be right to say that a *viśeṣa* is to be regarded as the true *viśeṣa* only when it is found *in the particular cognition concerned* to be the true means of ascertaining whether or not *that particular cognition* is to be rejected]. Because this again would make the *viśeṣas* mutually exclusive (and thus make a comprehensive definition impossible); secondly as for the *bādhā*,—*rejection, sublation*,—of a certain cognition, this always appears in the shape of the right cognition of that form of the thing which is contrary to that apprehended by the rejected cognition; [*i.e.*, the misconception of shell-silver is rejected by the cognition ‘this is not silver’]; and hence such a rejection cannot provide us with any comprehensive notion of the latter thing (*i.e.*, the one apprehended by the wrong cognition); [and hence the *bādhā* also will have to be qualified by each thing concerned; which will make it impossible to have any comprehensive notion of all *bādhā*; and thus the character of *being the true means of bādhā* also will fail to provide the necessary comprehensive notion of all *Viśeṣas*]. And lastly you have still got to

establish the character of Right Cognition [and this enters into your conception of the *Vişeṣa*, which again is necessary for your conception of Right Cognition].*

(277) This definition of Right Cognition is also open to some other objections that we have shown above (sec. 15) against the definition '*yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā*,' with reference to the qualification '*yathārtha*'; and these objections we do not mention again, for fear of repetition.

(278) Then again, [there is yet another objection against the definition of Right Cognition as the *paricchhitti* of the qualified thing along with its distinguishing features]:† There are certain cognitions—for instance, the ratiocinative cognition, and certain imaginary doubtful and wrong cognitions—which appear only when certain distinguishing features are present (and cognised); and all these will become included in the said definition. Nor will it be right for you to assert that you do not admit of any merely imaginary doubtful and wrong cognitions. Because in your own system, you do actually admit of merely imaginary doubts and wrong cognitions as emanating from the avowed deceivers, the very basis of whose assertion consists of such cognitions,—or from the truth-knowing teacher who starts imaginary discussions for illuminating the understanding of his pupil.

* Right cognition you define as *सविशेषज्ञान*, and *विशेष* again you define as *वाच्यवस्थाहेतु*; and *वाच* is only *विपरीतप्रमा* or *ज्ञान* of the contrary form.

† When we see the smoke issuing from the hill, and remember the necessary premises, we conclude that there is fire on the hill; and this conclusion we strengthen by the reasoning—'under such circumstances if there were no fire, the smoke would be without a cause.' This last cognition, 'smoke will be without a cause' is what is meant by 'ratiocinative cognition.' It is a cognition following on the cognition of certain distinguishing features; and yet it is not *right cognition*. Then again, even though in the stock example of the *bhrama* of shell-silver, there may be no cognition of proper *viśeṣas*, yet we can imagine some instances of doubtful and wrong cognitions which follow on the cognition of due *viśeṣas*, and all these would become included in the definition in question.

(279) Lastly, the word *parichchheḍa* being synonymous with ‘*anuḥhava*,’ its introduction is open to all the objections that we have urged above against this latter word.

B.

[For similar reasons,—impossibility of affording adequate explanation of the words of the definition—we reject a *fourth* definition of *Right Cognition* as *an apprehension which is not defective*.]

(280) Nor is it right to define ‘Right Cognition’ as *an ‘anuḥhava’ or apprehension that is ‘avyabhichārī,’ i.e., not incorrect or defective*. Because if the expression ‘*avyabhichārī*’ as used in this definition be synonymous with the expressions ‘*taṭṭravishaya*,’ ‘*yathārtha*,’ &c., then the very same objections that we have urged above against these expressions present themselves again. If however it be asserted that the word ‘*avyabhichārī*’ means that the cognition is *not without, or unconcomitant with, the object cognised*,—then, we ask, what do you mean by this ? (1) Do you mean that the Right Cognition exists only at the time when the object exists ? (2) or that it exists only at the place where the object exists ? (3) or, that it is of the same character as, similar to, the object ?

(281) The first of these meanings is not possible: the word ‘*avyabhichārī*’ cannot mean that the Right Cognition exists only at the time when the object exists ; because in that case the definition would exclude all *inferential* cognitions of past and present things. Nor can the word mean that Right Cognition exists only at the place where the object exists, because in the first place, the definition, in that case, would not include those admittedly Right Cognitions which are not co-existent *in space* with their objects ; and secondly we would have to regard as *right* those Cognitions which impose wrongly the character of an object co-existent in space with the Cognition upon something

else. *Nor can the word mean that the Right Cognition is similar to the object; because in accordance with the view (which is the Logician's also) that the Cognition is something distinct from the object cognised, it would never be possible for the object to be similar *in all respects* to the Cognition (and hence no Cognition would be *right*); while according to the view that the Cognition is non-different from its object, this non-difference will have to be accepted in the case of *wrong* Cognitions also; and hence there would be no useful purpose served by the qualification '*avyabhichārī*' (which is added only with a view to preclude *wrong* Cognitions); and if with a view to escape from these predicaments you specify certain features in regard to which the *similarity* (between the Cognition and its object) is intended, then you become open to all the objections that we have urged above in connection with the definition containing the expression '*yathārtha*.'

C.

[On similar grounds, the Author rejects the fifth definition of *Right Cognition* proposed by the *Bauddha*—that it is that apprehension which is not incompatible with the object cognised.]

(282) Nor is it right to define 'Right Cognition' as *that* '*anubhava*' or *apprehension which does not disagree with—is not incompatible with—the object cognised*. Because what do you mean by this 'non-incompatibility'? (1) Do you mean that the cognition is *cognised by means of another cognition*, as being in agreement, or compatible, with the object? (2) or that it is *not cognised*, by means of another cognition, as being incompatible with the object? (3) or that the cognition has for its object something that is invariably concomitant

* e.g. *Ātman* is co-existent in space with Cognition; and when this character of *Ātman* would be imposed upon the body as '*iḍam śharīram Ātmā*,' we would still have the Cognition co-existent with its object *Ātman*; and yet this Cognition would be wrong.

with that Cognition? (4) or do you mean something entirely different from all this?

(283) The *first* of these is not possible: it cannot be that the cognition is cognised as compatible with the object; as according to this view, we should have to regard as 'right cognition' that misconception which proceeds in a continuous series (where the second member of the series will have the preceding Misconception for its object, and in perfect agreement with it, and so on and on each subsequent member of the series). Nor would it avail to urge that what is meant is that that other cognition also must be a *right* one; as what you are seeking to define is 'right cognition' itself, (and hence you cannot introduce the same term in the definition).

(284) Nor is the second meaning possible: it cannot be your meaning that the Cognition is not cognised as being incompatible with the object; as in this case the definition would include those wrong cognitions which may not have their sublating cognitions appearing for some time (and during this interval, the former cognitions would have to be regarded as *right*). And further, when the eye is in a healthy condition, we rightly see the conch-shell as white; if after this the organ happens to be affected with bile, we see the same shell as yellow; and in this case the former cognition (as *white*) would be *cognised* by means of the latter cognition as 'incompatible with its object' (*yellowness*), and would, as such, have to be regarded by you as *wrong*. If in order to avoid this you were to urge that the latter cognition spoken of in the definition should be a *right* one, then there is the objection that we have already pointed out—*viz.*, that 'right cognition' being the term to be defined, it will not be right to introduce it in the definition. If you say that, what is meant is that the cognition should not be sublated or rejected by a cognition *proceeding*

from a faultless source (thus avoiding the use of the term 'right cognition'),—then in that case, this last might well be the definition of 'right cognition' (and there would be no need for the definition in support of which you have to put forward this explanation). And further, until you have defined what is *faulty*, it cannot be ascertained what is *not-faulty* or *faultless*. It might be urged—"What of this? We can easily define the *faulty character* as some peculiarity in the source of the cognition which makes this latter *wrong* (contrary to the real nature of the thing)." But even this will not serve your purpose; * as what is meant to be excluded by the word 'wrong' is the cognition of that which is *not actually cognised*; and] as no account can be taken of that which is not cognised or known at all], the introduction of the word would be absolutely useless. And if the word were dropped, then the faultiness of a source of cognition would come to consist in its character of *producing a cognition*! and under the circumstances there would be no cognition proceeding from a *faultless* source! Nor can it be asserted that what the word 'wrong' serves to exclude is the 'right cognition.' Because this latter is what you have got to define; and so long as you have not got at its true definition, you can have no idea of it as distinguished from other kinds of cognition; and then under such circumstances how can you form any notion of its exclusion (by the word 'wrong')? And thus it comes to this that, without the cognition of 'right cognition' as differentiated from other cognitions, you can have no idea of the 'right cognition' as thus differentiated! And this would land you in all the three predicaments of *Ātmāśhraya* (Vicious Circle), *Anyonyāśhraya* (Mutual Interdependence) and *Anavasthā* (*Regressus ad Infinitum*).

'As a matter of fact, in the case of the definition of all such things as are possessed of more than one distinguishing

feature, when one of these features is singled out (for the purpose of defining the thing), then we have all the three predicaments just mentioned; because that feature itself is something other than the other features belonging to the same thing. [And if these are not already *known*, they cannot be *excluded*, etc., etc., as argued above.]' (32)

(285) Nor is the third of the alternatives (mentioned in para. 282) tenable; that is, the definition cannot mean that the Cognition has for its object something that is invariably concomitant with that Cognition. Because by the phrase 'invariably concomitant' do you mean anything and everything that may be concomitant? or only some particular thing? In the former case, we could not regard as *wrong* the cognition that we have *in a dream* of fire with smoke, or that which we may obtain from the assertions of an untrustworthy person (with regard to the existence of fire with smoke on a hill where, in reality, there may be no fire at all). In the latter case, is this particular 'concomitant' to be in the form of *effective action*—*e. g.*, the *burning* of fire? or in that of its accessories,—*e. g.*, *fuel* of fire? In either case there will be no escape from the aforesaid objections. [As during dreams many objects are cognised along with their effective actions]. And further, as all the cognitions (of the thing, its effective action, accessories, &c., necessitated by your view) could not be recognised as valid all at once, it will be necessary to accept some order of sequence in them; and under the circumstances, if it be considered necessary (for the validity of the cognitions of an object) to have in a continuous series, valid cognitions of its effective action and accessories, then the entire life of a person would become taken up by the cognition of a single object; while if a break in this series be admitted, then there will be nothing to establish the validity of the last item (at which the series stops); and thus the

invalidity of that one item would, in due backward course, vitiate the validity of every one of the items of the series, to the very first cognition. Then as regards the presence of *actual* effective action, it will be hard to ascertain whether or not a certain effective action is actually present; and hence in our ordinary usage, we cannot stop at each step to consider the actuality or otherwise of the effective action; and as for the fact of the mere idea (of the *effective action*), we have this in the case of wrong cognitions also (and so this cannot serve as a criterion).

(286) "Well, under the circumstances, we can accept the *fourth* alternative * (noted in *para* 282). That is to say, the *non-incompatibility* of the cognition may be regarded as consisting in the fact of its having for its object something which is capable of effective action; as has been declared in the following verse—'The non-incompatible cognition is valid, and *non-incompatibility* consists in the presence of effective action.' But this also is not right; because if you mean the presence of effective action, merely *in a general way*, then in the case of misconception (of shell-silver also) we will have such *non-incompatibility* (inasmuch as the *shell* is capable of the effective action of the *shell*, even though not of *silver*). In answer to this it might be urged that the thing cognised must be capable, *in the form cognised*, of effective action. But this will be extremely difficult to ascertain in every case. Nor will it be easy to ascertain this by actually perceiving the effective action; because it is possible for us to have the *perception* of effective cognition even when no such action is possible (*i.e.*, it is possible for us to have a misconception of effective action; and so such perception itself cannot serve as the right criterion). This may be met by the explanation that what is meant to be the criterion is the *right cognition* of the effective action; but this we have already

* Adopted by the Bauddha writer, *Dharmakīrti*.

refuted above; as we have yet to define what 'right cognition' is. It might be urged that—"every cognition is regarded as valid when it is found to be in keeping with (compatible with) the intention of the cogniser."* But this is not right; for if by this be meant that the cognition should be in keeping with the intention *at the time of the cognition*, then this will be found to apply to dream-cognitions also; while as regards other times, it will not be possible to ascertain whether or not a certain cognition is in keeping with the person's intention *at other times*.

(287) [Page 254]. The above arguments serve also to reject the explanation that—"what is meant by the '*samvāda*' (compatibility) of the cognition is that the thing cognised is capable of being actually got at (in the form cognised)." [As it cannot be ascertained *at the time of the cognition* whether or not the thing can be got at, etc., etc.]

Truly difficult of refutation is this theory of *Dharma-kīrti*'s, and one has to be very careful with regard to it.

D

[We cannot accept the sixth definition that 'Right Cognition is that cognition which is not sublated'; because it is not possible to fix the meaning of the phrase 'not sublated.']

(288) By what we have said above is also refuted the definition that *Right Cognition is that apprehension which is not sublated or rejected* (by any subsequent cognition). Because if you mean that the Cognition is 'not sublated' *at the time of the Cognition*,—then the definition becomes too wide (including all Cognitions, as no cognition is sublated at the time that it appears); and if you mean that it is 'not sublated' *at a different time*, then we have only got to point out that we can not be sure with regard to any cognition,

* When the person sees a thing before him and makes up his mind to use it in a certain way; if the thing really turns out to be fit for such use, then the cognition is *right*.

that it can *never* be sublated at any time. Then again, if you mean that the cognition is to be 'not sublated' *by the Cogniser himself*,—then too the definition becomes too wide (as no cognition is sublated or rejected by the cogniser at the time of the cognition); and if in order to avoid this you mean that the *sublation* denied is *by some other person*,—then, we can never be sure as to any cognition being 'not sublated' *by any person*.

E

[The seventh definition—that Right Cognition is cognition other than the ratiocinative, the doubtful, the wrong and the remembered—cannot be accepted; because of the arguments already explained.]

(289) Nor again is it right to define Right Cognition as *an apprehension or knowledge other than the ratiocinative, the doubtful, the wrong, and the remembered*. As this definition is to be refuted in the same manner as the one dealt with before where Right Cognition was defined as a cognition *other than remembrance*. (Para 220).

F

[The eighth definition—that Right Cognition is that cognition which belongs to the class of '*pramā*'—has to be rejected, because in the first place, this would involve a 'Cross Division'; and secondly, no real explanation of '*pramāṭva*' itself is available.]

(290) As for the definition that Right Cognition is that which is related to (belongs to) the class '*Pramā*' (*i. e.*, which is possessed of the general character of '*pramāṭva*')—this cannot be right, specially for one who (like the Logician) regards 'Cross-division' as wrong.* Then again, if this general character of '*pramāṭva*' were to give rise to the notion of *Pramā*, *without being itself duly recognised*, then

* The sense of this is that the Logician cannot accept any such *Jāti* or class as '*Pramāṭva*'; as this would overlap with another *Jāti* '*Sākṣātkāraṭva*'. Both of these reside in the ordinary *right sense-perception*, and yet '*Sākṣātkāraṭva*' is not present in *right inferential Cognition*, and '*Pramāṭva*' is not present in the *wrong sense-perception* of shell-silver.

there could be no Misconception or Doubt with regard to any Right Cognition being wrong. [That is to say, with regard to certain Right Cognitions, we have sometimes the misconception that it is wrong, or the Doubt that it may be right or wrong; and these are due to our failing to *perceive* the presence or absence in the Cognition concerned, of the character '*Pramāṭva*'; so if we were to have the notion of '*Pramā*', or '*Right Cognition*', without any idea of the character of '*Pramāṭva*', then all Right Cognitions would be always known as right, and there would be no room for the aforesaid misconception or doubt]. In order to avoid this predicament, if it be held that the notion of *Pramā* is due to the presence of the general character of '*Pramāṭva*' as accompanied by the absence of discrepancies (which are the source of misconception and doubt),—then, in that case, we should have to regard as 'right' that Cognition which is known as mere 'Cognition' in general, and with regard to which we do not have the notion of 'misconception', or 'doubt' or any such particular character. [As in this case also there are no discrepancies of the kind mentioned, as evinced by the absence of Misconception and Doubt; and as for the character of *Pramāṭva*, it may be there for aught we know; and according to your view it is not necessary for us to have any cognition of this general character.]

(291) [PAGE 256.] If in order to escape from all this it be held that it is when the character of '*Pramāṭva*' is duly recognised that we have the notion of Right Cognition,—then, you have to explain how this *Pramāṭva* itself is to be recognised. It cannot be recognised by means of sensuous perception through the mind; as in that case with regard to any 'right cognition' that might appear, there could be no misconception or mistake to the effect that it is a *wrong cognition*; nor could there be any doubt as to its being right or wrong; because like the *thing* itself (*i.e.*, the cognition), its

character (*rightness*) also would have been ascertained through the mind.* It may be argued that the recognition of 'Pramāṭva' is through the mind directly, while in the other case the mind stands in need of the help of other characteristics (as for instance, the character of being the apprehension of the real nature of the thing, and so forth); or it may be that the said recognition is only *inferential*, being brought about by the said characteristics which would be indicative of *Pramāṭva* (as distinguished from all other things). But this also affords only a false glimmer of hope to you; because in that case, all purposes of ordinary usage (*i.e.*, of forming a comprehensive notion of *all* right notions), being served on the basis of those characteristics, there would be no need for the assumption of any such generic entity as *Pramāṭva* (which is assumed solely for the sake of the said comprehensive notion). If, in order to escape from this predicament you have recourse to the argument that the *characteristics* are *many* (and not one, which would suffice for the comprehensive notion),—then you have to point what these *many characteristics* are. Each and every one of the characteristics of right notion that you have been putting forward one after the other we have been showing to be faulty, and we shall show this again later on, in the course of our refutation of the view that Cognition derives its validity from extraneous sources.

G.

[Lastly, Right Cognition cannot be defined as possessed of *Pramāṭva*, which is a particular kind of power or efficiency;—because it is not possible to ascertain what this efficiency is, and every definition that may be advanced is bound to be too wide.]

Ordinarily the cognition is mentally perceived; and as to whether it is right or wrong it is ascertained by such other means as the absence of subsequent sublation, and so forth. If both were *mental*, both would be *coeval*; and all so-called right cognitions would always be regarded as *right*; and there could be no doubt or mistake with regard to them.

(292) The reasonings advanced above also dispose of the definition that the 'Rightness,' *Pramātra*, of a Cognition being a peculiar power or efficiency, the Right Cognition is that which is possessed of this efficiency. Specially as it can not be ascertained what this 'efficiency' is.

(293) Then again, whatever the definition of Right Cognition may be, if it were the basis of our conception of such *rightness*, either when it itself would be merely recognised, or even when it is not itself recognised,—in either case, there would be an *undue extension* (*i.e.*, even Mistaken Cognitions would come to be regarded as *right*).* And if it be only when the *rightness* is *rightly* cognised (that it can serve as the basis of our notion of Right Cognition), then there could be no right cognition of the *rightness*, until we have ascertained what 'right cognition' is. [Thus there is a vicious circle]. It may be urged that it does not matter if this is not duly ascertained, the fact remains (that it is there). But this will not be right; as might not your opponent say (with equal force) that 'the fact remains, that it is *not* so'? And then you will have no answer to that. And further, according to what you say, there would be no need for seeking to ascertain what the character of *Right Cognition* is. Specially as in that case (*i.e.*, according to your view of the *rightness* remaining a fact even though not recognised) the cognition of the *jar* also might be regarded as *right* simply because the *rightness* is there [and it will not be necessary for us to recognise this *rightness*, for which purpose you have been putting forward the above definition and thus there is a total annihilation of all definitions.] We need not pursue this discussion any further.

*The sense is that even in Mistaken Cognitions, we have the notion, for the time being, that these are right. Whether this notion itself is wrong or right, that is another question. This aspect is met in the next sentence.

SECTION 17.

[It having been shown that no adequate definition of *Pramā*, *Right Cognition*, is possible, the Author next proceeds to demonstrate the untenability of all the definitions that have been proposed of *Pramāṇī*, Means of Right Cognition.]

A. [Pramāṇa cannot be defined as 'the instrument of right cognition'; because no adequate definition of 'instrument' is available.]

(294) It having been found impossible to define Right Cognition, the definition of *Pramāṇa* also as 'the means or instrument of right cognition' cannot be maintained; specially as the meaning of the word '*Karāṇa*,' 'Means,' 'Instrument,' cannot be defined.

(295) The opponent proceeds to supply a definition of the 'means' or 'instrument':—

"The name 'means' or 'instrument' is given to that cause which is not taken up in the making up (or fulfilment) of any other of the various agencies tending to the accomplishment of the action (but which aids directly and entirely in that accomplishment). * The Nominative or the Active Agent tends directly to the accomplishment (or bringing together) of the *Means* or instrument to the action, and is as such 'taken up in the making up of another agency' (and so it cannot come within the above definition of the *Instrument*). Even though the *Instrument* has an independent existence by itself, and cannot, as such, be said to be 'accomplished' by the Agent,—yet, inasmuch it is by the Agent that it is set in operation, it may be said to be *accomplished* by him (at least in regard to the action concerned); specially as it is a real 'means' only when thus set in operation. In the same manner the *Objective* also is taken up in the accomplishment of the *Instrument*; as it is on the *Objective* that the *Instrument* operates; and in the absence of the *Objective*, there is nothing upon which the operation of the *Instrument* could take

* He proceeds to show that the definition cannot apply to any other *kāraka* (agent) save the *karāṇa* (Instrument),

effect; and hence as being a necessary factor in the accomplishment of the character of the *Instrument* it can be said to be taken up in its accomplishment. Similarly the Locative also aids in the fulfilment of the operation of the *Instrument*. Lastly as regards the Dative and the Ablative, these are not necessary agencies in all actions, as the *Instrument* is. Consequently we can rightly define the *Instrument* as *that cause which is necessary in the case of all actions, and which is not taken up in the accomplishment of any other agency.*"

(296) The above definition cannot be maintained. The explanation that you have provided may look all very well until we have examined it closely; but when we proceed to look into it more carefully we find that, if the word '*anṭara*' that you have introduced in your definition (in the compound '*kārakānṭara*,' 'another agency') means only 'difference,'* then it cannot serve the purpose of *exclusion* (as it is meant to do); † because the word could serve the purpose of *excluding* certain *kāraḥ* and including the one intended, only if it were possible for a mere '*kāraḥ*' or '*Agent*' in *general*, without any specification, to be produced; but as this is not possible, the word '*anṭara*' cannot serve to *exclude* what it is intended to exclude. Nor can the word '*anṭara*' mean 'another'; as if it did, then it would be necessary to point out with reference to what the thing spoken of is 'another'; if this *other thing* is not pointed out, then it would refer to the word '*karāṇa*' itself, on account of the close proximity of that word; just as we have in the assertion '*anyaḥ ātmā, śarīram anyat*,' 'the self is another thing, and the body another'; then the word *kārkānṭara* would come to denote the *Agency other than the Instrument*: and this

* As in the assertion '*anyaḥ mahat anṭaram*.'

† It is only when the general *ghatā* is spoken of that we can make use of words that would exclude some and include others. In the case in question it is not possible for any *kāraḥ* in *general* to be produced; and hence no exclusion is possible or necessary. As it is only the *kāraḥ* of a *particular* kind that is produced.

would be objectionable, as it is still being ascertained what the '*Instrument*' is (and so we cannot introduce this word into the definition); and further, in this case the definition would become too wide (as the Nominative and the Objective also are taken up in the accomplishment of the *Instrument* only, and not in that of any Agency *other than the Instrument*). Nor can the word '*anṭara*' refer to the forms of the Nominative and the Objective; because in this case also the definition would become 'too wide', inasmuch as it would include these two also (because neither the Nominative nor the Objective is taken up in the accomplishment of its own form, both of these tending to the accomplishment of the Instrument, as you have yourself stated). Nor again can the word '*anṭara*' be explained as expressing *contradistinction to the Nominative and the Objective* (the definition meaning that which is not taken up in the accomplishment of any agency other than the Nominative and the Objective). Because in that case the introduction of the word would be absolutely useless; as it would suffice to say only 'that which is not taken up in the accomplishment of an agency.' [As the Locative and the rest would be included in the word 'Agency', '*Kāraka*', itself; and the *Instrument* is never taken up in the accomplishment of the Nominative and the Objective.] In order to escape from these difficulties, you will perhaps urge that the word '*kāṛakānṭara*' does not mean anything more than the word '*Kāraka*', and as such it may not be used. This will not avail you; because in that case the Hand and such other instruments, which do bring about many agencies (in the shape of *fire*, for instance, in the act of Cooking) will not be regarded as 'instruments' at all;—while as a matter of fact, a *Kāraka* or 'Agency' is any cause that is operative (towards the bringing about of some effect); and we find the Fire *operating* (towards the action of *Cooking*) through its contact with the vessel; and this fire in its turn is produced

by the *hand* (which thus is ‘taken up in the accomplishment of an agency).’ Nor will it be right for you to assert that the Hand is not an ‘instrument.’ Because inasmuch as it is found to be a *cause operating towards a certain end*, you cannot but regard it as that particular kind of ‘agency’; and as it cannot very well be regarded as the Nominative or any other *Kāraka*, you would have to postulate a seventh *Kāraka* (if you do not regard it as the ‘Instrument’)! You cannot argue that —“inasmuch as the operation of the Hand towards the burning of fire is not direct but interposed (by the action of the fuel, etc.) we cannot regard it as the *cause* of the burning, but only the *cause of its cause*.” Because the same might be said with regard to the Nominative agency also (which also would thus according to you, cease to be a *Kāraka*); because between the operation of the agent (wood-cutter) and the broken splinters of the wood, there intervene many other operations, such as the operation of the axe, the cutting, and so forth. It might be said in answer to this, that in this latter case all the intervening operations belong to the Agent, and as such they do not deprive this latter of the causal character. But then, the same may be said with regard to the Hand also. Thus then your definition is wrong; simply because it does not apply to things like the Hand, whose *instrumental* character is unquestioned. The above reasoning also serves to refute the view that the expression ‘*Kāarakūṇṭara*’ (in the definition of *karāṇa*) means ‘those other than the Nominative and the Objective.’ [As the acknowledged Instrument, Hand, is ‘taken up in the accomplishment’ of another *instrument*, which is neither the *Nominative* nor the *Objective*].

(198) Nor can the Instrument be defined as the *object or substratum (viṣaya)* of the agent’s operation. Because when a man makes an effort to set his body in motion, what becomes the object of his operation of *effort* is, either the

action of bodily motion, or the body as qualified by that action; and hence these will have to be regarded as the 'instrument' in the said action (of '*chālana*', *setting into motion*); but this cannot be accepted; because a thing cannot be the *instrument* towards itself in the future state [*i. e.*, while the *setting into motion* of the body is not accomplished, the *motion* of the body is still in the future; and as such this latter cannot be the *instrument* towards the former; and similarly the *body qualified by the motion*, does not exist until the body has been *set in motion*, and as such this could not be the *instrument* towards this latter.] Nor could this objection be escaped by adding the qualification of 'Direct' (*sākṣāt*),—the Instrument being defined as the *direct object of the operation of the agent*.^{*} Because (even though this addition may save you as regards the action of the Self in the shape of the Effort to set the body in motion, where the body is the *direct* object) the objection would remain in force, as regards the action of the Self towards the setting of the Mind and such other things into activity, (which are the *direct* objects of the operation of the Self); and secondly because this definition would not apply to all Instruments (for instance the *axe* in cutting is not the direct object of the cutter's operation, who operates through his hand).

(299) You will perhaps argue that the *hēṭu* or cause of a certain action is certainly the object or substrate of the operation of the agent or doer *of that action*, and this *cause* will be the 'Instrument' *for that action*. This also cannot be maintained, we reply; as by this definition there could be no *instrumentality* in the action of the sprouting of seeds, according to Atheists [as according to them there is no *doer* or *agent* in this case];—and further by this definition it will be necessary to exclude, from the category of 'Right

^{*} Thus, the Pūrvaśākin, would say, as the *effort* is the action of the Self, the Body cannot be said to be its *direct* object.

Cognition', the cognition that we have after deep sleep (that 'I have been sleeping *happily*'), as during deep sleep there is no actual *cogniser* (the Self having reverted at that time to its state of pure consciousness, without the *upādhī* in the shape of the cognitive faculty which is necessary for its being a *cogniser* or *agent*), and hence (by your definition) there can be no *Instrument* either; while for every *right cognition*, there have been enumerated (by you) distinct *Upādhīs* in the shape of Instruments. And, if in order to avoid this, you were to assert that the presence of the *Cognitive faculty* is not necessary for the *Agent* (in the case of *Cognition*), then this admission of yours could be made to extend too far (for your acceptance). [That is to say, in that case it would not be necessary for the Creator of the world to be endowed with the *Cognitive Faculty*; and the creation would have to be attributed to non-cognitive Matter.] Then again, according to the Theistic doctrine, as *all* causes would be *the object of the operation of God (the Agent)*, there would be no cause which (by your definition) would not be an *Instrument*. If you say 'Amen' to this, then all that remains for you to differentiate the Instrument from is *what is not a cause*; and for this it would suffice for you to define the Instrument simply as the 'cause'; and it is needless effort on your part to add qualifications.

(300) [PAGE 263.] To the above you may reply:—
 "Qualifications have been added not for the purpose of excluding other things, but for the purpose of showing that a single thing can, in the said distinctive form, be spoken of by the word '*Karaṇa*.'" But in that case the '*Karaṇa*' being that which has the distinctive form mentioned in your definition, the definition would come to contain a mere mention of the *Karaṇa*, which is *the thing to be defined*; and it would not be the statement of the definition, that you profess to provide. Nor would it be right to argue that, "the

only purpose of definition consists in showing the grounds for the use or application of the word denoting the thing to be defined [i. e., the definition is nothing more than the pointing out of the signification of this word].” This, we say, is not right; because in that case, *that which is possessed of odour* would not be a ‘definition’ of the Earth [as the word ‘Earth’ does not *mean* or signify *that which is possessed of odour*]. Then again, if such be your standpoint, then why did you not point out the denotation of the word ‘*karāṇa*’ by the statement ‘everything is *karāṇa*’? You might retort by saying—“I should have done this only if *everything* were actually spoken of as ‘*karāṇa*.’” But to this our rejoinder would be that the definition put forward by you would be all right only if *all kārāṇas* or *agencies* were spoken of as ‘*karāṇa*’; as a matter of fact however, neither the Nominative nor the Objective is spoken of as ‘*karāṇa*’ [and hence your definition is not sound].

(301) “But,” the opponent argues, “we do find the Nominative spoken of as the *karāṇa*; as for instance, (1) in ordinary parlance, in such sentences as ‘*Devadaṭṭa* is the *pramāṇa* or authority in this matter’ (where *Devadaṭṭa*, the Nominative agent, is spoken of as ‘*pramāṇa*’ which is a *Karāṇa*), and (2) in scientific works, as in *Nyāyasūtra* II—i-67, where the authoritative character of the whole Veda is sought to be established on the basis of the fact that the *trustworthy person is an authority or pramāṇa*,—as is found in the case of those portions of the Veda that deal with incantations and medicines; [where also *the trustworthy person*, the Nominative agent, is spoken of as *pramāṇa*, which is *karāṇa*].” This is not right, we reply; for we ask—is this use of the word ‘*karāṇa*’ as applied to the Nominative, only figurative (indirect), like the application of the word ‘fire’ to the (bright) Boy? or is it literal, (direct)? And if on the basis of your assumption the use be literal or direct, then we find that this view is negated

or made untenable by the argument that in that case, the word '*karana*' would, on the same grounds, be applied to the Objective also; and hence there is no other alternative save that of regarding the said use of the word as only *figurative*.

(302) [PAGE 265] It may be urged that the word '*karana*' is actually applied to the Objective also, when this latter is spoken of in the form of the Instrument. But it is absolutely impossible to point out any instance of such usage, either in ordinary parlance or in scientific works; for where do you find the sentence '*ghatēna pashyati*' used in the sense of '*ghatam pashyati*'? If there be any such usage only in your mind, we cannot make up our mind to pay any regard to it. Because (if we were to pay any regard to such individual freaks) we may have to accept the fact of the name '*karana*' being applied to all cognisable things,—a fact which would be present in the mind of that person of perverted intelligence who holds that 'every cognisable object is an Instrument.' The Opponent may urge,—“we do not meet with such a sentence as '*ghatēna pashyati*,' because no such sentence is ever used by people (and not because the Instrumental character does not belong to the Objective); as certainly it is not necessary that people should actually speak of each and everything that may have a certain character, as having that character.” That might be so; but it is incumbent on you to point out instances where the name '*karana*' is actually applied to the *objective*; but, as a matter of fact, any concrete instance of such application it is absolutely impossible to find.

(303) [PAGE 266] Nor can the Instrument be defined as *that which is inseparably related to the action*.* Because '*ayogavyavachchēda*.' (inseparability—non-non-companionship) ultimately means only '*yoga*' (companionship or

* The other agencies though *related* to the *action* are not *inseparably* connected with it; it is only the Instrument which is thus inseparably connected.

connection); and thus the definition would only mean that the Instrument is *that which is related or connected to the action by connection*; and this would be tautological. It may be explained that the word '*sambandhi*' or 'related' denotes relationship at some particular point of time, and hence it is with a view to indicate relationship *at all times* that we have the qualification '*ayogavyavachchhēdēna*' or 'inseparably.' This also is not right; because as a matter of fact, the word 'related' does not denote relationship at any particular time; and hence there would be no need for the adding of other words for the purpose of denoting *relationship at other times*, not already expressed. In answer to this it may be urged that—"the word 'related' signifying mere relationship in a general way, if we had that word alone in the definition, then it would be made applicable to the Nominative and such other agencies of the action also, by taking the general word 'related' as serving the purpose of denoting *relationship at a particular time* (which would apply to the Nominative also), even though these other agencies may not be related to the action at other points of time; and hence with a view to preclude this we add another word to signify *relationship at other points of time also*." This again cannot be accepted; because just as you have argued with regard to the general relationship signified by the word 'related,' so it might be said with regard to this other word also that you add: That is to say, this other word also signifying in general the relationship at other points of time, it might be taken as referring only to some one point out of the many 'other points of time'; and so for the purpose precluding the non-relationship at the other points of time, it would be necessary for you to add another qualifying word.

(304) It may be that you intend to preclude (by the qualification) the *non-relationship at any time* (i.e., the Non-relationship at all times). But this may be got at by

means of the word 'related' itself; and there is no need for seeking to get at it by means of another word. If it is argued that "the *Universality* of the Non-relationship is got at by the preclusion of the negation (*i. e.*, by the double negation)",—then we reply that the *preclusion of negation* is nothing more than simple *affirmation*.

(305) It may be asserted that what is meant by the word '*ayogavyavachchhēḍēna*', 'inseparably', is that the Instrument to which the 'relationship' belongs is such that it never becomes the substratum of *Non-relationship* (*i. e.*, it does not permit of the co-existence in itself of the *relationship* and its negation). This again is not right; as in the other Agencies (of the Nominative, &c.) also, *at the time that they are related to the action*, there is no non-relationship (and hence the definition would include these also). Nor would it be right to add the word 'always' (or 'at all times'); because in that case we would ask—would the *relationship of the action* with the Instrument exist also at the time that the Instrument itself is non-existent? (for certainly it should do so if it is to exist 'at all times'). If you add the qualification 'while the Instrument exists', then in that case the word '*sambandhi*' in your definition would be superfluous; as it would be enough to define the Instrument *as that which while it exists* is qualified or characterised by *ayogavyavachchhēḍa* (inseparable relationship)* Or you might define it merely as '*Sambandhi Kriyayā*,'—this word itself being meant to convey *relationship at all times* (which grammatically the possessive termination in '*Sambandhi*' is quite capable of expressing); as we have already pointed out above.

* The definition would be in the form *yātsaṭṭvam kriyayā ayogavyavachchhēḍēna*; the third case termination in the last word denoting *qualification* or *specification*.

(306) If you are ready to accept this signification of the word 'sambandhi', after having, by some perverted course of reasoning, shown the necessity of that word in your definition,—then we put forward the following objections:—By your definition the proximity of the asterism of '*Rohini*' would be the 'Instrument' in the action of the rising of the asterism of '*Kṛittikā*' that precedes it; and further the setting of the *fourteenth* asterism counted from the beginning would be the 'Instrument' in the rising of the fourteenth asterism after that.* Nor can this be regarded as right; as the two events (rising and setting) occurring simultaneously (and not one after the other), the one can never be regarded as the *cause* of the other (as *sequence* is a necessary factor in all causal relation); and not being a *cause*, it cannot be regarded as an *agency* (*kāraṇa*) towards the other [because the *Agent* is only a particular kind of *Cause*]; and so lastly, there is no possibility of its being the '*instrument*' (which is only a particular kind of *Agency*).

(307) Nor will it be right for you to argue that in the case cited there is no sort of 'relationship' present. As you cannot deny the fact that there is an *invariable concomitance* between the two events; and such concomitance has the character of a natural *relationship*. You might urge that the 'relationship' intended is that of cause and effect. But this also is not possible; as in that case the *sūmagrī* or contingent accessories tending to bring about a certain effect, would have to be regarded as 'instrument.' "Amen! be it so"—you might exclaim. But can you be happy by merely repeating this sacred syllable? It would seem as if you were going to pronounce a certain scriptural incantation

* There are 28 asterisms distributed among the twelve zodiacal signs located in the ecliptic circle. This circle in its continuous revolution makes the zodiacal signs and the asterisms with them rise and set in regular order, so that at the time that the sixth sign with the fourteenth asterism would be setting in the West, the twelfth sign with the 28th Asterism would be rising in the East.]

prefaced by this sacred syllable, seeking to force us to believe in the dogma that the 'contingent accessory also is an instrument', in which we have no trust.

(308) * The opponent argues : "[The definition of 'Instrument' that we have put forward involves the relationship of cause and effect; and this cannot apply to the Contingent Accessory or Auxilliary, because] As a matter of fact the Contingent Accessory does not constitute the 'cause', which is only one part out of its many parts, each of which severally forms the 'cause' of various kinds (*samavāyī*, *asamavāyī* &c); and the 'Contingent Accessory' is only that in the wake of which (in close sequence to which) the effect invariably follows." This is hardly satisfactory; as this definition of the 'Contingent Accessory' is found applicable to the Instrument also, which would thus itself become a 'Contingent Accessory;' and in this manner a *Kriyā* or Action would have to be regarded as the *instrument* of Disjunction and such other effects (due to that action); and this Disjunction again would have to be regarded as the *instrument* of the consequent destruction of Conjunction or contact!

(309) Then again, the character of the *cause* consisting in being the necessary and invariable antecedent,—which according to you resides severally in each of the parts of the *contingent accessory* (as a whole) also (as this is also the necessary and invariable antecedent of the effect),—how can you say that this latter is not the 'cause'? [And if it is the 'cause', it becomes included in the definition of the 'Instrument']. In reply to this it may be urged that, "the *contingent accessory* of a certain effect includes also that *point of time* which precedes the appearance of the effect; and certainly this could have no existence at that same point of time (as this would involve the absurdity of the point of time existing in itself) [consequently the 'contingent

* Here we have the *Khandana* of the *lakṣhana* of 'Sāmagrī.'

accessory' not always being the *antecedent* of the effect, it cannot be regarded as the 'cause'." But this is not right. Because for the very reason that you propound, the point of time preceding the appearance of the effect is not regarded as the 'cause'; and for this reason it does not enter as a factor in the 'Contingent Accessory' of the cause. [Consequently, if the definition of the *Instrument* applies to the Contingent Accessory qualified by time, it becomes defective, in that it is too wide.]

(310) * Then again, the 'Instrument' cannot be as it has been defined. Because, in some cases, even though the instrument may be fully active, may it not bring about the action (of which it is the *instrument*), *all along the time that it itself exists*? [e.g., the axe is an 'instrument' in the cutting, and yet it does not produce the cutting during all the time that it is in operation; for instance, it is in operation from the time that it is raised by the hand up to the time that it actually falls upon the wood to be cut; but the cutting is produced only at this last point of time]. † And further, it is impossible for you to adduce evidence to prove that the instrument (axe) does not continue to operate even for a moment, at the time that the action (cutting) actually appears; and hence it becomes doubtful (in the absence of such evidence) [whether the operation of the instrument is really the

* The author having shown that the definition of Instrument is too *wide* now proceeds to show that it is too *narrow*, in that it does not apply to such well-known *instruments* as the *axe* and the like.

† The translation follows the interpretation of the *Vidyāsāgarī* and the *Chitsukhī*. Śaṅkara Mishra reads and explains the passage differently. He reads '*Kriyā—akālē*' which he explains as 'at the time that the action does not come into existence,—i. e., at the point of time preceding the appearance of the action'; the passage thus means that 'there is no evidence available for proving that at this previous point of time also the action of *cutting* does not actually inhere in the axe which is being raised and let fall.' This tortuous interpretation also points to the, same argument as has been deduced from the passage by the simpler interpretation of the *Chitsukhī*.

antecedent to the cutting, or it is simultaneous with it]; and thus the definition becomes inapplicable to this Instrument [as according to the definition it is necessary that the operation of the Instrument be the necessary *antecedent* of the action]. [In the case just mentioned it is doubtful whether or not the instrument is operating at the moment of the appearance of the action ; but there are cases where it is certain that the instrument is operating at the time ; for instance] in the case where a tangible substance remains touched by the hand for a long time, it must be admitted that there continues (even at the time of the appearance of the action of *touching*) the *contact of the organ of touch* which is the 'instrument' of the true sensation of touch [and this *contact* being the operation of the organ towards the action of *touching*, the two are found to be *simultaneous*].

(311) Then again, if you add to your definition of the 'instrument' the qualifying clause 'as long as it exists', it would mean that the thing is an 'instrument' during all the time that it exists (and not only at the time that it is operative towards the bringing about of a certain action). You cannot argue that the *causal nature* (of the thing) exists only at certain points of time (and not at all times of its existence) ; as the *causal nature* consists only in the necessary and invariable relationship with the point of time immediately preceding the appearance of the effect ; and as the factor of *time* already enters into this, it cannot be further referred to any other factor of time (as one *time* cannot be said to exist at another time).

(312) You may urge that—"what is meant by the Instrument *being related inseparably to the action*, is that the action (surely) invariably follows on its existence." But what do you mean by this ? (1) Does it mean that the action invariably appears *after the instrument* ? (2) or that the action invariably appears *during the existence* of the

instrument? (3) or that the action invariably *persists* after the instrument? The first of these alternatives cannot be accepted; as in that case the contingent accessory will have to be regarded as 'instrument', while the character of 'instrument' will have to be denied to the Hand and such other well-known instruments;—[because the action does not appear *after* the hand has ceased to exist]; and lastly, we will have to regard Pleasure, Pain and such other cognisable things to be true *means or instruments of cognitions*. Nor can you urge that the cognisable thing is certainly an instrument of the Cognition. Because no one ever regards them as such. Nor is the second of the above alternatives acceptable; because in that case the definition of 'instrument' will not apply to the organ of Touch, which remains in contact with the tangible object for a long time,—as if in such a case the mind happens to be pre-occupied, the sensation of touch (with regard to which the organ would be the Instrument) does not appear. Nor again can the third alternative be accepted; as in that case such other things as the contingent accessory and the like will have to be regarded as 'instruments'; and in the view that things have a permanent (and not mere momentary) existence, the *production or appearance* of the jar will have to be regarded as the 'instrument' of the jar (which exists invariably after its production, and which may be called a '*kriyā*' in the sense of *that which is done or brought about, i. e., an Effect*). Nor lastly is the fourth alternative possible; as according to this all things that happen to coexist at one time will have to be regarded as 'instruments' to one another. (Not finding any of these meanings of your definition possible) you may explain your definition of the 'Instrument'—as that which is inseparably related to the action—to mean that the 'instrument' is that which, *when operative*, does not fail to produce the desired result. But this definition will not

apply to such well-known Instruments as the Hand and the like [as in the above quoted case where the hand is in long, continuous contact with an object, if the mind happens to be pre-occupied, the result, in the shape of the sensation of touch, does not appear, even though its operation, in the shape of its *contact*, is present all the time.]

[The author now proceeds to refute the definitions of '*Vyāpāra*' or '*Operation*,'—a term that has been introduced by the opponent into the definition of the '*Instrument*.']

(313). What again, we ask, is this '*Vyāpāra*', '*Operation*' of the Instrument? (1) Is it the cause *produced* by it? (2) Or the cause having that Instrument for its substratum? The first is not possible; because no such cause is produced by the *minor premiss** (which is universally regarded as the '*instrument*' of inferential cognition).

(314) †The Opponent may argue as follows—"The first perception of the *smoke* (which is the *inferential indicative, probans*, *Liṅga*) in the *mountain* (which is the *pakṣa*, or '*Subject*' of Inference) can be regarded as the '*instrument*' of the inferential conclusion, only on the ground that, through the remembrance of the Major Premiss (*invariable concomitance* of the *probans* with the Major term or predicate of the Conclusion), it actually does *produce* the *vyāpāra* or *operation* in the shape of the second recognition of the *probans*; and thus in reality the *cognition of the major term* (which is the inferential conclusion) is brought about directly by this *second recognition* of the minor term as concomitant with that which is invariably

* In the reasoning—the mountain is fiery, because there is smoke in it which is invariably concomitant with fire,—it is the recognition of the presence of smoke in the mountain which is called '*Liṅgaparamarsha*.'

† In the case of the inference in question, the man sees the smoke in the mountain, this is the *first recognition*; then he remembers the fact that smoke is concomitant with fire; and then comes the conception that this mountain contains the smoke which is concomitant with fire,—this is the *second recognition*.

concomitant with that major term. [And thus this is the cause of Inference, and it is produced by the *first recognition of the probans* which thus becomes the Instrument].”

(315) This however is not right. For in a case where the Inference (of the presence of Fire in the Mountain) is deduced from the very first perception of Smoke in the Mountain, accompanied by the remembrance of the invariable concomitance of Smoke and Fire—this concomitance having been perceived elsewhere than in the Mountain,—the inference follows directly from the aforesaid *first* perception of the smoke in the mountain; and as thus there would be no *second* perception of the smoke (which according to the opponent, would be the *cause* produced by the first perception; the said *first* perception would, according to your definition, have no ‘operation’ towards the Inference, and would on that account, not be regarded as the ‘Instrument’ of that inference! It might be argued that, “just as in the case of the collision of two things moving in opposite directions, the contact is regarded as being due to both the things,—so in the same manner, the ‘remembrance of concomitance’ leading to the conclusion may be regarded as due to the perception of it elsewhere and also that in the mountain; and thus as this perception would be followed by the second perception it would have this latter as its ‘operation’, and would thus fulfil the conditions of the ‘Instrument.’” This again, we reply, is not right. For the cognition of the minor premiss—‘the Smoke that I see in the mountain is that which is invariably concomitant with Fire’—may be obtained merely by the remembrance of the Smoke perceived *elsewhere* as concomitant with Fire; just as the cognition of the negation or absence of something appears only after the remembrance of the object of which it is the negation;

prāmāṇa has been defined simply as 'apprehension'; and certainly the cognition of *fire* following upon the cognition of *smoke* is 'apprehension'. Then again, as a matter of fact, in all cases of Inferential Cognition, the *Prābhākara* argues, * the previous knowledge of the relation borne by the 'subject' to the 'probans' is absolutely necessary; and so the inferential cognition must always pertain to things already known. Then the reason why inferential cognition does not appear with regard to each and every thing that we know is that there can be no cognition of any sort unless we wish it; and as in a case where all that we wish to know of a certain thing is already known by other and more simple means of knowledge,—there is no occasion for us to recall to our minds the various relations borne by the thing; and hence, the idea of the relation not being before the mind, no inferential cognition ensues.

The *Bhāttas*, however, who accept the necessary relation between the cognitions of *fire* and *smoke*, as above explained, along with the view that the character of *being a cognition of something not already known* is a necessary factor in *pramāṇa*, regard this explanation of *Prābhākara* as an uncalled for ignominious retreat. They argue that even though it is true that the *smoke* is *seen*,—and the perception of smoke carries with it the vague generic idea of *fire* as related to the *smoke*,—yet the final object of the ultimate inferential cognition is not one that is *already known*, inasmuch as the perception of *smoke* does not involve the cognition of the *presence of the fire in the mountain*; and it is this *qualified fire* (and not merely fire in general) that forms the object of inferential cognition. The *Bhāttas* lay stress upon this fact,—not with a view to lend support to the *Prābhākara*, but—because they regard it as a necessary element in all *pramāṇa*, that the object should be something not already known.

* *Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 76.

4. The very definition of Inferential Cognition serves to indicate all the more important of the 'Defective or Fallacious Probans.' (1) For instance, the condition that 'the relation between the two factors should be one that has been previously known' precludes the '*asādhāraṇa*' or Too Specific Probans; that is to say, *the character that belongs specifically to the 'subject' of the inference alone cannot form the basis of any valid inference; because such a character could not have been known anywhere else; and thus this character along with the 'subject' could never be known as related to any third object; and yet it is the relation with this third object or character that forms the essence of an inferential conclusion. E.g., the Earth is related to 'Odorousness' by such a peculiar relation that that relation cannot point to the Earth in relation to anything other than 'Odorousness.'* (2) Then again, the condition that 'there must be relation between the two factors' precludes the '*Bādhita*' or Annulled Probans; *e.g. when the eternality of word is sought to be established on the basis of its being an effect, we find that no positive relation is possible between the character of 'eternality' and that of 'being an effect', the two being entirely contradictory characters; for this reason the inference of 'eternality' in this case cannot be valid.* (3) The mention of the condition that 'the relation should be *permanent* or *unfailing*' precludes the '*Sādhāraṇa*' or 'Too Wide' Probans. *E.g., when the 'eternality' of the word is sought to be proved on the basis of its being cognisable, it is found that the relation between 'eternality' and 'cognisability' is not permanent, inasmuch as there are many things that are cognisable without being eternal; and thus this relation cannot lead to the valid inference of eternality.* (4) The condition that 'one factor of the relation (which is to be the probans) must be *perceived* in order to give rise to the inferential cognition precludes the '*Asiddha*' or Impossible, or Unknown Probans. *E.g., when the perceptibility of such*

Prabhā. 46.

things as *Dharma* and *Adharma* by the Buddha is sought to be proved by his 'omniscience',—it is found that, inasmuch as this 'omniscience' has never been *perceived*, it cannot lead to any valid inference. Apart from these principal '*hetvābhāsas*,' the *Prābhākara* does not accept any other. For instance, it has been held by the Logician and others that the Valid Inference must be one that has no counter-inference vitiating its validity; *e.g.*, when the *imperceptibility* of Air is sought to be inferred from its *colourlessness*, this is found to be opposed by an equally strong inference of the *perceptibility* of Air from its *tangibility*; and thus the validity of each of these inferences is found to be vitiated by the other; to such a fallacious inference, they give the name '*Satpratīpakṣa*.' This view the *Prābhākara* does not accept; for the reason that, it is not possible for two mutually contradictory characters —[which are held to be the *probans* in the two contradictory inferences]—to subsist in any one 'subject'; for instance, in the case cited, it is not possible for Air to be *colourless* and at the same time *tangible*; as what is *tangible* can ever be entirely devoid of colour; hence it is only one of the two inferences that is *real* inference; the other cannot be so. Really contradictory inferences are possible only in regard to substances whose real character is not known; and in such cases of course no inference is possible; and this for the simple reason that the requisite definite knowledge of the two factors of the 'relation' is not available.

5. The object of inferential cognition is of two kinds—(1) the *dṛiṣṭasvalakṣaṇa*, that which has had its specific character perceived, and (2) the *adṛiṣṭasvalakṣaṇa*, that which has its specific character not perceived. To the former class belong all such ordinary things as *fire* and the like; and to the latter such *super-sensuous* things as the *capacity* of things and the like. In the case of the latter, though the 'specific character' may not be actually known, yet it is possible for us to cognise its permanent relation with certain factors;

and, through that relation, to get at the inferential cognition ; for instance, even though we do not actually perceive the burning *capacity* of fire, yet we can infer its presence from seeing its effects, on the basis of the general relation subsisting between the effect and its cause.

6. As to what is the '*pramāṇa*' and what the '*result*' of inferential cognition, we have to accept what has been said with regard to Perception. That is to say, if we regard '*pramāṇa*' as synonymous with '*valid cognition*' (*pramiti*),—and hence '*Anumāna*' as synonymous with '*inferential cognition*' (*anumiti*),—then what is '*anumāna*' is the *cognition of fire* proceeding from the mind-soul contact as influenced by the perception of smoke ; and the '*result*' in this case would be the *acceptance or rejection* of the cognised thing by the agent. If however we explain '*pramāṇa*' as that *by means of which* valid cognition is obtained,—and hence '*Anumāna*' as that *by means of which* the valid inferential cognition is got at,—then, in that case, the '*Anumāna*' (*pramāṇa*) would be (1) the mind-soul contact ; and the apprehension of the relation between the factors of inference, as along with the perception of one of these factors, would form the '*procedure*' of the *cognitive (inferential) process* ; and the '*result*' in this case would be the *inferential cognition* itself. If however, the '*means*' or '*instrument*' be regarded as that which is the *most effective* (*sūdhakaṭama*) in the bringing about of the result, then the *perception of the probans* (smoke) would have to be regarded as the '*Anumāna*' (*pramāṇa*) ; as it is this that is most directly and immediately effective in bringing about the inferential cognition.

7. There are two kinds of Inference—(1) '*svārtha*', *for one's own sake*, and (2) '*parārtha*' *for the sake of another* ; in the former, the inferential cognition is deduced for one's own benefit, from the premises recalled to the mind ; and in the latter it is deduced for the benefit of another person, from premises presented to him.

8. As a rule, every inferential process consists of three factors, technically called '*avayavas*'; all these three are implied in the definition of Inferential Cognition given above. For instance,—(1) the condition that the cognition should be valid, 'not sublated', implies the *Pratijñā*, or 'Statement of the Conclusion'; (2) that there should be knowledge of the permanent relation implies the '*dṛṣṭānta*,' the *Major Premiss*, 'the statement of the corroborative instance'; and (3) that the *probans* should be perceived implies the *Minor Premiss*, or 'statement of the *probans*.' Some Logicians put forward *five* 'factors' for the inferential process,—adding to the above three two more in the shape of the reassertion of the premiss and conclusion; the *Bauddhas* accept only two, discarding the 'statement of the conclusion', which, they argue, is implied in the premisses themselves. Herein appears to be the original source of the stock objection against syllogistic reasoning,—that every syllogism involves a *petitio principii*. The *Bhāttas** accept the three adopted by Prabhākara.

(1) By the 'statement of the conclusion' is meant the pointing out of what is intended to be proved; for instance, the proposition 'Word is eternal'; it is only when this has been pointed out that we can ascertain the fact of the inferential cognition being *valid* or *not sublated*; the qualification 'not sublated' serves to reject all such propositions as are distinctly contrary to well-known facts of experience.

(2) The 'Statement of the corroborative instance' becomes necessary, as it has to be shown to the other party that there is a permanent relation between what is sought to be proved and that by means of which it is to be proved; and this relation must be shown to exist in a case that is well known to both parties; for instance, when it is intended to prove the presence of fire by the presence of smoke, the

* *Shāstradīpikā*, p. 44.

corroborative instance is cited thus—‘Wherever there is smoke there is fire, *as in the kitchen*’; instances that do not apply to the case in question are regarded as *wrong*—‘*ḍṛiṣṭāntābhāsa*’; and older writers have divided the ‘Wrong instance’ under four heads :—(a) that which is not applicable to what is sought to be proved; *e. g.*, the case of the ‘Airy castle’ cited to prove the fact of *word being produced by effort*, *i. e.*, non-eternal, where it is found that the ‘Airy castle’ itself is not ‘something produced by effort’; (b) that which does not apply to the *probans*; *e. g.*, the case of the ‘jar’ cited to corroborate the argument that ‘word is non-eternal, *because it is incorporeal*’,—where we find that the jar itself is not *incorporeal*; (c) that which is applicable neither to the *probans* nor to that which is sought to be proved; *e. g.*, the case of *ākāsha* cited in support of the argument that ‘word is non-eternal, because it is an effect’, where we find that the *ākāsha* is neither ‘non-eternal’ nor an ‘effect’; (d) that which fails to establish the desired relation; *e. g.*, if the instance of ‘kitchen’, in support of the presence of fire as proved by the presence of smoke, were cited only in the form ‘like the kitchen’, without recalling the relation between *fire* and *smoke*.

(3) Lastly, inasmuch as Inferential Cognition has been defined as that which follows on the perception of one of the two factors between which a permanent relation is known to subsist,—this perception of one factor becomes a necessary element in all inference; and upon the assertion; of this ‘the statement of the *probans*’ becomes necessary: for instance, when seeking to prove the presence of *fire* by the presence of *smoke*, it is necessary to assert the proposition ‘there is *smoke* in the mountain’; as without this the conclusion cannot be rightly deduced. The ‘wrong’ Minor Premiss is that where either what it asserts is not the factor bearing the permanent relation, or which fails to denote that factor.

9. There is a difference of opinion as to the exact order in which an inferential argument should state the two premises. The opinion of Prabhākara is that there need be no hard and fast rule as to this order; because the conclusion 'there is fire in the mountain' is established all the same, whether we state the argument in the form—'(a) there is smoke in the mountain', and '(b) wherever there is smoke there is fire, &c., &c.',—or in the form '(a) wherever there is smoke there is fire, &c., &c.' and '(b) there is smoke in the mountain.' It is this freedom as to the statement of the reasoning that does away with any necessity for the *Upanaya* and the *Nigamana*, the two additional propositions that make up the 'five *avayavas*' of the Logician.

10. Some writers hold that the purposes of the 'Corroborative instance' can be also served by the *Negative instance*, or an *instance to the contrary*; for instance, in corroboration of the argument,-- 'there is fire because there is smoke,'—we can put forward the statement 'wherever there is no fire there is no smoke.' This view is not accepted by the *Prābhākara*; because, he argues, as a matter of fact, the *probans* can prove the conclusion only by force of its relation to that which is sought to be proved; and this relation can be asserted only by means of a *positive instance*, and not by a *negative* one; even though in some cases, the negative instance also may serve to point out the necessary relation,—yet it can do so only indirectly, the process thereby becoming more involved than if the instance were stated in its positive form; hence in all cases, it is the *positive instance* that should be put forward. The *Bhātta** also rejects the utility of the *negative instance*.

11. The discrepancies pertaining to the 'Subject' of the inference (*pakṣa*) are of two kinds:—(a) that it is contrary to well-known facts of experience, and (b) that it

* *Shāstrāḍīpikā*, p. 48.

has a qualification that is absolutely unknown. Those pertaining to the *probans* have been explained above (§4); and so also those pertaining to the 'instance' (§6). Those pertaining to the 'Statement of the Conclusion' are—(a) *inexpressiveness* or indefiniteness, obscurity, and (b) Non-assertion. The 'renouncing of the conclusion' (*pratijñāhāni*) does not come in here; inasmuch as one renounces his position only when he finds it assailed by insurmountable difficulties; and this is always due to some discrepancy in the main reasoning, and not only in the 'statement of the conclusion.'

SECTION (2)—*Sub-section (3).*

SHĀSTRĀ—*Scriptural or Verbal Cognition.*

1. The *Shāshṭra*—*Scriptural, or Verbal Cognition*—has been defined as the cognition of something not before the eyes, produced by the knowledge of words; Verbal Cognition thus is that cognition of things imperceptible—*i. e.*, not cognised by other means of cognition,—which proceeds from the Mind-Soul contact aided by the knowledge of sounds. The 'sound' meant here is that in the form of *letters*, these alone being perceptible by the ear, and the name 'sound' being applicable to only what is perceived by the Ear. From this it would seem that, according to Prabhākara, all sounds heard are in the shape of some *letter* or the other,—there being no such thing as mere '*dhvani*' or indistinct sound. Nor can the 'word' be regarded as something different from the letters composing it,—as might appear from the fact that '*na-dī*' and '*dī-na*', though containing the same letters, are yet not perceived by the Ear as the same word. As a matter of fact, in the case of such words also, it is only the *letters* that are perceived by the Ear, the difference of the word lying only in the order in which the letters are pronounced and apprehended. Nor does the perception of the word '*dī-na*' contain a single act of perception; in fact it involves two distinct perceptions,—one of the '*dī*' and

another of 'na'; so that there is a difference in the order of the perceptions of the component letters of the words also; there are as many perceptions as there are letters in the word; and the idea that the perception is one only is due to the close proximity of the two perceptions. The idea of the 'word' however must be regarded as *one* only; is it is found to admit of the denotation of a single thing.

The comprehension of this denotation or meaning of the word is not obtained through the sense-organs, because the organs perceive only the *letters*, which may be the same in more than word; and hence there can be no *sensuous* perception of *many* words; from this it follows that it is in the same letters themselves that there is a certain potency which brings about the apprehension of the thing denoted by the word composed of those letters. It is for this reason that Prabhakara* has held the *letters* to be the *means of verbal cognition*.

The perception of each letter vanishes as soon as it appears; hence it is held that every verbal cognition leaves an impression, which helps in the cognition of the next letter in the word; and so on, the impressions left by these letter-cognitions combine with that left by the cognition of the last letter in the word, and thus bring about the idea of the *whole word* which expresses the denotation. Each word has thus to be regarded as having the potency of bringing about the comprehension of a certain meaning. In a case where, even on the due hearing of all the letters of the word, no meaning is comprehended, it has to be admitted that some necessary auxiliaries are wanting. For these reasons the conclusion is that it is the *letter* that is the direct cause of verbal cognition; and neither Perception nor Inference can give us any idea of the *word* as apart from its constituent *letters*.

* *Prakaranapāñchikā*, pp. 87, *et. seq.*

This view of the *word* is also accepted by the *Bhāṭṭa*, according to whom—

‘The *word* is nothing apart from the letters’; and,—
‘just as the various subsidiary actions of an elaborate sacrifice combine to bring about the final result; so the various letters composing the word combine to accomplish the denotation of the meaning.’ (*Shāshṭraḍṛipikā*, pp. 70—71); and again—

‘The order of sequence belongs, not to the *letters*, but to the *sounds*; and through these latter, it is imposed upon the *letters* that are manifested by the sounds; hence it is *letters* alone that can be held to be *expressive*.’ (*Ibid.* p. 73.)

2. The next question that arises is—what is meant by the ‘*artha*’, ‘meaning’ or ‘denotation’ of a word? The ‘*artha*’ of the word is that which is *denoted* or *expressed* by it, and ‘that which is denoted by the word’ is that to which it bears a relation independent of, and not related or established by, any human agency—this relation being that of the *denoter* and *denoted*, *i. e.*, the *denotative relation*. Even though we do not comprehend the ‘meaning’ of the word when we hear it for the first time, yet it cannot be denied that the denotative potency of the word is something that belongs to it by its very nature. When we are listening to a conversation between two elderly persons, and fail to comprehend the ‘meanings’ of words used by them, there arises an uncertainty in our minds as to whether or not the words are expressive of any ‘meanings’ at all; we proceed to reason in our minds that if the words were entirely *inexpressive* they could not convey sense to the person to whom they are addressed; while from his behaviour it is clear that he does derive the idea of something out of the words, and yet if the words are really expressive, how is it that they do not convey any meaning to ourselves? The only explanation for this apparent anomaly must lie in the fact that in the person to whom the words

are addressed there is something, some peculiar power, which is wanting in ourselves; this power must be in the shape of the knowledge of what is denoted by the word,—it is such power alone whose presence in the man is indicated by his behaviour; we can have no idea of the man having the knowledge of any *sañketa* or 'Convention' bearing upon the denotativeness of the word (*i. e.* some such conventional law as that 'this word denotes this meaning,' upon which some philosophers base the denotativeness of words); until we are ourselves cognisant of the meaning of the word we cannot form any idea of any such law bearing upon it; as the knowledge of the law—'this word denotes *this meaning*'—presupposes the knowledge of the meaning. From this it follows that the only power present in the person comprehending the meaning of a word consists in his knowledge of the fact that the word is expressive of such a meaning; and this proves that the expressiveness of the word is something that belongs to it by its very nature. As this is sufficient to explain the phenomena of all verbal cognition and usage, there is no reason for attributing the expressiveness of words to any 'conventional law' or '*sañketa*.' In the case of some words—*e. g.*, *proper* names—however, the presence of such a 'convention,'—as that 'this name points to that man'—is quite patent; and is therefore admitted by Prabhākara. But in the case of such *common* words as 'cow', 'jar', 'man,' and the like, there is no justification for the postulating of any 'conventional law'; consequently the relation of all such words to their meanings must be held to be independent of all human agency.

3. The *Mīmāṃsaka** lays great stress upon the denotativeness of words being independent of human agency, and belonging to the words by their very nature; because if it were not so, the *validity* of the *word* and the verbal cognition would be, not something inherent in the word itself, but

* Praka-pañch., p. 133, *et seq.*

due to the trustworthy character of the person pronouncing the word; and thus, as the *Mīmāṃsaka* denies any personal agency in connection with the composition of the Veda, there would, *ipso facto*, be no validity in the Veda itself. Nor can the *Mīmāṃsaka* accept the Logician's point of view, by which the denotativeness of words is created and fixed by 'conventions' among people who introduce, and make use of, the words for the first time,—according to the Logician created by God Himself. This view necessitates the postulating of a 'God' as the originator of *all* words,—and hence also of the Veda; and this militates against the *Mīmāṃsā* doctrine of the *self-sufficiency* of the Veda, which must be independent of all personal agency. In fact, if the denotativeness of words depended solely upon any 'Convention', the Veda would be reduced to the position of a meaningless jumble of words; because according to the *Mīmāṃsaka*, the pre-eminent function of the Veda lies in the enjoining of certain acts as accomplishing an *apūrva*,—an invisible subtle potency,—leading to a desirable result; and as this *apūrva* is something of which no 'person' could ever have any knowledge, independently of the Veda, how could the denotativeness of those words of the Veda be fixed by any 'Convention'? And as thus no 'Convention' would be found applying to these words, these would, by the *Nyāya* view, have to be regarded as absolutely meaningless. If a Creator, God, were admitted, then, as this God, being omniscient, would be possessed of the direct knowledge of the *Apūrva*, he would be in a position to lay down 'Conventions' with regard to the denotativeness of the word denoting the *apūrva*. But the *Mīmāṃsaka* does not admit of such a God; hence for the sake of the Veda, his all in all, he finds it necessary to stick to the view that all words and their denotations are eternal, everlasting, independent of all 'conventions' and 'agencies.'

4. As regards the eternality of the denotativeness of words, it is argued that, in the case of *Proper* names, we can infer the fact of their denotations having been fixed by 'convention'; but no such inferential basis is available in the case of *Common* names. Those who hold 'Convention' to be the basis of all denotation infer the existence of 'Convention', in the case of each and every word, from the fact of its being found to be possessed of a certain denotation,—which, they argue, would not be possible unless there were some basic 'convention'; they formulate their inference thus:—'All words have their denotation fixed by *convention*,—because they are *denotative*,—like the proper names *Devadatta* and the like.' In controverting this, the *Mīmāṃsaka* argues that in the case of Proper names, we actually find that the thing or person to whom the name is applied has had a beginning in time; and we also know that the name must have been given by some person after that thing came into existence; and thus in the case of these names we admit the 'convention' as assigned by the person giving the name; specially as in this case there is no other explanation available for the fact of the word being denotative; in the case of Common names, on the other hand, their denotativeness can be accounted for otherwise than on the basis of such a 'Convention'; and so we have no grounds for assuming this latter. It is a well-known fact that we comprehend the meaning of a word because we know its denotative potency; and thus the knowledge of this potency being the direct *perceptible* cause of our comprehension, there can be no justification for the assumption of an *imperceptible* cause in the shape of 'Convention.' Then again, this denotative potency of the word could not have had a beginning in time; it must be regarded as eternal, being cœval and co-eternal with the word itself; the word itself could not have had a beginning in time; as the thing it denotes has had no such beginning; for the simple reason that the world itself has had no beginning, according to the

Mīmāṃsaka; ever since the world has existed, and man has existed, he must have talked of things by their names; and thus the words and the things denoted by them being without beginning, eternal, the relation subsisting between the two must also be eternal. That all men have, from time immemorial, applied the same names to the same things is proved by the following reasoning:—It has already been shown above that, as young men, we come to be acquainted with the meanings of words by observing the conversation and behaviour of older persons; and by analogy we infer that those older people also must have derived their knowledge from like sources; and so on and on, carrying the analogy backwards, we are led to the conclusion that the process must have gone on ever since the things spoken of have been in existence; and as these had no beginning in time, it follows that the words, their denotative potency, and the relation between the two could have had no beginning in time.

5. Having established the eternality of the denotativeness of words, we now proceed to prove the eternality of the words, or names of things. It has also been pointed out that we comprehend the meaning of words by observing their use among experienced people on various occasions. If then, at each time that the old man speaks of a thing, he were to create a new name for it for the occasion, which name would again disappear as soon as it was uttered,—necessary corollaries of the view that the word is not eternal,—then, what basis would the younger man have for observing the use of the word and thereby ascertaining its meaning? As each time that the thing is spoken of he would be face to face with a brand-new word, never heard before; and as such the meaning of the word would remain ever uncomprehended and incomprehensible; and until the word affords some Cognition, it cannot be regarded as '*pramāṇa*.' Consequently unless the Logician be prepared to deny the character of '*pramāṇa*' to words, he must accept them to be eternal. Then there

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remains the question,—‘If the word is eternal, why is it not *always* present in our consciousness?’ The answer to this is that, though the word is ever present, yet, in order that it may be cognised by us, it stands in need of a certain auxilliary agency that manifests it, or makes it cognisable, or presents it to our consciousness. This manifestive agency consists of the effort put forth by the man who pronounces the word. The Logician regards this effort as the *cause* of the word, bringing it into existence; but Prabhākara regards it as a force or agency that serves to manifest to our perception the word that is already in existence. And as these efforts may be many, there need be no incongruity in the same word being pronounced, and heard, by several people; wherever the manifestive agency is present, the word will be heard; if there are many men putting forth an effort for pronouncing a word, it is only natural that there should be many manifestations of the word in consciousness; that it is the same word that is cognised in each of these cases is proved by our direct cognition of all of them as one and the same; and this is another reason for regarding the word as eternal. The effort put forth by the speaker is not, in itself, sufficient to account for the cognition of the word; as in that case we could not account for the non-hearing of the word by the deaf; in fact the effort tends to manifest the word only through certain effects that it produces in the auditory organ of the person standing by. The several steps in the physiological process of speech are thus explained:— 1) The speaker puts forth an effort; (2) this effort brings the soul into contact with the air enclosed in his lungs; (3) in obedience to the impulse imparted by this effort the air rises upwards; (4) in its upward progress it comes into contact with the vocal chords lying about the various regions of the body; (5) these contacts change the character of the air to a certain extent; (6) on issuing from

the mouth, the air passes onwards, and reaches the ear of the persons standing near enough to be reached by the air; the extent of whose reach depends upon the greater or less degree of the initial effort of the speaker; (7) on reaching the ear, it produces in it a certain change that is conducive to its power of making the sound audible. Thus then it is this power or faculty of the ear that is the direct agent manifesting the word to the consciousness of the person to whom the ear belongs. As the air is endowed with a certain velocity, it keeps moving onwards; and when it has passed out of the ear, the sound passes out, and the audition ceases, the person hears the sound no longer. All this process of speech and audition is acknowledged by the Logician also; the only difference lies in this that what Prabhākara regards as a mere *manifesting agency*, the Logician regards as the *Cause*. The next question that arises is—‘what is the change produced in the auditory organ which makes it capable of manifesting sound?’ The ear cannot be made capable of manifesting sound by the removal of any layer of air obstructing the manifestation,—for the simple reason that Air cannot obstruct sound; what occurs is that the Air-waves issuing from the mouth of the speaker, in striking the fixed layer of air enclosed in the receiving ear, produces in this latter a peculiar imperceptible change, whereby it is rendered capable of manifesting the sound. The *Mīmāṃsākū* postulates the presence, in the ear-cavity, of the fixed layer of air, for the purpose of affording a screen of resistance to the sound-waves; against which screen, these waves would strike, and thereby effect the change in the auditory organ; it is a well-recognised fact that Air cannot produce any effects unless it meets with a certain degree of resistance. Another objection generally brought against the above view of the physiology of audition is that, the ear being of *ākāśa* which is one and indivisible, if there were any material change in any one ear, the change ought to

affect *all* ears, and so the sound heard by one person would be heard by all persons. The answer that the *Prābhākara* has to this is this:—Even though *Ākāsha* is one, yet the ear-drum is distinct in each person,—each one being limited in its power and scope by the virtue and vice of the person to whom it belongs; then again, the change produced in the sound-waves is not in the *ākāsha* of the ear, but in the air enclosed in the ear-drum; and as this latter differs in each person, all men need not hear the sound heard by one.

As a matter of fact, we observe that when the sound-waves travel with the wind, the sound is heard at a greater distance than when it travels against the wind; this phenomenon could not be explained under the hypothesis that each sound goes on producing a fresh sound at each step of its progress towards any definite direction; as if this were so, the direction or force of the wind could not have any effect one way or the other.

6. Each time that we hear a letter or word pronounced, we at once recognise it to be the same, and not as different in each case. Even though the word may be pronounced in varying degrees of loudness, &c., yet all the difference that we are cognisant of is in the tone or pitch of the sound, and not in the word itself, which latter is always recognised to be the same. For these reasons, the conclusion is that the *word* has no cause bringing it into existence; and thus it has the same eternality that belongs to *Ākāsha* and such other things.

7. We have seen that, according to *Prabhākara*, people learn the meanings of words only by watching the usage and activity of older persons; when a set of words is addressed by one person to another, whereupon the latter person acts in a certain manner, it is clear that the meaning of the words pronounced must have been in the form of an

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injunction to do what the other person has done. In the case of words where such an interpretation is not possible, the comprehension of the meaning must depend upon something indirectly connected with the injunction. This is the reason why in the definition of *Verbal Cognition* we have it that the object cognised must be one that has not been cognised by any other means of knowledge; this can be always so only in the case of injunctive words. All words ending in the Imperative or a similar termination express the injunction directly; while other words denote things related to the injunction,—such things, for instance, as the name of the *act* enjoined, the *person* enjoined and so on. This leads to the view that the whole direct denotation of the Veda must lie in the enjoining of something *to be done*. This leads to the controverting of the view held by the Vedāntin, that the direct denotation of all the more important Vedic texts lies, not in the enjoining of something *to be done*, but in the pointing out of certain *well-accomplished things*, e.g., Brahman. In opposition to this Vedānta view, it has been held that, though such may be the case with a few words, yet the comprehension of the denotation of those words also could not but be obtained by observing their use by older persons; and this use also must always lie in the form of an injunction addressed by one person to another for the *doing of a certain act*; thus ultimately the denotation of *all* words must lie, either directly or indirectly, with something *to be done*. Those Vedānta texts that speak of *Brahman* must be regarded as speaking of Brahman as something on which one is *enjoined to meditate and know*, in order to escape from the meshes of metempsychosis.

8. Inasmuch as the meanings of words can be known only when they occur in an injunctive sentence, it follows that the words must denote things only as related to the other factors of the injunction; and no word can be comprehended as having any denotation when taken apart from such

sentence. This is the theory known as the *Anvīṭābhīdhānavāda*; and it is the main distinctive feature of the *Prābhākara* School of Thought bearing upon Verbal Cognition; and it has the tacit support of Shabara (see pp. 32-35 and 132). It is on this point too that it is directly opposed to the sister school of the *Bhātta*; it is here that the two schools stand out pre-eminently as the champions of two distinct theories bearing upon Verbal Cognition,—the two theories known under the names of *Anvīṭābhīdhāna* (of Prabhākara) and *Abhihiṭānvaya* (of Kumārila). According to the latter,—

‘ Words themselves can express their separate meanings by the function *Abhidhā* or *denotation*; these are subsequently (combined) into a sentence expressing one connected idea. The former, called the *Anvīṭābhīdhānavādinah*, hold that words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence, and as grammatically connected with each other; they only express an action or something connected with an action; in (*gāmānaya*) (*bring the cow*) *gām*—does not properly mean *gotva*, but *ānayananānvīṭa gotva*—i.e., the *bovine genus as connected with bringing*; we cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb, and *vice versa*.’ (*Sarvadarshana-saṅgraha*, Cowell, Note, p. 202).

9. According to Prabhākara, we can have a truly valid *verbal cognition* only in the case of words and sentences of the Veda; this is clear from the very name ‘*Shāstra*’ that he has given to this *pramāṇa*. As a necessary corollary to this it is held that, apart from the words found in the Scriptures, no words can afford any cognition of things not already known by other means of knowledge; all words used in ordinary parlance are mostly only such that denote things that can be cognised by Perception and Inference also; and those things that can not be cognised by these latter means can be *rightly* cognised only when described in words of unquestionable authority and trustworthy character. From this it follows that cognitions provided

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by words other than these,—and all non-Vedic words belong to this category—can have no inherent validity in themselves.

This theory becomes divested of much of its apparent absurdity when we realise the fact that, inasmuch as it is the Scriptural word alone that is inherently authoritative and trustworthy, no other words can be accepted as affording *invariably* valid cognitions; specially when it is found that in ordinary parlance, most cognitions afforded by the words of ordinary people turn out to be invalid and untrustworthy; hence, at best, cognitions derived from non-scriptural words must be regarded to be of the same kind as ‘Remembrance’, and hence of doubtful validity; and as cognitions of doubtful validity cannot be called Cognition, which, by its very nature, is *valid*, Non-scriptural words cannot by themselves afford any *cognition*, in the proper sense of the term; they are mere *describers* or *translators* or *refectors* of what is in the mind of the person uttering those words; the validity whereof can be ascertained only by other means of knowledge; it is in reference to such non-scriptural words that we have the saying—

‘*Paḍamapyadhikābhāvāt smarakūna vishiṣyate*’

(‘The word is not different from that which affords remembrance, as it is in no way more than this’).

This cannot be said with regard to the words of the Veda; as in the case of the *non-Vedic* word, its invalidity, or doubtful validity, is based upon the generally untrustworthy character of the speaker, due to many such causes as wrong understanding, incapability of using the right words, and so on; in the case of the words of the Veda, on the other hand, as they do not emanate from a ‘person’, there is no source to which the *falsity* of the assertions might be due. In the case of the assertions of ordinary people, even when we find the words affording a reasonably connected meaning, we have always a lurking

suspicion lest there be some defect in the source from which the speaker has derived the information that he seeks to convey by means of those words ; and for this reason we can not be sure of the validity of the cognition afforded by such words, which, for this reason, cannot be regarded as ‘means of right cognition.’ Even in cases where the ordinary words do afford valid cognitions, it is not the *words* that bring about the valid cognition directly ; as what occurs is that on hearing the words, we find that they convey a certain information ; and then we proceed to *reason* that the speaker is a trustworthy person, as not one of the grounds of untrustworthiness is found present in the case ; consequently what he says must be true ; so the information conveyed by his words must be true. Thus in this case the words are not the *direct* cause of the valid cognition ; they only indirectly indicate the presence of the cognition in the mind of the speaker ; so in this case, for the hearer, the words cannot be ‘*pramāṇa*’ ; at any rate not independently of the Inference that is involved in the process whereby the word indicates to the hearer the presence of the Cognition in the speaker’s mind ; all such cases involve a clear inferential process ; such, for instance, as—‘this speaker has a particular Cognition in his mind, because he has pronounced these words.’ Says the *Prakaraṇapāñchikā* (pp. 15—16),—

‘It is only the Veda that can be called *Shabḍapramāṇā*, ; and that also only when containing an *injunction* ; ordinary words cannot be so ; because the cognitions afforded by them are purely *inferential* ; when we hear a man saying something, our mind goes through the following reasoning—‘This man speaks of such a thing,—this he must be speaking of after having known what he speaks of,—so what he says must be true ;’ the *speech* of the man is an effect of his *knowledge* ; and hence from the *effect* we *infer* the *cause*. Thus all ordinary verbal cognition is *inferential* ; that afforded by the Veda alone is purely *verbal*. It is true that all words are

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endowed with an inherent denotative potency; but in the case of ordinary speakers of the world, this potency of the word is *obscured* by suspicions with regard to the trustworthy character of the persons; in the case of the words of the Veda, there being no *speaker*, and hence no grounds of suspicion, the potency remains unobscured.'

It is for this reason that Kaṇāda * regarding the Veda as the work of a personal author, has declared that 'Verbal Cognition' is nothing apart from *Inferential Cognition*, as all personal words afford only Inferential Cognitions, and there is no such thing as purely *verbal* cognition. From this it is clear that '*Shabḍa*' as a distinct '*pramāṇa*' can be acknowledged only by those who regard the Veda as eternal, and not the work of a personal author.

10. That the Veda is not the work of a personal author is proved by the fact that all words and things denoted by them being eternal (as shown above), and there being no other means (save the Veda) available for the knowledge of Dharma,—including, as it does, such super-sensuous things as the *Apūrva* and the like,—the Veda itself, being only a collection of words speaking of such things, must be eternal, and as such independent of all authorship.

11. The above theory of *Verbal Cognition*, which restricts it to the cognition afforded by Vedic injunctions only, is not accepted by the *Bhātta*, † who, at the very outset divides the '*Shabḍa Pramāṇa*' into *pauruṣeya* 'or human and '*apauruṣeya* ' or *super-human*, the latter including Vedic sentences, and the former all utterances by such human beings as are trustworthy; both of these cognitions—*human* as well as *superhuman*—are regarded by him as *valid*; because the only ground of invalidity in a word lies in the fact of its emanating from an untrustworthy source; and this

* *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, I-i-3; II. 2-32; VI-i-1; IX-2-3; X-2-9.

† See *Shāstradīpika*, p. 51.

ground is as absent in the case of the utterances of trustworthy persons as in that of Vedic declarations.

12. Just as in the case of the other *pramaṇas*, so here also, if we regard the word '*Shāstra*' as an Accusative Abstract Noun, *shisyate yaṭ taṭ*—equivalent be '*Shiṣṭi*'—then it is synonymous with '*Verbal or Scriptural cognition*'; if however it be taken as an Instrumental Abstract Noun,— '*shisyāṭe anena*,'—then it is synonymous with the word *affording verbal cognition*.

13. 'Words,'—or what is the same, according to Prabhākara, 'Scriptural texts',—are divided into two classes,—(a) one that is actually found in the Veda, and (b) that the presence whereof in the Veda has to be inferred. To the latter class belong all those texts that are inferred as supplying the basis for the injunctions of actions found in the *Smṛitis*, whose sole claim to authority rests on the fact that they contain no injunctions save what are vouched for by Vedic texts. It may be observed here, as the *Prakarṇa-pañchikā* (p. 101) remarks, that the '*Shāstra*' or Vedic injunction often stands in need of some factors being supplied from without; *e. g.*, the text, that speaks of a certain action merely as accomplishing certain desirable results, stands in need of some such injunctive words as that 'this action should be performed,' which have to be supplied. Similarly it also stands in need of certain well-ascertained facts of ordinary experience; *e. g.*, for ascertaining the true signification of the injunction '*udbhiḍā yajeta*,' it is necessary to have recourse to ordinary experience; the word '*udbhiḍ*' primarily means a tree; so the sentence might well be taken to mean that 'one should sacrifice *with the tree*;' but here our ordinary experience steps in and shows that such sacrifice would be an impossibility; and it is only on account of this impossibility that we are led to take the word '*udbhiḍ*' here as the name of a sacrifice,—which is the correct interpretation.*

* Vide *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, I-IV-2.

Then as regards the question as to how a number of words can be regarded as a *single* 'Shāstra' or *text*,—the answer is that just as we regard a number of letters as *one word* on the ground of their denoting one definite thing,—so in the same manner, we regard a number of words as a *single sentence or text* on the ground of their expressing one definite complete idea*; or properly speaking, we have to regard as a single sentence those words which together go to speak of any one *action*; as it is the *action* that forms the main factor in the denotation of all Injunction.

SECTION (2)—SUB-SECTION (4).

Upamāna—ANALOGY.

1. *Upamāna* or Analogical Cognition is the cognition of *similarity* as subsisting in an object not in contact with the sense-organs, brought about by the perception of similarity in some other object which is perceived by the senses. For instance, when a man who has seen a monkey happens to see the ourang-outang, he *sees* the latter as being *similar* to the former, and then comes to cognise the similarity of the *monkey* to the *ourang-outang*; the similarity of the ourang-outang is *seen*; and from that follows the cognition of the similarity of the monkey; and it is this latter cognition that is 'analogical.'

The *Bhāttas*† are in agreement with Prabhākara on this point. According to them also,—

'When we see a certain object, and remember another object, the cognition that we have of the *remembered* object as being similar to the *seen* object is *analogical*; for instance, the notion—*the cow that I had seen in the city is similar to this garaya that I see now*—is analogical.'

But unlike the *Prābhākara*, the *Bhāttas* does not regard 'similarity' as a distinct category; as according to them

* *Īd.*, II-1-16.

† *Skāṣṭradīpikā*, p. 52.

it is only a *quality* consisting in the fact of more than one object having the same set of qualities.

2. Analogical Cognition is distinct from *Perception*; as it is the cognition of something not in contact with the senses; for instance, the monkey is not actually seen at the time that we have the cognition of its similarity to the ourang-outang. Nor is it mere *Remembrance*; as at the time that the monkey was *seen*, the ourang-outang had not been seen, and hence at that time the *Similarity* could not have been *seen*; and what has not been *seen* cannot be *remembered*. Nor lastly, can it be regarded as *Inference*; as none of the factors essential for Inference are found to be present in the case cited.

3. Some philosophers have defined *Upamāna* as pertaining to the similarity of something unknown with what is known. This definition cannot be accepted; because according to this definition, the resultant analogical cognition would be in the form 'this animal is the ourang-outang';—this cognition coming to the man who, going to the forest, sees the ourang-outang, and remembers the words of a forester to the effect that 'the ourang-outang is like the monkey;' such a cognition could not be valid; (1) because the words 'the ourang-outang is like the monkey,' as emanating from a human source, could not be absolutely trustworthy; and as such could not form the basis of any valid cognition; —(2) the cognition of the ourang-outang, and that of the similarity of that animal to the monkey, can not be regarded as 'analogical;' as this is Perception pure and simple; —(3) the cognition that 'this animal that I see is what is denoted by the word *ourang-outang*' is also merely *inferential*; as the word is not pronounced at that time, having been told to the man at some previous time. Thus then, by this definition, there would be nothing left that could form the subject of any such cognition as 'analogical.'

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SECTION (2)—SUB-SECTION (5).

Arthapatti—PRESUMPTION.

1. In a case where the well-ascertained perception of a thing or things (*artha*) cannot be explained or reconciled without the presumption of another thing or things, then it is this *presumption* that constitutes *Arthapatti*. For instance, when we know that Devadatta is alive, and perceive that he is not in the house, these two ‘things’—*being alive* and *non-existence* in the house cannot be reconciled unless we *presume* his existence somewhere outside the house; and the presumption of this external existence is what is called ‘*Arthapatti*.’

The principal point on which this differs from Inference is that, in the case of the latter, no kind of *doubt* enters as a necessary factor; while in Presumption it is necessary that there should be a doubt as to the validity of the two irreconcilable facts of perception. Thus the source of Presumption lies in the *perceived thing*, which, in the absence of something else, remains *inconsistent*, and hence *doubtful*; and for the sake of removing this element of doubt with regard to itself, it leads to the *presumption* of that other thing;—in the case of Inference, on the other hand, the *probans*,—which forms the real source,—is not beset with any doubt; in fact no inference from it would be possible if its validity were at all uncertain. Thus in the case of Presumption, the source or origin is doubtful; while in that of Inference, it must be absolutely free from all invalidating circumstances. For instance, it is only when the smoke is perceived to exist, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that it leads to the inference of fire; while in the case of Presumption, the perceived non-existence in the house leads to the presumption of external existence, only when it has thrown itself, and also the other known fact of the man’s being alive, into uncertainty.

This view of Presumption is not accepted by the *Bhātta*, who argues that in the case of the example cited, if the fact of the man being alive were at all *doubtful*, it could not afford a sound basis for the requisite Presumption; it is only when the fact of his being alive is *known for certain*, that it can warrant the presumption of the man having gone out. Then again, this doubt, if there were any, as to whether the man is alive or not, would be set aside, not by the cognition of his *being outside*, but only by the *certainty* of his *being alive*.* According to the *Bhātta*, the basis of Presumption lies, not in a Doubt, but in the mutual *irreconcilability* or *inconsistency* between two *well-ascertained* things; which inconsistency is removed by the presumption of a third thing, which presumption constitutes ‘*Arūhāpaṭṭi*’.+ There is no such inconsistency between well-ascertained things in the case of Inference; and it is in this, according to the *Bhātṭa*, that lies the difference between Presumption and Inference.

2. In the other well-known instance of Presumption,—where the fact of Devaḍaṭṭa eating at night is presumed on the ground of his being fat and yet not eating during the day,—some people have held that what is *presumed* in this case is the assertion ‘he eats at night’; but this is not right; as what effects a reconciliation between the two facts of the man being fat and that of his not eating in the day, is only the *fact* of his eating at night, and not the mere *assertion* of his doing so.

SECTION (2)—Sub-section (6).

Other So-called Pramāṇas.

1. The above five are the only *pramāṇas* accepted by Prabhākara. Over and above these five some philosophers have postulated three more,—(a) *Abhāva* or Non-apprehension (b)

* *Shāstradīpikā*, pp. 53—54.

† *Ibid.* p. 55.

Sambhava or Probability, and (c) *Aitihya* or Rumour. These Prabhākara rejects, on the following grounds:—

2. (a) The *Bhūttas** posit Non-apprehension as a distinct *pramāṇa*, and they argue as follows;—In the case of the conception ‘there is no jar in this place,’ what is cognised is the *absence of the jar*; this absence cannot be cognised by Perception, which stands in need of positive sense-contact, which is not possible in the case; nor can it be cognised by Inference or any other of the above-mentioned *pramāṇas*; what then affords the cognition of the *absence* is only the non-operation of any of the aforesaid *pramāṇas*; and thus this *Non-operation* would be the *means* whereby we obtain the valid cognition of absence; this means of right cognition is thus quite independent of the five described before; and it is to this that the name ‘Non-apprehension’ is given.

In controverting the above, the *Prābhākara* advances the following arguments:—All cognitions of things are of two kinds,—in one kind we cognise the thing as along with something else, and in another we cognise the thing alone by itself; and in this case this latter cognition is apprehended in terms of things that are not there, and which, if present, would have been cognised. In all cases where *absence* is cognised, what we have is only the non-perception of some thing that would have been perceived, if present; hence the *negative* cognition can be nothing more than the cognition of the one thing in terms of those other things which are not perceived, and which, if present, would have been perceived. Thus in the case of the conception ‘the jar is not in this place,’ all that this means is that—‘even though the jar would have been quite perceptible, if it were present, what we perceive is the *place* only’; and this is an ordinary *positive* cognition, pure Perception in this case. In this manner it can be shown that there is nothing that could be

* *Shloka-vārtika*—‘Abhāva,’ Shl. 18 *et seq*; and also *Shāstrāḍīpikā*, pp. 60-65.

cognised by means of *Non-apprehension*, which, therefore, cannot be regarded as a '*pramāṇa*.'

3. (b) As regards *Probability*, people who accept it as a distinct *pramāṇa* cite as an example the cognition that we have of the lesser number (*f. i., ten*) in the larger number (*twenty*). According to Prabhākara, and also according to the *Bhātta*,* this is only a case of *Inference*; the larger number bears an invariable relation to the lesser number, and hence the presence of the former implies that of the latter.

4. (c) Lastly, as regards *Rumour*, this can never be accepted as a *means of valid cognition*, because the source of information not being known, it could not be ascertained whether or not it is trustworthy; hence there can be no certainty as to the validity of the resultant cognition. The *Bhātta*† agrees with Prabhākara in rejecting *Rumour* as a *pramāṇa*.

SECTION (3)—*Sub-section (1)*.

Ātman—SELF.

1. It becomes necessary for the *Mīmāṃsaka* to prove the existence of the Self or Soul as apart from the body; as without some such permanent entity ensouling the body, there would be no sense in those Vedic texts that speak of the performer of a certain action going to heaven, and so forth. With regard to the real character of this entity however there are various differences of opinion among philosophers:—(a) It has been variously regarded as identical with the body, the sense-organs, and *Buddhi*;—(b) some have held it to be *perceptible* by the mind; others as cognisable by *Inference* only; and others as self-illuminated; while others regard it as being the element of *chit* or consciousness appearing in all cognitions;—(c) it has been regarded as transient by some, and by others as eternal; (d) some people have held it to be atomic in size; others as of the size of the body; others

* *Shāstradīpikā*, p. 65.

† *Shāstradīpikā*, p. 65.

again as all-pervading, omnipresent ; -- (e) according to some it is one only, in all things ; while according to others it is many, one with each body.

2. According to Prabhākara,—(a) the Soul is something entirely distinct from the body, the sense-organs and Buddhi; (b) it becomes manifest in all cognitions; (c) it is eternal, (d) omnipresent, and (e) many, one in each body.

(a) That the *cogniser* is something entirely different from *Buddhi* is proved by the fact, among others, that Buddhi is absent during sleep; and yet during sleep there are cognitions. Then again, the mere fact of Buddhi being always concomitant with the Soul—even if true—could not establish the absolute identity of the two. The sense-organs cannot be regarded as the Soul; because we often perceive a single object by more than one organ;—‘I am touching with the hand the same thing that I am seeing with the eye;’ and this fact shows that the factor of ‘I’ which is present in both perceptions cannot be either the hand or the eye, each of which is present in one cognition only. Then again, we find that the blind man remembers the things that he had seen before he became blind; which shows that visual memory persists after the visual organ is gone; if the organ were the ‘seer’, then, with the eye, the *perceiver* having gone, the remembrance of what it had seen would not be possible. Lastly, as regards the Body we find by its very nature, that it can never be the *cogniser*. Because, in the first place the Body is of the earth; and Cognition is a ‘specific’ quality; [as is proved by the facts that, (1) while subsisting in substances, it does not, by itself, bring about the conjunction or disjunction of substances, which fact proves that it is a quality;—and (2) that it is never found apart from bodied or corporeal beings]; and it is a rule with all ‘specific’ qualities that, in order to be present in any product, it should abide in the constituents of that product; but in the case of the Body, we find, as a matter

of fact, that Cognition or Consciousness is not present in earth-particles,—as we learn from the fact that there is no cognition in such earthy substances as the jar and the like; and from this it follows that it cannot be present in any thing made up of earth-particles; and this leads to the conclusion that that in which cognition abides is something distinct from all such things as are made up of material particles. Apart from this, in all cognitions, we are actually conscious of the *cogniser* as apart from the Body; *e. g.*, when we see the jar, we have the notion ‘I see the jar’; in this notion we do not find any idea of the *body*, which is only the collective name given to the hands, legs, head, &c., and none of these limbs, either severally or collectively, enter into our consciousness at the time; while in all individual cognitions, it is necessary that there should be a manifestation of the *cogniser*; as, otherwise there would be no difference between the cognition of one person and that of another; and as in the notion ‘I see the jar’ the factor of ‘cogniser’ is found to be manifested, not in the form of the body or the sense-organs,—it follows that the cogniser must be something apart from these. In cases where the word ‘I’ is found to be used in connection with the body, the use of the word must be regarded as figurative or poetical. Then again, the word ‘Soul’ can be applied to that only which is endowed with intelligence; and as the body is not found to be so endowed, it cannot be spoken of as the ‘Soul’; the sole proof of anything being endowed with intelligence lies in the testimony borne by our own Consciousness; and inasmuch as we have the consciousness of things of the past and the future also, intelligence cannot be regarded as belonging to any material objects perceived by the senses; as in the case of our cognition of past and future objects, the objects are *not present* at the time.

3. If *all* cognitions were due solely to the Soul, then inasmuch as the Soul is everlasting, we would never have a

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cessation in our cognitions. In view of this difficulty, it has been held that even though the Soul may be regarded as the material or constituent cause of cognitions, it must stand in need of the aid of other auxilliary agencies, in the bringing about of cognitions. As this auxilliary agency, some philosophers postulate the *operation of the mind*. This view however is not accepted by Prabhākara; because, he argues, by its very nature, this *operation of the mind* would itself stand in need of further auxillaries. He, therefore, puts forward, as the required auxilliary of the Soul, the *contact of the Mind with the Soul*;—this contact being brought about by a certain action of the Mind, due either to the effort of the Soul or to the ‘Unseen Agency’ set going by the previous ‘*karman*’ of that Soul; these *Efforts and Unseen Agencies* also, in their turn, are the effects of previous *Mind-Soul contacts*; and so the infinite circle goes on.

4. The existence of the Mind is proved by the manifestation of the qualities of the Soul itself, which would not be possible without the operation of the mind. These qualities of the Soul are—*Buddhi* or Intellection, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Destiny (Unseen Force) and Faculty. The existence of *Buddhi* is self-manifest, in the form of Valid Cognitions and Remembrances; Pleasure, Pain, Desire Aversion and Effort are apprehended by mental perception. By ‘Faculty’ or ‘*Samskāra*’ is meant a certain force or power or capability imparted to the Soul by its cognitions; its existence is proved by the fact that, unless we have some such force intervening between the cognition of an object and its remembrance, we cannot account for this latter. As for Destiny, this always takes the form of Virtue and Vice—whose real character can be known only from Scriptures, which alone can be the safe guide as to what is *virtue* and what is *vice*.

5. All our cognitions are not due to Mind-Soul contact only; *e. g.*, in the perception of colour, if that contact

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were the sole cause, then the blind man would also be able to perceive colour ; it is in view of this fact that we have to admit the agency of the external sense-organs, the Eye, &c. ; and as all perceptible external objects fall within five classes, we postulate five organs of perception ; these five, along with the Perceptive Mind which may be regarded as the Universal Organ, form the six organs of which the Body is the abode.

6. Thus the Body may be defined as *the abode of the six sense-organs*. Of Bodies there are three kinds—(1), born of the womb, (2) born of eggs, and (3) born of sweat. Prabhākara does not accept the Vegetable body, on the ground that we have no proofs for the view that vegetable organisms are endowed with the six organs of perception. Nor does he admit any such body as is not made of the Earth. Two of the six organs—the Mind and the organ of Touch—are present in all bodies. That the Mind is a substance is proved by the fact of its having contacts with the Soul and with the objects of cognition. It cannot be made of many constituent particles, as that would involve an unnecessary multiplication of assumptions. Then again, as the Soul is omnipresent, and without parts, if the Mind also were of the same character, no contact between the two would be possible ; as between two omnipresent things either there can be no contact, or the two must be one and inseparable. Hence it follows that the Mind is atomic in its dimension. And as it exists, and yet has no cause, it is eternal ; it is extremely mobile, as is proved by the very swift contacts formed by it, at the time that we have one perception following another in quick succession, which must be due to the Mind coming into contact with one perceptive organ after the other. Unless aided by the Mind, no organ can apprehend its object ; as is found in the case of the absent-minded man who fails to see things even before his eyes. The contact of the Mind with the conscious

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Soul is due to the endless series of virtues and vices—effects of the past deeds of that Soul.

7. Thus then, the Soul is *the experiencer* or enjoyer, the Body *the abode of experiences*, the Sense-organs *the instruments of experience*; and the *Objects of experience* are of two kinds—*Internal*, in the shape of pleasure, pain, &c., and *External*, in the shape of the Earth and the rest; and *Experience* consists in cognition or consciousness. It is in these five that all truth is centred; there is nothing that exists that does not fall within one or other of these.

8. The Soul as *Cogniser* is never cognised apart from the cognised object; nor is the Object ever cognised without the *Cogniser* entering into the Cognition as a necessary factor. It is what has already been explained above as 'Triune Cognition' under 'Perception.' From this it follows that the Soul is cognised by the same means of Valid Cognition as the objects themselves. Even though in this manner, the Soul would be that upon which the operation of cognising would come to bear, it is not the *objective* but the *nominative* agent of that operation; just as even though the person who walks has the operation of walking bearing upon him, he is regarded as the Nominative agent of the walking, and not its objective; specially as a true *objective* is that upon which bears the operation of something other than itself; which is not the case with the Soul, upon which its own action of cognising bears. Thus then, according to Prabhākara, the Soul is not *self-illuminated*; he could not regard it so, as he draws a distinction between Cognition and the Soul, both of which are regarded as identical, by the Vedāntin, who alone regards the Soul as self-illuminated; according to Prabhākara it is Cognition alone that is so; and as the Soul is something different from cognition, it cannot be so. This is plainly stated in the *Prakaranapañchikā* (p. 51). The Soul then is that which is the substratum of the self-illuminated cognition, in which it

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also enters as the cognitive element of 'I', which is inseparable from all cognitions. The cognition of the Soul being obtainable only along with the cognition of some other things, it is only natural that during sleep, when no things are actually cognised, there should be no cognition of the Self. During the 'fourth' or highest stage of consciousness, however, the Soul is present, merely as *something existing*, a pure *esse* subsisting as the substratum of the collective cognition of all things taken together.

9. While putting forward the above view with regard to the Cognition of the Soul, the *Prābhākara* rejects the other two theories,—(1) the hypothesis of the Logician that the Soul is *perceived by the mind*; this view is rejected on the ground that under this hypothesis the Soul would become the *perceiver* as well as the *perceived*, which is absurd; this absurdity the *Prābhākara* has tried to explain away in his own case, as shown in the preceding paragraph; but the real ground for rejecting the Logician's view appears to lie in the fact that, so long as the Cognition of the Soul can be explained either by self-luminosity, or by making it a part and parcel of the cognition of all things, there can be no justification for postulating an independent mental perception for the Soul; (2) the second hypothesis rejected is that of the Vedāntin, according to whom the Soul is self-illuminated; this view may be thus briefly stated:—

"*Illumination* is the purpose served by all means of knowledge; as such, these are necessary only in the case of the cognition of such things as are by themselves devoid of inherent luminosity; the Soul however is by its very nature illumined; and as such does not stand in need of any other means of knowledge; the ordinary object of cognition cannot be regarded as self-luminous, because in that case every object would be always cognised and cognisable; hence we could not account for sleep and such other apparently unconscious states of the Soul; during which states the cognition

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is not manifested, because it does not exist at the time ; during final Release also, the self-luminosity of the Soul does not cease ; as if it did, then, there being nothing present in consciousness during final release, this would not be something desirable."

This Vedānta view is rejected by Prabhākara on the following grounds :—If the Soul were self-illuminated, it would be present in consciousness during the state of Deep Sleep also, just as during the waking, dreaming and fourth states ; as that which belongs to a thing by its very nature can never be set aside from it ; and as self-luminousness would belong to the Soul by its very nature (according to the Vedāntin), it could never cease, in whatever state the Soul might be. And further, so long as we can explain all our consciousness under the hypothesis of the self-luminosity of *cognitions*, there is no reason why anything else should be regarded as self-luminous. That the Soul is not the same as the Cognition has already been shown above.

10. According to Kumārila also, the Soul is different from the body, and eternal (*Shlokavārtika*, Ātmavāda, 7 and 147) ; and omnipresent (Ibid. 20, and also *Tantravārtika*, Translation, p. 515). But he holds the Soul to be either the *substratum* (*Shlokavārtika*, Ātmavāda, 110) or the *object* (Ibid. 126) of the notion of 'I' (*Shāstṛaḍīpikā*, p. 100), which enters into all acts of cognition ; while according to Prabhākara, the Soul is that *notion of 'I'* itself (see above, § 8). Kumārila holds that the Soul is not self-luminous, but known by mental perception (*Shāstṛaḍīpikā*, p. 101), which latter fact Prabhākara denies. Kumārila again, with the Vedān, in regards the Soul to be of the nature of pure Consciousness (*Shlokavārtika*, Ātmavāda 73, and *Tantravārtika*, Translation, p. 516), while according to Prabhākara, consciousness is only a quality of the Soul. Unlike the Vedāntin however, Kumārila holds the Soul to be many, but indivisible, being eternal and

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omnipresent (*Tantravārtika*, Translation, p. 521 and *Shāstra-dīpikā* p. 102).

11. According to Prabhākara, the Soul, in its liberated state, continues to exist as a mere *essè*, 'sat'. What proof is there, it is asked, for the assertion that the Soul continues to exist as an *esse*, free from, and beyond, all perceptible things? The answer to this is that it is an universally recognised fact that anything that exists, without having been brought into existence by a cause, is imperishable; as is the case with *Ākāśa* for instance; it is also admitted that the Soul exists, as also that it is not brought into existence by any cause; hence it must follow that the Soul is imperishable.

The Soul again is omnipresent, like the *Ākāśa*; but its properties—pleasure, pain, &c.—cannot manifest themselves anywhere except in a body; as the manifestation of the properties of the Soul can be brought about only by the contact of the Soul with the Mind, and the Mind cannot subsist apart from the body. This omnipresence of the Soul obviates the necessity of postulating *movement* for it. Nor is the Soul perceptible anywhere else except in a body; as by itself, it is beyond the reach of the senses; hence its imperceptibility is not incompatible with the fact that the dimension of the Soul is the *largest*,—which is only another name for omnipresence; and Prabhākara, on this account, denies that the Soul is of the size of the atom, or of that of the body it ensouls. Even though the Soul is omnipresent, it cannot experience what is going on in another body; because all *experiencing* needs certain bodies and organs, the nature of which depends upon the past *karma* of the experiencer; hence a particular Soul can experience only that which goes on in the body equipped with the organs brought about by the past *karma* of that Soul.

12. This leads to the question as to whether the Soul is one and the same in all beings as held by the Vedāntin, or
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one distinct in each body, as held by the Logician and the Sāṅkhya. Prabhākara, as also Kumārila, favours the latter view ; and that for the following reasons :—

(a) In the case of other bodies, we infer the presence therein of the Soul, only from certain activities manifesting therein, not accountable without the presence of the Soul ; howsoever deeply we ponder over it, we feel it to be not the same soul as our own, but something that is always known as the *not-my-soul*, for the person who has inferred its presence in the other body ; in fact it is always known as *another* Soul ; what we feel is that, just as the activities of my body are due to the effort *of my* Soul, which ensouls *my* body, so the activities of that other body are due to the effort *of another* soul, which ensouls that body ; we never look upon the activities of another person as due to our own effort.

(b) We always find a distinct difference between the *Dharma-Adharma* and the consequent Pleasure-Pain of different persons. All these are qualities of the Soul ; consequently if the Soul were one only, the same in all persons, its qualities also would be the same in all bodies ensouled by it ; and thus the *Dharma*, &c., of one person would be the same as those of another person ; and the resultant experiences of the two would also be the same ; that is, when one person would be happy, the other also would be happy, and so on. Nor would it be right to bring forward against this reasoning the fact of the localisation of pain, wherein, even though pain is felt by the Soul ensouling the *whole* body, it is actually felt as localised in only a particular part of the body—*e. g.*, the leg, the arm, and so forth. Because as a matter of fact, in all cases the *pain* is felt by the Soul only ; and it subsists also as a quality in the Soul only ; and is only what causes the pain,—*e. g.*, heat or cold—that is present in the part of the body, where the pain is localised. As regards the *Veḍāntin's*

conception that—‘just as the sun, though one only, yet, when reflected in different substances, becomes endowed with distinct properties, so the Soul also, though one only, yet as ensouling different bodies, becomes endowed with diverse qualities’,—it has to be observed that the analogy in this case is not quite correct; as in the case of the Sun, the qualities that appear different are only those that belong to the reflecting medium and not to the Sun which is reflected; and so if the analogy were true, the diverse qualities appearing in connection with the Souls would also belong to the bodies ensouled, and not to the Soul; while as a matter of fact, it cannot be denied that pleasure, pain, &c., are qualities of the Soul, and not of the body, or of any other accidental adjuncts of the Soul.

SECTION (3)—SUB-SECTION (2).

Mokṣa—LIBERATION

1. The *Liberation* of the Soul, according to Prabhākara, consists in the disappearance of all *ḍharma* and *adḥarma*. It is on account of the *ḍharma* and *adḥarma* accruing to the Soul that it is born in various bodies; consequently when there is an entire disappearance of all *ḍharma* and *adḥarma*, there remains nothing that could lead the Soul to be born again into any body; and when the Soul ceases to have any connection with bodies,—and also with the organs, &c.,—all his metempsychic troubles are ended, and he is *free*. As to how all this comes about, the following explanation is given:—(1) First of all, the man becomes disgusted with the troubles that he has to undergo during mundane existence;—(2) finding the pleasures of the world also to be invariably accompanied by some sort of pain, he comes to lose all interest in, and longing for, pleasures also;—(3) he turns his attention towards Liberation;—(4) he ceases to perform such deeds as are prohibited and which lead to trouble, as also from those that are prescribed only as leading to some sort of happiness here or hereafter;—(5) he attenuates all

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previously accrued *ḍharma* and *aḍharma* by undergoing the experiences resulting from them;—(6) he destroys the sole receptacle or abode of his experiences by the *knowledge of the Soul*, along with such auxillaries as contentment, self-control, and so forth,—all of which are laid down in the Scriptures as tending to put a stop to the further return of that Soul into the world;—and it is only when all this has come about that the Soul is *free*. The Vedic texts speaking of the ‘non-return to this world’ cannot be regarded as mere *Arṭhavāḍa*; because the *knowledge of the Soul* not being laid down as subservient to anything else, the result spoken of must be regarded as a qualification for the man entitled to that knowledge.

2. There does not appear to be much difference on this important point between Kumārila and Prabhākara; The *Bhātta* view of Liberation we find stated in the *Shloka-vārṭika*, chapter on *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, *Shlokas* 108-110, in the following words—

‘For those that have realised the real character of the Soul, all their past *Karma* having been exhausted by experience, and there being no further Karmic residua to wipe off,—there is no further body; as the Soul is burdened with a body only for the experiencing of the results of *Karma*;—therefore, one desiring Liberation should not engage in such actions as are either prohibited, or are enjoined with a view to material results; but he should continue to perform those that are prescribed as *necessary duties*, in order to avoid the sin of the neglect of such duties.’

The *Nyāyaraṭṇākura* and the *Kāshikā* on Shl. 106, go on to add that—‘Liberation must consist in the destruction of the present body, and the non-production of any further body.’ And in the *Prakuraṇapañchikā* we find the *Prābhākara* view briefly stated that—‘Liberation is the absolute cessation of the body, caused by the disappearance of all *ḍharma* and *aḍharma*,’—and ‘not by Knowledge’

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ledge' (adds Kumārila, *Shlo. Vā., Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, Shl. 103). Both are also agreed as to the negative character of Liberation, as otherwise it could not be eternal (*Shlo. Vā.*, 105-107) They are also agreed as to Liberation not being a mere *cessation of pain* (as there being no body, the Soul is free, not only from pain, but from pleasure also); or a mere blissful state (as without the body, the Soul can have no experience, and *bliss* is only a kind of experience). [See *Pra-pañ.* p. 153, and *Shlo-Vār. Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 105].

SECTION (3)—SUB-SECTION (3).

God.

1. The *Prābhākara* denies a creator for the Universe. Even though he admits that the Universe is made of constituent parts, and as such it must have a beginning and an end in time,—yet he finds no reason for believing that the Universe, as a whole, had a beginning at any one point of time, or that it would all come to an end at any one point; hence if the constituent factors of the Universe have a beginning, they must have beginnings one after the other, and they must also cease one after the other; in fact this is what is actually found to be the case in every-day experience. Thus then, if it were true that certain factors of the Universe are brought into existence by an ultra-mundane Supervisor of *Dharma-Adharma*, this could not be true for the entire Universe, as a whole. For instance, the bodies of all men and animals are found to be produced by the functioning of the parents, and not by a supervening agency; and this fact will enable us to infer the same with regard to the bodies of all animals, past and future also.*

Nor is there any force in the Logician's argument that our *Dharma-Adharma* must have for a supervisor a being

* The *Prābhākara* view is set forth in great detail in the *Prak-Pañ.* p. 137, &c.

possessed of intelligence higher than our own. Because the *Dharma-Adharma* of the body that is the product of these must always belong to the same intelligent being to whom the body belongs; any being, howsoever intelligent, can never have any knowledge of the *Dharma-Adharma* of any other being; hence the ultra-mundane 'God' can have no knowledge of the *Dharma* or *Adharma* of the beings born as men, animals, &c.; and without such knowledge he could not exercise any intelligent control over them; 'God' could not perceive *Dharma* by his senses, as *Dharma* is absolutely imperceptible; nor could he perceive it by his mind alone, as the mind by itself can not perceive things outside the body, and the *Dharma* of all beings born in the world would always be outside the body occupied by the mind of the perceiving person, 'God.'

Then again, it becomes necessary to examine the character of the 'supervision' that 'God' is said to exercise over *Dharma* and *Adharma*. (a) This 'supervision' cannot be of the nature of *contact* or *conjunction*; because *Dharma* and *Adharma* being *qualities* are not capable of conjunction, which is possible for *substances* only. (b) Nor could it be in the form of *Samavāga* or *inherence*; as the *Dharma-Adharma* inhering in other Souls could not inhere in the 'God.' And as these two are the only possible alternative forms of relation, no other kind of 'supervision' is possible. In the case of ordinary agents,—the carpenter, for instance,—the 'supervision' consists in their contact with the tools and implements; and this is not found to be possible in the case of 'God.' Nor is it possible for the operations of 'God' to have any effect upon *Dharma-Adharma*; because, being *qualities*, they could not have any actions bearing upon them. Nor can the action bringing about the creation be held to lie in the atoms, which operate under the Will of 'God; because in all our experience, we never come across any

such 'supervision' or 'guidance'; as all 'supervision' or 'guidance' is found to be done by the Soul over that body which it ensouls by virtue of its *Dharma* and *Adharma*; and the atoms can not be said to be such a body of 'God'; hence he could not guide the activity of these. Even if we grant such a 'body' for 'God,' the activity of the body could not be due to mere *wish*; it must be due to an *effort* put forth by him. Nor could the *wish* be eternal, as, in that case, the activity of the atoms also would be eternal, which would lead to the absurdity of an *unceasing* creation.

2. The argument that the Logician puts forward in proof of his 'God' is that, "The body must have a supervisor, because it is non-intelligent." To this his opponent opposes the counter-argument that God cannot be the Supervisor, because he cannot have any motive in doing so; we cannot deny the truth of the proposition that there is intelligent supervision only in cases where some purpose of the supervisor is served by it. Then again, the same argument that would prove the existence of the intelligent supervisor would also prove that supervisor to be a bodied or corporeal being; as the Logician bases his argument upon the analogy of the carpenter supervising and guiding the making of wooden articles; and as this carpenter is a *bodied* being, the analogy, extended a little farther would prove this supervising 'God' also to be a bodied being; but at the same time we know that no bodied being can exercise any intelligent control over such subtle things as the *atoms*, *Dharma* and *Adharma*. Even if he did, he would himself, as a bodied being, have to be the creation of another Creator or Supervisor, and so on, *ad infinitum*. Thus then no supervision of the creation of the Universe being possible it has to be regarded as a never-ending process of things coming into existence and passing out of it, under the influence of the *Dharma* and *Adharma* of the Souls ensouling

the bodies coming into touch with those things; and there is thus no room for the assumption of an ultra-cosmic 'God.'

3. Kumarila's views in regard to 'God' are found in the *Shloka-vūṭṭika*, 'Sambandhākṣepaparihāra'. He also denies the creation (*śloka* 47) and dissolution (68) of the Universe as a whole (113); he bases his denial of the creator on the same grounds as that of the 'omniscient person.' (47-59; 114-16).

SECTION (4).

Paḍārthas—THINGS OF THE WORLD.

1. According to Prabhākara the external world is real; the stock argument of the Idealist—'Cognitions have no real counterpart in the external world,—because they are cognitions,—like dreams'—being rejected; (1) on the ground of its being contrary to all experience; and (2) by showing that dreams also are not absolutely devoid of real counterparts in the external world (*see above*, Sec. 1).

2. As regards the constituents of the Universe—called '*paḍārthas*' or '*categories*'—we have not been able to find in any Prābhākara work, a systematic statement of what these are, according to Prabhākara. We believe such a systematic statement is contained in the '*Prameyapārāyaṇa*' mentioned in the *Prakaranapañchikā*, on pp. 110-11; from its name it appears to be a chapter of this latter work, following closely upon the chapter on '*pramāṇas*' called the '*Pramāṇapārāyaṇa*.' In the printed edition of the work however we do not find any such chapter; nor is it found in the portion wanting in the printed text,—manuscripts of which have just come to hand from Travancore. So our information on this point depends upon stray declarations in the *Prakaranapañchikā*, and upon a comparatively recent work, called the '*Sarvasiddhāntarahasya*' From this latter work we glean the following:—The '*paḍārthas*,' according to Prabhākara, are—(1) *Dravya* or Substance, (2) *Guṇa* or Quality, (3) *Karman* or Action, (4) *Sāmānya* or Generality, (5) *Paraṭantratā* (Subsistence or
Prābhā. 88.

Inherence), (6) *Shakṭi* or Force, (7) *Sādrishya* or Similarity, and (8) *Sanṅkhyā* or Number. 'Action' is inferred from the separation of a thing from one point in space and its conjunction with another point. 'Subsistence' or 'Inherence' is not *nitya* or *eternal* (like the '*Samavāya*' of the Logician); because it subsists in perishable things also, being a relation whereof it cannot be eternal; it is both *produced* and *not-produced*, and also *perceptible* and *imperceptible*, in accordance with the nature of things to which it belongs. Nor is it *one* (like the Logician's '*Samavāya*'); it is as many as there are things. '*Shakṭi*' or 'Force' is the common name given to that by virtue of which, Substances, Qualities, Actions, and Generalities come to be regarded as the 'Cause' of things; it is to be inferred from the effects; it is eternal in eternal things, and non-eternal in perishable things. 'Similarity' [and 'Number' also], like Force, cannot come under any other category and so have to be regarded as distinct categories. The '*Viśeṣa*' of the Logician cannot be a 'category', because the *differentiation* among eternal things like the *ākāśa* and the various kinds of atom—for the purposes of which the Logician posits the *Viśeṣa*—can always be done on the basis of the ordinary qualities of such things. '*Abhāva*' also is nothing apart from the point in space where it is supposed to exist. The mention of 'number' in this connection appears to be wrong; as on p. 54, the Prak-Pañ. speaks of 'number' as a 'quality.'

We shall now see what we can gather direct from the '*Prābhākara*' books. The *Prakaranapañchikā*, on page 110, prefaces the proving of 'Similarity' as a distinct category, with the statement that it cannot come under any of the six categories of 'Substance,' 'Quality,' 'Action,' 'Generality,' 'Inherence' and '*Viśeṣa*'; but with regard to the last—'*Viśeṣa*', it says (on the same page) that '*Viśeṣākhyaṇṭu paḍārtham pramāṇavāḍino nānumanyante*' ('People learned in the science of reasoning do not accept any such category as
Prābhā. 89.

viśeṣa'). So herein we have the authority of a *Prābhākara* work as regards the first five of the eight categories mentioned above. On the same page, the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* proceeds to give the following account of 'Similarity,—

'What is *similarity*? It is neither Substance, nor Quality, nor Generality, nor Inherence; it is something entirely different from these; as is proved by the fact that it enters into our consciousness exactly in the same manner as any other category; and our consciousness is the sole criterion as to the existence of categories,—that of which we are conscious as a *category* we regard as such. It cannot be Substance, because it subsists in Qualities and Action also (which no Substance can do); as we speak of *similar colours*, *similar motions*, and so forth. It cannot be Generality, as it does not form the basis of any comprehensive conception [says the *Bṛihatī* p. 8 b]. Inherence is a kind of relation, and as such cannot include *Similarity*. Lastly, as regards the *Viśeṣa* of the Logician, it is not a distinct category, being nothing more or less than the quality of *Separateness*; just as an ordinary quality *separates* or *differentiates* between ordinary things, so the *Viśeṣa* of the Logician differentiates atoms; virtually the two are precisely the same; in any case, this *Viśeṣa* is something quite contrary to *Similarity*. For these reasons, *Similarity* must be regarded as a distinct category by itself; and as subsisting in perceptible objects it is apprehended by the apprehension of the qualities, actions and constituent parts as common to two or more things.'

The *Bhātta** does not accept *Similarity* as a distinct category; his chief objection being that, if it were a category, we could not account for the varying degrees of similarity that we are cognisant of, in our ordinary experience.

As regards *Shakti* or *Force* we learn from the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (pp. 81-82) that, as a matter of fact, all things in the

* *Śāstraḍḍipikā*, p. 52.

world are found to be possessed of some sort of *śakti*; we cannot *perceive* it, but it can be *inferred*: For instance, we see the fire producing a certain effect, in the shape of burning; but the same fire, when under the influence of certain *mantras*, fails to produce that effect; there is nothing in the visible form of the fire itself that can account for this phenomenon, the form of the fire remaining exactly the same in both cases. This leads us to the conclusion that there must be something in the fire by virtue of which it can burn, and in the absence whereof it cannot burn; from this it follows that in all things there is something which enables them to bring about their effects, and being deprived of which they are not able to do so. To this imperceptible something, *Prabhākara* gives the name of ‘*Śakti*’ or Force.’ In eternal things, it is eternal, and in transient things it is brought into existence along with them. It differs from ‘*Samskāra*’ in that this latter is transient in eternal things also.

‘*Karman*’ or ‘Action’ is also one of the *imperceptible* categories. When a thing moves, what we actually see is not the *moving* of the thing, but only the various conjunctions and disjunctions of the things with certain points in space; the expression ‘the thing moves’ also refers to these conjunctions and disjunctions, which latter cannot be regarded as the ‘Action’ of *moving*; because the action of moving subsists in the moving thing, while the conjunctions and disjunctions subsist in outside space; and as it is only these latter that we actually perceive, Action cannot be held to be *perceptible*, as maintained by Kaṇāḍa; it is always to be *inferred* says the *Prakaranapañcikā* (pp. 78-79). The above view is not in agreement with the *Bhātta* view; says the *Shūṣṭradīpikā* (p. 50):—

“Action can never be inferred; as it could be inferred only as the immaterial cause of the conjunctions and

disjunctions of the thing with points in space ; and as such it would have to be cognised as subsisting in the thing as well as in space ; this is not the case ; as it is cognised in the *thing* only. Action must be regarded as being *perceived* ; we see the thing undergoing certain conjunctions and disjunctions with points in space ; but the cognition that we have is that what brings about these conjunctions and disjunctions is in the thing, and not in space ; and that which forms the basis of this cognition is called the 'action' of the thing."

Inherence, says the *Prakaranapañchikā* (pp. 26-27) cannot be regarded as everlasting ; because as a matter of fact we find that the inherence of the class and character in an individual belonging to that class is produced, and also perishes, along with that individual. The *Bhātta* view of '*Samavāya*' is that, as subsisting between inseparable things, it cannot be anything distinct from these things themselves ; it must be regarded as a particular phase of the things themselves, among whom it is believed by the Logician to subsist. (See *Shlokavārtika*, Sū. 4, Shl. 146-50).

3. As regards 'Substance' we find the *four*—(1) Earth, (2) Water, (3) Air, (4) Fire—mentioned in the *Prakaranapañchikā* (p. 24) ; where also we find the '*gaganādayah*' mentioned ; so (5) '*gagana*' or '*ākāśhā*' would be the *fifth* substance ; (6) '*Ātman*' is admitted as a substance in the section dealing with '*Ātman*' (the chapter of *Prakaranapañchikā* called '*Tattvālokā*'), where we also find '*Manas*' (7) mentioned (p. 149), as something whose contact with the *Ātman* brings about *Buddhi*, *Sukha*, *Duḥkha*, and such other specific qualities of the *Ātman* ; then again, on page 84, we find the eternal substances enumerated, wherein, apart from the *atoms*, the *Ākāśha* and the *Ātman*, we also find—(8) *Kāla* or Time, and (9) *Dik* or Space. *Tamas* is not a quality : nor is it a substance ; it is nothing apart from *absence of light* (*Prakaranapañchikā* pp. 143-45). Earth, Water, Air, and Fire are

perceptible by the Eye and also by Touch. *Ākāsha* and the rest cannot be regarded as *perceptible*, because they can not be seen or touched. (*Pra-pañ.* p. 24); *Ākāsha* cannot be seen by the eye, because it is devoid of colour; if it had colour it would also be tangible; as colour and tangibility always go together; the whiteness that appears in the *Ākāsha* belongs to the particles of fire hanging in the atmosphere; and the darkness noticed at night is not the quality of anything, it is mere absence of light; if it were a positive quality it would be perceptible during the day also. (*Pra-pañ.* pp. 143-44). In this connection it may be noted that, inasmuch as *Ākāsha* is imperceptible, Prabhākara does not accept the view that it is one of the five constituent factors of the *body*. Though *Ākāsha* cannot be *perceived*, it can be *inferred* as the substratum of sound: Sound cannot belong to the source from which it proceeds; as the organ of hearing can apprehend only where it can reach, and as a matter of fact, it can never reach or approach the source of sounds. (*Pra-Pañ.* p. 145).

The touch of Air is *neither-hot-nor-cold*; its apparent *coolness* being due to the water-particles hanging in the Air and the *hotness* to the fire-particles floating with it. (*Pra-pañ.* pp. 77-78).

4. Among Qualities, Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort are *perceptible*.

Conjunction is of three kinds:—(1) Due to both the things concerned, (2) due to the action of one of the two, and (3) due to another conjunction. (*Pra-pañ.* p. 26 and 151).

5. The *Sarvasiddhāntarahasya* has the following with regard to the *Bhātta* view of the Categories:—All categories are divided into (1) *Bhāva* or Positive and (2) *Abhāva* or Negative; the latter is of four kinds—(a) Prior Negation, (b) Utter Destruction, (c) Absolute Negation, and (d) Mutual

Prabhā. 93.

Negation. Of *Bhāvas* there are four—(a) Substance, (b) Quality, Action and Generality. Of substances there are eleven,—Earth, Water, Light, or Fire, Air, *Ākāśha*, Space, Time, *Ātman* Mind, Darkness and Sound (some people adding *Gold* as the twelfth). Of qualities there are thirteen,—Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Gravity, Fluidity and Viscidity. There are five actions—*Throwing upwards* and the rest ; two ‘generalities’—Higher and Lower. *Shakti* and *Sāḍṛishya* are all included under ‘Substance ;’ of *Shakti* there are two kinds—*sahaja* or inborn, and *ādheya* or produced and borrowed.

6. The word ‘*Svārga*’ or ‘Heaven’ is applied to that happiness which is totally free from all touch of pain, and which, as such, is desired by all men (*Pra-pañ*, pp. 102-3). *Sukha* or Pleasure is not mere absence of pain. In the absence of pain what we experience is that there is no pain, the feeling being a negative one ; and hence, from the very nature of the Cognition of Negation (as shown above) it follows that what we are conscious of in this case is only the *Soul* by itself, *as without pain*,—and not as with some positive quality ; on the other hand, when we feel pleasure, we are conscious of something positive, a positive quality as belonging to the Self,—or, more properly, the Self as endowed with a positive quality. (*Pra-pañ*. p. 149).

7. We have reserved the consideration of ‘*Jāti*’ or ‘Generality’ for this last section, because on this matter we have a very full explanation available in the *Prakaranapañchikā* (pp. 17-32).

There is a difference of opinion among philosophers, as regards the exact character of *Jāti* :—(1) According to some the notion of the ‘*Jāti*’ is purely imaginary ; (2) according to others, it has a real existence, but not apart from the individuals in which it subsists, and as such is cognised along with these ; (3) others again hold that it has a real existence, apart from the individuals comprising it, and its

existence can be apprehended only by inference; (4) lastly, according to some it is different, as well as non-different, from the individuals comprising it.

According to Prabhākara, the '*Jāti*' is something real, distinct from the individuals which are its substrates, and is perceptible by the senses. Says the *Kārikā* — '*Jātirāshrayaṭo bhinnā, pratyakṣajñānagocharā*'. When we properly analyse the notion of '*Jāti*,' we find that the only basis that we have for accepting any such thing lies in our conception of some form of *non-difference* among a number of things which, hitherto, have been known as different. Says the *Prakaraṇapāñchikā* — '*Bheda-grahaṇa-purassaraṃ mabhedajñānam bhinnēṣu jātyabhyupagame śaraṇam*.'

3. According to Kumārila, the *Jāti* is not something different from the component individuals (*Shloka-vārṭika*, '*Ākṛiti*' 52-62, and also '*Vanavāda*,' 75-76); and the distinct ideas of the 'individual' and the 'class' that we come across in ordinary experience, are thus explained :—

'In perceiving an object, when we cognise the '*Jāti*' as identical with the individual, what presents itself to consciousness is the individual only,—the '*jāti*' or class-character lying latent in it, and helping its existence; when, on the other hand, we cognise the individual as identical with the *jāti*, it is the class-character that is present in consciousness, and the individual character continues to lie latent.' (Ibid. '*Ākṛiti*,' 59-62).

Kumārila agrees with Prabhākara in regarding '*Jāti*' as something perceived by the senses—'*Jātirindriyagocharā*' (*Vanavāda*, 24).

4. All the main objections against *Jāti* are based upon the denial of the possibility of any aggregation of constituent parts; the '*Jāti*' is only an aggregate of the individuals composing it; hence those individuals bear to the *Jāti* the same relation that is borne by the constituent particles of a
Prabhā. 95.

substance to the substance itself; consequently if one admits of the fact that substances are made up of constituent particles, the whole ground is cut off from under the theory that denies all '*Jāti*'; if you accept aggregation in one case, you can have no reason for denying it in the other.

We shall review, in brief, the objections that are brought—chiefly by the Idealist—against all 'aggregates' in general. With a view to make his position unassailable, the Idealist begins with the denial of any such thing as 'Substance'; and it is the substance that is regarded as the substrate of the '*jāti*.' Such a generic 'substance' could be either in the form of the subtle 'atom', or in that of the gross product of atoms; as regards the former alternative, no such '*jāti*' as 'atom' is possible; because such a *generic* entity is made to rest upon the comprehensive conception that we form of a number of things as 'one'; and as a matter of fact, we find that we have no all-comprehensive conception with regard to the four primitive atoms of the Earth, the Water, the Air and the Fire; and under the circumstances, how could there be any such generic name as 'Atom'? Then as regards the conception of 'atom' that we find persisting in regard to all atoms,—this can be explained on the basis of the *atomic* dimension possessed in common by all atoms. In the same manner the generic conception of 'Earth' is based upon the common property of *smell*; and so on with 'Water' and the rest.—Nor in the second place can there be any gross substance as the substrate of '*jāti*'; for the simple reason that there is no proof for the existence of any such substance; all such substances are held to be the products of the conglomeration of atoms; but as a matter of fact, no such conglomeration is possible; as there can be no *Conjunction* among atoms, which are, *ex hypothesi*, devoid of extension, and hence of parts. Nor can it be ascertained whether the gross *whole* resides in its entirety in each of its component parts, or only in all of these latter collectively; as the former

alternative is, on the very face of it, absurd ; in the latter alternative also, no perception of the *whole* would be possible until *all* its parts had been perceived (which latter contingency is seldom possible). Then as regards the conception of the 'gross' object common among all men, it may be explained in the following manner :—Certain atoms continuing to appear one after the other, become, after a certain number have appeared, perceptible by the senses ; and we, who were unable to perceive them before, on coming to perceive them, are led to attribute this phenomenon to the fact of the atoms having formed themselves into a conglomerate *whole* ; this notion of the *whole* however is a pure fancy ; as what is actually before us is only a number of atoms, each one imperceptible by itself, but perceptible when appearing in the company of one another. Thus then, inasmuch as the 'atom' cannot be the substrate of the '*jāṭi*', and there is no *gross* substance apart from the *atom*, we are led to the conclusion that there can be no such thing as '*Jāṭi*.' Then again, the '*Jāṭi*' cannot be perceived by the senses, as it is held to be by Prabhākara ; because being eternal, it could not be perceptible, as otherwise it would be liable to unceasing perception, which is an absurdity. Then again,—does the '*Jāṭi*' come into existence, and cease to exist, along with the individuals comprising it ? If so, then it would be something totally distinct from each of these individuals, and would therefore lose its essential character. Then, if it is eternal, it must exist before the individual is brought into existence ; and yet if it is held to come into existence along with the individual, it cannot subsist before this latter. The '*Jāṭi*' again cannot be either different or non-different from the individuals. It cannot be non-different as in that case, it would have to appear and disappear with the Individuals, which involves the aforesaid absurdity. If then, it were different from them, it would be cognisable independently, and apart from them—another absurdity. The

question put in connection with the *gross* object is put in connection with the 'jāti' also. Does the 'jāti' subsist in its entirety in each individual, or in all individuals collectively? If the former, then there are as many 'jātis' as there are individuals. If the latter, the 'jāti' cannot be cognised until *all* the individuals composing it have been cognised; as this is never possible, no cognition of the 'jāti' would be possible. For the above reasons it is concluded that any such thing as 'jāti' has no real existence; nor are there any 'substances' which could be the substrate of 'jāti.'

5. In answer to the above, the *Prābhākara* argues that the proof for the existence of anything must ultimately rest in our own consciousness; and it cannot be denied that there are present, in our consciousness, distinct cognitions of the *gross* forms of things; and what is thus distinctly cognised cannot reasonably have its existence denied. As regards the constitution of the *gross* substance,—the *gross* object exists as we actually perceive it; that it is made up of subtler constituent particles is implied by its very nature, in fact without this, our very conception of it would be impossible. Such being the indisputable fact, it becomes necessary for us to find out an explanation for the fact of a number of subtler particles combining to make up a *gross* object. The only explanation possible is that a number of particles, on acquiring a conjunction among themselves, tend towards the bringing into existence of a single object, which being perceptible, (while the particles are imperceptible) is called '*gross*,'—a single Conjunction subsisting over all the particles, and that same Conjunction tending to combine the particles into one conglomerate *whole*. Thus then, in the bringing about of the *whole*, the particles are the *material* cause, and their conjunction the *immaterial* cause.

This *whole* subsists over all the particles collectively, and not in each part individually; in this it differs from the 'Jāti' which resides in its entirety in each individual.

constituting that *Jāti*. It is not necessary for all the particles to be perceived before the *whole* is perceived; because the *whole* is something different from the parts; and as in every case the 'cause' that we are justified in assuming is only that which is sufficient to account for a certain given effect, for the perception of the *whole* we must regard as the necessary cause the perception of only those parts without which the perception of the whole would not be possible; and as a matter of fact, if only a few of the parts are perceived, this brings about the perception of the *whole*. Then again, the fact of the *whole* being always found together with the *parts* is due to one being the cause of the other; that the *whole* is different from the parts is shown by the fact that the two give rise to entirely different effects in our consciousness; for instance, the *whole* gives rise to the notion of something that is *one* and *large* or *extensive*; while the *parts* produce the notion of things *many* in number and *small*. Thus then, inasmuch as the *whole* is different from the parts, it can be perceived, even when all its parts are not perceived.

These *wholes* are of four kinds—Earth, Water, Fire and Air; the first three being *large* and having colour, are perceptible by the organ of touch, and also by that of vision; Air being devoid of colour is perceptible by touch alone. The atoms of these are by their very nature imperceptible; so also is the compound of *two* atoms; as the *large dimension*, which is a necessary condition in all perceptibility, is present in only such substances as have *many*—i. e., not less than three—constituent particles. Akāsha, Time and Space, even though *large*, are not perceptible, as they are devoid of touch and colour.

The existence of the *whole* substance having been proved, the existence of '*Jāti*' cannot be denied merely on the ground that there can be no *wholes* made up of parts.

Prabhā. 99.

6. Though the *Jāti* or 'class-character' is eternal, yet when a new individual belonging to that class—*i. e.*, possessing that class-character—comes into existence, what is brought into existence by this appearance of a fresh individual is not the 'class-character,' which is ever present, but only the relation (inherence) of the individual with that class-character. There is nothing objectionable in the 'production' of 'inherence,' because 'inherence,' according to Prabhākara, is not eternal (as held by the Logician) [*see above*, §2] nor is there anything incongruous in the inherence of the individual being produced before, or along with, the individual itself; because 'Inherence' is not, like 'Conjunction,' dependent upon the previous existence or action of the members between whom it subsists. Similarly when a particular individual ceases to exist, the 'class-character' does not go away elsewhere (because it has no *motion*);—nor does it subsist in that individual (as this has ceased to exist);—nor does it itself cease to exist (as it is found present in other individuals);—but what ceases is the inherence of the 'class-character' with that particular individual; it is only natural that when one member of the relation has ceased to exist, the relation itself should cease with it.

The 'class-character' resides in its entirety in each individual; as is proved by the fact that we recognise the same 'class-character' in every individual. Nor is the 'class character' ever perceived apart from the individual. It is perceptible by the senses; as is shown by the fact that its cognition is brought about by its coming into contact with the organs of perception, through the individual in which it resides, and which is in direct contact with the organs. We cannot deny that when we perceive a thing quite distinctly, we perceive it as having a certain 'class-character.'

While admitting such '*jāṭis*' as *Substance*, *Quality*, &c., Prabhākara does not accept any such *summum genus* as '*Saṭtā*' or 'Being', as including all that exists; and this

Prabhā. 100.

for the simple reason that we have to accept such a *jāti* as *Substance* because we perceive a number of individual things as having certain characters in common; and on the basis of this conception we postulate the '*jāti*' *Substance*. We have, as a matter of fact, no such cognition of a number of things as merely 'existing'; and in the absence of such a conception we can have no basis for the postulating of such a class as 'Being.' Though we have such a word as '*sat̥tā*' (Being), yet that cannot warrant our regarding it as the name of a 'class-character;' as all that the word denotes is the mere *individuality* of things—*Sarvapaśat̥tā*; when we speak of a thing as '*sat̥*', we do not mean that it is possessed of any such 'class-character' as '*sat̥tā*'; what we mean is that it has an individual existence of its own.

Nor does Prabhākara admit of such '*jātis*' as *Brāhmaṇatva*, '*Kṣātrīyatva*' and the like, all of which cannot be perceived by the senses. What is meant by calling a man 'Brāhmaṇa' is not that he belongs to any such *jāti*, but only that he is descended from a particular line of ancestors. So says Kumārila also—'*Brāhmaṇatvaṇi yonitvaḥ*' (*Shloka-vārtika*, 'Vanavāda', 29); The purity of descent has to be accepted until there is sufficient proof to the contrary (Vide, *Tantravārtika*, under I—ii—2).

CHAPTER III.

An Analytical Account of the Mīmāṃsā Shāstra.

[Books consulted :—

1. The *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* of Jaimini (Bibliothica Indica).
2. The *Bhāṣya* of Shabara (do.)
3. The *Shloka-vārṭika* of Kumārila (Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series, Benares).
4. The *Nyāyaraṭnākara* of Pārthasarathi Mishra—a Commentary on (3). (Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series, Benares).
5. The *Kāshikā* of Sucharita Mishra—a Commentary on (3). (*Manuscript* with Mahāmahopādhyāya P. Chitrādhara Mishra, Darbhanga).
6. The *Tantravārṭika* of Kumārila (Benares Sanskrit Series).
7. The *Tuṭṭikā* do (do).
8. The *Nyāyāsudhā* by Someshvara—Commentary on (6) (Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series).
9. The *Vārṭikābharana* by Someshvara, Commentary on (7) (*Manuscript* with Mr. Govindāśa, Benares).
10. The *Shāstraḍīpikā* by Pārthasarathi Mishra—a Commentary on (1) ('Pandit,' Benares).
11. The *Tantrarātna* by Pārthasarathi Mishra—a running Commentary on the last nine chapters of (2). (*Manuscript* with Mr. Govindāśa, Benares).
12. The *Mayūkhamālikā* by Somanātha—Commentary on (10). *Manuscript* with Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Chitrādhara Mishra, Darbhanga).
13. The *Nyāyamālā* and *Viṣṭara* of Mādhavāchārya (Ānandasram Series).
14. The *Subodhini* Commentary on the Sūtras ('Pandit,' Benares).

15. The *Mīmāṃsānayaviveka* by Bhavanāṭha Mishra—a Commentary on (2), *Manuscript* with Mr. Govindadāsa, Benares).
16. The *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇī* by Maṇḍana Mishra—an abstract of (2)—(*Manuscript* with the writer).
17. The English Translations of (3) and (6) by the writer (Bibliotheca Indica).
18. The *Mīmāṃsābālāprakāśha* of Shaṅkara Bhatta (Chaukhambhā Sanskrit Series).
19. The *Bṛīhaṭī* of Prabhākara Mishra (*Manuscript* with the writer, and also in the Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal). Adhyāyas I to V, and Adh. VI (pādas 1 and 2).
20. The *Rijuvimalā* of Shālikanāṭha Mishra—(*Manuscript* with Writer, at the India Office Library, and at the Travancore Palace Library). Adhyāyas I (incomplete), and III to V.
21. The *Prakaranapañchikū* of Shālikanāṭha Mishra (Chaukhambhā Sanskrit Series).
22. The *Bhāṭṭabhāskara* of Jivadeva (*Manuscript* with Writer).
23. The *Vidhiviveka* of Maṇḍana Mishra ('Pandit').
24. The *Nyāyakanīkā* of Vachaspati Mishra—Commentary on (23) ('Pandit').
25. The *Nyayaraṭnamālā* of Pārthasārathi Mishra (Chaukhambhā Sanskrit Series).
26. *Bāmānuja's* Commentary on (25) (*Manuscript*, first half, with Mr. Govindadāsa, Benares, and second half at the Bodleian Library, Oxford).
27. The *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā* of Kṛṣṇayajvan ('Pandit').
28. The *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśha* by Anantaḍeva ('Pandit').
29. The *Bhāṭṭalaṅkāra*—Commentary on (28) (MS. with writer).

30. The *Vidhirasāyana* of Appayya Dikṣiṭa (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series).
31. *Mīmāṃsāvidhibhāṣana*—by Gopala Bhatta (MS. with Mr. Govinda-dasa).
32. The *Arthasaṅgraha* of Laugākṣi Bhāskara (Benares Sanskrit Series).
33. The English Translation of (30) by Dr. G. Thibaut (Benares Sanskrit Series).
34. The *Śatapaṭha Brāhmaṇa* (Berlin Edition).
35. The *Shrautaśāstranirvachana* ('Pandit').
36. The *Trikāṇḍamaṇḍana* (Bibliothica Indica).

*SECTION I—SUB-SECTION (1).

Veda—its bearing and authority in regard to Dharma.

1. The understanding of the true nature of Dharma being the avowed aim of the *Mīmāṃsaka*, he takes care to justify it, at the very outset, by proving that an earnest enquiry into the nature of Dharma was something that in itself was absolutely necessary for every responsible agent; unless he knows what his Dharma or Duty is, how can he regulate his actions? The next question that arises is—why should this enquiry be carried on in the manner in which it has been done by Jaimini and his followers? In this connection, the *Mīmāṃsaka* holds that the Veda is the sole authority for Dharma (Sū. 2),—the only source from which a right knowledge of Dharma can be obtained; for this reason the proper study of the Veda becomes necessary. But as this study of the Veda itself would be a Dharma, this also must have its basis in the Veda; consequently the *Mīmāṃsaka* makes it his business to show that the proper study of the Veda—for the special purpose of obtaining the knowledge of Dharma—is something that is laid down in the Veda itself. This forms the subject-matter of the first 'adhikaraṇa' or 'Topic of Consideration.'

* The 'section' corresponds roughly to the 'Adhyāyav' and 'sub-section' to the 'pāda' of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*.

2. Kumāṛila and his followers take as their basic text, in this connection, the sentence ‘*svādhyāyo’ dhyētavyaḥ*,’ ‘the Veda should be studied,’ and proceed to explain that the ‘*study of the Veda*’ herein laid down cannot be the getting up of the mere *words* of the Veda; but this, and also the due understanding of the *meaning* of the sentences; the getting up of the mere word would serve no useful purpose for the student. And as the meaning of the Vedic directions cannot be comprehended without due investigation and enquiry, an investigation such as the one initiated by Jaimini becomes necessary.

3. To the above view, Prabhākara and his followers demur. Their objections are briefly these:—By the above reasoning, all persons desiring to understand *Dharma*—no matter whether he be a *Ḍviija* or not—would be entitled to the study of the Veda; and this would be against the express injunctions of the Veda. Here, as elsewhere, the ‘Prābhākara’ view is more orthodox than the ‘Bhātta’ theory. In order to avoid the said difficulty, the Prābhākara takes for his text the sentence from the *Smṛitis*—‘*upanīya tu yaḥ śiṣyam vedaṁ nadhyāpayeḍ ḍviijaḥ sakalpam sarahasyaṁ cha ṭamāchāryam prachakṣaṭe*,’ ‘that Brāhmaṇa who, having initiated the pupil, teaches him the Veda along with the ritualistic rules and esoteric explanations,—him they call the *teacher*,’—as taken along with the Vedic text ‘*aṣṭavarṣam brāhmaṇam upanayīṭa*,’ ‘the Brāhmaṇa should be initiated when he is eight years old.’ The motive desire towards the enquiry into *Dharma*, in this case, is on the part of the Teacher, and not on that of the pupil (as in the case of the text quoted by Kumāṛila). The teacher wishes to obtain for himself the title and honours of the true *āchārya* or *teacher*; and as there can be no *teacher* without some one who is taught, he has to take (*upa-nī*) a pupil (*śiṣya*); but as the latter cannot be a ‘pupil’ unless he is made to ‘study,’ this *studying* by the pupil is implied in the

above texts; and as the 'study' cannot be carried on without the aid of a 'teacher,' the one is implied by the other. This explanation is free from the objection to which the *Bhātta* view is open; as the learned 'Teacher,' who, in his turn, cannot but be a *Dvija*, cannot take a *non-dvija* pupil. The injunction of *Vedic study* being thus implied in the injunction of taking a pupil for the purpose of obtaining the title and honours of the 'Teacher,'—it becomes necessary to find out a purpose for this study,—at any rate, so far as the pupil is concerned, for whose action the purpose of the teacher cannot supply the requisite motive. This purpose lies in the due comprehension of the meaning of the Vedic texts studied; and as this is not possible without due reflection and pondering of the texts, the investigation carried on in the *Mīmāṃsā-shāstra* becomes fully justified.*

4. The necessity of the enquiry for the purpose of obtaining knowledge of *Dharma* having been established, the question naturally arises—What is the '*Dharma*' for the knowing of which we have to carry on all this difficult investigation? This forms the subject of the second *adhikaraṇa* comprising the *sūtrā* I—i-2. The word '*dharma*' here is not used in the ordinary sense of the *merit* acquired by the performance of some good deed; it is used in the much wider sense of such act or acts as are laid down in the *Veda* as conducive to the happiness of the agent.

5. According to the *Bhātta* view this *adhikaraṇa* meets the position that *Dharma* is something that cannot be defined; and hence for a knowledge of it there is no valid means available. The answer to this is that we have a good definition of *Dharma* in that *it is that which, while being conducive to happiness, is mentioned in the Veda*; and this same also shows that in the *Veda* we have the valid means of knowing *Dharma*. Thus then *Sūtra* 2 contains three statements;—*viz*: (1) that *Dharma* is that which is laid

* See *Prakaraṇapāñchikā*, pp. 5-12.

down in the Veda as conducive to happiness; (2) that the Veda is the means of acquiring the right knowledge of *Dharma*; and (3) that the Veda is a trustworthy means of knowledge. The *Prābhākara* view on the other hand is that the first *Sūtra* having declared that, (1) the enquiry into *Dharma* is to follow the study of the whole Veda, that (2) the whole Veda is intended to be expressive, and that (3) hence the word '*Dharma*' applies to all that is mentioned in the Veda,—the question naturally arises—'What do you mean here by *all that is mentioned in the Veda*?' Does it include *all* that we find there,—for instance, also those parts that contain mere *descriptions* of things as they are,—or only those parts that contain *injunctions* of what is to be done? And in regard to this question, the conclusion is that the '*Veda*' meant here as to have its meaning studied as providing Knowledge of *Dharma* is only that part of it which speaks of *something to be done*; and the reason for this is that, according to the *Anvīṭābhīḍhāna* theory (chapter II, §8), we can construe a sentence and find out its meaning only when it contains some sort of an injunction for something to be done. For instance, when we find certain effects in the shape of joy and so forth, produced by a mere statement of facts,—*e. g.* 'a son has been born to you,'—as the effect is one that can be due to a number of causes, we cannot necessarily know that it was due to the news of the birth; but when we see that the boy brings the jar on being ordered to 'bring the jar,'—we at once conclude that the sentence *means* the bringing of the jar. Thus then, we find that the chief point at issue between the '*Bhātta*' and the '*Prābhākara*' Schools lay in *Prabhākara's* theory of verbal construction, called the '*Anvīṭābhīḍhānavāda*' as distinguished from the '*Abhihiṭānvayavāda*' of Kumārila and his followers; and though *Prabhākara* could not have any serious objections against the *Bhātta* view of the *adhikaraṇa*, yet he has put forward his own interpretation with a view to emphasise, at

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the very outset, what forms the keystone of his School of Thought. According to *Bhāṭṭa* the word 'Uhoḍanā' of Sū. 2 stands for the *Veda*, while according to *Prabhākara* it stands for *Vedic Injunctions*.*

6. That the *Veda* affords the means of knowing *Dharma* having been proved in *sūtra* 2, the question arises as to whether or not it is necessary to examine the character of the *Veda*. The answer as given in *sūtra* 3 is that such an examination is essential, specially for the *Mīmāṃsā-shāstra* which makes it its business to enquire into all matters relating to *Dharma*. According to *Prabhākara*, the question dealt with in *sūtra* 3 is whether it would not be the right order of procedure,—after having proved the fact of the *Veda* affording the means of knowing *Dharma*,—to ascertain what is contained in the *Veda* (which is dealt with in *Adhyāyas* II, *et. seq.*), rather than proceed with an enquiry as to the validity or the trustworthy character of the *Veda*. The conclusion is that, though when it comes to *action*, then certainly what is contained in the *Veda*, as *to be done*, becomes of prime importance; but when we are carrying on an enquiry into the character of *Dharma* and the means of knowing it, our first business is to ascertain how far our avowed source of knowledge is valid and can be relied upon; as it is only then that we can be sure as to what is actually mentioned in the *Veda* as *to be done*. Another reason for taking up this point first lies in the fact that the validity of a means of knowledge is something inherent in itself, and as such independent of everything else; whereas, whether a certain act is, or is not, laid down by a certain authoritative text depends upon the trustworthy character of that text itself.†

7. Before proceeding to explain the valid means of the knowledge of *Dharma*, our authors prove by various arguments that the ordinary means of knowledge—Perception,

**Bṛhatī*, Ms. pp. 3—5; and *Rijurimatī* Ms. pp. 10 and 14.

†*Rijurimatī*, Ms. p. 27.

Inference, Words (in the ordinary sense), Analogy and Presumption—are by their very nature unable to afford a knowledge of *Dharma*. We have already given above (Chapter II) a detailed account of these ‘means of knowledge’. The author of the *Sūtra* takes up in Sū. 4, only Perception, and shows that it pertains only to such things as are in the present, and are in contact with the organs of perception; and from this the natural conclusion is that it cannot afford any knowledge of *Dharma*, which is neither a thing of the present, nor one that can ever be in contact with any organ of perception. Inference, Presumption and Analogy are all based, directly or indirectly, upon Perception; and hence these also cannot apply to *Dharma*, which is entirely beyond the range of Perception.

8. Having thus, in Sūtra I—i-4, which also forms the fourth *Adhikaraṇa*, shown what is *not* the means of knowing *Dharma*, the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to show, in Sūtra I-i-5, which also forms the fifth *adhikaraṇa*, what *is* such means. Herein it is pointed out that ‘Word’ is the only means of obtaining valid information on the subject of *Dharma*. What is meant by this ‘word’ and how it brings about the cognition of what it denotes we have already explained (under Chapter II). It would suffice here to state briefly that in regard to all matters not within reach of the organs of perception, ‘word’ is the infallible source of knowledge, independently of all other agencies. In proving the eternity of the word and what is denoted by it, the Mīmāṃsaka meets the opposition of the Idealist and the Nihilist; for this reason, Śaṅkara, and Prabhākara and Kumārila with him, devote a section to each of these systems, and herein it is proved that the things of the external world have an independent reality of their own. In order to establish the validity of such Vedic texts as speak of agents going to heaven, it also becomes necessary to establish the existence

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of the Ātman or Self, as something apart from the perishing body.

9. In *Adhikaraṇa* 6 (*Sūtras* 6-23), the eternality of 'words' is proved in greater detail; and all objections to the contrary are met. In *Adhikaraṇa* 7 (*Sūtras* 24-26) we have the proof of the capacity of the Veda to afford valid knowledge of *Dharma*. *Adhikaraṇa* 8 (*Sūtras* 27-32) proves the fact that the Veda is not the composition of an author, either human or divine. This is a necessary corollary to the eternality of the Veda. Thus the whole of the First *Adhyāya* is taken up in the establishing of the two main propositions propounded in *Sūtra* 2,—that the Veda is authoritative and trustworthy, and that in the matter of *Dharma*, it is the only source of valid knowledge available. On these two points there is a general agreement among all Mimāṃsakas.*

10. The Veda has been defined as 'The collection of *Mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas*'. Of 'Mantra' no formal definition has been attempted by the earlier writers. Later *Sūtra*-writers have however defined it as 'the *karana* or instrument of offering'; but this definition is too wide; as the substances offered, the various implements used, and such other accessories of the sacrifice, are all as much 'instruments of offering' as the *mantras*. It is for this reason that the more logical writers on Mimāṃsā have contented themselves with explaining 'mantra' as a name including all those Vedic passages to which the learned men apply that name. (*Mimāṃsā-sūtra* II—i-38). Says the *Bṛīhaṭī MS.* p. 50 b.—

'In the Veda some passages are *Mantras* and others *Brāhmaṇas*; those to which the learned apply the name 'mantra' are *mantras*; while all the rest, to which they also apply the name 'vidhi', are *Brāhmaṇas*;—the *Arthavādas* and the *Nāmadheyas* are also included under these latter,—'Brāhmaṇa' proper being the name applied to

* See *Mimāṃsābalāprakāsha*, pp. 1-8.

the Injunction, and the *Ārthavāḍa* and *Nāmadheya* passages being included under that name, by reason of their always, in some way or the other, subverting the Injunctions along with which they are construed.

11. The *Brāhmaṇas* or Injunctive Sentences have been divided into five classes:—(1) The *Karmotpattivākya*, which enjoins a certain act,—e. g. ‘one should perform the *Agnihotra*’; (2) the *Guṇavākya* which enjoins certain necessary details connected with a prescribed act, e.g. ‘one should perform the *homa* with curds’; (3) the *Phalavākya*, which mentions the result following from the performance of a certain act, e.g. ‘one desirous of attaining heaven should perform the *Agnihotra*’; (4) the *Phalāyaguṇavākya*, which lays down a certain accessory detail as conducive to a particular result,—e.g. ‘one desirous of having efficient sense-organs should perform the *homa* with curds’; and (5) the *Saguṇakarmotpattivākya*, which enjoins an action along with an accessory detail,—e.g. ‘one should perform the sacrifice with *soma*.’

Another classification of Injunctions is under the following three heads:—(1) the *Apūrvavidhi* or *Original Injunction*, which enjoins something not otherwise known, as possible—e.g. ‘the grains should be washed’; (2) the *Niyamavidhi* or *Restrictive Injunction*, which fixes upon a certain method as the one to be adopted in all cases, while in the natural course it would be adopted in a few cases only;—, e.g. ‘the thumping of the corn’ insisted upon as the only one method to be adopted for removing the chaff from the grains; and (3) the *Parisaṅkyāvidhi* or *Preclusive Injunction*, which precludes some from among a number of possible alternatives,—e.g. the preclusion of the use of the *Mantra* ‘*Imāmagrībhaṇa rashaṇām*, &c.’ in the holding of the reins of the ass. In the *Niyamavidhi* that which is enjoined is already known as possible, but only as an alternative, and as such it is possible in one case only, and not possible in other cases; in the *Apūrvavidhi*—*Prabhā*. 111.

vidhi what is enjoined is entirely unknown as possible: this is what is meant by the saying - *Viḍhira'ḡaṇṭamaprapṭe niyamak pṛakṛike saṭi*;—in the *P. risuḥkhyāvidhi* on the other hand, all that is enjoined is already known; but not necessarily as possible alternatives; they may be known as all simultaneously possible; there nothing is *unknown*; all are known; and out of these a few are chosen and enjoined.

12. *Mantras* are classed under three heads—(1) *Ṛik*, *Sāman* and *Yajus*; on these three names the *Bṛihaṭi* (Ms. p. 50 b) remarks as follows:—

‘The words *Ṛik*, *Sāman* and *Yajus* are found to be used in connection with the Vedas; hence it becomes necessary to ascertain what part of the Veda is to be called *Ṛik*, what part *Yajus* and what part *Sāman*. On this point, our conclusion is that the name *Ṛik* is applied to those sentences that are divided into *feet*,—i.e., into certain well-defined parts, each consisting of a definite number of syllables—and are called, on that account, by such prosodial names as *Āgātṛi* *Triṣṭup*, &c.’ (Mīm. Sū. 11—1-35).

The word ‘*prīṭha*’ is sometimes used to imply the *Rig-veda* (Mīm. Sū. VII—iii—35-36). The word *Sāman* does not strictly apply to the *mantras* themselves; it is applied to the *music* to which certain *mantras* are set, and not to the *words* (Mīm. Sū. II—1—36), and hence a *mantra* can be called ‘*Sāman*’ only when it is set to music and *sung* as such (Mīm. Sū. VII—ii—1 to 21). Thus one and the same *mantra* set to different kinds of music, becomes known under different names—such as ‘*Raṭhaṇṭara*’, ‘*Bṛihaṭ*’, and the like. This setting to music is regarded as a *samskāra* or purification of the *mantras* (Mīm. Sū. IX—ii—3 to 13), and as such owes its origin to the singer; and in so far it cannot be regarded as *Veda* proper, which is independent of all sources, human or divine. For instance, the syllables *ā hau*, &c., that are added to the *mantras* by the exigencies of music, are by

no means fixed, they depend upon the singer, who may or may not use a certain syllable, or sets of syllables. (Mīm. Sū. IX—ii—29). In the case of all *mantras*, wherever they are used as *prais*, they must be used in their *Sāman* form—that is, set to music and sung; as the praise pleases more when it is sung than when it is merely recited. (IX—ii—30-31).

Sāmans are divided into several kinds, the division being based upon the different methods of singing; for instance, the *Bṛihati* *Sāman* is to be sung with force and very loudly, while the *Rathin'ara* is to be sung not loudly, and not with force (Mīm. Sū. IX—ii—46). The name 'Yajus' is given to all those *mantrāḥ* that are neither arranged in metrical feet, nor set to music (Mīm. Sū. II—i—37). There are some *mantras* that have been called 'nigāḍas'; this is a name given to those *mantras* that are addressed to others. These also are included in the 'Yajus'; because like these latter, they also have neither metre nor music; hence they have been defined as such *Yajus* *mantras* as are addressed to others, and are recited *loudly*, and not in the low voice prescribed for the *Yajus* in general. The *Rik* and the *Sāman Mantras* also are to be recited loudly.

13. What we have explained above is the main three-fold classification of *Mantras*. There is also another classification based upon the difference in the character of the signification of accentuation and so forth. This classification pertains only to the *Rik* and the *Yajus Mantras*. Of the former there are 273 kinds, and of the latter, 50. These have been described and exemplified in detail by Śhaṅkara Bhatta in his *Mīmāṃsābūlaprakāśha* (pp. 58-70). We shall note here only those that have been mentioned by Upavarṣa in his *Vṛitṭi* mentioned in the *Bhāṣya* of Śhaṅkara (page 126):— (1) *asyanta*—those ending in the word 'asi'—e. g. 'medhā 'si &c.' (2) 'Tṛānta'—those ending in the word 'tṛā,' e. g. 'Īkhē tṛā' (*Vājasaneyasamhitā* I-1). (3) *Benedictory*—e. g.

‘*Āyurdā asi, &c.*’ (Vājas. sam. 3-17). (4) *Eulogistic*—*e. g.* ‘*Agnirmūrḍhā, &c.*’ (Rigveda 1-8-14-16). (5) *Incoherent*—*e. g.* ‘*akṣi te Indra piṅgale duleriva.*’ (6) *Plaintive*—*e. g.* ‘*Agnīdag-
in rīhara*’ (Taittī. Sam. 6-3-1-2). (8) *Inquisitive*—*e. g.* ‘*Ko-si kaṭamo-si*’ (Vajas. Sam. 7-29). (9) *Interrogatory*—*e. g.* ‘*Prichchhāmi tvā, &c.*’ (Rigveda 1-164-34). (10) *Descriptive*—*e. g.* ‘*Iyam Vedih, &c.*’ (Rigveda 1-164-35) (11). *Elliptical*—*e. g.* when the words ‘*achchhidreṇa pavitreṇa*’ are added to the mantra ‘*Chitpaṭistvā punātu*’ (Taittī. Sam. 1-2-1-2). (12) *Prayoga-mantras*—*i. e.*, *Mantras* with three-fold and four-fold accent—*e. g.*, ‘*Ikhe tvā &c.*’ (Vāj. Sam. 1-1) and ‘*Agnimīle, &c.*’ (Rigveda 1-1-1) respectively. (13) *Indicative*—*e. g.*, the mantra ‘*Devasya tvā—nirvāpāmi*’ is indicative of *nirvāpa* (*i. e.*, the putting in of a handful of corn into the winnowing basket).

14. Mantras have also been classified according to their metres. This classification pertains to the *Rik Mantras* only. The following are the principal metres :

- (1) *Gāyatrī*—having 24 syllables, with its 9 sub-divisions.
- (2) *Uṣṇik*—having 28 syllables, with its 8 sub-divisions.
- (3) *Anuṣṭup*—having 32 syllables, with its 7 sub-divisions.
- (4) *Bṛihaṭī*—having 36 syllables, with its 9 sub-divisions.
- (5) *Prakṛiṭī*—having 40 syllables, with its 8 sub-divisions.
- (6) *Tṛiṣṭup*—having 44 syllables, with its 10 sub-divisions.
- (7) *Jagaṭī*—having 8 syllables, with its 3 sub-divisions.
- (8) *Aṭijagaṭī*—having 52 syllables.
- (9) *Shakvarī*—having 56 syllables.
- (10) *Aṭishakvarī*—having 60 syllables.
- (11) *Aṣṭī*—having 64 syllables.
- (12) *Aṭyaṣṭī*—having 68 syllables.
- (13) *Dhṛiṭī*—having 72 syllables.
- (14) *Aṭidhṛiṭī*—having 76 syllables.

Of these, the Gāyatrī, the Trīstup and the Jagatī are found mentioned in the *Śatapaṭha Brāhmaṇa* in 1.2.2.6; 3.4.1.22; 3.4.4.8.; and 4.1.1.8; some others are mentioned in 8.2.2.6 also.

15. From the very definition of the *Rik* it would follow that there can be no metre in the *Yajus-mantras*. But Piṅgala in his *Chhandahśūtra* says that there are metres in these also. That this is a later innovation is proved by the fact that true 'Vedic authority' is not accepted by many old writers (Karka for instance) to belong to those *Yajus-mantras* that are differentiated by metres; and that even those who accept their authority (for instance Devayājñika) assert that there is no metre in many *Yajus-mantras* on account of the number of syllables in them not being fixed. Herein may be found an orthodox authority for the view propounded by Western Orientalists, that the metrical portions of the Yajurveda are comparatively modern.

16. Having described the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Mantra*, we proceed to describe the *Arthavāda*. *Arthavāda* passages are of three kinds :—(1) Descriptive by indirect implication; (2) Descriptive by direct intention; and (3) Descriptive of an accomplished fact. This is the main classification; there is another classification, whereby we have 38 kinds of *Arthavāda*. These are described and exemplified in detail in the *Mīmāṃsā-bālaprakāśha* (pp. 48-58). We shall note here a few of the more important kinds :—

(1) *Benedictory*—‘*so-kāmayata prajāḥ srijema;*’ (2) *Anecdotal*—‘*Puruṣam vai dēvāḥ paśumālābhanṭa;*’ (3) *Ratiocinative*—‘*Shūrpeṇa juhoṭi, tena hyannaṅkriyate;*’ (4) *Deprecatory*—‘*so-roḍi!*’ (5) *Eulogistic*—‘*vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭhā dēvaṭā*’ (6) *Descriptive of deeds done*—‘*Iti hasmāha, &c.*’ (7) *Indicative of deity*—‘*Annādam vā ya eṭamātmano janayate yadagnin.*’ (8) *Indicative of material*—‘*eṭadrai sarvadevatyam vāso yaṭ kṣaumatam.*’ (9) *Indicative of action*—‘*upari hi dēvebhyo dhārayatī*’.

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(10) *Indicative of the agent*—‘*eṣā rū-nāhītāgne*’. (11) *Indicative of time*—‘*upamshupaurṇamāsyam yajan*.’ (12) *Indicative of place*—‘*Tāṇḍake sarasvatyā cinashanē, &c.*’ (13) *Figurative*—indicative of similarity—‘*yathā vai shyeno nityayūḍaṭṭe evaṇ dviśaṇṭam bhrātrivyaṇ nipaṭyūḍaṭṭe.*’

17. When dealing with *Mantras*, Jaimini lays down three principles governing the construing of sentences. Among the three kinds of *mantras*, with regard to those that are in the metrical form, and those that are set to music;—i. e., the *Rik* and *Sāman* *mantras*,—there is not much difficulty in ascertaining how far the *mantra* extends. When however we come to the prose *mantras*—the *Yajus* and the *Nigādas*—it is sometimes difficult to ascertain how far a certain *mantra* may be regarded as extending. It is in connection with this question that the ‘principles of interpretation’ are discussed and laid down. These principles are known by the names of—(1) The *Ekavākyaṭṭādhikaraṇa* or the Principle of ‘Syntactical Connection’ (Mim. Sū. II—i—56),—(2) the *Ukyaḥbhāṭṭādhikaraṇa* or the Principle of ‘Syntactical Split’ (II—i—47),—and (3) the *Anuśaṅgādhikaraṇa*, or the Principle of ‘Elliptical Extension’ (II—i—48). We shall explain each of these Principles in some detail; as they play an important part in the whole science of *Mīmāṃsā*, and serve a directly useful purpose in all textual interpretations.

I.—The *Principle of Syntactical Connection*.^{*} The principle may be thus stated:—*When a number of words are found to be such that when construed collectively, they are expressive of a single idea,—and when taken severally they are not expressive of any idea, being short of some necessary syntactical factor,—these words must be regarded as forming a single sentence.* (II

^{*} See *Bṛihaṭ*, M.S. p. 51; and *Tantravārtika*, pp. 423—31.

Both Prabhākara and Bhatta take this principle, as here laid down, to apply to the *Yajus* *Mantras* only; as the extent of the *Rik* is fixed by the metre, and that of the *Sāman* by the music.

—i—46). As an example we have the following:—In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamasā* sacrifices, we read the sentence ‘*Devasya tva savitah prasave—ashvinorbāhubhyām—puṣṇo hastābhyām agnayē juṣtam nirvapāmi*’ (Shatāpāṭha Br. I. 1-2-17). Here we find four distinct parts, each of which might be taken as an independent sentence and *mantra*, unless we had something to show that the whole must be taken and used as a single sentence and *mantra*. This something we have in the form of the principle in consideration. If we take the first part—‘*devasyā tva savitah*’—we find that it does not express any idea, being wanting in the verb; similarly with each of the other parts we find that it is wanting in some integral syntactical factor; the last part also—‘*agnayē juṣtam nirvapāmi*’—though otherwise complete, is found to be in need of an instrumental nominative in connection with the passive past-participle ‘*juṣtam*’; we further observe that if we take the whole together, it expresses the single idea of the *nirvāpa* or *preparation of something resorted to or accepted by the arms of the Ashvins and the hands of Pūṣan*.

There is a difference of opinion among the followers of Kumārila as to the exact meaning of the word ‘*artha*’ (translated above as *idea*) in the *sūtra* enunciating the principle. Pārthasārathi Mishra takes it to mean *purpose*; and thus according to him, all the words, phrases and clauses *that serve a single purpose* are to be regarded as ‘one sentence.’ Someshvara Bhatta, on the other hand, in his *Nyāyasūdhā* takes it in the sense of *idea*. According to Prābhākara, ‘*artha*’ here means ‘the reminding or indicating of what is to be done’; and he distinctly favours the ‘Mishra’ view; specially as being an *Anvīṭābhīdhānavādin*, he could not very well accept the words to have any meaning apart from the other words; hence he says that the word ‘*artha*’ must mean *prayojana*, ‘purpose’; as this is the most important factor, and all words must be related to the most important factor (See *Bṛihatī* p. 51.)

Prābhā. 117.

II.—The *principle of Syntactical Split*.^{*} This principle, an antithesis of the foregoing, may be thus stated :—*When a number of words are found to be such that when each word, or set of words, taken severally, independently of others, is equally capable of expressing one complete idea,—each of these should be regarded as a distinct sentence.* For instance, in the passage,—‘*Āyuryajñena kalpaṭām—prāṇo yajñena kalpaṭām &c.*’ (Vājas. Sam. 9-21), each part is a distinct sentence complete in itself; because it expresses a complete idea, independently of the other. That this construction is the correct one is also proved by the Vedic junction ‘*kṛipṭīrvāchayaṭi*’ where the passage in question is spoken of by the name ‘*kṛipṭī*’ in the plural, which shows that the passage contains as many distinct sentences as there are ‘*kalpaṭāms*’ in it. This principle applies, not only to cases where the words of the *mantra* are found to be so construable, but also to those cases where, even though the words actually present in the *mantra* are such as not allowing of separate construction, yet such construction becomes possible by virtue of certain words added to the *mantra*, under proper authority. For instance, in the *mantra*—*Ikhe tvorjē*, &c. (Vājas. Sam. I-1), we find that the *mantra*, as it stands, is not capable of being broken up into many sentences; but in connection with the several parts of this passage we meet with such Vedic injunctions as—‘with the words *urjē* he washes it’ and so forth (Vide *Shatapaṭha Br.* 1, 1, 6, 6; 1, 7, 1, 2; 4, 3, 1, 1, 7); on the authority of these injunctions then, it becomes necessary to supply to the *mantras* such words as ‘*chhināmi*’ and ‘*anumārjmi*’ and the like; and with these words supplied, each of the several parts of the passage becomes a complete sentence, expressing a complete idea,—such as—(1) *O palāsha* branch, I am cutting thee for the obtaining of desirable food,’ and (2) ‘I am washing thee for the obtaining of strength,’ and so forth. In

Bṛihaṭi MS. p. 61 b. and *Taṇṭravārtika* p. 431.

connection with this however, it may be noted that a single *Yajus* cannot be broken up into many sentences without sufficient authority. We had such authority in both the cases cited above. This 'syntactical split' as it has been called, is permissible only in very rare cases; in fact, not until it is shown that no other construction is possible,—either in view of the structure of the sentence itself, or in virtue of some direct injunction necessitating such split; and the reason for this is that in a case where the nature of the sentence is such that it admits of being taken as a single sentence, if we do have recourse to 'syntactical split,' we incur the responsibility of abandoning the natural, syntactical construction without any authority; and further, where the sentence, taken as a single *mantra*, would lead to a single transcendental result, we—by forcing the syntactical split—make it necessary to assume a number of such results proceeding from each of the different *mantras* into which the original passage may be split up. And in a case where we have no direct injunction necessitating the syntactical split,—and where the split necessitates the addition of more words,—these words, being supplied by ourselves without the authority of the Vedic injunction, cannot be regarded as 'Vedic'; and hence the *mantra* containing those non-Vedic words would no longer remain '*mantra*' in the proper sense of the term.

To this Principle we have a corollary to the effect that, *when different parts of a mantra are found by their implication to be meant for serving distinct purposes, each such parts should be regarded as a distinct sentence.* For instance, in the mantra—*Syonante sadanankri-nomi.....tasmin sīda'* (*Taittī. Brāhmaṇa*, 3, 7, 5, 2; and *Mānava Shraṇṭasūtra* 1-2-6-19),—we find that the first part, by its meaning, is intended to be employed in the act of preparing the 'seat' for the cake, while the last part, in the

same manner, for that of actually keeping the cake upon that 'seat'; hence the passage is regarded as containing two distinct *mantras*. This has been called 'Syntactical Split due to difference in Use.' (See *Bṛihaṭi* Ms. p. 79 b).

III. *The Principle of Elliptical Extension.**

In many *Yajus* passages it is found that there are several sentences that stand in need of a certain word or phrase or clause, while the whole *yajus* contains only one such word phrase or clause; in such cases it would appear that this word, phrase or clause is to be construed and used along with only that one of the several sentences which happens to be nearest to it; and it is the possibility of this construction that the present principle precludes. By this principle the word, phrase or clause is to be used along with every one of the sentences,—provided that every one of these is of the same type and form; and the reason for this is that the intervention of a similar sentence does not become an obstacle to syntactical connection. As an example we have the passage—'*yā te agne' yaḥṣhayā tanūrvarṣiṣṭhā gahvareṣṭhā ugram vacho apūradhītṭoeṣumapāvadhītṣvāhā—yā te agne rajāṣhayā—yā te agne harāṣhayā*' (Vājas. Sam. 5-8; and Śaṭapatha Br. 3-4-4-23). Here by the principle above stated, the clause '*tanūh.....svāhā*' has to be repeated along with '*yā te agne rajāṣhayā*', as also with '*yā te agne harāṣhayā*'; and its connection does not cease only with '*yā te yaḥṣhayā*.' In this example, the clause to be connected with different sentences, forms the principal clause in each sentence; but it does not make any difference even if the clause in question be a subordinate one. For instance, in the passage—'*Chītpaṭistvā punātu—Vākpaṭistvā punātu—devaṣṭvā savitvā punātu—achchhidreṇa pavitṛeṇa vasoḥ sūryasya rashmibhiḥ*'—(Taitṭi. Sam. 1-2-1-2) the subordinate clause '*achchhidreṇa.....rashmibhiḥ*' has to be taken with each of the sentences ending in *punātu*.'

Bṛihaṭi. Ms. pp. 51 b—52, and *Tanṭravārtika* pp. 434 et. seq.

SECTION I—*Sub-section (2).*

Authoritative character of the *Mantra*, the *Arṭhavāḍa* and the *Nāmaḍheya*.

1. In the last sub-section we have seen how the whole Veda is regarded as authoritative; and we have also seen that 'Veda' is the name given to a collection of sentences, which have been roughly classed under the three heads of the *Brāhmaṇa* or *Vidhi*, the *Mantra* and the *Arṭhavāḍa*. And the question that we shall consider under the present sub-section bears upon the degree of authority attaching to these three kinds of sentences.

2. As regards the *Vidhi* or Injunctive passages, they lay down directly what constitutes *Dharma*; and as such they constitute the 'Veda' *par excellence*; and as such there can be no question as to their trustworthy character. This has been shown, in the very definition of *Dharma*, that *Dharma* is that act which is laid down by the injunctive passages of the Veda, as conducive to happiness. We shall proceed now to consider the case of the *Arṭhavāḍa* and the *mantra* passages.

3. * Though as we have seen above, *Arṭhavāḍas* are of many kinds, yet for our present purposes we shall take only the two classes under which most of them fall,—*viz.* the *Eulogistic* and the *Deprecatory*. Those belonging to the former class are found to praise something—material, action or deity—related, directly or indirectly, to some act laid down by an injunctive passage; while those of the latter class are found to deprecate something related to an act that has been prohibited. Both these sets of passages have their use, in persuading men towards the speedier fulfilment of the injunction, or the quicker avoidance of what is prohibited by the prohibition, with which they may

* Mim. Sū. I—ii-7.

be respectively connected. And so far as the *Arthavāda* is found to be capable of being construed along with injunctions,—it is regarded as authoritative; specially as it serves the distinctly useful purpose of helping the injunction in its persuasive or prohibitive function.

4. As regards the Prābhākara view of the authority of the *Arthavāda*, Gaḍādhara (from what he says in his *Shaktivāda*) would have us believe that *Arthavādas*, according to Prābhākara, are not *untrustworthy*, but they are simply *inexpressive*; as, in accordance with the *Anvīṭābhiḍhāna* theory, only that sentence is really *expressive* which lays down something *to be done*; and hence it is only the injunction that can be really *expressive*; as meanings of word can be comprehended only through injunctions addressed by the old to the young. Though this may be true with regard to the *Arthavāda* passage taken by itself; yet this cannot be accepted as the final conclusion accepted by Prābhākara; as on referring to Prābhākara's own work, the *Bṛīhaṭī*, we find that the view expressed above represents only the '*Pūrvapakṣa*'; and is demolished by the final '*Siddhānta*.' The *Bhāṭṭa* '*pūrvapakṣa*' is that *Arthavādas* are *apramāṇa* or untrustworthy. While the *Prābhākara* represents the '*pūrvapakṣa*' as that they are *arṛchaka* or inexpressive,—the opponent finding this a more suitable view to be propounded in face of the *Prābhākara*, who holds tenaciously to the *Anvīṭābhiḍhāna* theory of word-denotation. The *Siddhānta* or final conclusion as adopted by Prābhākara is that 'the *Arthavāda* is as much *Veda* as the *Viḍhi* itself, as it also, like the *Viḍhi*, expresses the *Kāryatā* or *performability* of certain acts.* Though it is quite true that, according to the Prābhākara view of syntactical connection, the *Arthavāda* by itself cannot be *expressive* in the correct sense of the term,—yet this can be urged against only such *Arthavādas* as are absolutely incapable of being construed with any injunction.

* *Bṛīhaṭī*. MS. p. 30.

Most of the *arthavādas*, however, are actually found capable of being syntactically connected with injunctions; and as such helping by the *praise* the persuasive power of the injunctive word, they serve a most useful purpose by expressing the fitness of the act to be performed; and hence they are fully entitled to the name 'Veda.' Says the *Bṛihaṭi* (MS. pp. 29-30):—'*vidhyudḍeśhādēva kārṇyāvagaṭihyaṭo hi karṇaryatā-vagamyaṭe sa vedah; asnūchcha karṇyavatā-vagamyaṭe.*' It may be that Gaḍādhara's interpretation of the *Prābhākara* view is based upon some later work of the School; and it would be interesting to investigate the matter. But it cannot be done here; as the only later work known to us at present is the *Rijuvimāla* of Shālikanaṭha Mishra, of which the only manuscript available is found to be wanting in this part.

5. The next question that arises is thus explained in the *Bṛihaṭi* (MS. page 30):—

'Thus then, the trustworthy character of such descriptions as are contained in the *Arthavādas* having been proved, the question arises as to how to regard those few passages which are found to be capable of being taken as independent injunctions, as also as mere descriptive *Arthavādas* related to, and subserving, other injunctive passages. For example, the passage—'the post is of *Uḍumbara* wood.....the *Uḍumbara* is powerful; one obtains powerful cattle by using that wood,'—the first sentence, 'the post is of *Uḍumbara* wood' indicates one action, *the making of the post with a particular wood*; and the other sentence, 'one obtains powerful cattle, &c.', indicates another action, *the obtaining of cattle*. This latter sentence again is also capable of being taken as merely a *praise* related to, and subserving the injunction of, the action indicated by the former sentence,—the meaning of the whole passage being that, "*inasmuch as the Uḍumbara wood brings powerful cattle, the post should be made of that wood.*"

Prābhū. 123.

Thus this latter sentence has all the appearance of an injunction; while as containing no injunctive word, it is liable to be taken as mere *arthavāda*.

Now the question arises as to which of the two significations of the latter sentence should be accepted; both cannot be accepted, as that would make the exact meaning of the Veda doubtful, and thereby lead to its absolute authority being doubted. The conclusion is that the meaning is not at all doubtful; the sentence must be taken as an *arthavāda*. So long as we can construe the sentences occurring together as constituting a single complex sentence, it is not permissible to find in them many injunctions; as unnecessary multiplication of injunctions is to be avoided. In fact, even if we regard the two as independent injunctions, the latter sentence would lay down an action that would follow only from the action enjoined by the preceding sentence. For instance, it would lay down the 'obtaining of cattle' by the 'making of the post with *udumbara* wood,' which 'making' is enjoined by the preceding sentence. In this manner also, the two sentences are shown to be related, as pointing virtually to the same action—the 'making of the post with *udumbara* wood.' Says the *Bṛihātī* (MS. page 30 b):—

'Sādhyadvayāragame-pi pramāṇataḥ siddhasādhyatayaiva hyekārthāvagaṭīh.'

In explaining this passage, the *Rijuvimalā* (MS. p. 332) remarks—

'Yadyekārthāvagaṭīh tadānukūlananimiṭṭaikalpanīyam; ekorṭhaḥ siddharūpo—bhyūpagamyatām, aparashcha sādhyarūpaḥ, yena parasparasambandhe satyekārthāvagaṭīh upapadyate.'

That is to say, 'if the whole passage is taken as pointing to one signification, then sufficient reason should be found for such interpretation; and this reason consists in the fact that one of the acts (*i. e.*, the obtaining of cattle)

mentioned must be regarded as something *accomplished*, and the others (the making of the *yūpa* with uḍumbara wood) as *to be accomplished*; it is only thus that the two sentences could be construed to afford a single meaning.'

The *Bhūta* presentment of the Pūrvapakṣa on the point is somewhat different; by which the sentence in question is taken as pointing out the result that *actually* follows from the action prescribed in the preceding sentence; the final conclusion is that it does not describe the *real* result, it is a mere *arthavāda*.

6. * This leads us on to another class of *Arthavāda* passages,—those that appear to be laying down reasons in favour of a certain course of action prescribed by an injunction. For instance, the sentence 'the libation should be poured with the ladle, as it is with this that food is got ready'—lays down, in the latter part, a reason for the action prescribed in the former part. In regard to this it is argued that, the ratiocinative section of the passage must be taken as expressing the mere *praise* of the ladle; as for what is directly enjoined in a Vedic sentence, there is no need for the support of any reasoning or argument, which, therefore, even if present, would be wholly irrelevant; and in the Veda there can be no irrelevancy or superfluity.

7. † Having considered the authoritativeness of *Arthavādas*, we now proceed to consider the case of *mantras*. From the very nature of *mantras* it is clear that they cannot be taken as injunctions;—being as they are entirely devoid of any kind of injunctive word; also because all *mantras* are found, either syntactically, or by direct declaration, or by indirect implication, construed along with other passages which are injunctions; so if the *mantras* themselves were to enjoin another action, there would be two actions enjoined

* *Mīm. Sū.* I—ii—27.

† *Mīm. Sū.* I—ii—31 to 53.

by what is practically only one 'sentence.'* Nor are the *mantras* found to contain any *praise* or *deprecation*; so they cannot be taken as *Arthavāda*. With all this however, the *mantras* cannot be regarded as absolutely meaningless or useless; forming an integral part of the Veda, they must serve some purpose, must have some meaning, expressing something that is needful in the actions prescribed by the injunctive passages. This is thus explained by the *Bṛihaṭī* (p. 31):—

*Nāvivakṣiṭārthā mantrāḥ, svādhyāyanīyogasambandhitāyā ; Svādhyāyasyārthavatlōkṭā, kārye prāmāṇyābhidhānāt.....Anuṣ-
thīyamānūrthau payikāyā vivakṣiṭārthaṭvameva gamyamānan.
na shakyaṭe.....hanṭum.*—

This usefulness of the *mantras* cannot be in their mere recitation bringing about transcendental results. There can be no justification for such an assumption in face of the fact that the *mantras* convey a distinct meaning,—that indicating something, in most cases the deity, in connection with sacrifices enjoined elsewhere. The *mantras* are generally found to be in the form of address to a certain power or being ;—which shows that the power or being to whom the *mantra* is addressed is the 'deity' to whom one should offer the sacrifice enjoined by some sentence in the same context. There are some *mantras* however which are not found to be indicative of anything related to the sacrifice; such *mantras* are relegated to the category of '*Arthavāda*.'

8.† There is one portion of the 'Veda' left to be considered:—It is that comparatively smaller portion which has been called '*Nūmadheya*'; that is to say, those words that have the appearance of a name of action, and are yet

* *Bṛihaṭī*. Ms. p. 50.

† *Mīm Sū*. I. iv.—*Bṛihaṭī* MS. pp. 38—38b. This forms the subject matter of the fourth *pāda*, and as such, by our arrangement, should have formed our sub-section 4.' But the subject-matter is closely allied to this section; and hence we have included it here.

capable of another interpretation. For instance, the sentence ‘*uḍbhīḍā yajēta pashukāmaḥ*’; ‘one desirous of acquiring cattle should sacrifice with the *Uḍbhīḍ*’; it would appear that what is laid down here is a certain substance to be offered at some worldly act of sacrifice not prescribed by a Vedic injunction, but performed by men in their ordinary life. But as a matter of fact, it is found that there is no sacrifice prescribed by any Vedic passage where an offering could be made of the ‘*uḍbhīḍ*’—which can only mean *that with which something is dug*, a spade for instance; and under the circumstances the injunction of such a substance would be absolutely meaningless, and this would vitiate the trustworthy character of the Veda. In order to avoid this, the word ‘*uḍbhīḍ*’ has to be taken as the *name of a sacrifice*,—the sentence in that the case being taken as enjoining the particular sacrifice named ‘*uḍbhīḍ*’ as to be performed by people desirous of acquiring cattle.

9. The *Bhātta* statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* is somewhat different; according to which the *Uḍbhīḍ* is regarded as the ‘spade’ to be offered at one of the well-known sacrifices—the *Jyotiṣṭoma* for instance (and not at a special sacrifice prescribed by some unknown sentence).

10.* The word ‘*Āgneya*’ is another example cited. In regard to this word as occurring in the sentence ‘*yadāgneyo—ṣṭakapālo—māvūsyāyām*, &c.’ it is argued that this word also must be regarded as the name of a sacrifice (in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa* as stated by Kumārila), or the whole sentence must be rejected as devoid of any signification helpful to sacrificial performance, the word ‘*āgneyā*’ being a mere *name of action*, and not laying down anything to be used at sacrifices (according to the *Pūrvapakṣa* as stated by Prabhākara). But the conclusion, according to Kumārila as well as Prabhākara, is that the sentence serves the useful purpose of indicating, by means of the word

* *Bṛihati* MS, pp. 41b—42.

‘*Āgneyah*,’ Agni as the deity to whom ‘the cake baked upon eight pans’ is to be offered. As on this point, so in regard to the discussions over some other words also, the final conclusion is the same according to Kumārila and Prabhākara; but as regards the statement of the *pūrvapakṣa*, there is a difference, in almost every case; Kumārila in every case stating it in a specific form, and Prabhākara always making it bear upon the general significance of the passage. For instance, in regard to the word ‘*varhi*,’ the *Bhūta pūrvapakṣa* is that it denotes, not ‘*varhi*’ in general, but that particular *varhi* which has been consecrated; whereas the *Prabhākara pūrvapakṣa* is that the sentence in question is incapable of affording any meaning likely to help a prescribed action, and as such, must be rejected as altogether devoid of ‘Vedic’ authority.

SECTION (1)—Sub-section (3).

The authoritative character of Smṛitis, Puraṇas and Itihāsas.

1. Though like an orthodox *Mīmāṃsaka*, Jaimini has declared in Sū. I—i—2, that “Veda” is the sole authority on matters relating to *Dharma*, and is the only source from which right knowledge of *Dharma* can be derived, yet, in actual practice he found that, by the time that he systematised in his *sūtras* the Vedic exigetics, the Vedas had become so remotely ancient that they were not found sufficient for all religious purposes; and the knowledge derived from them had to be supplemented by that derived from other sources,—notably the collection of works known under the comprehensive name of ‘*Smṛiti*,’ and the ‘usage’ of respectable men. It was in view of this indubitable fact that Manu and other writers laid down at the very beginning of the *Dharmashāstra* compilations, that the source of the knowledge of *Dharma* lies (in the order of precedence) in the Veda, the Smṛiti, the usage of good men, and also self-satisfaction. It was in view of this again that

Prabhā. 128.

Jaimini found it necessary to devote a special section of his *Sūtras* to the consideration of the authoritative character of the *Smṛiti*. Says the *Bṛhaṭi* (MS. p. 31):—

‘The *Smṛiti* also has been accepted by people learned in the Vedas as *authoritative* and *trustworthy*; hence it is necessary to enquire into this matter also.’—

And in this section Jaimini shows that whenever they do not flatly contradict the Veda, the *Smṛitis* are to be regarded as authoritative,—but (in order to be consistent with what he had said with regard to the Veda being the *sole* authority) only in so far as they are based upon, and derive their authority from, the Veda. In considering this question, Kumāṛila has cited a *Smṛiti* text which lays down the *Aṣṭakā* performance which is not prescribed by the Veda; but Prabhākara, consistently with his determination to connect all discussions with the question of the authority of the Veda, cites the *mantra*, ‘*Yāñjanāḥ prañinandanti &c.*’ which is not found to be used at any Vedic sacrifice, and should therefore (according to the *Pāṇinipāṭya*) be rejected as useless; and hence the authority of the Veda to that extent becomes vitiated;—and the final conclusion is that the *Smṛiti* has its source in the Veda, hence what is laid down in the *Smṛiti* should also be regarded as Vedic; hence the *Aṣṭakā* at which the *mantra* in question is used, being Vedic, the *mantra* is not useless.

2. It is interesting to note what reasons the orthodox *Mīmāṃsaka* puts forward for justifying his doubts with regard to the authority of the *Smṛitis*. Kumāṛila in his *Tantravartika* (translation, p. 105) sums up these reasons in the following words:—

‘Inasmuch as these *Smṛitis* emanated from human authors (and are not eternal, like the Veda) their authority cannot be self-sufficient. Nor can they be rejected as altogether untrustworthy; because of the firmness of popular trust in them.....The *Smṛitis* of Manu and

Prabhā. 129.

others are dependent upon the memory of the authors, and memory depends for its authority upon the truthfulness of its source ; consequently the authority of not a single *Smṛiti* can be held to be self-sufficient, like that of the Veda ; and inasmuch as we find them accepted as authoritative, by an unbroken line of respectable people learned in the Vedas, we cannot regard them to be absolutely false either. And hence it is only natural that there should be a doubt on the point.”—

Prabhākara however, in his *Bṛihaṭī* (Ms. pp. 31-31 b) makes the whole discussion turn upon the main subject of the authority of the Veda. In his introductory remarks on the *adhikaraṇa*, he justifies the enquiry into the character of the *Smṛitis* on the ground that the enquiry is directly connected with the question of the authority of the Veda ; as many actions that are laid down in the *Smṛitis*, and not in the Veda,—for instance, the *Aṣṭakūśhrāddhas*—are found to be referred to and indicated in the Veda ; for instance, those *shrāddhas* are enlogised in the sentence ‘*Yāñjanūh-pruṭinandanti*, &c.’ (Pāraskara Gṛihyasūtra 3. 2.2). And thus the enquiry into the *Smṛitis* is only an off-shoot of the enquiry into the Veda. Consequently, when the *Pūrvapakṣin* puts forward the view that the *Smṛitis* are not trustworthy, he tries to vitiate by this contention the trustworthy character of the Veda itself. It may be noted that in thus making all *adhikaraṇas* of the first *adhyāya* turn upon the main subject of the *adhyāya*,—the Authority of the Veda,—Prabhākara has shown himself more consistent than Kumārila, who leaves the connection to be inferred ; while Prabhākara emphasises it at each step.

3. In later classical literature, the word ‘*Smṛiti*’ is found to include the *Itihāsas*, *Purāṇas* the *Sūtrās*—*śrauta* and *smṛta*—and also the so-called *Smṛitis* proper, such as those of Manu, Yājñavalkya, Aṭri, Vasiṣṭha and others.

Prabhā. 130.

In the present context, however, the word has been accepted (by Kumāṛila* and his followers) to include only those *Smṛtis* which are applicable throughout Āryāvarta and to all men. In this category, Kumāṛila classes—(1) the *Purāṇas*, (2) the *Itihāsas* and (3) the *Smṛiti of Manu*. The other ‘*Smṛitis*’—those of Aṭri, Gauṭama, Vashiṣṭha, &c.,—he relegates to another category; and considers them later on, under *sūtrās* 15—16 *et. seq.* With regard to the *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇas*, Kumāṛila † takes a liberal view. Direct injunctions are found embedded in a mass of matter of a purely descriptive character. These latter passages are relegated to the category of ‘*Arthavāda*,’ being descriptive of acts done by good and bad men of ancient and modern days. These are regarded as ‘*arthavāda*’, because, if the stories found therein were taken as literally true, then, with reference to these at least, the injunction to recite would be useless, as no purpose could be served by mere descriptions or stories; hence these have to be taken as indirectly implying the *praise* or *deprecation* of certain courses of action; and as these stories have been inserted with the sole purpose of such praise or deprecation, they need not be regarded as absolutely correct with regard to facts. In justification of this method of instruction adopted by the writer of *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas*, Kumāṛila makes the following remarks :—

‘Guided as they were by the study of the Veda, Vālmiki, Vyāsa, and others, composed their works on the same lines as the Veda; hence it is that we find in the works of these men, as in the Veda, many apparently useless stories &c. and as those for whom these works were intended, were persons of varying degrees of intelligence, and of diverse tastes, it was only proper for them to insert every kind

**Tantrīvivārtika*—Translation, p. 244. The *Bṛihaṭi*, like the *Bhāṣya*, says nothing as to what works are intended to be included under the term ‘*smṛiti*’.

†*Tantrīvivārtika*. Translation, pp. 25-26.

of matter in their works, so that they might be of use to all men. Hence it is that in certain parts we find pure injunctions; while in others, the injunctions are mixed up with *Arthavādis*,—the sole motive for this diverse procedure lying in the making of the works attractive to all men.'

4. As regards the authority attaching to these works, it is held that some of the injunctions contained in them are found to be based directly upon the Veda, while others are based upon considerations of pleasure and pain as experienced in the world; among the *Arthavādis* also, some are those that appear in the Veda, some are based upon ordinary experience, and some are purely imaginary, like ordinary poetry; but all these have an authority based upon the fact of their praising enjoined actions, or deprecating prohibited ones. As for those portions that are not capable of being taken along with any injunctions or prohibitions, some of these are such as give pleasure in their mere recitation,—to this class belong such descriptions as those of the '*Gaṇḍhānṛjana*' and the like; and some, for instance, the descriptions of wars, serve to encourage the brave as well as the coward, and thereby serve a distinctly useful purpose for the kings of men. In those cases however, where none of these explanations is possible—for instance, in the case of hymns to deities, which are not found capable of serving any useful purpose,—we assume an 'unseen' or transcendental result. Then again, the Purāṇic descriptions of the parts of the earth serves the purpose of distinguishing places fit for the due performance of religious acts. The histories of families recounted serve to differentiate the people of diverse castes, and are based upon memory and direct perception. The details as to measures of time and space are intended to regulate the ordinary practices of men, and also the science of astronomy and astrology; these are based upon direct perception and mathematical calculation. The descriptions of future states of things serve to point out the character of the various

periods of evolving time, and also the results of righteous and unrighteous conduct; these are based upon the Veda directly. *

5. Thus far we have dealt with the *Itihāsas* and the *Purāṇas*; now as regards the *Smṛitis* proper,—those that constitute the ‘*Dharmashāstra*’,—only five assumptions are possible :—(1) That the authors of the *Smṛitis* were totally mistaken in what they said;—this is rejected, on the ground that it is not compatible with the fact that all these works are excellent compilations containing useful teachings, and also on the ground that this assumption would necessitate further assumptions as to the foolish character of the people who have accepted these teachings. (2) The second hypothesis is that the assertions are based upon the personal observations of the compilers;—this view is rejected, as it assumes, in the first place, the observation and, in the second place, the possession by those authors of extraordinary powers of observation by means of which they could make correct observations in connection with *Dharma*, which has been shown to be beyond the reach of the ordinary means of knowledge. (3) By the third hypothesis, the authors learnt what they have written from other persons,—their authority thus being based upon tradition;—this also is not accepted; for in matters relating to *Dharma*, no trust can be reposed upon mere tradition, which, in this case, has been likened to an information relating to colour handed down by a tradition handed along a race of blind men. (4) The fourth hypothesis is that the authors have purposely put forward wrong teachings for the purpose of leading people astray;—this involves a number of baseless assumptions,—such for instance, as a motive sufficiently strong to make them adopt this deceptive course, and also that people have allowed themselves to fall into the trap laid for them, and so forth. (5) All the above

* *Tantravārtika*—Translation, p. 119.

hypotheses being found unacceptable, the orthodox Mimāmsaka puts forward the view that the assertions contained in the *Smṛitis* are all based upon Vedic texts. This view necessitates only one assumption,—that of the existence, and the subsequent disappearance, of such Vedic texts as are not to be found in the Vedic texts as we have them at the present day. For most of the injunctions contained in the *Smṛitis*, corroborative Vedic texts are easily found; but there are some for whom we seek in vain for corroboration in the Vedic text; and with regard to these it is held that Vedic texts corroborative of these also were known at the time of the *Smṛiti*-compilers, and have since become lost among the numerous Vedic recensions no longer current. *

Instead of compiling a collection of these Vedic texts themselves, the authors had recourse to another method, because the order in which the injunctions were found in the Veda, was found, in the later degenerate times, to confuse the ordinary man; and so the writers set about arranging and classifying the various duties; and putting them forward in a language more intelligible to the ordinary householder. As in the case of the *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas*, so here also, those portions that pertain directly to *Dharma* or to *Mokṣa* have their source directly in the Veda; while those that have in view pleasure, &c., are based upon the ordinary experience of the world; and lastly, as for the stories met with here and there, they serve the purposes of the *Arthavāda*.

6. The *Prābhākara* view of the trustworthy character of *Smṛitis* does not differ materially from the above, except on the point of such *Smṛitis* as are neither injunctive nor prohibitive of actions. We append here what the *Prakaraṇa-pañchikā* (pp. 100-101) says on the point :—

* See *Tantravārtika*—Translation, pp. 112—114.

‘The *Smṛiti* texts for which direct corroboration is found in the Vedic texts are undoubtedly authoritative. Those for whom such corroboration is not available, are *inferred* to have such corroboration,—the inference being based upon the long traditional lines of *Smṛiti* writers, each of whom drew his information from a predecessor, and so on and on to time immemorial, from eternity. This eternal corroboration of *Smṛitis* is proved in the same manner as the eternality of the relationship between words and their denotations.’

But on page 150—

‘Those *smṛitis* however that do not prescribe or prohibit any actions need not be taken as authoritative. For instance, such passages as speak of souls being born in vegetable bodies. In all these cases also, the texts may be regarded as having meanings other than those that they directly express.’

7. As regards the *Aṅgas*, or Subsidiary Sciences, of the Veda, Kumārila (*Tanṭravārtika*—Translation pp. 119-22) says—

‘Among the auxiliary sciences, there are certain portions that treat of things useful in sacrificial performances; and all these have their source in the Veda; while other parts are useful, only in the serving of some visible worldly purpose; and these have their basis in ordinary experience.’

(1) In the *Shikṣā*, we find the differentiation of the organs of pronunciation, accents and such other subjects. These have their perceptible use in the recitation of Vedic hymns; while it is upon the Veda that are based such declarations as that, if the *mantra* is recited with a wrong accent, it does harm to the reciter. (2) In the *Kalpasūtras* we find explanations of the real purport of the injunctions deducible from the rules found scattered in the Veda. These have their source in these same Vedic texts. The rules of

Prabhā. 135.

conduct herein laid down for the priests are based upon considerations of general convenience. (3) As regards the *Vyākaraṇa*, the knowledge afforded by it of the correct and incorrect forms of words serves a perceptible purpose, and is based upon direct perception. (4) The case of the *Nirukṭa* is similar to that of Grammar; as it serves to regulate the sense in which a word can be correctly used. As regards the science of Prosody, the correct differentiation of the metres of *mantras* serves a useful purpose in the Veda as well as in ordinary experience. (6) Lastly, the science of *Jyauṭis* provides the knowledge of dates and asterisms, which is based upon mathematical calculations. These serve useful purposes in fixing the times for sacrificial performances. Astrology, which represents another phase is based upon the Veda itself, dealing as it does, with things 'unseen', and also the future. The case of the Science of Architecture is similar to that of *Jyauṭis*. (8) *Mīmāṃsā* is based partly upon the Veda, partly upon ordinary experience, and partly upon perception, inference and the other means of knowledge; and like the other main '*Śāstras*,' this also has been worked upon by a long unbroken line of teachers. The Science of Reasoning has its use in saving men from unrighteous paths. Based upon the Veda,—in its three parts, Injunctions, *Arthavāda* and *Upaniṣads*,—it points out the trend of the ordinary misconceptions from which unrighteous conduct proceeds, not dogmatically, but in a manner calculated to bring conviction home to the sceptic; it begins with laying out the strong reasonings available for the two opposite views on a particular issue; and then after duly weighing the arguments for and against each view, it leads on to the correct final conclusion. If such standard typical reasonings were not available in a collected form, ordinary men would be at the mercy of any and every stray person that might turn up; and there would be no standard by which to judge of the soundness or otherwise of the reasonings propounded. As

regards the philosophical hypotheses relating to the origin of the world and such other matters,—these have their origin in ideas arising from certain *mantras* and *arṥhavādas*; and they only serve to point out the general truth that the *gross* has its source in the *subtle*; and the use of all this lies in the due comprehending of the relation of cause and effect, without which the relation between the Sacrifice and its results could not be grasped. The theories of Idealism, of the momentary character of things, and so forth have all been propounded for the sole purpose of dissuading people from cultivating an undue attachment to things of the world. Thus then, all the *Smṛitis* as well as the Auxilliary Sciences are authoritative,—deriving their authority directly from the Veda. In the case of all these, we find two classes of results depicted—those to appear in the very distant future, and those appearing immediately in the present; and the texts pertaining to the former class are based upon the Veda, and those relating to the latter have their basis in ordinary experience.

8. The authority of *Smṛitis* in general having been established, the question arises as to how we should regard those *Smṛiti* texts which are found to contradict well-known Vedic texts. In connection with these also, as indeed throughout *Adhyaya* I, Prabhakara turns the *Pūrvapakṣa* on to the authority of the Veda. * The *Pūrvapakṣa* propounded by him is that, as there is contradiction between the Veda and the *Smṛiti*, and through this, the Veda upon which the *Smṛiti* is, *ex hypothesi*, based,—they nullify each other; and thus no Veda can be regarded as absolutely authoritative. The conclusion is that, inasmuch as the *Smṛiti* is not self-sufficient in its authority, being dependent as it is upon the corroboration of Vedic texts, inferred from certain reasons—whenever a *smṛiti* text is found to contradict the Vedic text that is well known, and has not got to be *inferred*, there

* Bṛihaṭī, Ms. p. 32.

can be no justification for the assumption of a Vedic text contrary to one that is already known,—which would lead to the nullification of both the Vedic texts. Hence when it comes to a choice between the Vedic text, on the one hand, and the *Smṛiti* text—not based upon any Vedic text—on the other, there can be no hesitation in rejecting the latter in favour of the former. The opposite courses of action laid down in the two texts cannot be regarded as optional alternatives; as such option is permissible only in cases where the two texts are possessed of equal authority. This is not so in the case in question,—the authority of the Veda being direct and self-sufficient, and that of the *Smṛiti* dependent upon Vedic texts that might, at best, be assumed (which too, under the special case in question, is not possible). Hence the conclusion is that no authority can attach to such *Smṛiti* texts as contradict the direct assertions of the Veda.

9. The above facts have been deduced from *Mīm. Sū.* I—iii—3. The *Sūtra* that follows has been doubly interpreted by the *Bhāṣya*. By the first interpretation, it is made to supply a further argument in support of the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Sūtra*,—the argument being that the *Smṛiti* texts contradicting the Veda can have no authority, as they are found to have their source in the ignorance or avarice of the sacrificial priests. The other interpretation makes the *Sūtrā* an *adhikaraṇa* by itself,—dealing with such *Smṛiti* texts as do not contradict any Vedic texts, but are found to be apparently due to the ignorance or covetousness of the priests. Such texts for instance as the one speaking of the giving away, to the priest, of the cloth with which the sacrificial post is covered. The conclusion with regard to these is that they can have no authority. The *Bṛihatī* (Ms. Page 32 b) adds that what is denied here is, not the trustworthy character of all that may be found to have its source in the world of visible effects, but the authority of only those passages that claim to pertain to the world of

invisible effects, and are yet found to have their source in visible facts; that is to say, the sentence laying down the giving of the cloth to the priest has nothing inherently untrustworthy in itself, so far as the mere *giving* is concerned; but if the giving be regarded as bringing about an invisible result in the shape of 'merit' for the giver,—then its authority becomes vitiated by the fact that it has its source in the covetousness of the priests.

10. The above interpretation of the last two *adharma*-*śāstras* by which many *Smṛiti* texts become deprived of trustworthy character, is not accepted by Kumāṛila, who with his orthodox instincts, would not reject the authority of any *Smṛiti* texts. In the *Tantracārṭika* (translation, pp. 154—63), he has shown that there is no real contradiction in the instances cited in the *Bhāṣya*; and so long as there is no contradiction, there is every justification for the assuming of Vedic texts in corroboration of the *Smṛiti* texts concerned; and thus the two courses of action—one laid down directly in the Veda, and the other in the *Smṛiti*,—can be reasonably regarded as optional alternatives. Consequently Sū. 3 must be interpreted to mean that—'in a case where we find the Vedic text laying down one action, and the *Smṛiti* laying down another,—thus there being an apparent contradiction between the two on that point,—it is desirable that in practice, we should adopt the course laid down in the Veda.* This does not imply the *rejection* of the *Smṛiti*; it lays down only a *preference* for the Veda; and that on the ground of the latter being independent of extraneous support.

11. † There is yet another interpretation of the *adharma*-*śāstra* suggested by Kumāṛila :—The *Smṛitis* spoken of here as to be disregarded are, not indeed the *orthodox Smṛitis* compiled by Manu and others, but those so-called '*Smṛitis*' that have been compiled by the later secessionists from the

* *Tantracārṭika* Translation, p. 164. † *Ibid.* p. 165.

orthodox fold. It is interesting to note that the *Smṛitis* relegated by Kumārila to this category are :—

‘(1) The compilation of certain texts bearing on *Dharma* and *Adharma* by Shākya, and by the propounders of the systems known as the *Sāṅkhya*, the *Yoga*, the *Pañcharātra*, the *Pāshupata* and the like,—all of which have in them a certain support of the Veda.....based upon the strength of certain visible results quite unconnected with the Veda, and upon arguments seemingly based upon perception, inference, analogy and presumption. (2) Those that lay down certain instructions with regard to the gaining of a living.....treating also of certain incantations and recipes for the treatment of diseases, hypnotism and the like,.....the efficiency whereof is based upon success in a few stray cases. (3) The compilations treating of the most repugnant practices, and yet classed as *Smṛiti*.’

12. With regard to *Sūtras* 5-7, there is a difference of opinion between Shabara (and in his wake, Prabhākara) and Kumārila : The former takes them as embodying an independent *adḥikaraṇa*, dealing with one further instance of the contradiction of *Veda* by *Smṛiti*. But as Kumārila would not admit of any such real contradiction between his ‘*Smṛitis*’ and ‘*Veda*,’ he suggests that *sūtrās* 5 and 6 be taken as parts of the preceding *adḥikaraṇa*, to which they raise certain objections and answer them. In course of his explanation of *sūtra* 6, Kumārila makes the following declaration with regard to the trustworthy character of the works of human compilers* :—

‘In matters relating to *Dharma*, we accept as authoritative the declarations of only such persons as are mentioned in Vedic *mantras* and *Arthavādas* as the authors of the *sciences*.’—

And again—

‘We conclude that *Dharma* brings about its due results only when it is understood with the help of those scriptures

Prabhā. 140.

that are recognised to be not incapable of having their basis in the Veda.....Just as we do not admit that knowledge of Dharma to be true which is obtained by an improper study of the Veda, so also in the case of the works of such authors as are known to have conduct against the teachings of the Veda,.....we do not accept these as valid means of knowing Dharma.'

The seventh *Sūtra* has been taken by Kumārila as embodying an independent, and rather important, *adḥikaraṇa*, dealing with the authority attaching to the practices of good men.* The opponent having cited many instances of men universally recognised as 'good' and 'righteous' having deviated from the right path,—the author has tried to explain away those cases, and has finally come to the conclusion that—

'When we find that certain actions are performed by good men, and we cannot attribute these actions to any such perceptible motives as greed and the like, they should be accepted as *Dharma*; and the reason for this is that when good men regard a certain act as *Dharma*, the very fact of their being good men and learned, coupled with the fact that the act in no way proceeds from greed or any such motive, is proof of the fact that the act must have some basis in the Veda; as all good men know that no action not countenanced by the Veda can be regarded as 'Dharma'; specially as only those people are universally recognised as 'good' who are found to be always acting in accordance with Vedic injunctions.'

From this it is clear that it is not *all* that good men *do* that is to be regarded as 'Dharma'; it is only what they *do* and *regard as* '*Dharma*' that has to be so regarded.

Kumārila proposes also a third interpretation of *Sūtras* 6 and 7, whereby these embody an independent *adḥikaraṇa*,—

* *Tantravārtikā*—Translation, pp. 182-83.

Sūtra 6 containing the *Pūrvapakṣa* that, “inasmuch as the scriptures are limited in their scope, the practices of good men, devoid of Vedic support, cannot have any authority relating to Dharma”;—in answer to which *Sūtra* 7 provides the *Siddhānta* as explained above.

It is interesting to note that Prabhākara does not take any notice of these important interpretations propounded by Kumārila.

13. *Sūtras* 11-14 consider the authoritative character of the *Kalpasūtras*. A distinction has been drawn between the *Smṛitis* and the *Kalpasūtras* on the ground that while the latter lay down the rules of sacrificial procedure exactly as laid down in the Vedic texts still available, the former are mere compilations based *presumably* upon many such Vedic texts as are now lost, and can have their existence only *inferred*; and for this reason, the authority of the *Kalpasūtras* cannot be made to depend entirely upon the arguments that have been brought forward in support of the authority of the *Smṛitis*. The *Pūrvapakṣa* view with regard to the *Kalpasūtras* is that they are as self-sufficient in their authority as the Veda; and hence the *Darśha* sacrifices should be performed on *all days* as laid down by them, and not only on the *New-moon day* as prescribed in the Veda.* The *final conclusion*, on the other hand, is that, in view of the fact that the *Kalpasūtras* only repeat in more intelligible language what is found to be already mentioned in the Vedic texts still available, there can certainly be no doubt as to their trustworthy character; but that at the same time, they can have no self-sufficient authority; as such authority can belong only to those scriptures that are independent of human authorship; which the Vedas alone are. Says the *Bṛikati* (MS. P. 33b)—

‘*Naitadūpapaḍyate pauruṣeyaṭvam anapekṣaṭvam cheṭi, siddhāntchāsyā pauruṣeyaṭvam*’—(‘It is not possible that what

* *Shatapatha Brahmana* X. 1-5.

proceeds from a human source should be self-sufficient in its authority; and it is well-known that the *Kalpasūtra* is the work of human authors').

The above is the interpretation of the *Adhikaraṇa* propounded by Shabara, and also adopted by Prabhākara and Kumārila. The latter however proposes three more likely interpretations:—(a) It refers to the trustworthy character of the *Smṛitis* along with the *Kalpasūtras*; with regard to both of which, it having been established that they are authoritative, it is now proved that neither the one nor the other is *self-sufficient* in its authority, independently of the Veda. (b) It refers to the authority of the *Āgroidṣyās* or Subsidiary Sciences—*Shikṣā*, *Kalpa*, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Nirakṣa*, *Chhandas* and *Jyauṭis*,—with regard to which the conclusion is that they derive all their authority from the Veda, and have no authority apart from it. (c) It refers to the so-called *Smṛitis* of the *Bauddha*, and proves that these can never be regarded as 'eternal scriptures,' and as such are of no consequence in matters relating to Dharma.

14. We shall take up here the case of the *Smṛitis* of Gautama, Vashiṣṭha, Hārīta, Shaṅkha, Āpastamba, Bauddhāyana and others, which have only limited scope, and pertain to certain specialised areas and classes of men. These, according to Kumārila, are included in the subject-matter of the *Holakādhikaraṇa*—the *adhikaraṇa* dealing with local customs (*sūtras* 15-23). Prabhākara's Pūrvapakṣa is that, inasmuch as the *smṛiti* passages laying down these customs themselves contain such limiting words as 'pertaining to the East' and so forth, they and the Vedic passages on which they are based, must be regarded as limited in their scope; and thus the Veda, to this extent, cannot be accepted as *universally* and absolutely authoritative. The final conclusion arrived at in regard to these *smṛitis* is that, on account of the universal character of the

Injunctions and Prohibitions contained in them, they must be accepted as applying to *all men*. Nor is this view incompatible with the fact that the *smṛitis* themselves speak of certain acts as to be done by certain persons only; because such injunctions with limitations are found in the Veda also, —which, for instance, speaks of the *Rājāsūya* as to be done by the Kṣatṛiya only (*Shatāpatha, Brā.* 5-1-1-12).

15. The *fifth adhikarana*—*sūtras* 8, 9—is another important point where Kumārila is entirely at variance with the *Bhāṣya* and Prabhākara. From the consideration of the Practices of Good Men in regard to *action*, the next step is to their practice in regard to the *usage of words*. In different parts of the country, and in different communities, different meanings are found to be attached to the same word; and the question arises as to which of these significations is to be accepted as the most authoritative. The conclusion is that—‘the sense in which the word is used by those persons that take their stand upon the *Shāstras* is to be accepted as the most authoritative’ (*Sūtra* 9).

This is the interpretation of the *adhikarana* by the *Bhāṣya*, accepted by Prabhākara; who says—‘*Shiṣṭaprayoga eva balavān ityuchyate*’ (*Bṛihatī* MS. p. 33). Kumārila, however, takes the *adhikarana* as pertaining to the usage of words current,—not indeed among two sets of good men in the *Ārya* country, but—among the *Āryas* on the one hand, and the *Mlechchhas* or Foreigners on the other;—the conclusion being in favour of the former.

Kumārila also proposes a third interpretation:—The comparison instituted is between the sense attached to words in ordinary parlance of the present day, and that in which they are found to be used in Vedic passages; and the conclusion is in favour of the latter.

Apart from the above three interpretation, Kumārila proposes* what appears to be the most cogent interpretation

**Tantravārtika*, Trans. pp. 209-12.

of the *adḥikaraṇa* :—He institutes a comparison between the authority of the *smṛitis* and that of the *Practices of Good Men*; and this appears to be the most natural point to follow after the last *adḥikaraṇa* ; after the establishing of the authority of the *Veda*, we have established the authority of the *Smṛitis*; this naturally gave rise to the question as to which of these two possesses the greater authority, when they are found to differ; after this we established the authority of the *Practices of Good Men*; and the question naturally presenting itself is as to which of these two—*Smṛiti* and *Practice*—should be regarded as possessing superior authority. What gives rise to this question is the fact (proved above) that both of these ultimately derive their authority from the *Veda*, upon which they are both based. On this question, the final conclusion is in favour of greater authority attaching to the *Smṛiti*; and the reason for this is that it is based directly upon the *Veda*, while the *Practice of Good Men* gets at its authority in the *Veda* only through the intervention of the *Smṛiti*; that is to say, it is the authors of the *Smṛitis* alone who are believed to have derived their ideas of *Dharma* directly from the *Veda*; all later good men derive their ideas, not always from the *Veda* directly, but from these only through the help of the *Smṛitis*; so that the difference between the authoritative character of the two lies to the same extent as that between the character of the *Smṛiti*—compilers and the good men of later days.

16. In this connection, *sūtras* 15-32 consider the character of certain popular local customs;—The idea being that local customs, if at all authoritative, in howsoever limited a manner, must owe that authority to the Vedic texts;—it is argued that if the customs have only *local* authority, then the Vedic texts upon which they are based must also have only local (and limited) authority; and thus the very keystone of the *Mīmāṃsaka's* position—the ‘*universal*

authority of the Veda'—becomes shaken. The final conclusion upon this point is that the Vedic Injunctions assumed in support of such customs cannot be qualified by any specifications of time or place;—firstly because the specifications generally spoken of—'in the east,' 'in the north-west,' and so forth,—are only relative, and do not refer to any particular country or people; what is 'eastern' to one is 'western' to another;—and secondly because the customs are not found to be observed by *all* men of any limited area; nor are they found to be *not* observed by *all* men of other parts of the country. Says Prabhākara*—

'There being no fixity to any specification, no limitation is possible. That there is no fixity is proved by the fact—(1) that the Injunction does not impose any such limitation; as all that an Injunction can do is to indicate that a certain act has to be done; (2) that the names of the customs themselves, *holūka* and the rest, cannot indicate any such limitation, as all that they signify is a certain act;—(3) nor is there anything else that could specify the place or time; as there are no words indicative of any *quality*, *genus*, *position* or *place*.'

17. The next *Adhikaraṇa*—*Sūtra* 10—raises a rather interesting question:—There are certain words, even in the Veda, that are not current in *Āryāvarta*; but are in use among *Mlechchhas* or Foreigners; with regard to these there arises a doubt as to whether they should be accepted to have that signification which is sanctioned by foreign usage, or some other meaning should be deduced from them etymologically,—the words themselves in their entire form being in this case regarded as meaningless. The *Pūrvapakṣa* according to Prabhākara, as usual, is that such words contained in the Veda are meaningless, and that for this reason, the Veda in its entirety cannot be regarded as affording valid knowledge of Dharma,—thus vitiating the main thesis of

Adhyāya I, put forward in *Sūtra* 2; and hence, in order to avoid this meaninglessness, some signification should be deduced from the etymology of these words. The final conclusion, however, is that, inasmuch as in the case of all words we accept the meaning assigned to it by usage among men, we shall be fully justified, in the case of the words in question also, in accepting the usage of the foreigners, in the absence of any other source of information. Says Prabhākara*—

‘For this reason, in the understanding of the meaning of the Vedic passage, we shall certainly be guided by such usage of the foreigner as is *not* found to be opposed to any *Ārya* usage.’—

As to whether or not the form of the word current among foreigners is the correct one, that is always doubtful; but when we find the word in the Veda to be exactly the same as that in use among foreigners, we must unhesitatingly accept the signification assigned by this usage; specially in the case of such words as denote things found in the foreign country only. A recourse to the etymology of the word for finding out its meaning would be justifiable only in cases where no meaning can be got at though the help of any usage in any part of the world,—the meaning assigned by usage always having precedence over the derivative meaning—*‘Yogādṛūḍhīrbalīyasī.’*

18. The difficulty raised above in connection with the correct *meaning* of words leads us on directly to the question of the correct *form* of words, and the rules regarding these forms as embodied in Grammar. What bearing the trustworthiness of Grammar has upon the authority of the Veda is thus explained by Prabhākara† :—

‘The students of Veda hold that all such words as *gaūh*, *ashva*?, and the like have definite meanings; in fact, it is only

* *Bṛīhaṭī* MS. Page 33b.

† *Bṛīhaṭī* MS. Page 34.

when these and other words contained in the Veda have definite meanings that any explanation or comprehension of Vedic passages is possible; and this definiteness of meaning is possible only if the Science of Grammar is authoritative and trustworthy; as in the absence of this, there would be no reasonable basis for accepting any definite meaning; and the meaning of the whole Veda becoming thus indefinite and uncertain, the Veda comes to have that untrustworthy character which is inseparable from all that is indefinite and uncertain. Hence in view of the fact that the correct forms of words, and their significations, can be ascertained only by the help of Grammar, it becomes necessary to enquire into the character of works dealing with Grammar, in order to ascertain which of these may be accepted as authoritative.'—

Thus here, as in all other *Adhikaraṇas*, the subject of Grammar is considered only as having a bearing upon the general authority of the Veda.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* arguments against the necessity of using only 'correct' forms of words,—and also against the Science of Grammar in general,—may be thus summed up* :—

(1) The word '*gāvī*' and such other vernacular 'corruptions' are as expressive of the *cow* and other things as the 'correct' word '*gāūh*' and the like.

(2) The 'corruptions' are as *correct* as the so-called 'correct' forms.

(3) They are not 'corruptions'; because they are as perceptible by the ear as any other words.

(4) They are all equally 'eternal,'—as in the case of these also we cannot trace any beginning in time.

(5) No 'transcendental' result can follow from the use of the so-called 'correct' forms; as the use of these also only serves the ordinary purpose of denoting things; and also because they cannot form the subject of Vedic injunctions.

* *Bṛīhaṭī* MS. Page 35. *Tantravārtika*—Translation, Page 298.

(6) Grammar cannot be called 'Scripture,' because it has not got the form of the Veda,—the Science of Grammar not differing in any way from the ordinary explanations of vernacular words.

(7) Grammar cannot derive its authority from the Veda, as it does not treat of *actions*, which alone form the subject-matter of Veda proper.

(8) Grammar cannot be regarded as an integral part of the Veda, as is it not found to serve any useful purpose in matters relating to Dharma,—specially as in the expressing of their meanings—the words of the Veda do not stand in need of any help of grammar.

(9) The ordinary usage of words cannot be based upon grammar; as it is this latter itself that proceeds on the basis of *usage*.

In answer to the above the final conclusion is as follows:—Even though a certain word be found to be current in ordinary usage, there would be no ground for the belief that it has been in use from time immemorial; it is always necessary to enquire whether or not it is correctly expressive of the meaning which it is intended to convey; and it is this enquiring that the Science of Grammar makes it its business to undertake. As a matter of fact, for denoting one thing or idea, there can be only one verbal expression; and there can be no justification for assuming endless synonyms. Words and phrases are used for the sole purpose of enabling us to talk of things; and so long as this purpose is served by a single verbal expression, no synonyms are permissible. In some cases however, we have to accept synonyms, as they are found sanctioned by usage in the Veda and the Smṛitis. For the vernacular and other more recent forms of words however, there is no such sanctioning authority available; hence there can be no justification for assuming any denotative potency in these. 'Potencies' or 'forces' are

Prābhā. 149.

to be postulated only when without them we cannot explain certain well-established facts; hence when the established fact—in the shape of our talking of the cow, *f.i.*—is found possible to explain through the potency of the word ‘*gaūh*’, which is found in the Veda, we have no reason for postulating a further potency for any vernacular forms of that word. Then as regards the fact that the vernacular forms of words are actually found to be expressive of the same thing as the correct forms,—this must be due to the similarity of sounds; the word ‘*gāvī*’ for instance, being similar in sound to ‘*gaūh*,’ denotes the *cow*, not directly, but only through the latter word. As regards the Science of Grammar, it is true that all correct words are present in the Veda; but how would it ever be possible to collect all these words from out of the endless Vedic texts, unless we had the help of Grammar, which classifies and arranges the words in certain well-defined groups, through their derivation? As for the ‘eternality’ of this science, it is found as a matter of fact—(1) that we cannot think of any point of time where some sort of grammatical rules did not exist; and (2) that Vedic injunctions supply the requisite basis for all the six factors of science—*viz.* (a) the derivation of words, (b) the correct forms of words, (c) the injunction of using the correct forms thus ascertained, (d) the actual use of such words, (e) the prohibition of the use of words not so explicable; and (f) the actual avoidance of such words. And from all this we conclude that these are eternal, having had no beginning in time. The continuity of the Science of Grammar is as unbroken as that of the making of the Sacrificial Post and other such sacrificial things; just as in the case of the latter, the making of an individual Post may have a beginning in time, but the Veda lays down an injunction with regard to it,—so in the same manner, even though a certain using of the correct words may have a beginning in time, yet the Veda can lay down injunctions

pertaining to such using. Then again, as regards the vernacular words being expressive of their meanings,—whether or not a word is really expressive cannot be ascertained by usage alone, nor indeed by Grammar alone; it is only when the two conjointly point to a single conclusion that the word can be regarded as really expressive. It is for this reason that we accept as expressive only such words as are *correct*, that is, which are proved to be so by usage, as also by the Science of Grammar. As regards the *corrupt* words, on the other hand, their expressiveness is indicated by usage, it is true; but it is not countenanced by Grammar; and it has been shown above (§15) that *Smṛitis* have an authority superior to that of *usage*; consequently what rests solely upon usage cannot be accepted as true when it is opposed to *Smṛitis*. Hence the incorrect forms of words cannot be accepted as rightly expressive; the fact that they do denote the same thing as the correct word must be attributed to their similarity to these latter, as explained above. As regards the ‘scriptural’ character of the Science of Grammar,—even though it is found to bring about only ordinary perceptible results, it cannot be denied that there must be a transcendental result following from the use of the correct word, which could not be brought about by the use of the corrupt word,—the authority for the assumption of such a transcendental result consisting in those Vedic texts which prohibit the use of incorrect words. It is upon this prohibition too that the whole science of grammar is based. Being thus based upon the Veda, it must be regarded as ‘scriptural.’ The authority of grammar is also based upon the highest code of ethics: Truth always leads to supreme happiness; and Truth is of two kinds—that pertaining to facts, and that to words; consequently, just as the assertion of the true state of things is ‘good’, so also is the utterance of the true (*i. e.*, correct) word; and this latter character of the word can be ascertained by grammar alone.

19. The question as to whether a certain word is 'correct' or not having been settled by grammar, the next question that would arise would be as to what that word signifies. This forms the subject-matter of *Sūtras* 30-35. Before entering into this question however, it becomes necessary to ascertain if the words found in the Veda are the same as those used in ordinary parlance; because most of the arguments propounded in this connection would proceed upon the basis of ordinary experience; as the Veda itself does not say anything regarding the signification of words; and ordinary experience can bear upon only such words as are in common use in everyday life; consequently if the words in the Veda were totally different from those in ordinary use, there would be no sound basis for ascertaining the meaning of Vedic passages, which would thus become absolutely untrustworthy. Says Prabhākara * :—

'It is from the trustworthy character of the Veda that we ascertain the purpose of the present enquiry; and this purpose is no other than the recognition of the fact that the words used, as also the things signified by them, in the Veda are the same as those in ordinary everyday life.'

The *Pūrvapakṣa* arguments in support of the view that the two are entirely different are put forward in the *Bhāṣya* and the *Bṛīhaṭī*, in the shape of certain examples of words that are found in the Veda in a sense entirely different from that assigned to them in ordinary speech. This view of the *Pūrvapakṣa* however is not accepted by Kumārila, who bases the difference upon the fact that between the two sets of words there are distinct differences of pronunciation, accentuation and so forth; another reason being that while the woman and the *Shūdra* cannot utter 'Vedic' words, there is no such restriction with regard to ordinary words.

In answer to the above, the final conclusion is that the words are the same in both cases;—firstly, because, if they

* *Bṛīhaṭī* Ms. Page 36.

were different, there would be no means of ascertaining the meaning of the words of the Veda, which would thus become meaningless and hence untrustworthy ; and secondly, because the form of the words is exactly the same in both.

20. From the above we are led to the question of the exact nature of the denotation of words: Does the word—‘ *gauḥ* ’ for instance—denote the *class*, or the *individual*, or *both* ? The ground for doubt on this point put forward by the *Bhāṣya* is that—‘while the cognition pertains to the *class*, the action laid down pertains to the *individual*.’ This same view is accepted by Prabhākara, * who holds the *Anvīṭabhidhāna* theory, according to which the denotation of a word is obtained only through its connection with some particular action ; and as each sentence would naturally pertain to some individual thing, this theory would appear to lend support to the *Individualistic* theory. The above-mentioned ground of doubt however is not accepted by Kumārila ; and his reason is that, as a matter of fact, the cognition is often found to refer to the Individual also (and not always to the Class, as the *Bhāṣya* asserts). Kumārila bases his doubts as to the true denotation of the word upon the fact that both Usage and Cognition are found severally to apply to the class *and* the individual, while works on grammar lend support to the *Individualistic* theory. The ‘class’ or ‘class-character’ has been defined by the *Bhāṣya* (page 79, bottom) as the *commonality of Substances, Properties and Actions* ; and this is explained by Kumārila in the following words—

‘At the time that we perceive certain cows,.....we have an idea of a certain character that is common to all the various individuals perceived.....and it is this *common character* or *commonality*—that constitutes the *class*.’

The Individual has been defined by the *Bhāṣya* as that which is the *receptacle or substrate of specific peculiarities*. The practical purpose of the present enquiry lies in the fact

* Bṛihaṭī Ms. Page 36 b.

that if all words denoted only individuals, there could be no differentiation of rules into *general* and *particular* (the general law and its exception); and thus it would not be possible for the former to be set aside by the latter;—this would give rise to much confusion.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* arguments on the point at issue may be thus summed up :—

(1) Words must denote individuals; because if they did not do so, no injunction of any action would be possible, either in the Veda, or in ordinary worldly activity.

(2) If words denoted only Classes, different ‘numbers’ and ‘cases’ of nouns would not be possible.

(3) If nouns denoted only classes, there could be no words expressive of *qualities* of objects, and thus there could be no co-ordination between nouns and adjectives. This is the *Prābhākara* interpretation of the *Sūtra*; according to Kumārila the form of the argument embodied in the *Sūtra* is that—it is only when words denote individuals that there can be a co-ordination between nouns and adjectives.

Prabhākara, in his characteristic manner, turns this question also upon the authority of the Veda. The *Pūrvapakṣa*, according to him, is that it being doubtful whether the words contained in the Veda denote individuals or classes, the meaning of the whole becomes open to doubt, which vitiates the authority of the entire Veda.

In answer to the above, the final conclusion is that—there is no doubt as to the true meaning of words: *it is the class that is signified by the word, because it serves the purpose of actions* (*Sūtra* 33). The reason for this, given by the *Bhāṣya* and by Prabhākara,* is that, if the noun denoted the individual, we could not explain such injunctions as ‘the altar is to be built as *kite*’; because it could not possibly mean the making of an individual bird in the altar; it must

* *Bṛihaṭi* MS. Page 37-37b.

mean that 'with brick and mortar one should make an altar of the shape of the kite'; and as it would be impossible for *all* altars to be built like an *individual* bird, the word '*shyena*', '*kite*' must mean the *class* '*kite*'; and as that alone is the 'denotation' of the word which is found to be related to a sentence,—and here we find the *individual kite* incapable of being so related,—the word must denote the *commonality* or class-character. The *Bṛiḥaṭī* (p. 37b) adds that though all this may be true in the case of the particular sentence—'*shyenāchiṭam chinvīta*,'—in the case of other sentences, it is equally evident that the noun *cannot* denote the *class-character*; thus then, it being uncertain as to whether the words in the Veda denote the individual or the class, no trust can be reposed on the Veda, containing, as it does, words of doubtful signification. In answer to this, the *Bṛiḥaṭī* proceeds to point out that, as a matter of fact, we find that the injunctive function of an injunctive sentence cannot be accomplished until its words afford some idea of 'commonality'; consequently all *actions* must be related to that *commonality* or *class-character*, and *not* to the *individual*;—the idea of the individual, when necessary, being obtained indirectly, through the commonality, with which it is inseparably connected. This is what, according to Prabhākara is meant by the word '*kriyārthaṭvā*' (in Sūtra 33).

Not satisfied with the above exposition of the *Siddhānta* Kumārila puts it forward in the following form—*It is the class that is denoted by the word*;—(1) because, as a matter of fact, whenever we hear a word, the first idea that it brings up before our mind is that of the *class*—'Cow' for instance—and not of any *individual* cow; (2) because if individuals were, denoted, then, inasmuch as these are diverse, there could not be any such single idea as is found to be actually presented to, the mind by the word 'Cow'; and even if this were possible, it would only be a conglomeration of all the specific characteristics of all individual cows; (3) because in the case

of the denotation of *individuals* —(A) *all individuals* cannot be denoted; as that would necessitate the assumption of as many expressive potencies in the word as there are individuals denoted by it; and the conception of *all* individuals being an impossibility, the full signification of any word could never be grasped; (B) nor can an *aggregate of individuals* be denoted; as in this case also *all* individuals would have to be grasped, which is not possible; and further, all units of this aggregate being perishable, the aggregate also would be perishable; and thus there could be no eternality in the relationship of the word and its meaning; (C) nor lastly could a *single individual* be denoted; as the relationship of words and meanings would cease to be eternal; and as it could not be ascertained which particular individual is denoted, no business could ever be carried on.

Then as regards the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument,—that no sacrificial action would be possible with reference to a ‘class’, if it were the *class* that was denoted by the word,—it is declared (in *Sūtra* 34) that all such actions are laid down for the purpose of bringing about certain transcendental results; and as the proper agents for the carrying out of the acts leading to these results are the *substances*, what the word denotes is the *class*, not indeed for the sake of the class merely, but only with a view to provide the requisite knowledge of the *substance*, which knowledge would not be possible until the pointing out of the *class* to which that substance belongs.

21. We have thus seen that due authority and trustworthiness attaches to all the more important factors of the Veda,—viz, Injunctive Sentences, *Arthavūṭas* *Mantras* and Names,—as also to the *Smṛitis*, &c. based upon the Veda.

*Apart from these however, we find in many cases that the true indication as to what should be done is afforded also by Supplementary Explanations and Indirect

* *Tantravārtika*—Translation, Page 466.

Implications of the words contained in Vedic texts. In such cases, these also have to be accepted as authoritative; inasmuch as these also serve the useful purpose of settling doubtful points in regard to Dharma.

SECTION II.

Differentiation of Actions and Texts prescribing them.

Sub-section (1)—Apūrva.

1. In Section I, Jaimīni has described the *means* of knowing Dharma. The first sub-section has shown that the Vedic Injunction is such a means *par excellence*, and the other sub-sections have shown that the character of being such means belongs also to *Arthavāḍas*, Names, *Mantrās Smṛitis*, Usage, Supplementary Explanations and Indirect Implications. Thus the first section has supplied the full answer to the question—‘what are the means of obtaining the true knowledge of Dharma?’ In answering this question, in detail, it has also been shown that the true character of Dharma belongs to such actions as (for instance) the *Agni-hotra* and the *Jyotiṣtoma* (directly enjoined in the Veda), the *Aṣṭakū* (laid down in the *Smṛitis*), the *Holāka* (as established by custom). and so forth. But in the preceding section, these actions have been mentioned only by way of exemplifying the general principles therein discussed; and the detailed question of the individual character of these actions was left over for the second section. Thus the second section supplies the detailed answer to the second question propounded by the *Bhāṣya*—‘what is Dharma?—that is to say, what are the particular acts that are to be regarded as Dharma?’ Or as Prabhākara, with his usual desire for turning the entire body of the *Sūtras* upon the *Veda* itself, states the subject of the *adhyāya*:—‘What are the *several* texts that lay down the various acts that constitute *dharma*?’—Hence according to Prabhākara the subject-matter of Adh. II consists of difference among the texts prescribing the actions, and not among the actions directly, these latter being regarded

Prābhā. 157.

as different according to the difference of the texts prescribing them. This view of the subject-matter of Aḍh. II has been red-argued in the *Shāstrāḍipikā*, in the beginning of Aḍh. III. The third question—‘What are the *Sāḍhanas*—the means of accomplishing—of Dharma?’—is reserved for the third section.*

2. In order to find out each individual act laid down as Dharma, it becomes necessary to have some basis for proceeding with the enquiry as to differentiating one action from the other—from among a number of actions laid down in the Veda, &c.; and it is this basis that is discussed in the present section, where it is shown that one action is to be known as different from another when the two are found to be mentioned by different words and so on (*see below*). Then again, inasmuch as one action cannot be regarded as entirely different from another, unless the transcendental results—*apūrvas*—proceeding from them be also different, we have here an explanation of the difference among the *apūrvas* also. Lastly, so far it would seem that for each act there is a distinct *Apūrva*; so in order to set aside this view, we have the further distinction of Actions into ‘primary’ and ‘subsidiary,’ in connection with which it is shown that it is only the ‘primary’ action that leads to an independent *apūrva*, while those actions that are ‘subsidiary’ tend merely to complete that ‘primary’ action to which they are subsidiary; and as such have no distinct *Apūrvas* of their own. But this distinction between the ‘primary,’ and the ‘subsidiary’ action is merely mentioned here,—its detailed consideration being left over to sections (3) and (4); the fourth section deals with the *motives* of actions; section (5) is devoted to the subject of the *order* in which certain actions have to be performed; and the question of persons entitled to the performance of sacrifices is dealt with in section (6); sections (7) to (12) deal with he

*See *Shāstrāḍipikā*—Page 193.

subject of the *Transference* of details from one action to the other. Thus we find that all the subsequent sections—from (3) to (12)—turn upon the *Difference* among actions, which, for that reason, forms the subject of section (2).

3. Before proceeding with the grounds of difference among actions, Jaimini devotes the whole of *sub-section* (1) to what has been called by the commentators an 'introduction' to the main subject. This *sub-section* deals with such matters as—(a) which is the word in the injunctive sentence to which the *apūrva* resulting from the enjoined action is related (*sūtrās* 1-4); (b) Is there any such thing as 'Apūrva'? (*sūtra* (5); (c) Division of actions into 'primary' and 'subsidiary' (*sūtrās* 6-8), and so forth. In connection with this last subject, the further question is raised as to whether verbs are always injunctive of some action (primary or subsidiary), or sometimes they serve other purposes also; the conclusion on this point being that in many cases, where it cannot, under the peculiar circumstances, enjoin an action, the verb has to be regarded as merely expressive of a certain act, which it recalls as being the one at the performance of which the passage (in which the verb occurs) can serve a useful purpose by being recited. As this is found to be the case with *Mantrās* mostly, the *Bhāṣya* has interpreted the *aḍhikāraṇa* as proving the fact that *Mantrās* are never purely *injunctive*. In connection with *Mantrās*, in the present context, the *Sūtrās* supply us with definitions of the three principal kinds of Mantras.*

4. As the existence of *Apūrva* must be proved before we consider the question of the word to which it is related, we shall change the order of treatment adopted in the *Sutrās*, and begin with the question of *Apūrva*. The *Pūrvapakṣa* argument against the assumption of *Apūrva* is thus stated by Prabhākara † :—

*See above—Section I, sub-section (1), § 12 and 13.

† *Bṛihaṭī*, MS. p. 47b.

‘The injunction imparted by the injunctive word only urges the agent to the performance of a certain *action*, and not towards anything desired by him; the *action* is something ephemeral, and is not present immediately before the attainment of heaven by the agent; hence in order to meet these difficulties we must accept the Sacrifice itself to be either everlasting, or bringing about a certain faculty in the agent, or the favours of the deity; and there is no reason for assuming any such thing as the *Apūrva*.’

In answer to the above, he continues—

‘At the very outset you commit a mistake in assuming that the Injunction prompts the agent to *action*; what the Injunction really does is to prompt him to *exertion*; and the particular *action* denoted by the root is only the *object of that exertion*. [Thus then, what is denoted by the injunctive sentence is the ‘*nīyoga*’ (decree or mandate); this ‘mandate’ urges the man to *exertion*; and this ‘exertion’ pertains to some sort of action (denoted by the verb).] The assumption that the action itself is everlasting is against all evidence; the Self also is, by its very omnipresence, inactive; hence what brings about the final result cannot abide in the Self.’

The above passage from the *Bṛihaṭī* is not quite clear; nor has it been possible for us to obtain a manuscript of this portion of the commentary, *Rijuvimalā*. But the whole subject is discussed, from the *Prābhākara* stand-point, in the *Prakaraṇapāñchikā* (page 185 *et seq.*), from which the following may be gleaned:—

‘There can be no doubt as to the ephemeral character of the Sacrifice itself; it is borne out by everyday experience. Nor can the sacrifice be held to be laid down for the purpose of obtaining the favour of the deity; as there is no evidence in support of this; as a matter of fact also, Sacrifices are never performed for that purpose; the deity is only one to whom
Prābhā. 160.

the offering is made ; and we could please a deity by only such acts as could reach it ; then again, it is not possible for any deity to get at all the offerings made by different men at all times ; specially because no deity is either eternal or omnipresent. Nor can we accept the view that the verb with the injunctive affix expresses an action tending to produce, in the agent, a certain faculty, which is the immediate cause of the final result. This is the view favoured by *Kumārila*. * We cannot accept this view ; as there is no proof for the postulating of the appearance of any such faculty in the agent. That the sacrifice produces such a faculty is not proved either by Perception or by Inference, or even by Verbal Authority,—there being no Vedic texts pointing to any such faculty ; specially as we find that the *action* is brought about by the *exertion* of the agent ; and therefore the causal potency must reside in this *exertion*,—which *exertion* therefore should be denoted by the injunctive sentence. The assumption of the faculty in question might be said to be proved by Presumption, based upon the consideration that the action cannot be the cause of the final result, without some such faculty lasting during the time intervening between the completion of the action and the appearance of the result. But what presumption can justify us in assuming is some faculty or potency *in that thing itself which is found to be incapable* in the absence of that faculty ; so in the case in question, the Presumption can only point to some faculty in the *Action*, and not in the *Agent* ; what appears in the *Agent* cannot be regarded as belonging to the *Action* ; hence what is brought about by the faculty abiding in the *Agent* cannot be regarded as produced by the *Action*.’

The whole matter of what the *Bhātta* calls ‘ *Apūrva* ’ and the *Prābhākara* ‘ *Niyoga* ’, is thus explained in the *Prakarana-pañchikā* (p. 187) :—

* *Tantravārtika*, Translation, p. 504.

(1) The second aphorism of *adhyāya* I has shown that what the Injunctive Sentence denotes is *kārya*, *something to be brought about*. (2) In the beginning of *adhyāya* VI, it has been shown that, of this *kārya* denoted by the sentence, the *Niyojyā*—i.e. the person prompted to its bringing about—is one who is desirous of acquiring for himself some desirable result in the shape of Heaven and the like,—this person being denoted by the sentence, by virtue of his being related to that *kārya*. (3) In the *Bādāryaadhikaraṇa* (III—i-3) it has been proved that it is this *kārya* that is the direct cause of the production of that desirable result which is desired by (and as such, qualifies) the *prompted* person. (4) In the *Devatādhikaraṇa* (Sū. IX—i—9) the *Bhāṣya* has shown that this *kārya* cannot be the *act* (of *sacrificing*, for instance); as this *act* cannot possibly be the direct cause of the final result; nor could it be held to lead to the result through the favour of the deity to whom the sacrifice is offered; nor can it be regarded as leading to the result through a certain potency in the agent; and it is well known that either the act itself, or any potency abiding in itself, does not last long enough to bring about the result. (5) In the *Apūrvādhikaraṇa* (II—i-5) we have the final conclusion led up to by all the above *adhikaraṇas*: That which is denoted by the injunctive affix and other factors of the Injunction is the *kārya* inhering in the agent, who is *prompted* by the sentence, and as connected with whom the *kārya* is indicated; as this *kārya* is not cognisable by any other means of knowledge, it has been called *apūrva*, *something new, not known before*. The connection of this *kārya* with the *agent* and the *action* may be thus traced:—The *kārya* by its very nature is something brought about by *kṛiti*, or operation; and this *operation* is none other than the *exertion* of the agent. In the *Bhāṣya* (II—i—1) again, it is shown that no such exertion is possible, independently of some *act* denoted by the verbal root. Hence what the

injunctive sentence denotes, in this connection, is the *Niyoga* or *prompting*, relating to that *act*. This *act*, thus being the object of that *prompting*, comes to be spoken of as the *instrument* by which that *prompting* is accomplished, as shown under III—i—3. Even though the *kārya* is brought into existence at a time other than that of the appearance of the final result, yet, inasmuch as it is inseparably related to the *prompted* agent,—in whom the desire for that result is present,—and this agent is present at the time of the result,—there is nothing incongruous in regarding that *kārya* as the direct cause of the result. This *kārya* has been called *apūrva* by the *Bhāṣya* by reason of its being *something new* to all other means of knowledge, save the Injunctive sentence; but the name given to it by Prabhākara is *Niyoga* or *prompting*, by reason of the fact that it acts as an incentive to the *prompted person* (*Niyojya*) and makes him put forth an *exertion* towards the accomplishment of the action denoted by the verbal root. This *kārya* or *Niyoga* is expressed neither by the verbal root, nor by the injunctive affix, nor by any other word in the sentence; but it is denoted by the *sentence as a whole*; all other necessary factors being expressed by the several words of the sentence individually, what the sentence *as a whole* expresses is this *Niyoga* as related to the *prompted* person expressed by one of the words in the sentence (*i. e.*, the word signifying the *result*, the person desiring which is the *prompted* person). That the *Niyoga* is thus expressed by the sentence is also proved by the fact that the general rule is that, that which is the principal thing made known by the sentence forms its denotation; and there is no doubt that of all things made known by the sentence, the *Niyoga* is the most important; for even though the final *result* has all the appearance of the most important factor, yet it is the *Niyoga* that is really such, because it is the direct and immediate cause of the result, and it is also the immediate effect of the action performed; and further

because the result also has to be regarded as subservient to the *Niyoga*, in view of the fact that the *result* enters as one of the factors necessary for the making up of the full character of the *Niyoga*. To explain—the *Niyoga* cannot be a true *Niyoga*, until there is a *Niyojya*, the person to be prompted to exertion; as without exertion there can be no *Niyoga*; then again, without the *agent* there can be no exertion; nor can an agent put forth exertion—and be a *Niyojya*—until he is entitled to the undertaking resulting from that exertion; and lastly, it is only the person desiring the result issuing from the undertaking that is entitled to its performance; thus indirectly, through the agent, the result becomes a necessary factor in the *Niyoga*; this relation between the *Niyoga* and the *result* being similar to that between the master and servant: without the servant the master cannot be a true ‘master,’ and yet it is the master that is the more important person of the two.

The *Prakaranapañchikā* raises an interesting question here:—“Granted that the injunctive sentence—‘one desiring heaven should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma*,’—expresses the *Niyoga* as proceeding from the action of *Jyotiṣṭoma* Sacrifice, and as being the direct cause of attaining heaven. But just as the sacrifice being an effect, has only an ephemeral existence, and cannot continue till the appearance of the result,—so in the same manner, the *Niyoga* also, as an effect, could not but be transient, and as such unable to continue till the appearance of the result. Thus the very purpose for which the hypothesis of the *Niyoga* has been put forward, fails to be accomplished by it. This cuts off the ground entirely from under the whole fabric of the *Niyoga* or *Apūrva*.” The author fails to answer this objection satisfactorily. All that he says is that the *Niyoga* does not bring about the result immediately after it itself comes into existence, because in its action towards the bringing about of the result, it stands in need of certain auxiliaries, which are not always available,

and until whose appearance the result cannot appear. This explanation does not meet the difficulty that the *Niyoga* itself cannot, and does not, exist at the time that the result appears. He has explained in another place that, it is through the *prompted* agent, that the *Niyoga*, though itself appearing at the present time, brings about the result. This however is as much as to say that the *Niyoga* produces something *in the agent*, which latter something brings about the result; and thus this much-vaunted theory of the *Prābhākara* is found to be less acceptable than the *Bhātta* view, by which the action,—of sacrificing—itsself produces a certain faculty in the agent, which faculty brings about the result at the proper time; while *Prābhākara* appears to assume a *Niyoga* intervening between the *action* and the *something lasting* that is produced in the agent, he does not call it 'faculty,' but which comes to be the same.* In order to meet the difficulty, *Shālikanātha* has been forced to call in the aid of 'Fate'; he says that it is only when the *Niyoga* is aided by *Flute* that it brings about the result. This after all is a very poor explanation to be offered by the '*Mīmāṃsāniṣṭhā*' as he has called the followers of *Prābhākara*.

Another question arising in this connection is that, what has been said above may be all right so far as those actions are concerned which are laid down as to be performed with a view to a certain result; but how would it apply to those actions which are to be performed merely in fulfilment of a duty incumbent upon all persons, without reference to any result?,—or to those passages that lay down the *non-doing* of certain acts? The answer to this is that, in the explanation of *Niyoga*, the *Prābhākara* has brought in the *result*, not as something desired by the agent, but only as something the presence of which makes a person entitled to the performance of a certain act; in the case of those actions then,

* Herein lies the only justification for *Prābhākara*'s views being regarded as 'gauravād-dūravāntam.'

that are laid down as *necessary* duties to be performed *throughout life*,—any person *who is endowed with life* being entitled to the performance of those acts, the character of the 'Agent' becomes fully accomplished; and this is all that is needed for the explanation of the *Niyoga*.

By Kumārila's view the *Apūrva* is 'a capability in the principal action, or in the agent, which did not exist prior to the performance of the action, and whose existence is proved by the authority of the scriptures'.* Before the sacrifices laid down as leading to heaven are performed, there is in the Sacrifices themselves, in the first place, an incapability of leading to heaven, and in the second place, in the agent, that of attaining to heaven. Both these *incapacities* are set aside by the performance of the sacrifice; and this performance creates also a positive force or capacity, by virtue of which heaven is attained; and to this latter force or capability we give the name '*Apūrva*.' The proof for the existence of such an *Apūrva* lies in Presumption,—based upon the fact that without some such force many Vedic passages are wholly inexplicable. For instance, there are many passages declaring that certain sacrifices lead the sacrificer to heaven,—the idea being that he goes to heaven, not indeed immediately on the completion of the sacrifice, but after death. The question then arises that, as a general rule the effect comes into existence while its cause is still present, or immediately after the cause has ceased to exist; but in the case in question, the sacrifice ceases to exist at the present time, while the attainment of heaven comes ten or twenty years later. This can be explained only by the hypothesis that the sacrifice, on its completion, produces directly a certain potency or faculty in the agent, which resides in him, like many other faculties, throughout life, at the end of which it leads him to heaven. Without some such intervening potency—as the connecting link between

* *Tanṭravārttika*—Translation, page 504.

the sacrifice and its ultimate result—the causal relation between these two cannot be explained. *Apūrva* thus is nothing more than a force set in motion by the performance of the action,—this force being the] direct instrument whereby, sooner or latter, the action accomplishes its result. There is nothing incongruous in this hypothesis ; as every action is actually found to set going certain forces, either in some substance, or in persons connected with those substances ; and the force thus set going accomplishes its result, as soon as it reaches its full development with the aid of attendant auxiliaries. The whole process is thus briefly stated systematically in the *Nyāyamālāvistāra* :—

‘(1) The sentence—“one desiring heaven should perform sacrifices”—lays down the fact that the *sacrifice* is instrumental in the bringing about of the attainment of heaven. (2) Then arises the question—how can the sacrifice, which ceases to exist at the moment that it is complete, bring about the result at a much later time ? (3) The answer to this is that the sacrifice accomplishes the final result through the agency of the force called *Apūrva*. (4) A further question arises—how is this *apūrva* brought into existence ? (5) The answer is—by the performance of the Sacrifice.’

In all simple sacrifices, there is a single *apūrva* leading to a single result. But there are certain elaborate sacrifices which are highly complex, being made up of a number of subsidiary sacrifices ; such, for instance, as the *Darsha-Paurṇamāsa* sacrifices. In all such Sacrifices, there are as a rule four kinds of *apūrva* :—(1) The *Phalāpūrva*—that which brings about the result directly, and which is the immediate cause of the result ; (2) the *Samuḍāyāpūrva*—in the *Darsha-Paurṇamāsa* sacrifices, the three sacrifices performed on the New Moon day form one group, and the three performed on the Full Moon Day another group ; each of these groups occurring at different points of time could not have a single *apūrva* ; hence each group has a distinct *apūrva* of

its own, the two *apūrvas* combining to produce the final *Phalāpūrva*; and each of these distinct *apūrvas* is called a 'Samuḍāyāpūrva'; (3) the *Utpattīyapūrva*—i. e., the three *apūrvas* following from each of the three sacrifices forming the 'Darsha' group; these three *Apūrvas* lead to the *Samuḍāyāpūrva* of the group; which, when combining with the *Samuḍāyāpūrva* of the 'Paurṇamāsā' group, leads to the final *Phalāpūrva*; (4) the *Āṅgāpūrva*—each of the three sacrifices of the group is made up of a number of minor acts, each of which in its turn, must have a distinct *apūrva* of its own; as otherwise the act could not help in the final *Phalāpūrva*.

5. The general law having been established, that every action enjoined in the Veda brings about an *apūrva*, the *Sūtras* proceed to note certain exceptions. These exceptions form the subject-matter of *Sūtrās* II—i—6 to 8;—which also deal with the distinction of actions into 'primary' and 'secondary.' The chief basis of this distinction may be thus explained:—Every action is related to a certain material substance; and hence the material has been regarded as serving the visible purpose of accomplishing the action. In certain cases, the action mentioned turns upon itself and imparts an aid to the material; as for instance, in the case of the *threshing* which cleans the corn; while in some cases the action rests upon itself entirely, its sole purpose being its own fulfilment,—*e. g.* the performance of a sacrifice. In this latter case, there naturally arises a desire in the mind of the agent to know what useful purpose would be served by the action; and where no visible purpose is found to be served by it, we have to assume a transcendental result in the shape of the *apūrva*. Where, however,—*e. g.* in the case of the *threshing* of the corn—the action is found to serve a distinctly visible purpose, we have no reason for assuming any transcendental result; specially as the injunction of the action is quite justified by a visible end. From the

above distinction it follows that—*those actions that do not tend to make a material are 'primary' actions* (Sūtra II—i—7). And the reason for this is that these actions—which do not serve to bring into existence any material substance, or to produce a certain peculiarity in a substance already extant—cannot but be regarded as bringing about transcendental results, and as such being 'primary.' *Those again are 'secondary' actions which are meant to make material substances*—(Sūtra II—i—8),—such actions, for instance, as the consecrating of the sacrificial fire, the appointment of priests at a sacrifice, the threshing and grinding of the corn, and so forth. It may be noted here that the distinction of actions into 'primary' and 'secondary' is distinct from the subject of '*aṅga*' or '*śreṣṭha*' (Subsidiary) and '*aṅgin*' (Principal; as the former refers to *actions* alone, while the latter is a relationship subsisting between *actions* on the one hand and Substances, Qualities and Purifications on the other. This latter forms the subject-matter of section (3).

6. Having proved the existence of the *apūrvā* we now proceed to consider the question—Which is the word in the injunction of an action with which the result of that action is related, and which would, on that account, indicate the difference or non-difference among the *apūrvās* leading up to the results, and thence also among the *actions* themselves. The first step in the answer to this question is—that the result is related to only *one* word in the injunctive sentence;—and the second, that it is related either to the *noun* or to the *verb*. This then leads to the final question—To which of these two—the noun or the verb—is the result related? The answer to this is contained in what has been called the '*Bhāvārthādhikaraṇa*'* (Sūtras II—i—1 to 4). That the result cannot be related to the noun follows from the very nature of nouns: Nouns are the names of things already *accomplished*, and not standing in need of

* *Bṛiṣaṭi*—MS. pp. 44—47; *Tantravārtika*, Translation, pp. 473—96.

any thing else,—being self-sufficient in their denotation. That word, on the other hand, to which the main result is related, must, as a matter of fact, be something that has *yet to be accomplished*, and as such stands in need of such agencies as would help in its accomplishment. It is only *Verbs* that are found to be expressive of things that do not already exist at the time, but have got to be accomplished with the help of certain agencies. And inasmuch as the *Apūrva* also is something that is *yet to be accomplished*, it is to the Verb that it must be closely related.

As to how the *Apūrva* is related to the verb, this may be thus explained :—Every verb in an injunctive sentence is found to be made up of a verbal root and the injunctive affix. This affix denotes what has been called ‘*vidhi*’ or, more technically, ‘*bhāvanā*’, by which is meant *the activity of the agent towards a certain course of action*. That is to say, the injunctive affix in the word ‘*yajeta*’ signifies that ‘the agent must put forth his effort towards a definite end.’ This is what has been called the ‘*Ārthī bhāvanā*’; while the factor of *prompting* that accompanies the injunctive is called the ‘*Shābḍī bhāvanā*.’ But in the present connection it is the *Ārthī bhāvanā* that concerns us.

As soon as we have realised the above import of the *bhāvanā*, we are confronted by the following three questions—(1) *what* is it that is to be accomplished by the effort of the agent? , (2) *by what* is it to be accomplished? and (3) *how* is it to be accomplished? (1) As for the *first* question it naturally follows that it is the desirable result mentioned in the sentence that has to be accomplished; as regards the *second*, the answer is supplied by the particular action expressed by the verbal root in connection with which the injunctive affix appears,—in the case of the word ‘*yajeta*’, the action of *Yāga*, *Sacrifice*, denoted by the root ‘*yaji*’; and lastly, as regards the *third* question, the answer is supplied by the details of procedure laid down in the Veda in con-

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nection with the action. Thus it is to the verb alone that the result can be related,—both grammatically and materially; and hence it is the injunctive verb alone that can show whether or not any two *apūrvas* are different; and from this it would follow as a corollary if any two actions expressed by the two verbs are one and the same or different.*

This leads us on to the main subject of the section—the Difference among Actions.

SECTION (2)—*Sub-section (2).*

DIFFERENCE AMONG ACTIONS.

1. Before proceeding with the question of what differentiates one *action* and *apūrvā* from another, we shall explain the different kinds of action.† I. The first division of actions is into—(1) *Laukika*—worldly, and (2) *Vaidika*—Vedic, pertaining mainly to the other world. II. Vedic Actions are classed under three heads:—(1) Positive or Action Proper, the performance of an act, (2) Negative, or Avoidance of an act, (3) Positive-Negative, or Partaking of the character of both Performance and Avoidance, also called '*Paryudāsa*.' Another division of Vedic Actions is into—(1) *Guṇakarma* or Secondary (Auxiliary) Action, and (2) *Pradhāna* or *Artha-karma* or Primary action. III. Of Positive Actions the three main divisions are into the three kinds of 'Sacrifice'—(1) '*Yāgu*' Sacrifice Proper, the offering of a certain substance to a deity, (2) '*Homa*' offering of the substance into fire or water, and (3) *Dāna*—the waiving of one's own proprietary right over a thing in favour of another person.‡ Kātyāyana§ draws a further distinction

* In connection with the *Shābḍi bhāvanī*, what is accomplished is the activity of the agent; it is accomplished by the injunctive word in the Veda; and by means of the idea of the excellence of the activity afforded by the *Arthavāda* passages.

† *Mīmāṃsābālāprakāśa*, pp. 81 *et. seq.*

‡ See last chapter, on 'Sacrifice.' *Mim. Sū.* IV—ii—28.

§ *Śrauta-Sūtra*, 1-27, 28.

between *Yāga* and *Homa*,—the former being that in which the offering is made by a man *standing* and pronouncing the syllable ‘*vaṣat*’ at the end of the *mantra*, while in the *Homa* the man is *sitting* and pronounces the syllable ‘*svāhā*.’ Positive Action is divided into another three classes, by the followers of Kumārila (specially by Pārthasārathi Mishra):—

(1) *Kratvartha*—accomplishing something tending to the fulfilment of the Sacrifice, for instance, all Subsidiary Actions, called ‘*guṇakarma*.’ (2) *Puruṣārtha*—accomplishing something desired by the agent, for instance, all Primary Actions, also called ‘*Arthakarma*,’ that which produces the *Apūrva* directly; and (3) those that are neither *Kratvartha* nor *Puruṣārtha*, for instance, the *Agnyādihāna*. These three divisions have been mentioned by Pārthasārathi in the *Tantrarāṭna*, under the *adhikaraṇa* on *Dravyārjana*.^{*} Prabhākara however accepts only the first two of these; nor is there any authority for the third division, either in the *Bhāṣya* or the *Vārtika*. The two-fold classification, as accepted by Shabara as well as by Prabhākara and Kumārila, is based upon the authority of the *Sūtra* itself. IV. The *Kratvartha* Action is divided into—(1) *Ārādupakāraka*—helping the Sacrifice indirectly, through distinct subsidiary *apūrvas*,—e.g. the *Prayājas*; and (2) the *Sannipattiyopakāraka*, helping the Sacrifice directly. V. The *Sannipattiyopakāraka* Action is of three kinds:—(1) that which fulfils a visible purpose; (2) that which accomplishes an invisible or transcendental purpose; and (3) that which fulfils both visible and invisible ends. The *first* of these again is of two kinds—(a) that which brings about something visible in substances *to be used* at the Sacrifice, and (b) that which effects some visible result in that which *has been used*,—this latter action being called ‘*Pratipattiikarma*.’ The *second* kind of the *Sannipattiyopakāraka* is also of three kinds:—(1) That which affects the substance that *has been used*—e. g.,

^{*}Mim. Sū. IV—i—(Fourth *Varṇaka*).

the burning up of the substances out of which the offerings have been made; (2) That which affects the substance *to be used*—*e. g.* the sprinkling of water over the Corn; and (3) that which is performed and affects the substance at the time that it is *being used*,—*e. g.* the offering of the cake without turning the vessel. Another division of the *Kraṭvartha* Action is into the following four kinds:—(1) *Uṣatti* or Productive Action—*e. g.* the kneading of the dough, which produces the cake; (2) *Prāpti* or Approaching,—*e. g.* the milking of the cow, whereby the milk is *got at*; (3) *Vikṛiti* or Modificatory,—*e. g.* the threshing of the corn, which changes its shape; and (4) *Samskṛiti* or Purificatory,—*e. g.* the sprinkling of water over the corn.

Another classification of Vedic Actions is into the following four classes:—(1) *Prakṛiti* or Archetypal,—*e. g.* the *Agnihotra*; (2) *Vikṛiti* or Ectypal,—*e. g.* the *Māsāgnihotra*; (3) *Prakṛiti*—*Vikṛiti*, partaking of the character of both,—*e. g.* the *Agnīśomīya*, the *Savanīya* and the like, the former being the *ectype* of the *Darśhapuṣyamāsa*, but the *archetype* of the *Savanīya* (see *Mīm. Sū.* VIII—i—14); and (4) That which is neither *archetypal* nor *ectypal*,—*e. g.* the *Darvīhoma*; that this is neither the one nor the other has been explained in the last *adhikaraṇa* of the VIII *adhyāya* of *Mīm. Sū.*

The most well-known classification of Vedic actions is into—(1) *Nitya*, Absolutely Necessary,—*e. g.* the performance of the daily *Sandhyā*; (2) *Naimittika*, Necessary but for certain specified occasions,—*e. g.* the performance of the *Jyotiṣ* sacrifices on the advent of spring (see *Mīm. Sū.* VI); and (3) *Kāmya*, Performed for a specific worldly end,—*e. g.* the *Kārīrī* sacrifice, performed for obtaining rain.

The above are the main divisions of the Positive Action. The Negative Action—Cessation from Activity, or Non-performance—is of two kinds:—(1) *Kraṭvartha*,—*e. g.* the *non-holding* of the *Ṣodashin* vessels at the *Aṭirātra* sacrifice; and (2) *Puruṣārtha*—*e. g.* the non-killing of animals.

Prabhā. 173.

The third kind of action,—which is neither Positive nor Negative—is also of two kinds:—(1) *Kraṭvartha*,—*e. g.* the reciting of the ‘*yeyajāmaha*’ hymns at the performance of the main sacrifice, and their non-reciting at the *Anuyājas*. and (2) *Puruṣartha*,—*e. g.* the vow to *not see* the rising one.

2. Having explained the more important divisions of Action, we shall now turn our attention to the main question of the *Section*—what are the means by which we ascertain the difference or non-difference among actions? There are *six* means of ascertaining the fact that one action is different from another* :—

(1) *Difference in words*—when two actions are found to be mentioned by two distinct words, there is no doubt that they are intended to be regarded as entirely distinct; specially so when the difference is between the verbs, the roots whereof are directly expressive of the *action*. ‘As the *Niyoga* or *Apūrva* is related to the verb, as shown above, we must accept as many distinct *apūrvas*, and hence *actions*, as there are *verbs* in the sentence’—says the *Bṛihāṭī* (page 52 b).

(2) *Repetition*—When the verb is found to be repeated—*e. g.* in the passage ‘*Samidho yajati, tanūnapātam yajati, &c., &c.*’ †—each ‘*yajati*’ is regarded as mentioning a distinct sacrifice.

(3) *Mention of number*—when it is distinctly laid down that there should be ‘*three libations*,’ each of these three must be regarded as a distinct action.

(4) *Difference of names*—in the passage ‘*ṣa vishvajyotiḥ ṣa sarvajyotiḥ, &c.,*’—it is clear that each of the names ‘*vishvajyotiḥ*’ and ‘*sarvajyotiḥ*’ pertains to a distinct action.

(5) *Difference of material*—The sentence ‘*Vaishvadevī āmikṣā*’ speaks of the offering of the *āmikṣā* to the Vishve-

* *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*—Page 45. *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra*—Aṭhyāya II, Pādas 2 and 3

† A passage referring to certain offerings to the Seasons,—occurring in the *Shāṭpaṭha-Bṛāhmaṇa* 1. 5. 3. 9 *et seq.*

devas ; and the sentence ‘*Vājibhyo vājinaṃ*’ similarly speaks of the offering of the *vājina* to the Vājins ; and from this it is clear that the offering of the *Āmikṣū* is one action and that of the *Vājina* another.

(6) *Difference of context*—we find the sentence ‘*Upasād-bhishcharitvā māsamagnihoṭrañjuhoti*,’—‘Having performed the *Upasād* sacrifices, one performs the *Māsāgnihoṭra*,’—in a context entirely different from that of the ordinary *Agnihoṭra* ; and this fact shows that the *Māsāgnihoṭra* Sacrifice herein laid down is an action that is entirely different from the ordinary *Agnihoṭra*,—even though the details of the two sacrifices are entirely alike. In this connection the *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra* (Adhyāya II, Pāda 4, Sūtras 8 to 32) raises the question as to whether or not the ‘*Agnihoṭra*’ mentioned in a passage of the *Mādhyandina* Rescension of the Yajurveda is the same as that mentioned in a passage of the *Kāṇva* Rescension ; and the final conclusion is that the two are one and the same ; mentioned in different Rescensions for different sets of readers. It is only when actions are mentioned in different contexts of the same rescensional text that they are to be regarded as different.

SECTION (3)—SUB-SECTION (1).

Mutual Superviency among Actions.

1. The difference among actions having been established, the next question that arises is—is each and every action expressed by verbs occurring in the Vedic texts an independent act by itself, bringing into existence a distinct *Apūrva* ?—or, are some subordinate to, and subserve the various purposes of, some others ?—and if the latter,—what actions are subservient to what ? Though this is what forms the main subject of section (3), yet it will be shown here that it is not only *actions* that are subservient or subsidiary to *actions*, but that under the word ‘subsidiary’—, *sheṣa*,’ ‘*aṅga*,’ ‘*āshrita*’—are also included Substances and

their properties. The consideration of this point is all the more important, as the subject-matter of all the rest of the *Sūtras* (sections 4 to 12) are, directly or indirectly, based upon this relationship of the 'principal' and 'subsidiary' among actions, as says Kumārila*—

शेषस्यैवाधिकारोऽत्र युक्तो, नान्यस्य कस्यचित् ।

शेषधीहिदध्यपेक्षत्वात् अन्यलक्षणवाग्वियाम् ॥

2. The 'Subsidiary'—'Sheṣa'—is defined as *that which is for the sake of another* (III—i—2); that is to say, that which is indicated by direct assertion, &c. as *aiding some action towards the fulfilment of its Apūrva*; this latter qualification being necessary in order to preclude mere verbal relationship. This *being for the sake of another* does not necessarily *in itself* imply that the Subsidiary should in some way help the Principal; but such help is assumed on the strength of Presumption. For instance, in the case of the action of *sprinkling water* on the corn, the fact of its having been laid down in connection with a sacrifice leads to the presumption that it must accord some help to that sacrifice. Similarly in the case of the *Prayājas*, laid down in connection with the *Darśhapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, we find that these latter stand in need of some help; and also that there are certain other actions laid down (in the shape of the *Prayājas*), which stand in need of some other action to which they could accord help; and this mutual need leads us to the presumption that the *Prayājas* subserve the *Darśhapūrṇamāsa*.

3. Before proceeding further we shall stop a while to discuss a question that has led to some confusion in the minds of all students of *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*. In the *Mimāmsā-sūtra*, II—i—7, 8, we have a division of actions into 'primary' and 'secondary,' the two *Sūtras* providing us with

* *Tantravārtika*—Text, p. 655 and 660.

the definitions of the two kinds. The question arises—‘Inasmuch as the ‘secondary’ action will be necessarily *subservient* to the ‘primary,’ where is the use of raising the question at all, in *aḍhyāya* III ?’

There are two answers to this question :—(1) that the Sūtras in *aḍhyāyā* II have taken note of *actions* only, and those also only such as are actually found to fulfill only visible ends ; while the third *aḍhyāya* takes up, not only *all* actions—serving visible as well as invisible ends—but *substances*, *mantras* and such other details also. This answer is rejected by Kumārila* on the ground that, in that case, the subject of *aḍhyāya* II would be only a part of what is dealt with in *aḍhyāya* III ; the answer that he proposes is as follows :—(2) that the actions mentioned in the second *aḍhyāya*—the threshing of the corn for instance,—are ‘subservient’ can be ascertained only from what the Sūtras say in the third *aḍhyāya* ; what has been said in the second *aḍhyāya* therefore is only this, that those actions cannot be regarded as leading to an *apūrvā*, for the simple reason that they are found to accomplish only visible purposes ; ‘and under the circumstances, if they were to produce an *apūrvā* also, they would be bringing about two results’—adds the *Rijuvimalā* (MS. Vol. III, page 11).

According to Prabhākara,* the connection between the two *aḍhyāyas* is thus explained :—What has been explained in the second *aḍhyāya* is only the difference among injunctive texts ; that is to say, it has been shown there how two texts are to be regarded as different, by reason of the difference in their *results*—*apūrvā*—spoken of in each, and also of the difference in the several adjuncts of these ; and as ‘action’ is one of the most important of these *adjuncts*, the difference among actions has also been explained in that *aḍhyāya*,—but this last only as the basis of differentiation among

* *Tantravārtika*, page 670.

† *Bṛīhaṭi* page 65, and *Rijuvimalā*, Vol. III, page 1.

the texts; and thus the *difference* therein dealt with is that based upon the consideration of the connection among the words of the injunctive texts. While the *difference* upon which the subject-matter of the third *adhyāya* is based is that of the *Niyoga* or *apūrva* resulting from actions.* The distinction herein drawn will be made clear from the example of the sentence ‘*graham sammūrṣti*’; here the relationship between the *graha* (vessel) and the *washing* expressed by the words is only that of the *vessel* being the ‘objective’ of the action of *washing*; while the relation of ‘subserviency’ between the two is based upon the fact that the *washing* is ‘subservient’ to the *vessel* as leading to some other result. • Thus it is found that what is dealt with in the third *adhyāya* is closely connected with what has gone before in the second *adhyāya*.

4. The answer to the question—what is it that can be the ‘subservient’ or ‘subsidiary’?—is supplied by the *Sūtras* III—i—3 and 4, wherein it is stated that the character of the ‘subsidiary’ can belong to—(1) ‘substances, (2) accessories (*i. e.* *mantra* and deity) and (3) purifications’ (these three only, according to Bāṇari—*Sūtra* 3; but according to Jaimini, also to) (4) ‘actions, (5) results, and (6) human agents.’ (*Sūtra* 4). (1) That *substances* are subservient to Sacrifices follows from their very nature; they exist, because they subserve some purpose. (2) *Mantras* and *Deities* also are necessary appendages to the Sacrifice. (3) Such *purificatory* or *preparatory acts* as the threshing of the corn come to be regarded as ‘subservient’ to Sacrifices, in view of the fact that Sacrifices need some substances out of which the cake and such other things could be made; the cake, for instance, must be made of some corn; but no entire corn can make it; the grains have to be threshed and cleaned, so that it may be used for the making of the cake to be used at the Sacrifice. (4) *Actions* (Sacrifices) also are ‘subservient’

* See *Rijuvimalā*—Vol. III, page 3.

to their result; as it is *for the sake* of the result that the action is performed.

(5) The *result* is 'subservient,' because it is *for the sake* of the human agent that seeks it, and accomplishes it by means of the action.

(6) The *Human Agent* is 'subservient' to the actions,—being the 'performer' who will accomplish the action, *for the sake* of which, therefore, he would exist. The 'subserviency' of the agent to the action is expressed by the word enjoining the act; for instance, of the word '*yajeta*' the 'Sacrifice' forms the principal factor in the denotation; and as no such action as the 'Sacrifice' would be possible without an *agent*, the agent also must be regarded as implied by the same word.

Apart from this, there are cases where the human agent occupies the most subordinate position; *e. g.* in the case where the man is required simply for the purpose of measuring the height of the sacrificial post.

The above is the view of Jainini as interpreted by the Bhāṣya; which quotes the interpretation of the 'author of the Vṛitti' (Upavarṣa),—the sense of which may be thus stated:—It is only *Substances, Mantras and Deities* and *Purificatory Acts* that can, by their very nature, be 'subservient' to sacrifices as held by Bāḍari; as it is only these that can *never* be 'principals'; and the reason for this view, says the *Bṛihaṭī* (p. 66b), lies in the fact that the *Niyoga* or *Apūrva* is accomplished by the Sacrifice, which, in its turn, is accomplished by Substances, Mantras and Deities and Purificatory Acts, which latter alone are forces contributing to the ultimate result.—'To the other three things, mentioned by Jainini, the *subserviency* can belong only relatively; for instance, the *Sacrifice* (mentioned in *Sūtra* 4) is *principal* in relation to the *substance*, but *subservient* in relation to the *result*; the *result* (mentioned in *Sūtra* 5) is *principal* in relation to the *Sacrifice*, but *subservient* in relation to the *agent*; the *human agent* (mentioned in *Sūtra* 6) also is *principal* in relation to the

result, but *subsidiary* to such acts as the *measuring of the sacrificial post.*' (*Shabara Bhāṣya*, page 211).—

The meaning of this is that the first three—Substance and the rest—are *always* 'subsidiary'; they are never 'principal'; while the latter three—Result and the rest—are both 'principal' and 'subsidiary' in relation to one another.

फलयागनराणाञ्च द्व्याकारत्वम्परस्परम्*

5. 'Subsidiaries' or '*Āṅgas*' have been divided by Kumāṛila and his followers† into two classes—(1) the Direct and (2) the Indirect. Those subsidiaries which, either directly or indirectly, help in the fulfilment of the Sacrifice, and, *only through that sacrifice*, the ultimate *Apūrva*, are called 'Direct'; e.g., the *substance* corn, and its *purificatories*, the threshing and water-sprinkling, the *deity* and the *mantras*; the sprinkling of water produces, in the corn, a certain peculiarity not otherwise possible; the threshing helps by removing the chaff from the grain; the corn itself helps by constituting the cake; the *mantras* help by recalling, and consecrating, the deity: and lastly, the deity helps directly by being one to whom the offering is made; and unless there is such a deity, there can be no 'Sacrifice', which is only the offering of substances *to a deity*. Those on the other hand, are called 'Indirect' subsidiaries which produce distinct *apūrvas* of their own,—these *apūrvas* appearing in the soul of the performer,—and which, through these *apūrvas*, help the ultimate *apūrva* of the Sacrifice.

Prabhākara and his followers ‡ proceed on a somewhat different line, as regards the classification of Subsidiaries; their classification is more logical and exhaustive; it is into the following four heads:—(1) '*Jāti*' or Class-character, (2) '*Guṇa*' or Quality, (3) '*Dravya*' or Substance, and (4)

* *Tantravārtika*—Page, 675.

† *Mimāṃsaparibhāṣā*, pp. 16-17, also *Shāstraḍīpikā*, p. 202.

‡ *Prakaranapañchikā* pp. 202-5.

‘Bhāvārthātṃaka’ or such things as are denoted by verbs’ *e.g.*, actions. The last of these is subdivided into the *San-nipattīyopakāraka* or Direct and the *Ārādupakāraka* or Indirect. That which produces its direct effects in a certain thing that is a *Kāraka* in,—*i.e.*, conducive to—the fulfilment of the Sacrifice, is its *Sannipattīyopakāraka* (p. 202); *e.g.* the *Sitting* of the *Sacrificer*, the *thumpi* of the material *object* offered, &c.; these have no *apūrvas* of their own, but are related to the final *Apūrva* of the Sacrifice to which they are ‘subsidiary.’ The *Sannipattīyopakāraka* again is divided into the following four kinds (p. 202)—(a) that which brings into existence a certain substance,—*e.g.* the kneading of the flour, which brings into existence the dough that did not exist before; (b) that which leads to the acquisition of a certain substance,—*e.g.* the milking, which leads to the acquisition of the milk that existed already; (c) that which produces some modification in the substances,—*e.g.* the boiling of ghee which changes the solid into the liquid form; and (d) that which purifies,—*e.g.* the sprinkling of water over the corn, which does not produce any material change in the corn, but adds to it something invisible and transcendental.

By the *Bhātta* view, the *Sannipattīyopakārakas* have no distinct *apūrvas* of their own,—their full effect lying in the accomplishment of certain material substances; they have thus only visible effects, (*see* *Tranṭravārtika* Translation, p. 526) and help the final *apūrva* of the Sacrifice only through the aid that they impart to the material fulfilment of that sacrifice. But even though the subsidiaries themselves do not bring about an *apūrva*, it is held by the *Bhātta* that a distinct *apūrva* does proceed from the recourse that is had to the particular subsidiary. Says the *Shāstraḍīpikā* (p. 203)—‘*Niyamāḍṛiṣṭaṇṭu kalpanīyam, taḍ varamekameva ḍṛiṣṭārṭhāvaghāṭaniyamāḍ alṛiṣṭam kalpiṭam.* For instance, the visible effect, the removal of the chaff, for which the

Prābhā. 181.

thumping of the corn is laid down, can be fulfilled by many ways; and so even though the *thumping* itself may not produce an *apūrva*, the choice that the performer exercises, in having recourse to the *thumping* out of the several other ways of removing the chaff, does produce an *apūrva*. The reason for this is that, according to Kumārila, every Vedic injunction must, by its very nature, be related to an *apūrva*; and as the *thumping* is *enjoined*, it must be related to an *apūrva* but as the action of thumping itself is found to be productive of only a visible result, in the shape of the removal of the chaff, the *apūrva* to which it is related must be due to the choice of that particular method of removing the chaff, in preference to others; and the real reason underlying all this lies in the fact that a Vedic Injunction must lay down a *Dharma*; and an injunction that would not have what it enjoins conducive to an *apūrva*, would lose its character of 'Injunction of *Dharma*'; and as the action itself is found to be conducive to only a visible end, we must accept an *apūrva* proceeding from the choice that is exercised; it is for this reason that these injunctions have been called 'Restrictive.'

The above view is traversed by the *Prābhākara* in the following manner:—In the case of the thumping of the corn, we find that the words of the text enjoining it, the thing (the corn) itself, the nature of the thing and the action enjoined,—all point to the fact that the only result that can be brought about is the removal of the chaff from the grain. Now if over and above this result, an *apūrva* were assumed, we would fall into the absurdity of a single action being related to, and bringing about, two results. Then as to how there can be a Vedic Injunction of that which refers to some material substance that already exists,—the explanation is that what the injunction lays down does not refer to the mere *shape* or *material form* of the corn, but to the action of *thumping*; and this thumping of the corn *in relation to the Sacrifice*, can not be known by any other means except the

injunction; hence the injunction can not be called 'restrictive', but purely 'original,' laying down, as it does, something not otherwise known; because what the injunction means is that the Sacrifice is to be related to *that corn which has its chaff remov-d by thumping*; and the *restriction* and *specification* of the particular method of removing the chaff is only a Secondary *purpose* served by the injunction, and not itself the *object* of the injunction. This may be thus explained:—If the *thumping* had not been laid down in connection with (and as subsidiary to) a certain *apūrva* (the *apūrva* of the Primary Sacrifice),—but simply for the sake of the visible result of removing the chaff, which would be all that was meant as necessary for the preparation of the cake,—then, inasmuch as this visible purpose could have been fulfilled by the tearing of the corns with the nails also, there would be no necessity for the *thumping*; while, if the *thumping* is laid down in connection with a transcendental result of the sacrifice, in the shape of the *apūrva*, then, as in view of this injunction, the *apūrva* could not be brought about if any other method of removing the chaff were adopted,—the specification of the process becomes necessary; and thus this specification is only the *motive* of the injunction. And as for the fact of the *thumping* being related to the *apūrva*, this is not known by any other means save the injunction in question; and thus in view of this also, the injunction lays down something not otherwise known and hence must be regarded as an 'original' and not a 'restrictive' injunction.

Though the *Sannipatṭyopakārika* is related to an *Apūrva* (that of the Sacrifice), it does not produce any *Apūrva* of its own; as all that the action does is the bringing about of something visible;—*e. g.*, the removal of the chaff; and yet it is a fit object of injunction, as it does, indirectly through the fulfilment of the sacrificial performance, help in the accomplishment of the final *Apūrva* of that sacrifice. That is why such actions have been called

‘*sannipatṭyopakāraka*’—*yūgasvarūpe eva sannipatṭya tasyā-pūrvasiḍḍhāvupakurvanti*. This relationship to the *Apūrva* is ascertained from the proximity of the sentence to the sentence laying down the Principal Sacrifice as bringing about the *apūrva*,—and not upon the words of the sentence themselves. This explanation is objected to on the ground that, in this manner, as the principal fact of the action (of thumping) being related to the *apūrva* would not be expressed by the sentence itself, the sentence would become practically meaningless. Prabhākara’s answer to this objection is that it is not necessary that every Vedic sentence *must* speak of some purpose to be served; it is merely a question of facts; a sentence that does *not* speak of a purpose cannot be *made* to speak of it. But in the case in question, the sentence does not, as a matter of fact, become meaningless or purposeless, as it serves the purpose of laying down a certain method of doing a certain thing; and it is only the connection of this method with the *apūrva* that is left to be implied by the said ‘proximity;’ and that ‘proximity’ forms one of the bases of syntactical connection is admitted by all philosophers. Thus the *Prābhākara** concludes that,—(1) all *Sannipatṭyopakārakas* are ‘subservient’ to the *apūrva* by direct assertion; (2) they are ‘subservient’ to the *object* conducive to the sacrifice (the corn) by the nature of their use; (3) they are ‘subservient’ to the *sacrifice* which is instrumental in the accomplishment of the *apūrva*, by virtue of their constituting the material offered at the sacrifice.

As regards the second class of ‘subsidiary’ actions, the *Ārādupakārakas*, these are of two kinds :—(a) That which fulfills only an *unseen* purpose; and (b) that which fulfills *seen* as well as *unseen* purposes. To the latter class belongs the *Payovrata*,—*i.e.*, the living on milk alone,—of the sacrificer and his wife, during the performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. To the former class belong such actions as are laid down by sentences

* *Prakaraṇapāñchikā*, page 209.

like 'samidho yajati,' which do not speak of the action as producing any effect in any of the *kūrakas*—the substance offered, or the human agent—helping the action; and as it is only effects produced in these that could be *seen*, the action cannot but be regarded as bringing about an *unseen* result. But all such actions produce an intermediate *apūrva*, through which they aid in the final *apūrva* of the principal sacrifice, to which latter, on that account, they are regarded as being 'subsidiary.' As such actions do not help in the principal Sacrifice in any perceptible manner,—if they were not accepted as producing an *Apūrva*—then, in as much as they will have been destroyed long before the fruition of the final *Apūrva*, they would not accord any help to the principal sacrifice. It is for this reason that in such cases Prabhākara admits of intermediate *apūrvas* resulting from subsidiaries.

These *Apūrvas* or *Niyogas* are expressed by the injunctive affix itself; and do not belong to the principal Sacrifice. Thus being related to the Sacrificer only through the principal sacrifice, these subsidiaries do not stand in need of the assumption of the fact of the Sacrificer desiring some result. This admission of intermediate *apūrvas* might give rise to the doubt that this result would necessitate a further enquiry and seeking after the method by which these *apūrvas* are to be brought about; but with a view to this, the Prābhākara* draws a subtle distinction between the '*anuṣṭheya*' and the '*kārya*',—the former being that which is recognised by the agent as something to be brought about independently, by itself—*e. g.*, the final *apūrva*; while the latter is that which is recognised as to be brought about only for the sake of the accomplishment of the former; and as a rule the question of details of procedure can arise only with regard to what is *anuṣṭheya*, and not with regard to what is *kārya*; and thus no question can arise with regard to the intermediate

**Prakaranapañchikā*, pp. 214—215.

Apūrvas, which are recognised only as helping in the accomplishment of the final *Apūrva*. It may be noted here that the Prābhākara is rather strict in the matter of postulating *apūrvas*; so long as he can find any perceptible result to justify an act, he will not assume an *apūrva* or *adṛṣṭa*; Kumārila, on the other hand, postulates an *apūrva* with every injunction. Being an *Anvīṭābhīḍhānavādin*, Prabhākara does not accept the law—‘*śhābḍi ākaṅkṣā śhābḍenaiva pūryatē*’—by which the *īṭikartavyatā* or details of procedure can be sought after only for the sake of a result in the shape of the *apūrva*, and not for the sake of a substance which is already in existence;* this law necessitates the assumption of an *apūrva* with every injunction, each of which, by this law, must be self-contained, having all its needs as an injunction supplied by itself; hence even the *apūrva*, which is one of the factors in the *bhāvanā* denoted by the injunctive verb, has to be got out of every injunction, even of the *Sannipattīyopakāra*kas,—if not with the action itself, at least from the *Niyama* or choice of the particular method. Prabhākara, not accepting this law, takes every injunction along with all that it is found to be related to; and thus the *subsidiary* action mentioned in the injunctive sentence being found to be expressive of the accomplishment of some material, it becomes related to the injunction of the *principal* Sacrifice in the following manner:—the *apūrva* of the principal action enjoined by the principal injunction is to be accomplished by means of the principal action performed with materials brought into existence in accordance with the subsidiary action enjoined by the subsidiary injunction; thus there is no necessity for assuming an *apūrva* for the latter,—the objective of these injunctions resting in the particular materials brought into existence according to them, and not in any *apūrva*.

* *Nyāyamālaviṣṭara*, page 423.

Section (3)—Sub-section (2) *.

Means of ascertaining what is 'Subsidiary' to What.

1. The six means of ascertaining what is 'subsidiary' to what are the following :—(1) *Shruṭi* or Direct Declaration in the Veda;—*e.g.*, There are certain *mantras* sacred to certain deities, which are named '*Niveshana Saṅgamana*,' '*Aindrī*' and so forth; with regard to these we meet with the following declaration in the *Vājasaneyā Samhitā* XII. 66 :— 'The *niveshana-saṅgamana* belongs to the Vasus, and with the *Aindrī* one should worship the *Gārhapatya* fire'; here the question arising as to whether the *Aindrī mantra* is to be used in the worshipping of Indra,—in virtue of the name '*Aindrī*' ('pertaining or belonging to Indra'),—or in that of the *Gārhapatya* fire,—in obedience to the aforesaid declaration in the Veda;—the conclusion is that the *mantra* should be used in the worshipping of the *Gārhapatya* fire, and is therefore to be regarded as 'subsidiary' to that worshipping. (*Mīm. Sū.* III—ii—3, 4).

(2) *Liṅga* or Indirect Implication.—It is laid down in the Veda that at the *Soma* sacrifice, the juice that is left after all the offerings have been made, should not be thrown away, it should be drunk; in connection with this drinking we meet with the *mantra*—'*bhakṣehi*, &c.' (*Taittīriya Samhitā* 3-2-5-1)—called the *Bhakṣānuvāka*; in regard to this the conclusion is that the *mantra* is to be used, not only in connection with the *eating* or *drinking*,—as the words of the *mantra* directly express,—but also with all those other actions without which the drinking would not be complete; *e.g.*, the taking up of the juice in the hand, examining it, swallowing it and digesting it, and so forth—all of which collectively go to make up the 'drinking.' In accordance with this conclusion, the whole of the *Bhakṣānuvāka* is broken up into four parts,—each part being employed with

* Including Pāda iii also.

each of the four above-mentioned acts; and this is due to the *indirect implication* of all these acts in the act of 'drinking.' (III—ii—24, 25).

(3) *Vākya* or Syntactical Connection.—In connection with the *Jyotiṣtoma* we meet with the declaration (*Shatapaṭha Brahmana*, 4-4-6-16, and 4-6-17-18)—'the *Rik* should be recited loudly, the *yajus* not loudly'; the question arises as to what is meant by the words '*rik*' and '*yajus*' in this connection? do they mean the *Rigveda* and the *Yajurveda*? or the *metrical* and the *prose* passages? In the latter case those *mantras* which are in the *metrical* form, even though they be *mantras* of the *Yajurveda*, would have to be recited *loudly*; while in the former case, all that appears in the text of the *Yajurveda* would be recited *not loudly*. The conclusion on this point is that the words refer to the two *Vedas*, and not to the *passages*; and this on the ground that, in the earlier part of the passage at the end of which we have the direction in question, we meet with the declaration—'Three *Vedas* came into existence, the *Rigveda* from Agni, the *Yajurveda* from Vāyu, &c., &c.'; and as the aforesaid direction with regard to the *loud* recitation of the '*Rik*,' &c., is a continuation of this same sentence, there is a *syntactical connection* between the two parts of the sentence, by virtue of which it is clear that the words '*rik*' and '*yajus*' in the latter part of the sentence must refer to the *Vedas* spoken of in the former part; and in accordance with this conclusion, the *metrical* passages occurring in the text of the *Yajurveda* only, cannot be recited loudly (III—iii—i).

(4) *Prakaraṇa* or Context.—In the *Shrutiṣ* we meet with the passages—'one desiring heaven should perform the *Darshapurṇamāsa* Sacrifices,'—'He should perform the *Samid* sacrifice,'—'He should perform the *Tanūnapāt* sacrifice.' (*Shatapaṭha-Brahmana* 1·5·3·9); we also find that there is no *syntactical connection* among these three passages, each being an independent sentence by itself; and as such capable

of being regarded as the injunction of a distinct sacrifice ; nor is there anything in the *indirect implication* of the sentences which could indicate any sort of dependence or connection of the *Samiḍ* and *Tanūnapāt* sacrifices with the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*.

We find, however, that no result is mentioned along with the *Samiḍ* and the *Tanūnapāt*, as 'heaven' is along with the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* ; and we also recognise the fact that being enjoined in the Veda, those Sacrifices also must lead to some desirable end ; but at the same time no such end is found to be mentioned ; all this leads to the conclusion that the injunction of these sacrifices is wanting in that factor, as without the end to be accomplished, no injunction is complete (see above, Sec. 2). Then as regards the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*, we find that all the information that the injunction of that sacrifice affords is that—'if one desires heaven he should perform the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*',—and it says nothing as to the procedure or method to be employed in the performance of that sacrifice ; and this shows that this injunction also is wanting in one factor,—the *method* or *procedure*, without which also no injunction can be complete.

Now then, looking into the two sets of injunctions, we find that, if taken together, they supply the need of each other, the factor wanting in the one being supplied by the other, and *vice versa* ; that is to say, 'the attainment of heaven' mentioned in the injunction of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* becomes recognised also as the *result* to the accomplishment of which the *Samiḍ* and the *Tanūnapāt* Sacrifices lend some help ; and that these sacrifices go to form the *procedure* or *details* of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*. This *supplying of mutual need* is what has been called 'Prakarana', 'Context.' The conclusion thus is that the *Samiḍ* and the *Tanūnapāt* Sacrifices—called collectively 'Prayājas'—are 'subsidiary' to the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*. In this case, the two sets of injunctions cannot be regarded as a *single sentence*, because there is no syntactical connection

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among them,—*syntactically* each injunction being complete in itself. (III—iii—11).

(5) ‘*Krama*,’ or ‘*Sīhāna*,’ *Order or Position*.—In the section of the *Darśhapūrṇamāsa* we meet with the *mantra*—‘You are the missile—may I remain unhurt—may you wound so and so (my enemy),’ (*Taittirīya Sam*, 1-6-2-4). There is no *direct declaration* as to where this *mantra* is to be used; nor is there anything in the *mantra* to show, by *indirect implication*, how it is to be used. But we find that the three sacrifices—the *Āgneya*, the *Upāmshu* and the *Agnīṣomīya*—are mentioned in a definite order; and later on we find three *mantras* mentioned in connection with these three sacrifices; and as the three sacrifices are mentioned in a definite order, and the three *mantras* also appear in a definite order, the natural conclusion is that the first of the *mantras* is to be used at the first of the sacrifices, the second with the second, and the third with the third. The *mantra* in question happens to be the second of these, and hence it is used at, and is ‘subsidiary’ to, the *Upāmshu* Sacrifice. (III—iii—12).

(6) ‘*Samākhya*’ or *Name*.—There are many *mantras* mentioned as to be recited by the various priests at the performance of Sacrifices; no distinct injunctions are found as to which *mantra* is to be recited by whom; but the confusion that might otherwise arise under the circumstances is averted by the *names* given to the *mantras*,—such as (1) ‘*hantra*’ indicating that the *mantras* (mainly those of the *Rigveda*) are to be recited by the *Hotri* priest, (2) ‘*ādhvaryava*,’ the *mantras* of the *Yajurveda*, to be recited by the *Adhvaryu*, (3) ‘*audgātṛa*,’ the *Samaveda* *mantras* to be recited by the *Udgātṛi*. Thus the fact of the *Hantra* *mantra* being recited by, and hence being ‘subsidiary’ to, the *Hotri* priest is ascertained by the *name* of the *mantra* (III—iii—13).

*2. (a) In a case where there is struggle for supremacy between *Direct Declaration* and *Indirect Implication*, it is the former that supersedes the latter. That is to say, when we have a Vedic declaration laying down that a certain 'Subsidiary'—*Mantra* for instance,—is to be employed at a certain sacrifice, while the words of the *mantra* itself indicate that it is to be employed in connection with another, we have to accept the former and reject the latter. The principle underlying this supersession is that, in all matters relating to *Dharma*, nothing can be regarded as authoritative except what is laid down in the Veda. In the case of *Direct Declaration* we have it directly stated by the Veda what should be done; in the case of *Indirect Implication*, on the other hand, even when its indication is accepted, the course of action implied is accepted as authoritative only after, on the strength of that implication, a *Direct Declaration* to the same effect is assumed. It is for this reason that whenever there is difference between the two, the *Direct Declaration*, which is self-sufficient, accomplishes its purpose long before the *Indirect Implication* can do its own, through the intervention of the assumed *Direct Declaration*. As an instance of this difference and supersession, we have the text—'with the *Aindri Mantra* one should worship the Gārhapatya fire' (*Vājasaneyā Sam.* XII. 66); this is a *Direct Declaration* laying down the use of the *Aindri* verse in the worshipping of the Fire; on the other hand we have the words of the *mantra* itself—'Kaḍā ca naṣṭarīraṣi neṇḍra saṣchasi ḍāshuṣē,' 'O Indra, you never harm anyone,—in fact you do good to one who makes offerings to you' (*Rigveda Sam.* 8, 51, 7.)—imply that the verse should be used in the worshipping of Indra. But before this latter can be accepted as authoritative, we have to assume, on the strength of this implication, a direct injunction to the effect that the *Aindri rik* should be used in the worshipping of Indra; but the

* *Mīmāṃsā-Sātra*, III—iii—14.

road to this assumption is blocked by the above-mentioned *Direct Declaration* to the effect that the *mantra* is to be used in connection with the worshipping of Agni.* (b) *Indirect Implication* in its turn is more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*. In connection with the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* we find the *mantra*,—‘*Syonante sadanam kṛṇomi ghṛīṭasya dhūrayā suśevam kalpayāmi—tasmin sīdāmṛiṭe praṭiṭiṣṭha vr̥hīṇām meḍha sumanasyamānaḥ*’, ‘O Cake, I prepare a nice seat for thee, with Ghee I make it comfortable! O Essence of Corn, may thou, with a peaceful mind, take thy seat upon this!’ (*Taittī—Bṛahmaṇa* 3-7-5-2);—here the words, as *syntactically* placed, make, of the two parts of the *mantra*, a single sentence; and this would imply that the whole is to be used in the preparing of the Kusha-bedding for the Cake. But the words of the two sections distinctly imply that the first section of the *mantra* is to be used in the *preparation of the bedding*, and the second section in the *placing of the Cake upon it*. What makes this latter implication more authoritative than the former is that in the case of the former, before we can assume the *Direct Declaration* to the effect that ‘the whole *mantra* should be used in the preparation of the bedding’, we have to assume the *Indirect Implication*, by the words of the *mantra*, of the act of *preparing*; while in the case of the latter, the *Indirect Implication* directly leads to the assumption of the necessary *Direct Declaration*. And thus being one step nearer to the necessary *Direct Declaration*, *Indirect Implication* is regarded as more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*. † Prabhākara adds one more reason for *Indirect Implication* being more authoritative: As to how a certain *Yajus-mantra* is to be employed depends upon the useful purpose served by it; what this purpose is can be learnt,—in the absence of *Direct Declarations* to the effect,—

* *Bṛihati*.—page 78 b.

† *Bṛihati*.—pp. 79—79b.

only from the significance of the words composing the *mantra*; thus then, the use indicated by the *implication* of these words is based directly upon what forms the very foundation of the usefulness of the *mantra*; the *Syntactical Connection*, on the other hand, indicates the use of the *mantra* purely on the verbal basis of grammatical construction afforded by the words, independently of any useful purposes served by it. Thus *Indirect Implication* is much nearer to the basis of usefulness than *Syntactical Connection*. (c) *Syntactical Connection* is more authoritative than *Context*. In the *Sūktavāka* mentioned in connection with the *Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa*, we read—‘*Agnīsomāviḍam havirājuṣeṭām ...Indrāgnī iḍam havirājuṣeṭām*’ (Ṭaitṭi. Brā. 3-5-10-3); as this *mantra* occurs in the *Context* of the *Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa*, it would follow from this that on the *Amāvāsyā* day, the word ‘*agnīsomau*’ should be dropped, and similarly on the *Paurṇamāsī* day, the word ‘*indrāgnī*’ should be dropped. But before this is accepted as authoritative, it would be necessary—(1) to assume, on the strength of this *Context* the *Syntactical Connection* (which is not present) between the two sets of words ‘*havirājuṣeṭām*’ and ‘*indrāgnī*’;—(2) to assume, on the strength of this *Syntactical Connection*, the *Indirect Implication* of Indra, &c., by the words of the first section of the *mantra*;—and (3) to assume, on the strength of this *Implication*, the *Direct Declaration* to the effect that the *mantra* should be used in making offerings to Indra-Agni. On the other hand, we find that *Syntactical Connection* indicates that the words have to be retained in both cases,—inasmuch as each is syntactically connected with the word that follows: and for the acceptance of this procedure, as the *Syntactical Connection* is already present, we have to assume only the *Implication* of the deities and the *Direct Declaration*. Thus being one step less removed from the ultimate *Direct Declaration*, *Syntactical Connection* is regarded as more authoritative than *Context*. Another

reason for this given by Prabhākara * is that what is indicated by *Syntactical Connection* is based upon the meaning afforded by the natural construction and interpretation of the words of the *mantra*; while what is indicated by *Context* would, at best, be based upon some construction or interpretation forced upon the words, in view of circumstances outside the limits of the *Mantra* itself. (d) *Context* is more authoritative than *Order* or *Position*. Under the *Rājasūya* we find many 'principal' sacrifices, one of which is the *Abhiṣēchanīya*; close upon the injunction of this last sacrifice we find the injunctions of such actions as *gambling* and the like. The proximity of these latter to the *Abhiṣēchnīya* would indicate that the *gambling* is 'subsidiary' to it; whereas the fact that the *gambling* is mentioned in the *Context* of the *Rājasūya* would indicate it to be 'subsidiary' to the *Rājasūya*; under the circumstances, the *gambling* is accepted as 'subsidiary' to this latter. The reason for preference is the same as in the preceding cases,—*Context* being one step nearer to *Direct Declaration* than *Order* (*Position* or *Proximity*). According to Prabhākara,† the *Context* consists simply in the mutual need between a certain act and a *mantra*; so when the *Context* indicates that the *mantra* is to be used at a certain sacrifice, it is more direct in its operation than *Order*; because the connection between the action and the *mantra* is indicated by *Context*, or *Mutual Need*, directly through the *Syntactical Connection* established, through that *mutual need*, between the words of the *mantra* and the words denoting the action; while the *Order*, for establishing such a connection, stands in need of many more intervening factors; for instance (1) the *Order* indicates the *Mutual Need*, (2) which indicates the *Syntactical Connection*, (3) which last again indicates the connection between the *Mantra* and the *Act*. (4) *Order*

* *Bṛihati*—page 79 b.

† *Bṛihati*, pp. 79b—80.

is more authoritative than *Name*. The *mantra*—‘*Shundhadhvam divyāya karmāṇe*—(*Taittī. Sam.* 1.1.3.1)—is met with in the chapter known by the name of ‘*Paurodashika*’; this fact would imply that the *mantra* is to be used in the purification of the Cake (*purodāsha*). But the *mantra* is found in close proximity to the mention of the *Sānnāgya* vessels;—on the strength of which the *mantra* is used in the cleaning of these vessels. The reason for this also lies in the fact that *Order* is one step nearer to *Direct Declaration* than *Name*; and also (according to *Prabhākara*)* in the fact that while *Order* is something *Vedic* or *Scriptural*, the *Name* is more or less *laukika* or worldly.

3. In connection with ‘Subsidiaries,’ Jaimini (*Mīm. Sū.* III—vii—18 to 20) raises the question as to whether the Sacrificer himself is to perform the Subsidiaries also, or it is necessary for him to perform the Primary Sacrifice only, the Subsidiaries being performed for him by priests appointed by him. The conclusion is that he may have the Subsidiaries performed by others, and yet, as being the *prime mover* in these actions also, the results of all actions—primary as well as subsidiary—will accrue to him.

The rest of *Aḍhyāya* III is taken up by discussions of cases of particular ‘subsidiaries’; such for instance as the nature of the ‘*Praṭipattikarma*’; those actions that are mentioned only incidentally in the *Veda*; the duties of the Sacrificer, and so forth.

4. There is an interesting matter in connection with *Aḍhyāya* III: after *Sūtra* 9 of *pāda* iv, the *Tantravārṭika* has six *Sūtras* that are not found in the *Bhāṣya*. There are various reasons assigned for this omission:—(1) The author of the *Bhāṣya* forgot to comment on these *Sūtras*; (2) his comments on these have been lost; (3) he omitted them as they were not of much importance; (4) he did not accept

* *Bṛihaṭi*—page 80.

them as having been written by Jaimini, on the ground that the intervention of these *Sūtras* makes it impossible to connect *Sūtra* 16 with *Sūtras* 1 to 9, a connection apparently intended by Jaimini. This last is the view accepted by Prabhākara,* who also omits the *Sūtras* in question, and connects *Sūtra* 16 directly with *Sūtras* 1-9. Kumārila, on the other hand, regards the *Sūtras* as genuine and makes four *adḥikaraṇas* out of them. The interception of connection between *Sūtra* 16 and *Sūtras* 1-9, he points out, is nothing unusual; as we often meet with such intercepted connection between *Sūtras*,—e. g. *Sūtra* III—iv—38 is connected with III—iv—34, even in the presence of an entire *adḥikaraṇa* (*Sūtras* 35-37) intervening between them. This omission of the *Sūtras* by Prabhākara has been noted by later writers also,—e. g. by Vidyāranya in his *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha*, (page 4). It may be noted that the *Rijuvimulā* also does not make any mention of these *Sūtras*; it does not even seek to traverse the arguments propounded by Kumārila in favour of their inclusion.

SECTION (4).

The 'Motive' of Actions.

1. After the Principal and 'Subsidiary' character of Actions has been ascertained, we proceed to consider the question of '*Prayukṭi*' or *Motive*; the question dealt with being—'What is it that affords the occasion for a certain action? What is it for whose accomplishment an action is to be performed, or a thing to be brought into use'? This question follows upon the preceding section, because as a rule it is the Principal Action that incites, or provides an occasion for, the Subsidiary. There are some actions however for which the sole motive or inciting cause is afforded by the desirable result; while there are others, not directly accomplishing anything desired by the agent, which are yet performed

* *Bṛhatī*—page 82.

for the purpose of helping in the fulfilment of some other action that accomplishes something desired by the agent. Hence the question of the *motive* of an action necessarily turns upon the question as to whether the action by itself fulfills something in connection with another action; the former would be called '*puruṣārtha*' and the latter '*kraṭvartha*.' For this reason, before proceeding with the main question of Motive, it becomes necessary to ascertain what is meant by actions being '*puruṣārtha*' and '*kraṭvartha*.'

2. The '*kraṭvartha*' is that which is laid down as making up the *procedure* of the *bhūvanā* of a certain enjoined action; that which is laid down for the accomplishment of something pleasing and desirable to the agent being called '*puruṣārtha*.' As an instance of the '*kraṭvartha*' action we have the *Prayājas*, which enter into the procedure of the *Darśhapūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices, and do not themselves bring about any such result as the attainment of heaven and the like. (1) The *Darśhapūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices and also the results accomplished by them belong to the '*Puruṣārtha*' class, as they fulfill something that is pleasant and desirable for the agent; specially as these latter do not accomplish anything towards the help of another sacrifice, as the *Prayājas* do for the *Darśhapūrṇamāsa*. (2) All material substances, also their preparations and purifications, are regarded as '*kraṭvartha*' even in cases where some results are mentioned as following from the use of such substances; the mention of such results being regarded as '*Arthavūḍa*' (IV.—iii—I). (3) There are certain things that may be regarded as both '*kraṭvartha*'—and '*puruṣārtha*'; for instance *Dadhi* is, in one place, mentioned only as a material to be offered (where it is '*kraṭvartha*'), but in another place, it is mentioned as a substance an offering of which makes the sense-organs of the performer efficient (where it is '*puruṣārtha*'). (IV—iii—5 to 7).

The above is one interpretation of the Sūtra IV—i—2; by which it is made to provide us with a definition of what

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is 'puruṣārtha' and 'kṛatvartha'. On the definition of the 'puruṣārtha' as herein provided, the *Rijuvimalā* (Vol. II, p. 369) makes the following observations :—

'*Puruṣārtha* cannot be defined as that which brings happiness, as this would not include the *Nitya* actions; nor can it be that to the performance of which only a person with some desire would be entitled; as this would not apply to such acts as Vedic Study and the like. It must therefore be defined as that which subserves the Principal Sacrifice and the purposes of the agent, *by itself*, and not through being employed in another action, and through this latter aiding the Principal Action ;—those of this latter kind being 'kṛatvartha.'

By a second interpretation, this same *Sūtra* is made to declare that the result of actions, which is desired for its own sake, and to which men are, by their very nature, attracted, do not, and need not, form subjects of injunctions; as an injunction only urges one towards something towards which he would not direct his attention without such an injunction; to the desirable result the attention is directed by the very fact of its being desirable in itself.

This interpretation of the *Sūtra*, propounded by Kumārila as *Varṇaka* II, is not accepted by the *Prābhākara*; as we find that the *Rijuvimalā*, while accepting all the other three *varṇakas* (I, III and IV) propounded by Kumārila, makes no mention of the second *varṇaka*.

By the third interpretation, the *Sūtra* is made to lay down the fact that in such cases as—'the water should as a rule be fetched in cups, but in the milking vessel for those who desire cattle'—the *milking vessel* is 'puruṣārtha', inasmuch as, while the mere act of *water-fetching* could be done by other vessels also, the particular result, obtaining of cattle, could be obtained only if water were fetched *in the milking vessel*.

By the fourth interpretation the *Sūtra* declares that the *acquiring of money* is '*puruṣārtha*', inasmuch as it is necessary for livelihood; and it is only because it is '*puruṣārtha*'—by supplying the means of livelihood and thereby making *living* possible,—that the acquiring of money can help the performance of sacrifices also; as unless the man *lives*, he cannot perform any sacrifices.

3. As regards 'Motive' that which is '*puruṣārtha*' contains its own motive within itself; whereas that which is '*kraṭvartha*' would have its motive in that particular action towards whose accomplishment it helps, or of whose *procedure* it forms a part. It is with the *Sūtra* IV—i—21 that Jaimini begins to consider in detail the question as to what is the 'motive' of what. We shall cite here only one instance, in order to show the method of reasoning adopted. We have the declaration that 'when curd is put in hot milk, there is found the *āmikṣā* (the solid curdled pieces) which is for the Vishvedevas; and the *vājina* (the liquid let loose) is for the Vājins'. The question arising as to whether it is the *Āmikṣā* or the *Vājina* that forms the *motive* of the action of putting curd into hot milk, the conclusion is that it is the former, the latter follows only incidentally. Says the *Bṛihaṭi* (page 93 b):—

'The action is not for the accomplishment of the *Vājina*,—which is found to be brought about by something else,—here it is the *āmikṣā* for the sake of which the action is principally done.'

4. The whole of *pāṇḍa* i, and also the greater portion of *pāṇḍa* ii, contain discussions as to the 'motive' of actions, and towards the end of *pāṇḍa* ii, some actions are noted which have no 'motive', but are performed only for the sake of *setting aside* things that have been used,—*e.g.*, the removal of the horn that, during the Sacrifice, has been held by the Sacrificer in his hand (IV—ii—19).

4. In course of the enquiry as to the 'motive' of actions, we find that there are some actions which are enjoined, and yet they neither effectively help some other actions, nor lead to any desirable result themselves; such for instance is the making of the *Juhū* of leaves. Such an action is regarded as purely '*kraṭvartha*'; and the results mentioned along with these,—such for instance as the *absence of ill-fame*—must be regarded as *Arthavāda* (IV—iii—1). To the same category belong also those actions which tend only to purify certain material substances used at sacrifices; these purificatory actions, it is argued, render help to the performance of the sacrifice, inasmuch as without those purifications the substances could not be used; and in the absence of the substance, the sacrifice could not be performed. Of the same doubtful character is the *Vishvajit* Sacrifice which is enjoined, but neither as part of another Sacrifice, nor as in any way helping in the preparation of a material substance, nor, lastly, as bringing about a desirable result with regard to such actions;—the conclusion is that they must be regarded as leading to the universally desirable result, in the shape of attainment of heaven, and as such being '*puruṣārtha*.' But this law, called the '*Vishvajinnyāya*',—whereby in cases where no result is mentioned, *attainment of heaven* is assumed as the result,—is applicable only to cases where no kind of result is found to be mentioned or implied by even supplementary *Arthavādas*; where any such is found, the action must be accepted as accomplishing, and preformed for the sake of, that result. *

Similarly the *Rātrisatra* is regarded as leading to *pratiṣṭhā* (respectability), which is found to be mentioned in an *Arthavāda* passage in close proximity to the injunction of that action. The *Darśhapūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices are mentioned as accomplishing *all* that is desirable; thus these are '*puruṣārtha*' leading to all these results. But a single

* *Bṛihaṭī*,—Page 97.

performance of these sacrifices can bring about a single result ; and for each particular result, the performance has to be repeated (IV—iii—27, 28). As regards those actions which are distinctly spoken of as accomplishing results pertaining to this physical world, the conclusion is that in every case, where there may be no obstacle in the way of the fulfilment of the result, the same result should be regarded as its 'motive' ; but if in any case there be some insuperable obstacles in the fulfilment of the result, we must accept the action as bringing about superphysical results,—thus in either case they retain their '*puruṣārtha*' character. The fact is that results are to be regarded as pertaining to another world only in cases where it is found absolutely impossible for them to be experienced in this world ; *e.g.*, the enjoyment of the pleasures of heaven. But as for such results as can be experienced in this world—*e.g.*, the obtaining of cattle—there is no ground for regarding them as pertaining to any other world than this. There are some actions laid down as bringing something desirable, not to the Sacrificer himself, but to his son ; *e.g.*, the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice. These also are classed as '*puruṣārtha*.'

5. The rest of *pāḍa* iii and *pāḍa* IV are devoted to the consideration of the question of certain Sacrifices being subsidiary to other actions, and as such being '*kratvartha*.' To this category belong the *Saṁtṛāmaṇi*, the *Gāmbhīra* at the *Rājāsūya* and so forth.

SECTION (5).

The Order of Performance of Actions.

1. In section (2) we had an account of *difference* among actions, which showed that certain actions, being different from one another, were to be performed separately ; in section (3) we gave an account of *subserviency*, where it was shown that certain actions, or things, were to be performed, or brought into use, in connection with certain other actions or

things; in section (4) also, where we had an explanation of the *motive* of actions, what we have dealt with is something to be performed on account of—*i. e.*, incited or occasioned by—a certain other action or thing. Thus then, the preceding sections having dealt with what is to be *performed*; the present section proceeds to deal with the *order* in which it is to be performed.

There is a difference of opinion between the *Bhātta* and the *Prābhākara* as to whether or not the *order* comes within the purview of injunction; according to the *Bhātta* * it does form an object of injunctions; while according to the *Prābhākara* † it cannot do so. The reasoning of the latter is that in the case of all injunctive sentences, apart from the enjoined *action* itself, we should be justified in accepting that alone as the further object of the injunction, without which the enjoining of the action itself would remain incomplete; as a matter of fact, the *order* of performance does not come under this category; as whether we perform the action at one time or the other, it would be *performed* all the same; and the purposes of the injunction would be fulfilled; thus then, *order* not being an integral factor in the action, it cannot as a rule be an *object* of injunction; in some cases however it is the order itself that is enjoined, the action having been enjoined by another injunctive sentence; for instance, the *drinking* or *eating* of the sacrificial remnant having been enjoined, the *order* in which the priests have to do this drinking is found to be enjoined by another sentence *vaśatkarṣṇaḥ praṣṭhamo bhakṣaḥ*—‘One who pronounces the syllable *Vaśat* is the first to drink’; such cases however are rather rare; as a rule, the injunctive sentence says nothing as to the *order*; and even if it does in a few cases, it does so, not by means of the *injunctive word*, but by some other word, ending in the past participial affix.

* *Nāṇamātara* V—i—i.

† *Bṛhat*—pp. 100—100 b; *Rijuvimalā* pp. 497 *et. seq.* and *Prakaraṇa-pāñchikā*, page 220.

2. There are six means of ascertaining this *order* :—

(1) *Direct Declaration*, in the Veda itself—*e.g.* ‘The *Adhvaryu* should initiate the Brahman after having initiated the Master of the House’. (V—i—1).

(2) The order in which the injunctive texts occur in the Veda; *e.g.* the *Tanūnapāt* sacrifice is to be performed after the *Samidh* sacrifice, because the sentence enjoining the former—‘*Tanūnapāṭam yajati*’—comes after that laying down the latter—*samidho yajati*’ (*Shatapatha Br.* I-5-3-9). (Mim Sū. V—i—47). Herein again, the order indicated by the order of the *mantras* has preference over that indicated by the order of the injunctive *Brāhmaṇa* passages. (V—i—16).

(3) The Use or Purpose,—*e.g.* the cooking of the *Yavāgā* is done simply for the purpose of the performance of *homa*; consequently that cooking is to be done before the *homa*; even though the sentence ‘*yavāgām pachati*’ occurs after ‘*agnihotrañjuhoti*’. (V—i—2).

(4) The Order of Commencement;—*e.g.* Seventeen animals have to be consecrated for seventeen offerings to Prajāpati; this ‘consecration’ consists of a series of actions done in connection with the animal; the first action of these series may be done with any of the seventeen animals got together; but when once this commencement has been made, the other actions must be done to the animals in the same order in which the former action has been done. (V—i—8, 12).

(5) Position,—In the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, there are three animals to be killed on three different days; the first animal called the ‘*Agnīṣomīya*’ is killed on the day preceding the sacrifice (see chap. IV, §67); the second called the ‘*savanīya*’ on the day of the *Satyā* or Soma-juice-extraction (ch. IV, §70), and the third called the ‘*anubandhya*’ or the last or *Avabhritha* day. Then there is another sacrifice called the ‘*Sūtyaska*’ which is a *vikṛiti* or

modification (i. e. ectype) of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; but in connection with this sacrifice, it is laid down that all the aforesaid three animals are to be killed *together* on the same day, i. e., the Second or *Sutyā* day; now as the point of time, or day, laid down for the killing of all the three animals, pertains *par excellence* to the *Savanīya* animal (as at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, it is the *Savanīya* that is killed on the *Sutyā* day)—when the actual killing comes to be done, it is the *Savanīya* that is killed first, then the *Agnīṣomīya* and the *Anubandhya*. (V—i—13).

(6) The Order of the Principal,—In connection with the *Darsha* sacrifice, the subsidiary details of the *Sānnāyya* are performed before those of the *Āgnēya*; but in spite of this, inasmuch as between those two themselves, it is the *Āgnēya* that is performed before the *Sānnāyya*,—when it comes to the performance of certain subsequent rites, it is the rites connected with the *Āgnēya* that have precedence over those connected with the *Sānnāyya*. (V—iv—2).

3. In the performance of the Subsidiaries, the order indicated by the order of the injunctive sentences is regarded as of greater authority than that indicated by the Order of Principals (V—i—15). In cases where there is none of the aforesaid six means available, any order may be adopted. (V—i—3). There is no fixed order among a number of Sacrifices performed for the obtaining of desirable results pertaining to this world,—when these do not form part of any one Sacrifice, but are performed independently of one another. When each is independent of the other, it may be performed at any time when the Agent happens to have a desire for the result accomplished by it. (V—iii—32).

Nor can any definite order be ascertained as between the *Soma* and the *Iṣṭi* Sacrifices* as such; as while in some cases, the *Iṣṭi* is dependent upon the *Soma*, in

* See Chap. IV, § 4.

others, it is the other way ; so there can be no definite order of sequence. (V—iv—5).

*Section VI—Sub-section (1).**

Who is entitled to the Performance of Sacrifices?

1. Having dealt with the Sacrifices and the Order in which they are to be performed, we proceed to consider the question as to who is entitled to perform them. The general principle that presents itself is that, in the case of all sacrifices accomplishing definite results, any person who is desirous of attaining a particular result is entitled to the performance of the Sacrifice accomplishing that result (VI—i—1). To this the most natural exception is that even if a person is desirous of attaining a certain result, if he is absolutely incapable of performing the Sacrifice laid down as accomplishing that result, he cannot be regarded as properly entitled to its performance (VI—i—4, 5.)

2. Having thus dealt with the most general principle and its most general exception, we proceed to consider special cases. Women are as much entitled to sacrifices as men (VI—i—6), with this exception, however, that the recitation of the Vedic *mantras* cannot be done by them. In the case of married men, neither the man *alone*, nor the woman *alone*, is entitled to the performance ; it is the two together that can perform sacrifices. The *Shūdra* cannot perform any sacrifice, for the simple reason that he cannot study the Veda, and as such cannot take an active part in any Vedic Sacrifice. Though this reason might be regarded as applying, with equal force, to the case of women also,—at least in accordance with later authorities,—yet the very fact of Jaimini differentiating the *Shūdra* from the *woman* in this respect would indicate that in ancient times women of the first three castes were allowed to study the Veda ; that this was so is proved by a passage in the

* Includes also the subject matter of Aḍh. VI—pāḍa VI.

Bṛiḥadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad also. This however would militate against what Jainini puts forward in VI—i—24 as a reason for the *man*, and *not the woman*, reciting the *Upasthāna* and other *mantras*; the reason here given is ‘want of knowledge of the Veda.’ But this is a reason which, in the case of the *Shūdra*, precludes him from all sacrificial performance; but not so in the case of the *woman*; so it would seem that it is only in cases of both husband and wife jointly performing the sacrifice, that those *mantras* are to be recited by the husband, and not by the wife. It may also be noted in this connection that the Sūtra itself does not contain any mention of the ‘want of knowledge of Veda’ in the case of *women*,—as it does in the case of the *Shūdra* (Sū. 26, 33); it has only been added by later commentators, who, by this interpretation, raised for themselves the difficulty mentioned above, which they have failed to explain satisfactorily;* there was, in reality, no ground for this difficulty in the *Sūtra* itself; it originated with the *Bhāṣya* declaring (page 620, lines 20-21) the ‘Woman as inseparably connected with Avidyā’ (‘want of knowledge’); the reason for this lay in the fact that later writers could not bring themselves to take the same liberal view in regard to women that Jainini had taken.

3. Of incapacitating circumstances, only two are mentioned—(1) want of necessary wealth, and (2) some disease that disables the man. As regards the former, it is not regarded as an insurmountable obstacle, as the poor man can with a little effort get together wealth enough for a particular sacrifice. As regards the latter, if the disease is an incurable one, the person cannot partake, in any sacrifice; if it is curable, he can do so after the cure. (VI—i—39 to 42).

4. The question as to who is entitled to perform sacrifices is dealt with more systematically by Kātyāyana †:—

* Vile *Shāstraḍ pīkā*, pp. 443—44, for an attempt at an explanation.
† *Śrautasūtra*—I, 3 to 12.

In *sūtra* 2 he puts forward the position that all beings—animal, human and divine—are equally entitled to the performance of sacrifices. *Sūtra* 4 rejects this view, and declares that *human* beings alone can be so entitled; as it is they alone that can perform sacrifices; the gods cannot do so,—the commentator, Karka, adds,—because they have all their desires already fulfilled, and do not stand in need of anything which they would seek to accomplish by means of sacrifices; and also because apart from the gods themselves, there are no ‘deities’ to whom they could make offerings; the *Rākṣasas* and *Pishāchas* cannot perform sacrifices, as they are, by their nature, impure, and as such unfit for sacrificial performances; nor can animals do it; as they are devoid of the requisite Vedic knowledge.

There are however certain exceptions. These are mentioned in *Sūtra* 5:—Sacrifices can not be performed by one who has one or more limbs wanting, who is devoid of Vedic knowledge, who is sexless, or who is a *shūdra*. These exceptions, Karka adds, are implied in the ‘incapacity’ mentioned in the preceding *sūtra*; for instance, one who has no legs cannot perform the *walking* involved in the *Viṣṇukrama*, * the blind cannot do the ‘*avekṣaṇa*’ or ‘examination’ of the *ghee*, † the dumb cannot recite the *mantras*; and a sacrifice in which these details would be absent would be much too deficient to deserve the name. One who is devoid of Vedic knowledge is not entitled to any performances, because he does not know how it is to be done. The sexless person is not entitled, because the Scriptures have declared him to be ‘impure’ by his very nature. The *shūdra* also is not entitled. On this point, both the *sūtra* and the commentary are silent; they do not put forward any ‘reasons’ in support of this exception. *Sūtra* 6 declares that the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣātrīya* and the *Vaiśya* alone are entitled to sacrifices,—because

* Mentioned in *Shatapatha Brā.* 1.1.2.13; 6.5.2.10; 6.6.4.1.

† Ibid. 1.3.1.18.

of declarations in the Veda to this effect'; the Veda, the commentator adds, has laid down the 'consecration of fire' as to be done by the three higher castes only; and as no sacrifices can be performed without 'consecrated' fire, this precludes the *shūdra* altogether. Kātyāyana does not, like Jaimini, exclude the *shūdra* merely on the ground of 'want of knowledge'; as this absence would exclude the ignorant Brāhmaṇa just as much as the ignorant Shūdra; and also because, if that were the sole reason, it would exclude women of the higher castes also, as pointed out above. *Sūtra* 7 distinctly lays down that women are as much entitled to the performance of sacrifices as men; specially as it is found that the Veda lays down directions for the 'initiation' of the *sacrificer as well as his wife*—'the former being initiated with the *mekhalū* and the latter with the *yoktra* (*Sūtra* 8). Though such is the liberal view taken by Kātyāyana, Karka could not resist the influence of the later age; he has added that women are entitled,—but *only as accompanied by their husbands*, and not independently by themselves; he bases this qualification upon a latter *Smṛiti* text which declares that 'there is no independent sacrificing for women.' He appears to have lost sight of the fact that the *man* also is not entitled to the performance of sacrifices, apart from his wife—in view of the declaration, '*yaḥ kartaryam tad mayā saha*.' In *Sūtras* 11 and 12, Kātyāyana takes account of those Vedic declarations that speak of the '*Raṭhakāra* and the '*Niṣādaśthapati*' as entitled to the 'consecration of fire'; '*Raṭhakāra*' is the name given to one who has his mother born of a *Shūdra* mother and a *Vaiśya* father, and his father is born of a *Vaiśya* mother and a *Kṣatriya* father; the Commentator remarks that for such a person, the 'consecration of fire' is only for the purposes of his purification, and not for that of sacrificial performances. The *Niṣādaśthapati*, the *Niṣāda* chief, is entitled to a particular *ṛṣi* sacrifice which is performed for the preservation of

cattle ; but this is to be performed in the *ordinary*, and not in the 'consecrated' fire, (*Sūtra* 14).

5. The sixth *padā* of *aḍhyāya* VI deals with the subject of persons entitled to the performance of *Sātras*.* The *Sātra* differs from an ordinary *sacrifice* in that—(1) it cannot be performed by one man, (X—vi—45 to 50 ; and X—vi—59 to 60),—and (2), all priests are from among the 'Sacrificers' themselves (X—vi—51 to 58). For this same reason, the services of the priests at the *Sātra* are not 'bought' or 'exchanged' for any promised 'fee' (X—ii—35 to 38); and the gift of 'a mare, or a slave girl or a cow', that is laid down in connection with the *Sūtrasvaṭā Iṣṭi* (which forms part of the 'procedure' of the *Sātra*) must be regarded as fulfilling a transcendental result, and not the ordinary result of such gifts, which has been shown (X—ii—22) to consist in the priests being won to service. (X—ii—44). If one of the Sacrificers at the *Sātra* should happen to die during the performance, his bones are to be kept wrapped in deer-skin ; and his place taken up by a person nearly related to him ; and at the end of a year, the Sacrificers should perform, for the sake of their dead partner, a special sacrifice called the '*Samvatsārayāgi*' (X—ii—47, 48).

All the (seventeen) persons undertaking the *Sātra* should belong to the same Brāhmaṇa sub-class—*i.e.* they should all be followers of the same '*Kalpasūtra*' (VI—vi—1 to 11). But in the *Kulāyayajña*, it is permissible for the King and his priest to belong to different '*Kalpas*.' (Sū. 12—15). *Kṣātrīyas* and *Vaiśhyas* cannot perform *Sātras*, to which *Brāhmaṇas* alone are entitled ; and of these also, only those who belong to the *Viśvāmītra Goṭra* ; and of these last, only such as are guided by the same '*Kalpa*' (Sū. 16-26). All persons partaking in the *Sātra* must be regular performers of the *Agnihoṭra* (Sū. 27—32). To the *Sāmīdhenī* however, all 'dvijas' are equally entitled

* For a discussion as to the 'result' of *Sātras*, see below, Sec. 6, Sub-sec. 2, § 1.

(Sū. 36—39). The *Juhū* and the other implements used at the *Saṭra* should be kept common among all the sacrificers, and none should belong exclusively to any one person; as if it did, then, if the person to whom it belongs were to die, he being an *Agnihoṭrin*, all his sacrificial implements would have to be burnt along with his body; and thus there would be a discrepancy in the sacrificial performance, for want of the implement thus burnt. (Sū. 33-35).

6. To the performance of the '*Vishvajit*' only such persons are entitled as can afford to give 1200 pieces of gold. (VI—vii—18 to 20).

SECTION 6—*Sub-section (2).**

Certain Miscellaneous Questions in regard to Sacrifices.

1. In the above connection, Jaimini treats incidentally of certain other matters, related to the main question of persons entitled to sacrificial performance. For instance, in *Sūtras* 1 and 2 he raises the question of '*Saṭras*,†—sacrifices performed by a number of persons (generally 17), and not by only one person. The question is whether the result of such *communitistic* sacrifices accrues to each person severally or to all of them collectively. The conclusion is in favour of the former view, for the reason that, even though acting only in the group, each of the group is as much a 'Sacrificer' as any single Sacrificer; and as results are said to accrue to the 'Sacrificer,' it is only natural that it should accrue to each and every person that is a 'sacrificer,'—no matter whether he be so alone or in a group. Says *Prabhākara* ‡—

'The conclusion indicated by the Scriptures is that each one of the group is an independent Sacrificer.'

* Including also the matter of *pāda* viii.

† Dealt with in *Shatapaṭha Br.* III and IV; and *Mim. Sū. Aḍh.* VI, *pāda* vi.

‡ *Bṛiṣat*—p. 112b.

Then there arises the question as to whether or not such collective performance is possible in the case of the well-known sacrifices of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* and the like. The text laying down the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* uses the injunctive verb in the singular number—‘*yajeta*’; hence the conclusion is that these sacrifices must be performed by a single Sacrificer. (VI—ii—3 to 12).

In regard to the Sacrifices laid down as bringing about visible results—cattle, rain &c.,—when the Sacrifice has been once begun, it must be carried to its end, even if the result desired should happen to be accomplished before its completion; as the Veda deprecates all unfinished acts, and prescribes expiatory rites for leaving sacrifices incomplete; and also because learned men decry men who begin a certain act and do not carry it to its end.* (VI—ii—13 to 15). But this rule does not apply to such purely *worldly* acts as the building of a house; because the aforesaid deprecation of unfinished acts is based upon the consideration that when a sacrificial performance has been begun, an expectation of receiving offerings has been raised in the mind of the deities concerned; so if the prescribed offerings were not made, it would be a breach of promise. Such is not the case with purely worldly acts; specially as the aforesaid deprecation is based upon the fact that the Veda prescribes expiatory rites for unfinished *sacrifices*—which could not apply to the worldly acts. (VI—ii—16 to 18) (*Bṛihaṭi* p. 113 b).

2. With regard to the *prohibited* acts,—such as the *eating of Kalañja*,—there arises the question as to whether or not the prohibition—‘one should nor eat the Kalañja’—is to be regarded as a *positive injunction* of taking a vow never to eat the *Kalañja*, just like the vow of the Brahmacārin not to look at the rising sun,—thereby making this

¹² *Bṛihaṭi*, p. 113b.

action of the *taking of the vow*, a *dharma* leading to Heaven (by the 'Vishvajit Law' enunciated under *Mim. Sū. IV—iii—10*). 'The reason in favour of the view that the sentence should be taken in the sense of prescribing a positive action, is that, all injunctive verbs laying down actions for the fulfilment of something desirable for the agent, the prohibitive sentences also,—which are in the form of *injunctions*,—must be regarded as laying down something *to be done*,—a mere *avoidance* in this case,—which would fulfill some desirable end',—says Prabhākara.* The final conclusion however is that such prohibitions can not be treated on the same level as the prohibition of the looking on the rising sun, &c., the reason given being that in the prohibition—'*na kalañjambhakṣayē?*',—the negative word must be taken as enjoining *the negation or cessation of that act of eating*,—and not any positive act; all injunctions of positive acts lay down *something to be done*; but the sentence in question does not prescribe any thing *to be done*; therefore it can not be regarded as the injunction of a positive act. Nor would such a prohibition be entirely purposeless; as it would serve the useful purpose of saving men from the troubles of hell which would be their lot if they ate the *Kalañja*. This interpretation saves us from the necessity of assuming a result for the avoidance (by the 'Vishvajit Law'); it is one who fears hell that is entitled to the cessation from the eating of *Kalañja*, and not one who desires heaven. For these reasons, Prohibitions can not be regarded as leading to any desirable results; they must be regarded only as saving from undesirable ones and from this it follows, as a necessary corollary, that that which is prohibited leads to undesirable results. It may be argued, here that the syntactical argument, based upon the connection of the negative particle with the Verbal root, applies with equal force to such prohibitions as 'one

* *Bṛihātī*—p.—113 b.

should not look at the rising sun'; and yet these latter have been taken (IV—i—3 to 6) as laying down the positive act of taking the vow not to do the act mentioned—such vow leading to a desirable result. There is however a great difference between the two cases. These latter prohibitions are found to be prefaced by the words '*atha vratam*'—'now then a few observances to be kept by the Brahmachārin',—and then follow the prohibitions of certain acts; these prefatory words distinctly show that the prohibitions are not prohibitions of acts leading to undesirable results, but they lay down the *desisting* from certain specified actions,—this *desisting* constituting an *observance*, bringing about *desirable* results; they say nothing as to any undesirable results proceeding from the prohibited acts; specially so because the *looking on the sun* is nowhere spoken of in the Veda as *sinful*, and as such leading to undesirable results. In the case of the prohibition of the *eating of Kalānja*, on the other hand, we do not find any such prefatory words; hence the prohibition necessarily implies that what is prohibited is so because it brings about undesirable results.

As for the duties laid down for the *Brahmachārin*,—such as approaching the Preceptor, studying under him, and so forth,—the conclusion is that these duties become binding, not upon all men, but only upon those of the higher castes who are entitled to Vedic Study; and upon these also, not as soon as they are born, but only when their *Upanayana* has been performed (VI—ii—21, 22); and those duties continue binding, not indeed throughout life, but only during the time specified for the purpose (*Bṛihati* p. 118).

3. The performance of the *Agnihoṭra* being laid down as *lifelong*,—the question arises as to whether this means that, throughout his life,—at all points of time, from morn till eve—the man is to be performing the *Agnihoṭra*, and hence doing nothing else; or that the performance is to be only at stated times,—*e. g.* some offerings in the morning, and

Prābhā. 213.

some in the evening. The conclusion is that the performance is not to be continued incessantly through day and night; because in connection with the acts laid down as making up the *Agnihotra*, it is distinctly declared that some are to be performed 'in the morning' and some 'in the evening.' Hence the expression 'throughout life'—'*yāvajjīvam*'—must mean *on all mornings and evenings during one's earthly existence*. (VI—ii—23 to 26). Similarly with the *Darśhapūrṇamāsa*, these also are laid down as 'lifelong'; but the offerings are to be made only on the New Moon and the Full Moon days. Three duties have been laid down as calculated to pay off the three kinds of debts:—(1) the *performance of sacrifices* whereby debts owing to the *Gods* are paid; (2) *Vedic Study*—paying off debts owing to the *Riṣis*; and (3) the *begetting of children*—whereby debts to the *Pitris* are paid. These acts may be supposed—on the basis of the '*Vishvajit Law*'—to be prescribed as leading to certain desirable results; and as such the idea would be that only those persons are to perform these actions who may be desirous of attaining that result; and of these also, only *Brāhmaṇas*; inasmuch as the actions are prescribed along with such others as the *Soma* and other Sacrifices which are meant for *Brahmṇas* only. But the conclusion is that all these actions are *necessary duties* and as such, to be performed by *all persons* of the three higher castes—irrespective of any desire for results. (VI—ii—31).

4. In *Pañcā* viii, we have certain minor sacrifices dealt with. In regard to the *Chaturhoṭra Homi*, it is stated that only such persons are entitled to its performance as are *not Agnihotrin*s; for such persons therefore the 'sacrificial fire' could not be the regular *Agnihotra fire*; it must only be that fire in which have been poured the libations in connection with the *Upanayana*. (VI—viii—II to 19). Similarly the sacrifice performed by the *Aiśvādu* chief must be offered in the *ordinary fire*; as in his case, there is neither the

Agnihoṭra nor the *Upanayana* fire (Sū-20—21). So also the *Avakirṇī* offering is to be made in the *ordinary fire*; as this is an offering that is to be made by the *Brahmachārin*, for whom the regular *Agnihoṭra* fire is not possible; as this can be 'laid' only by 'the husband and wife' together, and the *Brahmachārin* has no wife.

5. All religious performances, connected with the Gods, —such as the *Chudākaraṇa*, the *Upanayana* and the like,—should be performed during the 'Northern Solstice' of the Sun; and then also only during the brighter half of the month. (Sū. 23, 24).

6. In connection with the '*Jyotiṣṭoma*, the *Payovrata* (living upon milk) by the Sacrificer and his wife should be kept in all cases, and not only when milk is the material offered. (Sū. 28). For Agni-Soma the only animal that can be offered is the *goat*. (Sū. 30—42.)

SECTION (6)—Sub-section (3.) *

Capability of Sacrificers.

1. The question as to whether or not a person is entitled to the performance of Sacrifices naturally leads to the enquiry as to whether or not he is *able* to perform them; and in course of this we have to consider the chances of a man completing the undertaken Sacrifice under difficulties of sorts, and so forth.

In regard to the *Darśhapūrnīmāsa*, the *Agnihoṭra* and other such *necessary* and *life-long* performances, it is held that, in case one is not capable of performing all their

* Including *pāṇas* iv and v also. The only MS. of the *Bṛīhaṭī* that has been available closes with *Adh. VI, pāṇa* ii; consequently henceforward we shall not be in a position to give any references to Prabhākara's own work—and as to what is put forward here is the actual 'Prabhākara' view, the sole authority that we have is an indirect one: as Prabhākara, as a rule, agrees with the *Bhāṣya* in its apparent interpretation; all points where there is the slightest difference are noted in the *Mīmāṃsanyāyamālāvīṣṭara*. On some points however we have the direct authority of the *Prakaranapāñchikā*.

detailed subsidiaries, he need perform only the Principal Sacrifice in full, and omit the minor subsidiaries,—but only in case he is absolutely and really incapable, beyond all help. (VI—iii—1 to 7). This however applies only to the case of the *necessary* (*nitya*) actions; in the case of *Kāmya* actions—those performed with a view to certain desirable results,—the *entire* procedure has to be gone through scrupulously; as even the slightest omission would weaken the force of the action, which would be so far incapacitated to bring about the desired result. (VI—iii—8 to 10).

With regard to the materials of the Sacrifice, it sometimes happens that the substance that has been prepared and got ready for the offering gets spoilt or spilt or otherwise rendered unfit for use; and in such cases, even in the middle of the performance, if one of the prescribed substitutes of the substance is available, and is used in the remaining offerings,—that does not spoil the sacrifice in any way (VI—iii—11 to 17). But the substitute must be some thing similar to the original; for instance, the *yava* for the *vrihi* (Sū. 27.) If however another supply of the original substance is available, this must have preference over all substitutes (Sū. 35.) But in no case can we substitute a substance the use of which is prohibited,—such substances for instance, as the *māṣa*, the *chanaka* and such other substances, called ‘*ayajñīya*,’ ‘unfit for sacrifices.’ In the case of the offering of cakes, if in the baking, it should get spoilt, or burnt, another cake is permitted to be used, but only after certain expiatory rites have been performed (VI—iv—17 to 21). If the fire is extinguished, it should be kindled again, with all the due rites of the *Agnyādāhāna*. (VI—iv—26, 27).

Though substitutes are allowable in the case of *substances*, it is not so in the case of *Duties* or *Mantras*; if these happen to be wrongly named or recited, that performance is

spoilt, and cannot be remedied. (VI—iii—18, 19). Lastly, as regards the Sacrificer, if anything happens to him that disables him from taking part in the performance, then the action fails entirely, no substitute being allowable for the Sacrificer (VI—iii—21). In the case of *Saṭras* however, where there are a number of Sacrificers, if one happens to be disabled, his place can be taken by another; the reason for this is that in the case of *Saṭras*, all Sacrificers take part in the performance, not only as ‘sacrificers’ or ‘masters,’ but also as ‘priests’ (there being no other officiating priests at the *Saṭra*); and as even during the performance, a change of priests is permissible, the Sacrificer, who has been also acting as a ‘priest,’ can, on that account, be replaced (Sū. 22). But such a substitute can be regarded as a ‘Sacrificer’ only for the purpose of making up the prescribed number ‘Seventeen’; and he does not partake in the result. (Sū. 23). The real reason for this exception to the general principle of the *non-replacement of Sacrificers* appears to lie in *expediency*; in the case of a single Sacrificer, his incapacity spoiling the performance, this failure as pertaining to himself would be easily allowed; but in the case of *Saṭras*, there being seventeen ‘Sacrificers,’ if only one of them happens to be disabled during the performance, the other sixteen would not be willing to forego the elaborate Sacrifice and its much coveted result; and further, as there was a greater likelihood of one out of the 17 being disabled, some latitude had to be allowed in this case. In case any one of the persons taking part in a sacrifice should wish to go away after the performance has been begun, he may do so; but he should have to perform the *Vishvajit* sacrifice in expiation of his failure. (VI—v—25 to 27).

2.* In *pāṇdu* iv, we find two *adhikaraṇas* devoted to the ‘Eating of Remnants.’ It having been laid down that of the substances offered, if something is left, the remnant

* See Chap. IV, § 75.

should not be thrown away, it should be eaten,—this ‘eating of the remnant’ being regarded as a ‘*pratiṭṭāṭṭikarman*’; the question arising as to who should eat it, the conclusion is that the priests should do it (VI—iv—4 to 9),—those who have taken part in the offerings and libations, as well as those who have helped in the extracting of the Soma-juice (Sū. 24, 25). But the Soma-juice can be eaten by the *Brāhmaṇa* only; for which the principal reason is that all *priests* must be *Brāhmaṇas* (XII—iv—42 to 47); and every eater must eat out of the cup named after himself (III—v—22); it naturally follows that a *Brāhmaṇa* alone can eat it. The Sacrificer also being entitled to the eating of remnants, if he is a *Brāhmaṇa*, there is no difficulty; but if, as in the case of the Soma sacrifices, he happens to be a *Kṣātrīya*, instead of the remnant of the Soma-juice, they give him in its place, a preparation of Vata-seeds mixed with curds (III—v—23). But in case the remnant gets spoilt, or rendered inedible, it should be thrown into water (VI—v—48). If, after the priest has eaten it, he should vomit it, he has to make an offering of the *Somendra-charu*, as an expiatory rite (III—iv—38).

3. *Pāḍa* 5 deals with certain mishaps. For instance, the *Darsha* sacrifices are to be performed on the day that the moon is entirely invisible; if, however, by miscalculation of dates, the sacrifices are commenced on a wrong day,—and the moon becomes visible after the materials have been duly prepared,—then, these materials need not be thrown away, but they should be offered to some deity other than those prescribed for the *Darsha*; and the details of the *Darsha* itself begun over again on the proper date (VI—v—1 to 9).

4. From *Sūtra* 28 onwards, the subject of Initiation is taken up. In connection with the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* the number of initiations prescribed are various—1, 2, 3, 4, and 12; and the conclusion according to Shabara is that in all cases there should be 12 initiations; but according to

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Kumārila, the exact number depends upon the option of the Sacrificer, so far as the *Ḍarshapurṇamāsa* itself is concerned; but at the *Dvādashāha* Sacrifice, they must be 12. (VI—v—28).

From the day that the Initiation for the Soma Sacrifice begins, either on the *fifth* or the *seventh* or the *eighth* day, there is the extraction of the juice*,—this day being on that account called the ‘Sutyāha.’ On the same day there is also the ‘bath’; but if for some reason the bath is postponed, then the duties of the Initiate,—such *e.g.* as the making of no gifts—continue to be incumbent on him, until the bath has been performed, as it is the bath that forms the concluding item in the Initiation. (VI—v—38, 39).

The rest of *pāṭa* V deals with mishaps in connection with the moving of the priests out of the *Havirḍhāna*. It is laid down that they should go out in a fixed order, each holding the end of the cloth worn by one in his front†. If this order happens to be broken, certain expiatory rites have to be performed (VI—v—49 to 56).

SECTION 6—*Sub-section 4.*

The Vishvajit Sacrifice.

1. The whole of *pāṭa* vii is devoted to the consideration of certain details in connection with the *Vishvajit* Sacrifice. This sacrifice can be performed only by such persons as can afford to give 1200 gold pieces, which is the least that can be meant by the ‘*sarvasva*’ (all one’s belongings) which is the prescribed ‘fee’ in connection with this sacrifice (Sū. 18—20). In this connection, it is further laid down that when the Veda enjoins the giving away of *all one’s belongings* at this sacrifice—by ‘all belongings’ here are meant only the *riches* of the Sacrificer, and not such things as his parents, for instance (Sū. 1—2); but of the ‘riches’

* Chapter IV, §70 *et. seq.*

† Ch. IV, §73.

also no landed property is to be given (Sū. 3), nor horses (Sū. 9), nor such slaves as may be actually in attendance upon the master (Sū. 6). Where the Veda speaks of the giving of 'immeasurable riches', any number beyond 1000 (of gold pieces, presumably) is intended (Sū. 23-25). Similarly, where '1000 years' are spoken of as 'the period of the *Vishvajit*', it is 1000 *days* that are meant. (Su. 31-40).

SECTION (7).*

Transference or Extended Application of Details.

1. The first six *adhyāyas* have dealt with what has been called '*Upaśeṣa*'—the Direct Mention, or Indirect Implication, of what is required to be done, in connection with *Dharma*. The *seventh adhyāya* takes up the subject of '*Aṭiśeṣa*'—Transference, or Extended Application, of certain details from one action to the other. There are many sacrifices with regard to which the Veda does not prescribe all the necessary details; but lays down simply that 'such and such a sacrifice is to be performed in a manner similar to such and such another';—*e. g.* with regard to the *Iṣu* Sacrifice, after having mentioned what is peculiar to it, the texts declare—'the rest is like the *Shyena* sacrifice.' In such cases the *Shyena* would be called the '*Prakṛiti-yāga*,' the *Archetype*, 'original Sacrifice,' and the *Iṣu* the corresponding '*Vikṛiti*' or 'Modification' or the *Ectype*. The *transference* then, of the details of the 'Archetype' to the 'Ectype' is what is called '*Aṭiśeṣa*';—defined as 'that by which the details of performance are transferred, or extended, from one *archetype* to other sacrifices similar to it'...(quoted in the *Mīmāṃsānyāmūlāviṣṭara*, p. 374); the definition given by the *Prakuraṇapāñchikā* (p. 227) is that it is 'that through which the *Ectype* becomes connected with the details of the *Archetypal* Sacrifice'; it

* Including *adhyāyas* VII and VIII.

goes on to add that 'the extension of the details of one sacrifice to another,—when there is no incongruity in such extension—is called *Atidesha*.

2. Before proceeding with the main subject of *Transference*, Jainini pauses to consider a question, upon the consideration whereof the enquiry into Transference depends;—viz. The *Prayāja* Sacrifices which are mentioned as the 'subsidiary details' of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*,—are these 'subsidiaries' laid down for this latter sacrifice only, or for *all* Sacrifices? This enquiry becomes necessary at this stage, because if the details laid down in one section are intended by the Veda for *all* Sacrifices, then those details belong as much to one Sacrifice as to the other; that is to say, the details laid down in the *Shyena* section belong as much to the *Iṣu* Sacrifice as to the *Shyena*; and thus the details belonging equally to all sacrifices, by Direct Declaration, there would be no need for any 'transference'; in fact there would be no such thing as 'transference'; but in case the details mentioned in connection with one sacrifice are intended by the Veda to belong to only *a few* sacrifices, then those sacrifices to which they do not belong, and which have no details of their own, would be wanting in those details; and for the supplying of this want they would be dependent upon those sacrifices to which the details belong directly; and in this case alone, the former would be the '*ectype*' of the latter; and then alone would there be an occasion for considering the question of 'transference' of details (dealt with under *adhyāyas* VII and VIII), as also those of *Ūha* (Aḍh. IX) and *Bṛāḍha* (Aḍh. X).

3. The question of the details of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* belonging to all sacrifices or to only a few, turns upon the question as to whether the performance of the details is simply for the sake of accomplishing sacrifices, or for that of bringing about an *apūrva*; because, in the former case, as all sacrifices are equally 'sacrifice,' what are mentioned 'for accomplishing

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sacrifices' would be related equally to *all* Sacrifices; while in the latter case, they would be related to only one definite *apūrva*; and this one *apūrva* could not but be the one mentioned as following from the Sacrifices in whose connection the details are mentioned; as it is only of such Sacrifices that the details are 'aṅga' or 'subsidiary'—as explained in *adhyāya* III; and thus the details would belong directly only to these sacrifices, and could be connected with other sacrifices only by 'transference.'

The conclusion on this point is that the details are related to the *apūrva*;—(1) because between the *apūrva* and the *sacrifice* in general, it is the former that is the predominant factor, inasmuch as it leads directly to something desirable, while the mere 'Sacrifice' in general does not, independently by itself, bring about anything desirable; and (2) because it is only by such interpretation that the requirements of 'Context' are fulfilled,—the details being connected with that sacrifice in whose 'Context' they are mentioned. In the other case, no significance could attach to 'Context.' (VII—i—1 to 12).

4. Before taking up the special cases of 'Transference,' we shall offer a few observations on the general character of 'Transference'. At the very outset, it has to be noted that we have *Transference*, not only of *actions* or *procedure of action*, but also of other sacrificial details, materials and so forth; says the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* :—'*Atīdeśaḥ prakāśasya dharmāṇāṇchaiva yujyatē*'—'there is *transference* of the procedure of action as also of the accessory details'—(p. 227, shl. 13); it is only of the result that there is no *transference* (VIII—i—20 to 22). The only rule in regard to *transference* is 'the *ectype* is to be performed in the same manner as the *original archetype*,'—e. g. the '*Sau ya*' sacrifice is to be performed in the manner of the '*Āgneya*,' the '*Iṣu*' like the '*Shyena*,' and so forth; what is meant by this

is that all those details and accessories for the performance of the *Iṣu*, which are not directly laid down specifically as to be employed at it, are to be brought in from the *Shyena*. It is true, as the *Prakaranāpāñchikā* remarks (p. 226) that the first of the details that come up for *transference* are the *procedure*; but that is not all; if the *offering material* is not laid down, we have to bring in that material; and so also any accessory that may be found wanting. Nor does this in any way militate against the first *adhikaraṇa* of *adhyaṃya* X; as there we have the denial of the 'transference' of only such details of the *archetypal* sacrifice as have had their purposes entirely fulfilled, and which, on that account, could serve no useful purpose in the *ectype*; similarly under V—i—19, we have an instance of the details of the *archetype* not being transferred to its *ectype*, in virtue of Direct Declaration, whose authority is above everything,—also above the general law with regard to the transference of the details of the *archetype* to the *ectype*. Thus then, the 'Transference' being due to the needs of the sacrifice, the *need* or *motive* that prompts this 'transference' may lie either in some transcendental result expected out of what is *transferred*, or in some purely visible result, expected to be accomplished better by what is *transferred* than by any other means. (*Prakaranāpāñchikā* p. 227, shl. 18). The question then that we have to deal with here is—in what cases is this 'transference' possible or desirable? and in what cases is it not so? It is on this question that the whole of the second part of Jaimini's *Sūtras* (Adh. VII—XII) turns; that is why it is taken up here.

5. 'Transference' is regulated and controlled by—(1) *Prakaranā* Context), and (2) *Sthāna* (Position). For instance,—(1) a certain sacrifice will have its details transferred to another only if the two are found enjoined in the same context; this is the reason why the details of the *Shyena* are transferred to the *Iṣu*, and not to the *Saurya*. (2) In this
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'Transference', that which occupies the 'position' of the *Devatā* or Deity at the original sacrifice is to take the same 'place' when transferred to the other sacrifice; what appears in the former as the *offering material* is to be used in the same capacity at the latter also. In cases where the mention of the Deity indicates the 'transference' of the properties of one substance, while the nature of the *offering material* points to the properties of another,—preference is given to the latter. For instance, in the injunction 'for Indra one should prepare the *onṛpan* substance', the *deity* 'Indra' indicates the 'transference', to this *baking or preparing of the Cake*, of the properties of the *Sṭunāyya* (mixture of milk and curd) which is specially sacred to Indra; while the nature of the substance 'that which is baked upon one pan' points to the 'transference' of the properties of the *Cake*; and it is this latter 'transference' that is accepted (VIII—i—32 to 34).

6. There are primarily four kinds of Transference—
 (1) Transference by Direct Injunction,—*e.g.* with regard to the *Iṣu* sacrifice, we have the direct injunction 'the rest is to be done in the same manner as the *Shyena*', which lays down the *transference* of certain details from the *Shyena* to the *Iṣu* sacrifice. (VII—i—13 to 16). (2) Transference by *inferred or presumed* injunction,—*e.g.* In connection with the *Saurya* sacrifice we find no accessory details laid down; we know at the same time that no sacrifice can be performed without certain details; knowing also that the *Saurya* bears a close relationship to the *Darshapurṇamāsa*, we are led to the natural presumption that the details necessary for the performance of the *Saurya* have to be *transferred* to it from the *Darshapurṇamāsa*; and this presumption leads us to the inference of an injunction laying down such transference. (VII—iv—1). (3) Transference by the name of sacrifices—*e.g.* The *Māsāgnihoṭra* has not all its details mentioned in connection with itself; these

details have to be *transferred* to it from among these of the Ordinary *Agnihoṭra*,—simply because the name ‘*Agnihoṭra*’ is common to both.* (VII—iii—1 to 4). Transference by the name of *samskāras*,—*e.g.* in connection with the *Varuṇa-praghāsa* sacrifice, we find the ‘*Avabhṛitha*’ bath enjoined; this ‘*Avabhṛitha*’ which, in this connection, is only a *Samskāra* or purification, leads to the *transference* to the bath of the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, of the details of the bath in connection with *Agnistoma* sacrifice,—to which latter bath the name ‘*avabhṛitha*’ specifically belongs. (VII—iii—12 to 15). In this connection we may note that some writers have a third kind of name,—the ‘name’ applying to the sacrifice in its literal signification,—the literal signification of the names of sacrifices being, according to these writers, a guide as to the transference of details to it; but this is denied by the older writers, specially by Kumārila, who says†—‘*yaugikam nāṭīdeśhakam*,’ ‘no name, in its literal signification, can indicate transference.’‡

7. ‘Transference by presumed injunction’ is of three kinds—(a) the Transference of injunction,—an example of this we have already cited under (2) above. (b) Transference of substrate,—an instance of this is found under II—ii—25, 26, wherein it is shown that the sentence—‘one should make an offering of curds if the sacrificer be desirous of acquiring efficient sense organs’—enjoins only a particular substance, ‘curds’; as to what action or sacrifice is to be the *substrate* of an offering of that substance—*i. e.*, ‘the sacrifice at which the curds could be offered’—this is got at by *transference*; the *Agnihoṭra* being such a sacrifice. (c) Transference of substitutes,—an instance, of this has been mentioned under III—v—47 to 51. In the case of sacrifices

* That the *Māsīgnihoṭra* is entirely different from the *Agnihoṭra* has been shown under II—iii—24.

† *Tuṭṭikā* VII—i—5, page 156.

‡ *Mīmāṃsābalaprākāśa*, pp. 118—19.

being performed by the *Kṣatṛiya* or the *Vaiśhya*, it is laid down that when these people, as 'sacrificers' wish to eat the 'remnant,' they are to be given, not the 'remnant of the soma-juice,' but a decoction of Vata-seeds and curds; from this injunction of the 'Substitute of Soma-juice,' it is *inferred* that the decoction is to be substituted, not for the eating only, but also for the offering; that is to say, in case of the sacrifice being performed by a *Kṣatṛiya* or a *Vaiśhya*, the offerings also are to be of the same decoction, in the place of the offerings of Soma-juice.

In a case where only a portion of the details of the *archetype* is intended to be *transferred* to the *ectype*, it is the first of these details that are to be transferred; for instance, for the *Āgnēya* sacrifice 'eight pans' are prescribed; while for the offering to '*Dyāvāprithivī*,'—which is an *ectype* of the *Āgnēya*—we need only one pan; the particular pan used at the latter has to be the *first* of the eight pans used at the *Āgnēya*. (X—v—1 to 6).

Section 8.*

Ūha or Modification.

1. In the last section we dealt with cases where the details of one sacrifice are 'transferred' to another; this 'transference', we have seen, is not of actions only, but also of *mantras*; in connection with the latter however, it may so happen that the exact details—*e.g.* the words of the *mantra*,—as used at the *Archetype* are not quite applicable to the conditions of the *ectype* to which it comes by 'transference;' and in such a case certain alterations in the *mantra*,—in virtue of the altered conditions of the sacrifice,—would seem to be called for. It is the subject of this alteration or modification of *transferred mantras* that we proceed to consider now.

* Corresponding to Adh. IX.


In this connection it becomes necessary to consider what particular *detail* is related to, and regulated by, what particular factor of the sacrifice; and it is only after we have ascertained this that we can be in a position to judge whether or not a certain *transferred detail* is in keeping with the factors of the *ectype*. Jaimini has laid down the following correlations:—(1) all the details of the *Agnihoṭra* are meant to be related to the *apūrva* (IX—i—1). (2) So also is the washing of the Sacrificial implement. (Sū. 213 and also 11—89). (3) The loudness or otherwise of the recitation of the *mantra* is related to the Final *apūrva* (Sū. 3). (4) The details connected with the Result and the Deity are controlled by, and related to, the *Apūrva* (Sū. 4, 5). (5) The details are not dependent upon the nature of the Deity (Sū. 6—10). This is the ‘*Devatā-dhikaraṇa*’; and herein we meet with the pronounced opinion of the *Mīmāṃsaka* against all idea of the Deities having a corporeal form, &c., &c., &c. (6) The ‘*Upāṃshuṭva*’ enjoined in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is dependent upon the intervening minor *apūrva* (Sū. 20—25).

The greater part of *pādas* i and ii of *Adh. X* is devoted to distinctions drawn between the simple ‘*Rik*’ *mantra*, that has only to be recited, and the same *mantra* set to music and called ‘*Sāman*’. We have already explained this distinction above (in section I, sub-sec. 1, § 10 *et. seq.*)

* 2. *Ūha* or Modification is of two kinds:— (1) one that is directly laid down; as when it is declared that a certain corn in the *ectype* has to be thumped only *once*, and not as many times as may be necessary for the removal of the chaff—as is done in the *Archetype*; and the *mantra* accompanying the thumping has to be recited only once. (2) That which has to be inferred or reasoned out. This latter is of three kinds—(a) the *Ūha* of *Mantras*,—*e.g.*, In the *Āgneya* sacrifice, *Vrihi* is the material offered, and the offering is made to
Prabhū. 227.

Agni, and the *mantra* used is ‘*Agnaye tvā jṣtam nirvapāmi* *vrīhiṇām meḍha sumanasyamānūh* (*Vājās. sam.* I. 13); this *Āgneya* is the ‘Archetype’ of which the *Saurya* is an ‘Ectype’; but at this latter, the corn used is the *nīvāra*; and the offerings made to *Sūrya*; in virtue of these facts some alteration in the *mantra* also is found to be necessary; consequently, even though no such alteration is laid down in the Veda, we infer the necessary injunction and read the *mantra* as *sūryāya tvā jṣtam nirvapāmi* *nivārāṇām meḍha sumanasyamānūh* (IX—iii—1,2). (b) *Ūha* of *Sāman*,—e.g., for the *Vaishyastoma*, the *Kanvarathantara* *Sāman* is prescribed; while in the original sacrifice as performed by the Brahmanas, of which the *Vaishyastoma* is an ectype, the *sāmans* used are the *Bṛihat* and the *Rathantara*. The question then arises as to whether the *sāman* at the *Vaishyastoma* is to be sung in the manner of both the *sāmans* of the archetype, or of one of these two only; in the answer to this question, there is a marked difference between Shabara and Kumārila: according to Shabara, it has to be sung in the manner of both;—there being an option only with regard to such details of singing in which the *Bṛihat* is directly opposite to the *Rathantara*; as for instance, while the *Bṛihat* is to be sung *lowly*, the *Rathantara* is not sung loudly; according to Kumārila, on the other hand, there is an option with regard to all the details of singing; that is to say, when singing the *Kanvarathantara* at the *Vaishyastoma*, one should sing it either *wholly* like the *Bṛihat*, or *wholly* like the *Rathantara* (IX—ii—48). (c) *Ūha* of *samskāra*,—For the *Vājapeya* sacrifice, the *nivāra* corn is prescribed, while at its ‘archetype’ the corn used is the *vrīhi*, in connection with which *washing*, *thumping* and such other ‘purifications’ are laid down; though no such purifications are directly prescribed for the *Nivāra*, yet they have to be done in connection with this latter also; for the simple reason that without such ‘purification,’ the

Prabhā. 228.





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